factor test in California

2026“The substantial factor standard”—which of course states the legal rule behind question 5—“is a relatively broad one, requiring only that the contribution of the individual cause be more than negligible or theoretical.” (Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 953, 978 .) This standard “subsumes” and “generally produces the same results as does the ‘but for’ rule of causation which states that a defendant’s conduct is a cause of the injury if 11 the injury would not have occurred ‘but for’ that conduct.” (Id. at p. 969.) And “ ‘ “[l]egal causation is generally a question of fact t

2026It does not have 14 to be the only cause of the harm.’ ” (Sobalvarro v. Vibra Health Care (2026) 119 Cal.App.5th 748 , 762 (Sobalvarro), quoting CACI No. 430.) “[O]ur Supreme Court has explained that ‘ “[t]he substantial factor standard is a relatively broad one, requiring only that the contribution of the individual cause be more than negligible or theoretical.” ’ ” (Sobalvarro, at p. 763, quoting Bockrath v. Aldrich Chemical Co., Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 71 , 79 and Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 953, 978 .) “The substantial factor standard ‘subsumes’ and ‘generally produ

2025They are “(a) a legal duty to use due care; (b) a breach of such legal duty; [and] (c) the breach as the proximate or legal cause of the resulting injury.” ’ ” (Ladd v. County of San Mateo (1996) 12 Cal.4th 913, 917 .) “The proper test for proving causation is the ‘substantial factor’ test. [Citation.] The ‘causation element of negligence is satisfied when the plaintiff establishes (1) that the defendant’s breach of duty . . . was a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiff’s harm and (2) that there is no rule of law relieving the defendant of liability.’ ” (Mayes v. Bryan (2006) 139

2022It does not have to be the only cause of the harm.” “[T]he ‘substantial factor’ test subsumes the ‘but for’ test” for causation in fact. ( Mitchell, supra, at p. 1052 .) The substantial factor test is a relatively broad one.

2026It does not have 14 to be the only cause of the harm.’ ” (Sobalvarro v. Vibra Health Care (2026) 119 Cal.App.5th 748 , 762 (Sobalvarro), quoting CACI No. 430.) “[O]ur Supreme Court has explained that ‘ “[t]he substantial factor standard is a relatively broad one, requiring only that the contribution of the individual cause be more than negligible or theoretical.” ’ ” (Sobalvarro, at p. 763, quoting Bockrath v. Aldrich Chemical Co., Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 71 , 79 and Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 953, 978 .) “The substantial factor standard ‘subsumes’ and ‘generally produ

2026(Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 953 , 6 968.) “‘The substantial factor standard is a relatively broad one, requiring only that the contribution of the individual cause be more than negligible or theoretical.’” (Bockrath v. Aldrich Chemical Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 71, 79 (Bockrath).) Causation is ordinarily a question of fact and can only be decided on summary judgment if undisputed facts leave no room for reasonable minds to differ.

2022When a defendant is convicted of two or more crimes, “the second or other subsequent judgment upon which sentence is ordered to be executed shall direct whether the terms of imprisonment . . . shall run concurrently or 80 consecutively.” (§ 669, subd. (a).) “Upon the failure of the court to determine how the terms of imprisonment on the second or subsequent judgment shall run, the term of imprisonment on the second or subsequent judgment shall run concurrently.” (§ 669, subd. (b); see People v. Black (2007) 41 Cal.4th 799, 822 [§ 669 “provides for a default” if the court does not impose a cons

2022When a defendant is convicted of two or more crimes, “the second or other subsequent judgment upon which sentence is ordered to be executed shall direct whether the terms of imprisonment . . . shall run concurrently or 80 consecutively.” (§ 669, subd. (a).) “Upon the failure of the court to determine how the terms of imprisonment on the second or subsequent judgment shall run, the term of imprisonment on the second or subsequent judgment shall run concurrently.” (§ 669, subd. (b); see People v. Black (2007) 41 Cal.4th 799, 822 [§ 669 “provides for a default” if the court does not impose a cons

2026In Viner, our Supreme Court held that “a plaintiff in a transactional malpractice action must show that but for the alleged malpractice, it is more likely than not that the plaintiff would have obtained a more favorable result.” (Viner v. Sweet, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 1244 .) In discussing causation generally, the high court stated that “ ‘California has definitively adopted the substantial factor test of the Restatement Second of Torts for cause-in-fact determinations.’ ” (Id. at p. 1239.) The court went on to explain that “[t]he text of Restatement section 432 demonstrates how the ‘substant

2023The court found the evidence “overwhelmingly corroborate[ed] Caceres’s testimony that she did not hear the siren or see the emergency lights.” 8 The substantial factor test applies “where concurrent independent causes contribute to an injury . . . .” (Tansavatdi v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 639 , 661; State Dept. of State Hospitals v. Superior Court (2015) 61 Cal.4th 339, 352, fn. 12 ; see Modisette v. Apple Inc. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 136, 153, fn. 14 .) “Concurrent independent causes ‘are multiple forces operating at the same time and independently, each of which would hav

2022When a defendant is convicted of two or more crimes, “the second or other subsequent judgment upon which sentence is ordered to be executed shall direct whether the terms of imprisonment . . . shall run concurrently or 80 consecutively.” (§ 669, subd. (a).) “Upon the failure of the court to determine how the terms of imprisonment on the second or subsequent judgment shall run, the term of imprisonment on the second or subsequent judgment shall run concurrently.” (§ 669, subd. (b); see People v. Black (2007) 41 Cal.4th 799, 822 [§ 669 “provides for a default” if the court does not impose a cons

2022When a defendant is convicted of two or more crimes, “the second or other subsequent judgment upon which sentence is ordered to be executed shall direct whether the terms of imprisonment . . . shall run concurrently or 80 consecutively.” (§ 669, subd. (a).) “Upon the failure of the court to determine how the terms of imprisonment on the second or subsequent judgment shall run, the term of imprisonment on the second or subsequent judgment shall run concurrently.” (§ 669, subd. (b); see People v. Black (2007) 41 Cal.4th 799, 822 [§ 669 “provides for a default” if the court does not impose a cons

2020(See Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 953, 968 [“California has definitively adopted the substantial factor test . . . for cause-in-fact determinations.”]; Novak v. Continental Tire North America (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 189, 197 [same]; Demara v. The Raymond Corp., supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 554 [applying the substantial factor test to a design defect cause of action]; Garrett v. Howmedica Osteonics Corp. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 173, 190 [applying the substantial factor test to a manufacturing defect cause of action]; Huitt v. Southern California Gas Co. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4t

2020(See Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 953, 968 [“California has definitively adopted the substantial factor test . . . for cause-in-fact determinations.”]; Novak v. Continental Tire North America (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 189, 197 [same]; Demara v. The Raymond Corp., supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 554 [applying the substantial factor test to a design defect cause of action]; Garrett v. Howmedica Osteonics Corp. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 173, 190 [applying the substantial factor test to a manufacturing defect cause of action]; Huitt v. Southern California Gas Co. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4t

2021(Campbell v. General Motors Corp. (1982) 32 Cal.3d 112, 121-122 (Campbell); see also Doupnik, supra, at pp. 868-869 .) “ ‘The substantial factor standard is a relatively broad one, requiring only that the contribution of the individual cause be more than negligible or theoretical.’ [Citation.]” (Bockrath v. Aldrich Chemical Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 71, 79 .) “Thus, ‘a force which plays only an “infinitesimal” or “theoretical” part in bringing about injury, damage, or 3 “An appellant, on the other hand, must demonstrate that there is no substantial evidence to support the challenged findings.” (Ba

1999(See Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 953, 958, 977, 982 [ 67 Cal.Rptr.2d 16 , 941 P.2d 1203 ] [“Instruction on the limits of the plaintiffs’ burden of proof of causation, together with the standardized instructions defining cause-in-fact causation under the substantial factor test (BAJI No. 3.76) and the doctrine of concurrent proximate legal causation (BAJI No. 3.77) will adequately apprise the jury of the elements required to establish causation.”]; Milwaukee Electric Tool Corp. v. Superior Court (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 547, 565 [ 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 24 ] [“In apportioning faul

2024(E.g., In re M.S. (1995) 10 Cal.4th 698, 716 ; People v. Caldwell (1984) 36 Cal.3d 210, 220 ; Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 953, 968 .) “ ‘ “The substantial factor standard is a relatively broad one, requiring only that the contribution of the individual cause be more than negligible or theoretical.” [Citation.] Thus, “a force which plays only an ‘infinitesimal’ or ‘theoretical’ part in bringing about injury, damage, or loss is not a substantial factor” [citation], but a very minor force that does cause harm is a substantial factor [citation].’ ” (South Coast Framing, In

2021The substantial factor inquiry shields defendants whose contribution to a harm was “ ‘so infinitesimal or so theoretical’ ” that the injury truly hinged on something else. ( Caldwell, supra, at p. 220 .) The foreseeability inquiry helps courts distinguish between dangerous situations of a defendant’s own creation, and freak occurrences or opportunistic bad actors.

2006(See also Lineaweaver v. Plant Insulation Co. (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1409 [ 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 902 ] [discussing the substantial factor test with regard to claims involving asbestosis].) Relevant considerations include the “[frequency of exposure, regularity of exposure, and proximity of the asbestos product to plaintiff . . . although these considerations should not be determinative in every case. [Citation.] Additional factors may also be significant in individual cases, such as the type of asbestos product to which plaintiff was exposed, the type of injury suffered by the plaintiff, and other po

2006(See also Lineaweaver v. Plant Insulation Co. (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1409 [ 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 902 ] [discussing the substantial factor test with regard to claims involving asbestosis].) Relevant considerations include the “[frequency of exposure, regularity of exposure, and proximity of the asbestos product to plaintiff . . . although these considerations should not be determinative in every case. [Citation.] Additional factors may also be significant in individual cases, such as the type of asbestos product to which plaintiff was exposed, the type of injury suffered by the plaintiff, and other po

2023The court found the evidence “overwhelmingly corroborate[ed] Caceres’s testimony that she did not hear the siren or see the emergency lights.” 8 The substantial factor test applies “where concurrent independent causes contribute to an injury . . . .” (Tansavatdi v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 639 , 661; State Dept. of State Hospitals v. Superior Court (2015) 61 Cal.4th 339, 352, fn. 12 ; see Modisette v. Apple Inc. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 136, 153, fn. 14 .) “Concurrent independent causes ‘are multiple forces operating at the same time and independently, each of which would hav

2020Because the purported [factual] causes of an event may be traced back to the dawn of humanity, the law has imposed additional “limitations on liability other than simple causality.’’’” (State Dept. of State Hospitals, at p. 353.) In such situations, even “where the defendant’s conduct is an actual cause of the harm, the defendant will nevertheless be absolved because of the manner in which the injury occurred.” (Ibid.; accord, Modisette, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at p. 153 ; see Viner v. Sweet (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1232, 1235, fn. 1 [“Causation analysis in tort law generally proceeds in two stages: de

2022“It is reasonably well settled . . . that the causation inquiry has two facets: whether the defendant’s conduct was the ‘cause in fact’ of the injury; and, if so, whether as a matter of social policy the defendant should be held legally responsible for the injury.” (Osborn v. Irwin Memorial Blood Bank (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 234, 252 .) To determine causation in fact, California has adopted the substantial factor test set forth in the Restatement Second of Torts, section 431.

2021Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 71, 79 [“The substantial factor standard is a relatively broad one, requiring only that the contribution of the individual cause be more than negligible or theoretical.”]; Osborn v. Irwin Memorial Blood Bank (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 234, 253 [“[c]ausation in fact is ultimately a matter of probability and common sense”].) Substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding that Jensen’s negligence was a substantial factor in causing Hernandez’s harm.5 5 Jensen also contends the trial court erred in denying her summary judgment motion, in which she argued the same issues she chall

2025Mere possibility alone is insufficient to establish a prima facie case.” (Jones v. Ortho Pharmaceutical (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 396, 402 .) C.

2018Mere possibility alone is insufficient to establish a prima facie case.” (Jones v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 396, 402 (Jones); Rutherford, supra, 16 Cal.4th at pp. 976-977 & fn. 11; Lineaweaver v. Plant Insulation Co. (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1409, 1416 (Lineaweaver); Bromme v. Pavitt (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1487, 1498 .) As the Jones court explained in reviewing a judgment of nonsuit against a claim that the defendants’ pharmaceutical product caused the plaintiff’s cancerous condition, “[a]lthough juries are normally permitted to decide issues of causation without guidance fr

2023(See Summers v. Colette, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 367 .) 20 more than negligible or theoretical.” (Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 953, 968, 978 .) The substantial factor standard is broader than and “subsumes the ‘but for’ test while reaching beyond it to satisfactorily address other situations, such as those involving independent or concurrent causes in fact.” (Id. at p. 969.) Accordingly, “[u]ndue emphasis should not be placed on the term ‘substantial.’” (Ibid.) “Even ‘a very minor force’ that causes harm is considered a cause in fact of the injury.” (Uriell v. Regen

2021“The court’s use of CACI No. 430 to instruct the jury regarding the substantial factor standard for causation was appropriate and accurately stated the applicable legal principle. . . . [¶] Whether a defendant’s conduct actually caused an injury is a question of fact [citation] that is ordinarily for the jury.” (Uriell v. Regents of University of California (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 735, 744 .) CACI No. 430 states that Murphy’s negligence “does not have to be the only cause of the harm” as long as it is a nontrivial factor causing Davis’s post-accident pain and losses.

2026The substantial factor standard “subsumes” and “generally produces the same results as does the ‘but for’ rule of causation which states that a defendant’s conduct is a cause of the injury if the injury would not have occurred ‘but for’ that conduct.” (Rutherford, p. 969.) And “ ‘[l]egal causation is generally a question of fact to be determined by the jury . . . unless, as a matter of law, the facts admit of only one conclusion.’ ” (Whiteley v. Philip Morris Inc. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 635 , 694-695; see Ortega v. Kmart Corp. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1200, 1205 .) Substantial Evidence Supports the J

2024(Cal. Practice Guide: Personal Injury); see Whiteley, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at p. 696 [“A tort is a legal cause of injury only when it is a substantial factor in producing the injury.”].) “ ‘ “The substantial factor standard is a relatively broad one, requiring only that the contribution of the individual cause be more than negligible or theoretical.” ’ ” ( Whiteley, supra, at p. 699 .) Thus, a force which plays only an “ ‘ “ ‘infinitesimal’ ” ’ ” or “ ‘ “ ‘theoretical’ ” ’ ” part in bringing about the injury is not a substantial factor, but a “ ‘ “very minor force that does cause harm is a s

2023When foreseeability is analyzed to determine the existence or scope of a duty, foreseeability is also a question of law.” (Ericson v. Federal Express Corp. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1291, 1300 .) A. Premises Liability and Common Law Negligence Torres argues Dateland can be held liable under a premises liability theory because, though not the owners of the property, it had sufficient control over the premises when excavating under the terms of its agreement to take on a duty of care and a duty to warn typically reserved for owners, lessees, or general contractors. 10 “Premises liability ‘“is groun

2014When foreseeability is analyzed to determine the existence or scope of a duty, foreseeability is also a question of law.” (Ericson v. Federal Express Corp. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1291, 1300 (Ericson).) To support their contention that Hunter could not prove duty, Defendants produced declarations from the Rickards and Nansco manager Karla Cisneros.

2019(Hill, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 34 .) We explained: “The particular context, i.e., the specific kind of privacy interest involved and the nature and seriousness of the invasion and any countervailing interests, remains the critical factor in the analysis.

2016(Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 34-35 [ 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 834 , 865 P.2d 633 ].) In some cases, a compelling interest must be shown; while a simple balancing test is used in other situations. {Id. at p. 34.) “The particular context, i.e., the specific kind of privacy interest involved and the nature and seriousness of the invasion and any countervailing interests, remains the critical factor in the analysis.” (Ibid.) In Fett, supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at page 213 , the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s order compelling a physician to comply with an administra

2004Olson Corp. (1972) 8 Cal.3d 121, 127 [ 104 Cal.Rptr. 433 , 501 P.2d 1153 ]; Endicott v. Nissan Motor Corp. (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 917, 926 [ 141 Cal.Rptr. 95 ]; see BAJI No. 3.76.) [i] California has definitively adopted the substantial factor test of the Restatement Second of Torts for cause-in-fact determinations.

2004Olson Corp. (1972) 8 Cal.3d 121, 127 [ 104 Cal.Rptr. 433 , 501 P.2d 1153 ]; Endicott v. Nissan Motor Corp. (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 917, 926 [ 141 Cal.Rptr. 95 ]; see BAJI No. 3.76.) [i] California has definitively adopted the substantial factor test of the Restatement Second of Torts for cause-in-fact determinations.

2019(Ibid.) The substantial factor test originated in the Restatement (Second) of Torts (Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 965, 1025 ), which provides that an actor’s conduct “is not a substantial factor in bringing about harm to another if the harm would have been sustained” in the absence of the actor’s conduct.

2019Co. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1088 , 1103, 192 Cal.Rptr.3d 354 ; see Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 953 , 968-969, 67 Cal.Rptr.2d 16 , 941 P.2d 1203 ; Franklin v. Dynamic Details, Inc. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 375 , 391, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d 429 [applying the substantial factor test to causes of action for interference with contractual relations and interference with prospective economic relations].) "The term 'substantial factor' has not been judicially defined with specificity, and indeed it has been observed that it is 'neither possible nor desirable to reduce it to any lower ter

2025They are “(a) a legal duty to use due care; (b) a breach of such legal duty; [and] (c) the breach as the proximate or legal cause of the resulting injury.” ’ ” (Ladd v. County of San Mateo (1996) 12 Cal.4th 913, 917 .) “The proper test for proving causation is the ‘substantial factor’ test. [Citation.] The ‘causation element of negligence is satisfied when the plaintiff establishes (1) that the defendant’s breach of duty . . . was a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiff’s harm and (2) that there is no rule of law relieving the defendant of liability.’ ” (Mayes v. Bryan (2006) 139

2022(See ibid. [where finding of a jet ski design defect established increased risk of harm as a matter of law, there was “no need” for special instruction also requiring plaintiffs to prove the defect increased risk]; Mayes v. Bryan (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1075, 1080 [in wrongful death action, “trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on ‘but for’ causation because the jury was instructed on ‘substantial factor’ and ‘but for’ is subsumed under the substantial factor test”; “instruction would have been redundant, with the result that the omission did not prejudice defendants”]; John

2025(See Beebe v. Wonderful Pistachios & Almonds LLC (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 351 , 370, internal quotations omitted [“The substantial factor standard is a relatively broad one, requiring only that the contribution of the individual cause be more than negligible or theoretical.”]; see also T.H. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. (2017) 4 Cal.5th 145, 198 [“proximate cause is ordinarily a question of fact”]; Hoyem v. Manhattan Beach City School Dist. (1978) 22 Cal.3d 508, 520 [“[p]roximate cause . . . is generally a question of fact”].) Namini argues that there was no evidence he “was in any way untrut

2023Inc. (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 549, 558 .) “To prove causation at trial, a ‘ “plaintiff must introduce evidence which affords a reasonable basis for the conclusion that it is more likely than not that the conduct of the defendant was a cause in fact of the result.” ’ [Citation.] A ‘mere possibility’ of causation is insufficient. [Citation.] Rather, the plaintiff must demonstrate that ‘the defendant’s breach of its duty to exercise ordinary care was a substantial factor in bringing about plaintiff’s harm.’ ” (Hassaine v. Club Demonstration Services, Inc. (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 843 , 858; see also T

2024(Fromuth, supra, 2 Cal.App.5th at p. 103 .) “ ‘ “The substantial factor standard is a relatively broad one, requiring only that the contribution of the individual cause be more than negligible or theoretical.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 105.) We “presume that the jury drew all reasonable inferences that could support its finding that defendant had an unnatural or abnormal sexual interest in children.” (Id. at p. 104.) Case law explains that when it comes to children, it is generally understood that a defendant’s sexual interest in them will be considered abnormal and not within accepted standards of socia

2023A. Substantial Evidence Supports the Verdict Section 288.4 requires, among other things, proof that a person charged with violating the statute was “motivated by an unnatural or abnormal sexual interest in children.” Precedent elaborates that “section 288.4 requires that the prohibited motivation be a substantial factor in the commission of the prohibited act.” (People v. Fromuth (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 91, 103 .) “‘“The substantial factor standard is a relatively broad one, requiring only that the contribution of the individual cause be more than negligible or theoretical.” [Citation.] Thus, “a

2026(Holmberg, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 1321 .) “California courts have adopted the ‘substantial factor’ test for analyzing proximate cause.” (People v. Foalima (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1376, 1396 .) “ ‘ “The substantial factor standard is a relatively broad one, requiring only that the contribution of the individual cause be more than negligible or theoretical.” Thus, “a force which plays only an ‘infinitesimal’ or ‘theoretical’ part in bringing about injury, damage or loss is not a substantial factor” [citation], but a very minor force that does cause harm is a substantial factor [citation].’

2023Section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(3), provides: “To the extent possible, the restitution order . . . shall be of a dollar amount that is sufficient to fully reimburse the victim or victims for every determined economic loss incurred as the result of the defendant’s criminal conduct[.]” (Italics added.) Contrary to Velez’s proposed “but-for” standard, California courts have adopted the “ ‘substantial factor’ ” test in determining whether a victim’s losses “result” 11 from the defendant’s conduct.6 (Foalima, supra, 239 Cal.App.4th at p. 1396; Holmberg, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 1321 .) “ ‘ “The

2016(See In re Coley (2012) 55 Cal.4th 524, 557-558 [ 146 Cal.Rptr.3d 382 , 283 P.3d 1252 ],) 18 In People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 850-851 [ 62 Cal.Rptr.3d 588 , 161 P.3d 1146 ], the California Supreme Court stated that, in making its discretionary sentencing choices post-Cunningham, “the trial court need only ‘state [its] reasons’ [citation]; it is not required to identify aggravating and mitigating factors, apply a preponderance of the evidence standard, or specify the ‘ultimate facts’ that ‘justify[] the term selected.’ [Citations.] Rather, the court must ‘state in simple language th

2016(See In re Coley (2012) 55 Cal.4th 524, 557-558 [ 146 Cal.Rptr.3d 382 , 283 P.3d 1252 ],) 18 In People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 850-851 [ 62 Cal.Rptr.3d 588 , 161 P.3d 1146 ], the California Supreme Court stated that, in making its discretionary sentencing choices post-Cunningham, “the trial court need only ‘state [its] reasons’ [citation]; it is not required to identify aggravating and mitigating factors, apply a preponderance of the evidence standard, or specify the ‘ultimate facts’ that ‘justify[] the term selected.’ [Citations.] Rather, the court must ‘state in simple language th