factor test in Connecticut

2004A Turning first to the expansive causation claim set forth by the plaintiffs, we interpret the primary thrust of that claim to be that “[although [the trial court] correctly set forth the legal standard regarding proximate cause [the court] did not correctly apply the substantial factor test to the evidence.” 24 We disagree. “[P]roximate cause [is] defined as an actual cause that is a substantial factor in the resulting harm . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Doe v. Manheimer, 212 Conn. 748, 757 , 563 A.2d 699 (1989), overruled in part on other grounds, Stewart v. Federated Dept.

2004A Turning first to the expansive causation claim set forth by the plaintiffs, we interpret the primary thrust of that claim to be that “[although [the trial court] correctly set forth the legal standard regarding proximate cause [the court] did not correctly apply the substantial factor test to the evidence.” 24 We disagree. “[P]roximate cause [is] defined as an actual cause that is a substantial factor in the resulting harm . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Doe v. Manheimer, 212 Conn. 748, 757 , 563 A.2d 699 (1989), overruled in part on other grounds, Stewart v. Federated Dept.

2001The substantial factor test reflects the inquiry fundamental to all proximate cause questions, that is, whether the harm which occurred was of the same CT Page 12330 general nature as the foreseeable risk created by the defendant's negligence." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Medcalf v. Washington Heights Condominium Assn., Inc., 57 Conn. App. 12 , 16-17 , ___ A.2d ___ , cert. denied, 253 Conn. 923 , 754 A.2d 798 (2000).

2001The substantial factor test reflects the inquiry fundamental to all proximate cause questions, that is, whether the harm which occurred was of the same general nature as the foreseeable risk created by the defendant's negligence." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Medcalf v. Washington Heights Condominium Assn., Inc. , 57 Conn. App. 12 , 16-17 , 747 A.2d 532 , cert. denied, 253 Conn. 923 , 754 A.2d 798 (2000).

2016A critical factor in this test is whether the defendant exercises control over the property that is the source of nuisance." (Citations omitted.) Id. "[W]hen circumstances show that a defendant exercises de facto control over nuisance-causing property, the fact that title or possession of the property has been transferred to others does not absolve the defendant of liability for the nuisance." Id., at 184 , 527 A.2d 688 .

2016A critical factor in this test is whether the defendant exercises control over the property that is the source of nuisance." (Citations omitted.) Id. "[W]hen circumstances show that a defendant exercises de facto control over nuisance-causing property, the fact that title or possession of the property has been transferred to others does not absolve the defendant of liability for the nuisance." Id., at 184 , 527 A.2d 688 .

2000The substantial factor test reflects the inquiry fundamental to all proximate cause questions, that is, whether the harm which occurred was of the same general nature as the foreseeable risk created by the defendant's negligence." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Suarez v. Sordo , 43 Conn. App. 756 , 762 , 685 A.2d 1144 (1996), cert. denied, 240 Conn. 906 , 688 A.2d 334 (1997).

2000The substantial factor test reflects the inquiry fundamental to all proximate cause questions, that is, whether the harm which occurred was of the same general nature as the foreseeable risk created by the defendant’s negligence.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Suarez v. Sordo, 43 Conn. App. 756, 762 , 685 A.2d 1144 (1996), cert. denied, 240 Conn. 906 , 688 A.2d 334 (1997).

2000The substantial factor test reflects the inquiry fundamental to all proximate cause questions, that is, whether the harm which occurred was of the same general nature as the foreseeable risk created by the defendant's negligence." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Suarez v. Sordo , 43 Conn. App. 756 , 762 , 685 A.2d 1144 (1996), cert. denied, 240 Conn. 906 , 688 A.2d 334 (1997).

2000The substantial factor test reflects the inquiry fundamental to all proximate cause questions, that is, whether the harm which occurred was of the same general nature as the foreseeable risk created by the defendant’s negligence.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Suarez v. Sordo, 43 Conn. App. 756, 762 , 685 A.2d 1144 (1996), cert. denied, 240 Conn. 906 , 688 A.2d 334 (1997).

2001The substantial factor test reflects the inquiry fundamental to all proximate cause questions, that is, whether the harm which occurred was of the same CT Page 12330 general nature as the foreseeable risk created by the defendant's negligence." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Medcalf v. Washington Heights Condominium Assn., Inc., 57 Conn. App. 12 , 16-17 , ___ A.2d ___ , cert. denied, 253 Conn. 923 , 754 A.2d 798 (2000).

2001The substantial factor test reflects the inquiry fundamental to all proximate cause questions, that is, whether the harm which occurred was of the same general nature as the foreseeable risk created by the defendant's negligence." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Medcalf v. Washington Heights Condominium Assn., Inc. , 57 Conn. App. 12 , 16-17 , 747 A.2d 532 , cert. denied, 253 Conn. 923 , 754 A.2d 798 (2000).

2000The substantial factor test reflects the inquiry fundamental to all proximate cause questions, that is, whether the harm which occurred was of the same general nature as the foreseeable risk created by the defendant’s negligence.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Suarez v. Sordo, 43 Conn. App. 756, 762 , 685 A.2d 1144 (1996), cert. denied, 240 Conn. 906 , 688 A.2d 334 (1997).

2000The substantial factor test reflects the inquiry fundamental to all proximate cause questions, that is, whether the harm which occurred was of the same general nature as the foreseeable risk created by the defendant’s negligence.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Suarez v. Sordo, 43 Conn. App. 756, 762 , 685 A.2d 1144 (1996), cert. denied, 240 Conn. 906 , 688 A.2d 334 (1997).

1992State v. Rathbun, 74 Conn. 524, 529 , 51 A. 540 (1902).” State v. Harris, 182 Conn. 220, 224 , 438 A.2d 38 (1980).

1992State v. Rathbun, 74 Conn. 524, 529 , 51 A. 540 (1902).” State v. Harris, 182 Conn. 220, 224 , 438 A.2d 38 (1980).

2021The finding of actual cause is thus a requisite for any finding of proxi- mate cause.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Marandino v. Prometheus Pharmacy, 294 Conn. 564, 591 , 986 A.2d 1023 (2010). ‘‘[T]he deter- mination of whether the substantial factor test has been satisfied is a question of fact. . . .

2021The finding of actual cause is thus a requisite for any finding of proxi- mate cause.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Marandino v. Prometheus Pharmacy, 294 Conn. 564, 591 , 986 A.2d 1023 (2010). ‘‘[T]he deter- mination of whether the substantial factor test has been satisfied is a question of fact. . . .

2012The substantial factor test remains as it was prior to Birnie ...." Voronuk v. Electric Boat Corp., 118 Conn.App. 248, 255 , 982 A.2d 650 (2009).

2012The substantial factor test remains as it was prior to Birnie ...." Voronuk v. Electric Boat Corp., 118 Conn.App. 248, 255 , 982 A.2d 650 (2009).

2015This substantial factor test reflects the inquiry funda- mental to all proximate cause questions, namely, whether the harm [that] occurred was of the same gen- eral nature as the foreseeable risk created by the defen- dant’s negligence.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Label Systems Corp. v. Aghamoham- madi, 270 Conn. 291, 321 , 852 A.2d 703 (2004).

2015This substantial factor test reflects the inquiry funda- mental to all proximate cause questions, namely, whether the harm [that] occurred was of the same gen- eral nature as the foreseeable risk created by the defen- dant’s negligence.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Label Systems Corp. v. Aghamoham- madi, 270 Conn. 291, 321 , 852 A.2d 703 (2004).

2008The substantial factor test asks . . . whether the harm which occurred was of the same general nature as the foreseeable risk created by the defendant’s negligence.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Craig v. Driscoll, 262 Conn. 312, 330-31 , 813 A.2d 1003 (2003).

2008The substantial factor test asks . . . whether the harm which occurred was of the same general nature as the foreseeable risk created by the defendant’s negligence.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Craig v. Driscoll, 262 Conn. 312, 330-31 , 813 A.2d 1003 (2003).

2006The substantial factor test, in truth, reflects the inquiry fundamental to all proximate cause questions; that is, whether the harm which occurred was of the same general nature as the foreseeable risk created by the defendant’s negligence.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 571 .

2006The substantial factor test, in truth, reflects the inquiry fundamental to all proximate cause questions; that is, whether the harm which occurred was of the same general nature as the foreseeable risk created by the defendant's negligence." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 571 , 864 A.2d 1 .

2005The substantial factor test, in truth, reflects the inquiry fundamental to all proximate cause questions; that is, whether the harm which occurred was of the same general nature as the foreseeable risk created by the defendant’s negligence.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) *572 Purzycki v. Fairfield, 244 Conn. 101, 113 , 708 A.2d 937 (1998).

2005The substantial factor test, in truth, reflects the inquiry fundamental to all proximate cause questions; that is, whether the harm which occurred was of the same general nature as the foreseeable risk created by the defendant’s negligence.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) *572 Purzycki v. Fairfield, 244 Conn. 101, 113 , 708 A.2d 937 (1998).

2003The substantial factor test asks, “whether the harm which occurred was of the same general nature as the foreseeable risk created by the defendant’s negligence.” Merhi v. Becker, 164 Conn. 516, 521 , 325 A.2d 270 (1973).

2003The substantial factor test asks, “whether the harm which occurred was of the same general nature as the foreseeable risk created by the defendant’s negligence.” Merhi v. Becker, 164 Conn. 516, 521 , 325 A.2d 270 (1973).

2001The substantial factor test reflects the inquiry fundamental to all proximate cause questions, that is, whether the harm which occurred was of the same CT Page 12330 general nature as the foreseeable risk created by the defendant's negligence." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Medcalf v. Washington Heights Condominium Assn., Inc., 57 Conn. App. 12 , 16-17 , ___ A.2d ___ , cert. denied, 253 Conn. 923 , 754 A.2d 798 (2000).

2001The substantial factor test reflects the inquiry fundamental to all proximate cause questions, that is, whether the harm which occurred was of the same general nature as the foreseeable risk created by the defendant's negligence." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Medcalf v. Washington Heights Condominium Assn., Inc. , 57 Conn. App. 12 , 16-17 , 747 A.2d 532 , cert. denied, 253 Conn. 923 , 754 A.2d 798 (2000).

2001As noted in Carbone v. New Britain, 33 Conn. App. 754 (1994) [FN10]: [T]he language in Sullivan v. Norwalk, 28 Conn. App. 449 , 457 , 612 A.2d 114 (1992), stating that "it is settled that the substantial factor test is not the proper method of analysis for establishing causation under the statute [General Statutes 13a-149 ]," is not inconsistent with this opinion.

2001As noted in Carbone v. New Britain, 33 Conn. App. 754 (1994) [FN10]: [T]he language in Sullivan v. Norwalk, 28 Conn. App. 449 , 457 , 612 A.2d 114 (1992), stating that "it is settled that the substantial factor test is not the proper method of analysis for establishing causation under the statute [General Statutes 13a-149 ]," is not inconsistent with this opinion.

2000The `test' for proximate cause is whether the defendant's conduct was a "substantial factor' in producing the plaintiff's in . . . ." This substantial factor test reflects the inquiry fundamental to all proximate cause questions, namely, "whether the harm which occurred was of the same general nature as the foreseeable risk created by the defendant's negligence . . . ." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)." (Citations omitted.) Shegog v. Zabreclcy, 36 Conn. App. 737 , 745 , 654 A.2d 771 , cert. denied, 232 Conn. 922 , 656 A.2d 670 (1995).

2000The `test' for proximate cause is whether the defendant's conduct was a "substantial factor' in producing the plaintiff's in . . . ." This substantial factor test reflects the inquiry fundamental to all proximate cause questions, namely, "whether the harm which occurred was of the same general nature as the foreseeable risk created by the defendant's negligence . . . ." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)." (Citations omitted.) Shegog v. Zabreclcy, 36 Conn. App. 737 , 745 , 654 A.2d 771 , cert. denied, 232 Conn. 922 , 656 A.2d 670 (1995).

1999Joseph Corp. v. Atlas Sand , 120 Conn. 168 (1935) (injunction may be issued to abate continuing nuisance such as the interference with water rights, or the right of CT Page 1132 lateral support, or overflowing of land due to the nature of the injury;); Ferri v. Pyramid Construction Co. , 186 Conn. 682 , 687 (1982) (with respect to the requirement that a plaintiff prove proximate cause, under the substantial factor doctrine, trial court could accept plaintiff's evidence of causation without requiring that the defendant's alternative theories be expressly and entirely discredited.); Coburn v. Le

1998“Under the substantial factor doctrine, the trial court could accept the plaintiffs evidence of causation without requiring that the defendant’s alternative theories be expressly and entirely discredited.” Ferri v. Pyramid Construction Co., 186 Conn. 682, 687 , 443 A.2d 478 (1982).

2022This factor is to be weighed by the jury along with other evidence in the case.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Wilson, 308 Conn. 412 , 430, 64 A.3d 91 (2013). ‘‘Evidence of prior misconduct that tends to show that the defen- dant harbored hostility toward the intended victim of a violent crime is admissible to establish motive.’’ State v. Lopez, 280 Conn. 779, 795 , 911 A.2d 1099 (2007).

2022This factor is to be weighed by the jury along with other evidence in the case.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Wilson, 308 Conn. 412 , 430, 64 A.3d 91 (2013). ‘‘Evidence of prior misconduct that tends to show that the defen- dant harbored hostility toward the intended victim of a violent crime is admissible to establish motive.’’ State v. Lopez, 280 Conn. 779, 795 , 911 A.2d 1099 (2007).

2019Foreseeability is a critical factor in the analysis, because no duty exists unless "an ordinary person in the defendant's position, knowing what the defendant knew or should have known, would anticipate that harm of the general nature of that suffered was likely to result ...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ; see also Ruiz v. Victory Properties, LLC , 315 Conn. 320 , 328, 107 A.3d 381 (2015).

2018In the present case, the administrative law judge cited to this language in Rainey , stating that "any aggravation or contribution entitles the claimant to benefits." The administrative law judge also cited to Bath Iron Works Corp. v. Fields , 599 F.3d 47 , 53 (1st Cir. 2010), which states: "At the first stage, the claimant must make out a prima facie case by showing (1) that he suffered physical harm and (2) that a workplace accident or workplace conditions could have caused, aggravated, or accelerated the harm." We disagree with the defendant's argument that the administrative law judge's ci

2018See Reed v. Allen , 286 U.S. 191 , 201, 52 S.Ct. 532 , 76 L.Ed. 1054 (1932) ("the general and well settled rule [is] that a judgment, not set aside on appeal or otherwise, is equally effective as an estoppel upon the points decided, whether the decision be right or wrong"); Johnson v. Watkins , 101 F.3d 792 , 795 (2d Cir. 1996) ("Use of the doctrine [of collateral estoppel] represents an informed choice that the occasional permanent encapsulation of a wrong result is a price worth paying to promote the worthy goals of ending disputes and avoiding repetitive litigation....

2017This substantial factor test reflects the inquiry fundamental to all proximate cause questions, namely, whether the harm [that] occurred was of the same general nature as the foreseeable risk created by the defendant's negligence." (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id."Legal cause is a hybrid construct, the result of balancing philosophic, pragmatic and moral approaches to causation." Kowal v. Hofher , 181 Conn. 355 , 359, 436 A.2d 1 (1980). "[P]olicy considerations generally underlie the doctrine of proximate cause." Id., at 360 , 436 A.2d 1 .

2017This substantial factor test reflects the inquiry fundamental to all proximate cause questions, namely, whether the harm [that] occurred was of the same general nature as the foreseeable risk created by the defendant's negligence." (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id."Legal cause is a hybrid construct, the result of balancing philosophic, pragmatic and moral approaches to causation." Kowal v. Hofher , 181 Conn. 355 , 359, 436 A.2d 1 (1980). "[P]olicy considerations generally underlie the doctrine of proximate cause." Id., at 360 , 436 A.2d 1 .

2015As a threshold matter, we note that the determination of whether the substantial factor test has been satisfied is a question of fact. ‘‘[T]raditional concepts of proxi- mate cause furnish the appropriate analysis for determining causation in workers’ compensation cases. . . . [T]he test for determining whether particular con- duct is the proximate cause of an injury [is] whether it was a substantial factor in producing the result.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Marandino v. Pro- metheus Pharmacy, 105 Conn. App. 669, 678 , 939 A.2d 591 (2008), rev’d in part on other grounds, 294 Conn. 5

2015As a threshold matter, we note that the determination of whether the substantial factor test has been satisfied is a question of fact. ‘‘[T]raditional concepts of proxi- mate cause furnish the appropriate analysis for determining causation in workers’ compensation cases. . . . [T]he test for determining whether particular con- duct is the proximate cause of an injury [is] whether it was a substantial factor in producing the result.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Marandino v. Pro- metheus Pharmacy, 105 Conn. App. 669, 678 , 939 A.2d 591 (2008), rev’d in part on other grounds, 294 Conn. 5