factor analysis in Texas

2025Id.; IHS Cedars Treatment Ctr. of DeSoto, Tex., Inc. v. Mason, 143 S.W.3d 794 , 800 (Tex. 2004) (“Our precedents establish that merely creating the condition that makes harm possible falls short as a matter of law of satisfying the substantial factor test.”); Bell v. Campbell, 434 S.W.2d 117 , 120–22 (Tex. 1968).

2021Cf. Curnel, 562 S.W.3d at 565–66 (internal quotations omitted); see also IHS Cedars Treatment Ctr. of DeSoto, Tex., Inc. v. Mason, 143 S.W.3d 794 , 800 (Tex. 2004) (“Our precedents establish that merely creating the condition that makes harm possible falls short as a matter of law of satisfying the substantial factor test.”).

2010See In re M.R., 243 S.W.3d 807, 820 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, no pet.) (recognizing drug abuse is a factor in the analysis of child’s best interest).

2009In re M.R. , 243 S.W.3d at 820 (drug abuse is a factor in analysis of child’s best interest).

2015See Arthur Andersen & Co., 945 S.W.2d at 818 .

2015See Arthur Andersen & Co., 945 S.W.2d at 818 .

2024“When the defendant is able to make an ex parte threshold showing to the trial court that his sanity is likely to be a significant factor in his defense, the need for the assistance of a psychiatrist is readily apparent.” Id. at 82–83.

2023Unlike Ake, this case does not involve a request for expert assistance, nor does it involve the due process concerns at issue in Ake, namely providing indigent defendant’s meaningful access to justice. 57 54 Id. at 77 . 55 Id. at 83 . 56 Id. at 82-83 (“When the defendant is able to make an ex parte threshold showing to the trial court that his sanity is likely to be a significant factor in his defense, the need for the assistance of a psychiatrist is readily apparent.”); Williams, 958 S.W.2d at 192 (“While the Supreme Court’s suggestion that the threshold showing should be made ex parte is dic

2018Id.

2018Id.

2007Robertson, 978 S.W.2d at 126 ; Union Pump Co. v. Allbritton, 898 S.W.2d 773, 775 (Tex.1995) (noting cause-in-fact consists of a “but for” test and a substantial factor test).

2007Robertson , 978 S.W.2d at 126; Union Pump Co. v. Allbritton , 898 S.W.2d 773, 775 (Tex. 1995) (noting cause-in-fact consists of a A but for @ test and a substantial factor test).

2024The Texas Supreme Court has explained that cause-in-fact “is established when the act or omission was a substantial factor in bringing about the injuries, and without it, the harm would not have occurred.” Windrum, 581 S.W.3d at 777 (quoting Bustamante v. Ponte, 529 S.W.3d 447, 456 (Tex. 2017)); Brandywood Hous., Ltd. v. Tex. Dep’t of Transp., 74 S.W.3d 421, 426 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. denied).

2022It would have depended upon a lot of things.” 27 Following our decision in Providence, our Court held that the expert’s testimony did not establish that the physician’s negligence proximately caused the patient’s death. 28 Citing our decision in Bustamante v. Ponte, the court of appeals disregarded the cause-in-fact analysis applied in Providence and Rodriguez-Escobar, instead announcing that it would “apply the substantial factor test,” to the exclusion of requiring but-for causation. 29 In Bustamante, we rejected “a stringent but-for causation test” for an individual actor when the evidence

2010See Arnold v. State, 786 S.W.2d 295, 311 (Tex. Crim.

2010See Arnold v. State, 786 S.W.2d 295, 311 (Tex.Crim.App.1990).

2010See id. at 283-90 .

2010See id. at 283–90.

2010See Wesbrook, 29 S.W.3d at 119 .

2010See Wesbrook, 29 S.W.3d at 119 .

2009See In re J.G. , 195 S.W.3d 161, 183 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2006, no pet.) (weighing the length of objectionable testimony as a factor in a rule 44.2 harm analysis).

2009See In re J.G., 195 S.W.3d 161, 183 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2006, no pet.) (weighing the length of 11 objectionable testimony as a factor in a rule 44.2 harm analysis).

2024Ultimately, though, while “considerations such as the age and experience of a juvenile” are “relevant factors in the totality of the circumstances analysis, [they] are just that—factors[.]” Griffin, 765 S.W.2d at 431 ; see also id. at 428 (“Certainly that the accused is a juvenile is a relevant factor in this analysis, and could well prove determinative where all other circumstances ‘would make us pause for careful inquiry if a mature man were involved’”) (quoting Haley, 332 U.S. at 599 ).

1989Certainly that the accused is a juvenile is a relevant factor in this analysis, and could well prove determinative where all other circumstances “would make us pause for careful inquiry if a mature man were involved.” Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599 , 68 S.Ct. 302, 303 , 92 L.Ed. 224 , 228 (1948).

2022Rather, when the facts establish that concurrent causation exists for multiple negligent actors—each whose negligence is itself a but-for cause of the injury in question absent the others’ concurrent negligence—then the but-for requirement shifts from the individual level to the aggregate level of defendant tortfeasors. 31 Bustamante concerned a premature infant who had a 90% to 100% chance of developing retinopathy of prematurity, an abnormal blood-vessel growth pattern that can cause diminished vision or blindness. 32 Experts testified that a properly screened and diagnosed infant would have

2015See Bostic, 439 S.W.3d at 342-46 (“While but for causation is a core concept in tort law, it yields to the more general substantial factor causation in situations where proof of but for causation is not practically possible or such proof otherwise should not be required.”). .

2007Robertson, 978 S.W.2d at 126 ; Union Pump Co. v. Allbritton, 898 S.W.2d 773, 775 (Tex.1995) (noting cause-in-fact consists of a “but for” test and a substantial factor test).

2007Robertson , 978 S.W.2d at 126; Union Pump Co. v. Allbritton , 898 S.W.2d 773, 775 (Tex. 1995) (noting cause-in-fact consists of a A but for @ test and a substantial factor test).

2026See Lear Siegler, 819 S.W.2d at 472 .

2025See e.g., Hailey v. Hailey, 331 S.W.2d 299, 303 (Tex. 1960) (speaking of “a just, fair and equitable 9 Though the Texas Supreme Court stated that both legal and factual sufficiency are factors in the family law abuse- of-discretion standard, the court appears to have left the door cracked to a challenge that factual sufficiency cannot be considered as a factor in that analysis.

2024The Texas Supreme Court has explained that cause-in-fact “is established when the act or omission was a substantial factor in bringing about the injuries, and without it, the harm would not have occurred.” Windrum, 581 S.W.3d at 777 (quoting Bustamante v. Ponte, 529 S.W.3d 447, 456 (Tex. 2017)); Brandywood Hous., Ltd. v. Tex. Dep’t of Transp., 74 S.W.3d 421, 426 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. denied).

2024Ultimately, though, while “considerations such as the age and experience of a juvenile” are “relevant factors in the totality of the circumstances analysis, [they] are just that—factors[.]” Griffin, 765 S.W.2d at 431 ; see also id. at 428 (“Certainly that the accused is a juvenile is a relevant factor in this analysis, and could well prove determinative where all other circumstances ‘would make us pause for careful inquiry if a mature man were involved’”) (quoting Haley, 332 U.S. at 599 ).

2024Ultimately, though, while “considerations such as the age and experience of a juvenile” are “relevant factors in the totality of the circumstances analysis, [they] are just that—factors[.]” Griffin, 765 S.W.2d at 431 ; see also id. at 428 (“Certainly that the accused is a juvenile is a relevant factor in this analysis, and could well prove determinative where all other circumstances ‘would make us pause for careful inquiry if a mature man were involved’”) (quoting Haley, 332 U.S. at 599 ).

2023Unlike Ake, this case does not involve a request for expert assistance, nor does it involve the due process concerns at issue in Ake, namely providing indigent defendant’s meaningful access to justice. 57 54 Id. at 77 . 55 Id. at 83 . 56 Id. at 82-83 (“When the defendant is able to make an ex parte threshold showing to the trial court that his sanity is likely to be a significant factor in his defense, the need for the assistance of a psychiatrist is readily apparent.”); Williams, 958 S.W.2d at 192 (“While the Supreme Court’s suggestion that the threshold showing should be made ex parte is dic

2023Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 152 (1984) (noting that the absence of prejudice “is not an independent basis” to equitably toll the running of a limitations period but is only a factor in the inquiry).

2022See Wade, 422 S.W.3d at 674 (Supreme Court has never said that refusal to cooperate with a consensual search or encounter is irrelevant).

2021See Wilson v. Andrews, 10 S.W.3d 663, 669 (Tex. 1999) (noting that “we overstated our position” in Proctor v. Andrews, 972 S.W.2d 729, 734 (Tex. 1998), when Proctor Court in dicta agreed with court of appeals that city lacked standing to raise due process and equal protection challenges because municipalities do not enjoy due process rights); Stop the Ordinances Please v. City of New Braunfels, 306 S.W.3d 919, 929 (Tex. App.—Austin 2010, no pet.) (noting that “plaintiff is not required to allege the deprivation of a ‘vested right’ constituting a due-process violation to demonstrate the requisi

2021See also Rey v. State, 897 S.W.2d 333, 345-46 (Tex. Crim.

2021See id.; Adams v. Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 236 S.W.3d 271, 281 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.). 13 With respect to the best interest of B.P.