factor defense in Virginia

2023Instead, an indigent defendant “must demonstrate that the subject which necessitates the assistance of [an] expert is ‘likely to be a significant factor in his defense,’ and that he will be prejudiced by the lack of expert assistance.” Id. (quoting Ake, 470 U.S. at 82-83 ).

2022Instead, an indigent defendant “must demonstrate that the subject which necessitates the assistance of an expert is ‘likely to be a significant factor in his defense’ and that he will be prejudiced by the lack of expert assistance.” Id. (quoting Ake, 470 U.S. at 82-83 ).

2023Instead, an indigent defendant “must demonstrate that the subject which necessitates the assistance of [an] expert is ‘likely to be a significant factor in his defense,’ and that he will be prejudiced by the lack of expert assistance.” Id. (quoting Ake, 470 U.S. at 82-83 ).

2022Instead, an indigent defendant “must demonstrate that the subject which necessitates the assistance of an expert is ‘likely to be a significant factor in his defense’ and that he will be prejudiced by the lack of expert assistance.” Id. (quoting Ake, 470 U.S. at 82-83 ).

1994In Tuggle , our Supreme Court said that the defendant must make a “threshold showing to the trial court that his sanity [was] likely to be a significant factor in his defense.” 230 Va. at 106 , 334 S.E.2d at 843 (quoting Ake, 470 U.S. at 72 ).

1994In Tuggle , our Supreme Court said that the defendant must make a “threshold showing to the trial court that his sanity [was] likely to be a significant factor in his defense.” 230 Va. at 106 , 334 S.E.2d at 843 (quoting Ake, 470 U.S. at 72 ).

2015An indigent defendant who seeks government funds to hire an expert witness must demonstrate that: (1) “the subject which necessitates the assistance of the expert is ‘likely to be a significant factor in his defense,’ ” and (2) “he will be prejudiced by the lack of expert assistance.” Id. at 212 , 476 S.E.2d at 925 (quoting Ake, 470 U.S. at 82-83 , 105 S.Ct. at 1096 ). “[A]n indigent defendant satisfies this test by showing that ‘the services of an expert would materially assist him in the preparation of his defense and that the denial of such services would result in a fundamentally unfair tr

2015An indigent defendant who seeks government funds to hire an expert witness must demonstrate that: (1) “the subject which necessitates the assistance of the expert is ‘likely to be a significant factor in his defense,’ ” and (2) “he will be prejudiced by the lack of expert assistance.” Id. at 212 , 476 S.E.2d at 925 (quoting Ake, 470 U.S. at 82-83 , 105 S.Ct. at 1096 ). “[A]n indigent defendant satisfies this test by showing that ‘the services of an expert would materially assist him in the preparation of his defense and that the denial of such services would result in a fundamentally unfair tr

2021“Negligence is not a factor in our analysis.” Virginia Tree Harvesters v. Shelton, 62 Va. App. 524, 536 (2013); see Uninsured Employer’s Fund v. Keppel, 1 Va. App. 162, 165 (1985) -8- (“Negligence, regardless how gross, does not bar a recovery for workers’ compensation benefits.”).

2013See Uninsured Employer’s Fund v. Keppel, 1 Va. App. 162, 165 , 335 S.E.2d 851, 852 (1985) (“Negligence, regardless how gross, does not bar a recovery for workers’ compensation benefits.”).

1988See Pruett v. Commonwealth, 232 Va. 266 , 275 n. 3, 351 S.E.2d 1, 7, n. 3 (1986); Tuggle v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 99, 104-108 , 334 S.E.2d 838, 841-43 (1985), cert. denied; 478 U.S. [1010], 106 S. Ct. 3309 (1986).

1988See Pruett v. Commonwealth, 232 Va. 266 , 275 n. 3, 351 S.E.2d 1, 7, n. 3 (1986); Tuggle v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 99, 104-108 , 334 S.E.2d 838, 841-43 (1985), cert. denied; 478 U.S. [1010], 106 S. Ct. 3309 (1986).

2008Id. at 211-12 , 476 S.E.2d at 925 (citation omitted).

2008Id. at 211-12 , 476 S.E.2d at 925 (citation omitted).

2025See - 12 - Green v. Commonwealth, 266 Va. 81, 91-92 (2003); see also Lenz, 261 Va. at 461-62 (stating that “[a]n indigent defendant’s constitutional right to the appointment of an expert, at the Commonwealth’s expense, is not absolute,” that the defendant “must demonstrate that the subject which necessitates the assistance of the expert is ‘likely to be a significant factor in his defense,’ and that he will be prejudiced by the lack of expert assistance” (citations omitted)).

2003Lenz, 261 Va. at 462 , 544 S.E.2d at 305 (quoting Husske v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 203, 211 , 476 S.E.2d 920, 925 (1996), and Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 82-83 (1965)).

2025See - 12 - Green v. Commonwealth, 266 Va. 81, 91-92 (2003); see also Lenz, 261 Va. at 461-62 (stating that “[a]n indigent defendant’s constitutional right to the appointment of an expert, at the Commonwealth’s expense, is not absolute,” that the defendant “must demonstrate that the subject which necessitates the assistance of the expert is ‘likely to be a significant factor in his defense,’ and that he will be prejudiced by the lack of expert assistance” (citations omitted)).

2025See Blue Stone Land Co. v. Neff, 259 Va. 273, 279 (2000) (“The [harmless error] doctrine is never applied, however, when it appears that the jury has been misinstructed and, had it been properly instructed, that it might have returned a different verdict.”). - 16 -

2022To be entitled to this assistance, the defendant must “demonstrate that the subject which necessitates the assistance of the expert is likely to be a significant factor in his defense, and that he will be prejudiced by the lack of expert assistance.” Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 268 Va. 161, 165 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Husske, 252 Va. at 211-12 ).

2022Bethea v. Commonwealth, 297 Va. 730 , 756 n.13 (2019) (quoting Bloom v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 814, 821 (2001)). -6- expert is “likely to be a significant factor in his defense” and that the defendant “will be prejudiced by the lack of an expert.” Husske, 252 Va. at 211 (internal quotations omitted).

2021“Negligence is not a factor in our analysis.” Virginia Tree Harvesters v. Shelton, 62 Va. App. 524, 536 (2013); see Uninsured Employer’s Fund v. Keppel, 1 Va. App. 162, 165 (1985) -8- (“Negligence, regardless how gross, does not bar a recovery for workers’ compensation benefits.”).

2019“External consistency . . . looks . . . to the economic justification for the State’s claim upon the value taxed, to discover whether a State’s tax reaches beyond that portion of value that is fairly attributable to economic activity within the taxing State.” Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 185 (1995); see also Goldberg, 488 U.S. at 262 (“The external consistency test asks whether the State has taxed only that portion of the revenues from the interstate activity which reasonably reflects the in-state component of the activity being taxed.”).

2019“External consistency . . . looks . . . to the economic justification for the State’s claim upon the value taxed, to discover whether a State’s tax reaches beyond that portion of value that is fairly attributable to economic activity within the taxing State.” Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 185 (1995); see also Goldberg, 488 U.S. at 262 (“The external consistency test asks whether the State has taxed only that portion of the revenues from the interstate activity which reasonably reflects the in-state component of the activity being taxed.”).

2013See, e.g., Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 782 F.2d 1156, 1162-63 (4th Cir. 1986) (upholding Maryland's substantial contributing factor standard in an asbestosis case); Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 941 P.2d 1203, 1219 (Cal. 1997) 11 (approving the substantial contributing factor test in California); Borg-Warner Corp. v. Flores, 232 S.W.3d 765 , 773- 74 (Tex. 2007) (permitting a substantial factor test in a Texas asbestosis case).

2013See, e.g., Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 782 F.2d 1156, 1162-63 (4th Cir. 1986) (upholding Maryland's substantial contributing factor standard in an asbestosis case); Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 941 P.2d 1203, 1219 (Cal. 1997) 11 (approving the substantial contributing factor test in California); Borg-Warner Corp. v. Flores, 232 S.W.3d 765 , 773- 74 (Tex. 2007) (permitting a substantial factor test in a Texas asbestosis case).

2012Barnabei v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 161, 170-71 , 477 S.E.2d 270, 275-76 (1996) (citing Husske v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 203, 211-12 , 476 S.E.2d 920, 925 (1996)).

2012Barnabei v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 161, 170-71 , 477 S.E.2d 270, 275-76 (1996) (citing Husske v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 203, 211-12 , 476 S.E.2d 920, 925 (1996)).

2009See State v. Campbell, 127 N.H. 112 , 498 A.2d 330, 332-33 (1985) ("The analyses of probable value and risk must necessarily focus on the relationship between the subject of the expert services and the issues in the case.").

2009See State v. Campbell, 127 N.H. 112 , 498 A.2d 330, 332-33 (1985) ("The analyses of probable value and risk must necessarily focus on the relationship between the subject of the expert services and the issues in the case.").

2006Rather, the Court “essentially defined [the exception] by ‘the pervasiveness and regularity of the ... regulation’ and the effect of such regulation upon the owner’s expectation of privacy.” Id. (quoting Donovan, 452 U.S. at 605-06 , 101 S.Ct. at 2542 ). 2 The Court *451 gave an indication in an earlier decision that each regulatory scheme must be analyzed on a case by case basis because it held that “[t]he reasonableness of a warrantless search ... will depend upon the specific enforcement needs and privacy guarantees of each statute.” Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 321, 98 S.Ct. 1

2006Rather, the Court “essentially defined [the exception] by ‘the pervasiveness and regularity of the ... regulation’ and the effect of such regulation upon the owner’s expectation of privacy.” Id. (quoting Donovan, 452 U.S. at 605-06 , 101 S.Ct. at 2542 ). 2 The Court *451 gave an indication in an earlier decision that each regulatory scheme must be analyzed on a case by case basis because it held that “[t]he reasonableness of a warrantless search ... will depend upon the specific enforcement needs and privacy guarantees of each statute.” Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 321, 98 S.Ct. 1

2005The key factor in this inquiry is that “there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).

1999In concluding his argument to the court, counsel acknowledged, “I’m rolling the dice here.” The Supreme Court of Virginia has instructed that “an indigent defendant 2 who seeks the appointment of an expert witness, at the Commonwealth’s expense, must demonstrate that the subject which necessitates the assistance of the expert is ‘likely to be a significant factor in his defense,’ and that he will be prejudiced by the lack of expert assistance!,]” resulting “in a fundamentally unfair trial.” Husske v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 203, 211-12 , 476 S.E.2d 920, 925 (1996) (footnote added) (citations omi

1999In concluding his argument to the court, counsel acknowledged, “I’m rolling the dice here.” The Supreme Court of Virginia has instructed that “an indigent defendant 2 who seeks the appointment of an expert witness, at the Commonwealth’s expense, must demonstrate that the subject which necessitates the assistance of the expert is ‘likely to be a significant factor in his defense,’ and that he will be prejudiced by the lack of expert assistance!,]” resulting “in a fundamentally unfair trial.” Husske v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 203, 211-12 , 476 S.E.2d 920, 925 (1996) (footnote added) (citations omi

1997See id. at 227-28 , 450 S.E.2d at 399-400 (considering “the quality of any corroborating evidence” as a factor in the inquiry).

1997See id. at 227-28 , 450 S.E.2d at 399-400 (considering “the quality of any corroborating evidence” as a factor in the inquiry).