factor test in Maryland

2025Id. at 707. 14 A factor in our analysis was that “[i]mmunities are not favored in the law, and this one, in particular, has been under challenge, in both this Court and the Legislature, for several years.” Allstate, 376 Md. at 298 .

2025Id. at 707. 14 A factor in our analysis was that “[i]mmunities are not favored in the law, and this one, in particular, has been under challenge, in both this Court and the Legislature, for several years.” Allstate, 376 Md. at 298 .

2022The Fourth Circuit stated that, to “conclude that mere presence in a high crime area at night is sufficient justification for detention by law enforcement is to accept carte blanche the implicit assertion that Fourth Amendment protections are reserved only for a certain race or class of people.” Id. at 542 . - 51 - jurisdictions with respect to flight in the reasonable suspicion analysis where unprovoked flight occurs in a high-crime area—namely, that unprovoked flight under the circumstances of the case may be considered as a factor in the analysis—we arrive at a different outcome than the co

2022The Fourth Circuit stated that, to “conclude that mere presence in a high crime area at night is sufficient justification for detention by law enforcement is to accept carte blanche the implicit assertion that Fourth Amendment protections are reserved only for a certain race or class of people.” Id. at 542 . - 51 - jurisdictions with respect to flight in the reasonable suspicion analysis where unprovoked flight occurs in a high-crime area—namely, that unprovoked flight under the circumstances of the case may be considered as a factor in the analysis—we arrive at a different outcome than the co

2017This Court first applied the substantial factor test in a lead paint case in Ross v. Housing Authority of Baltimore City, 430 Md. 648 , 63 A.3d 1 (2013).

2017This Court first applied the substantial factor test in a lead paint case in Ross v. Housing Authority of Baltimore City, 430 Md. 648 , 63 A.3d 1 (2013).

2007In dicta, the Court added a reference to “an ex parte threshold showing,” commenting: ‘When the defendant is able to make an ex parte threshold showing to the trial court that his sanity is likely to be a significant factor in his defense, the need for the assistance of a psychiatrist is readily apparent.” Id. at 82-83 , 105 S.Ct. 1087 . *149 When other courts later addressed the right of an indigent defendant to seek state funding under circumstances similar to those in Ake , the courts in many states either authorized or required that the hearing on such requests be conducted ex parte in ord

2007In dicta, the Court added a reference to “an ex parte threshold showing,” commenting: ‘When the defendant is able to make an ex parte threshold showing to the trial court that his sanity is likely to be a significant factor in his defense, the need for the assistance of a psychiatrist is readily apparent.” Id. at 82-83 , 105 S.Ct. 1087 . *149 When other courts later addressed the right of an indigent defendant to seek state funding under circumstances similar to those in Ake , the courts in many states either authorized or required that the hearing on such requests be conducted ex parte in ord

1998Grimshaw, 115 Md.App. at 186 , 692 A.2d 5 .

1998Grimshaw, 115 Md.App. at 186 , 692 A.2d 5 .

1996Rather, they seem concerned with whether each contributing cause, standing alone, is a substantial factor in causing the alleged injury.” Id. at 424 .

1995In Tragarz v. Keene Corp., 980 F.2d 411 (7th Cir.1992), the court rejected the defendants’ argument that the substantial factor test is a comparative test in which the jury assesses all contributing causes and determines which ones are substantial.

2025Reid v. State, 428 Md. 289 , 319–20 (2012) (Harrell, J., dissenting).

2025Such an interpretation is consonant with the statutory mandate that the [MPIA] be liberally construed in order to effectuate its broad remedial purpose.”); Andy’s Ice Cream, Inc. v. City of Salisbury, 125 Md.

2020In Barksdale, defense counsel told the motions court that he “believe[d]” that a quantitative analysis of the contraband would “precisely quantify the cocaine, apart from any cutting agent, evidence which he speculates would negate any inference of an intent to distribute based upon gross weight.” Barksdale, 522 S.E.2d at 390 .

2018And the Landlords' proposed instruction requiring Mr. Johnson to prove the Landlords had notice of deteriorated paint at the Property was not a correct statement of law-it conflicted with the Court of Appeals's holding in Brooks , 378 Md. at 84 -85 , 835 A.2d 616 (a tenant is not required to show that the landlord had notice of housing code violations to establish a prima facie case of negligence).

2018And the Landlords' proposed instruction requiring Mr. Johnson to prove the Landlords had notice of deteriorated paint at the Property was not a correct statement of law-it conflicted with the Court of Appeals's holding in Brooks , 378 Md. at 84 -85 , 835 A.2d 616 (a tenant is not required to show that the landlord had notice of housing code violations to establish a prima facie case of negligence).

2017And, the Majority transforms the well-settled factor test for exceptional circumstances stated in Hoffman, 280 Md. at 191 , 372 A.2d 582 , by adding a new requirement that a trial court must find that a child has been away from his or parents for “a long period of time” in order to find that exceptional circumstances exist.

2017And, the Majority transforms the well-settled factor test for exceptional circumstances stated in Hoffman, 280 Md. at 191 , 372 A.2d 582 , by adding a new requirement that a trial court must find that a child has been away from his or parents for “a long period of time” in order to find that exceptional circumstances exist.

2017Subsequently, in Dow v. L & R Properties, Inc., the Court of Special Appeals considered a case where the plaintiff had put forth circumstantial evidence in support of a lead paint claim. 144 Md.App. 67, 73-74 , 796 A.2d 139 (2002).

2017Subsequently, in Dow v. L & R Properties, Inc., the Court of Special Appeals considered a case where the plaintiff had put forth circumstantial evidence in support of a lead paint claim. 144 Md.App. 67, 73-74 , 796 A.2d 139 (2002).

2017As I noted in a footnote in my Rogers dissent, in a lead paint negligence case a plaintiff may claim “that the defendant’s property is a contributing source of his harm from lead exposure, as part of a claim that multiple sources of lead exposure cumulatively proximately caused his harm.” Rogers, 453 Md. at 259 n.1, 160 A.3d 1207 .

2017As I noted in a footnote in my Rogers dissent, in a lead paint negligence case a plaintiff may claim “that the defendant’s property is a contributing source of his harm from lead exposure, as part of a claim that multiple sources of lead exposure cumulatively proximately caused his harm.” Rogers, 453 Md. at 259 n.1, 160 A.3d 1207 .

2016The most recent Maryland case to examine the elements of the “mere continuation” exception, Academy of IRM v. LVI Environmental Services, Inc., supra, added an additional factor to its analysis — the purpose of the asset sale. 344 Md. at 451 , 687 A.2d 669 .

2016The most recent Maryland case to examine the elements of the “mere continuation” exception, Academy of IRM v. LVI Environmental Services, Inc., supra, added an additional factor to its analysis — the purpose of the asset sale. 344 Md. at 451 , 687 A.2d 669 .

2014First, we note that the instruction given by the court is a verbatim reading of Maryland Criminal Pattern Jury Instruction 3:26. 3 The pattern instruction, like the instruction given in this case, provides language instructing jurors that they “have heard that the defendant _ evidence in this case.” We have explained that “[ajlthough the use of a pattern jury instruction does not insulate a conviction against review, it is a factor in our analysis.” Yates v. State, 202 Md.App. 700, 723 , 33 A.3d 1071 (2011), aff'd, 429 Md. 112 , 55 A.3d 25 (2012).

2014First, we note that the instruction given by the court is a verbatim reading of Maryland Criminal Pattern Jury Instruction 3:26. 3 The pattern instruction, like the instruction given in this case, provides language instructing jurors that they “have heard that the defendant _ evidence in this case.” We have explained that “[ajlthough the use of a pattern jury instruction does not insulate a conviction against review, it is a factor in our analysis.” Yates v. State, 202 Md.App. 700, 723 , 33 A.3d 1071 (2011), aff'd, 429 Md. 112 , 55 A.3d 25 (2012).

2014First, we note that the instruction given by the court is a verbatim reading of Maryland Criminal Pattern Jury Instruction 3:26. 3 The pattern instruction, like the instruction given in this case, provides language instructing jurors that they “have heard that the defendant _ evidence in this case.” We have explained that “[ajlthough the use of a pattern jury instruction does not insulate a conviction against review, it is a factor in our analysis.” Yates v. State, 202 Md.App. 700, 723 , 33 A.3d 1071 (2011), aff'd, 429 Md. 112 , 55 A.3d 25 (2012).

2014First, we note that the instruction given by the court is a verbatim reading of Maryland Criminal Pattern Jury Instruction 3:26. 3 The pattern instruction, like the instruction given in this case, provides language instructing jurors that they “have heard that the defendant _ evidence in this case.” We have explained that “[ajlthough the use of a pattern jury instruction does not insulate a conviction against review, it is a factor in our analysis.” Yates v. State, 202 Md.App. 700, 723 , 33 A.3d 1071 (2011), aff'd, 429 Md. 112 , 55 A.3d 25 (2012).

2014Indeed, we have repeatedly “recommended that trial judges use the pattern instructions.” Id. (citing Minger v. State, 157 Md.App. 157 , 161 n. 1, 849 A.2d 1058 (2004) (“Appellate courts in Maryland strongly favor the use of pattern jury instructions”); Green v. State, 127 Md.App. 758, 771 , 736 A.2d 450 (1999) (recommending that trial judges give pattern jury instructions)).

2014Indeed, we have repeatedly “recommended that trial judges use the pattern instructions.” Id. (citing Minger v. State, 157 Md.App. 157 , 161 n. 1, 849 A.2d 1058 (2004) (“Appellate courts in Maryland strongly favor the use of pattern jury instructions”); Green v. State, 127 Md.App. 758, 771 , 736 A.2d 450 (1999) (recommending that trial judges give pattern jury instructions)).