Restatement standard in Kentucky

2015Hill noted that “[i]n the context of guilty pleas, the first half of the Strickland v. Washington test is nothing more than a restatement of the standard of attorney competence already set forth in Tollett v. Henderson, [ 411 U.S. 258 , 93 S.Ct. 1602 , 36 L.Ed.2d 235 (1973) ], and McMann v. Richardson, [ 397 U.S. 759 , 90 S.Ct. 1441 , 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970)].” Hill, 474 U.S. at 58-59 , 106 S.Ct. 366 .

2015Hill noted that “[i]n the context of guilty pleas, the first half of the Strickland v. Washington test is nothing more than a restatement of the standard of attorney competence already set forth in Tollett v. Henderson, [ 411 U.S. 258 , 93 S.Ct. 1602 , 36 L.Ed.2d 235 (1973) ], and McMann v. Richardson, [ 397 U.S. 759 , 90 S.Ct. 1441 , 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970)].” Hill, 474 U.S. at 58-59 , 106 S.Ct. 366 .

2015Hill noted that “[i]n the context of guilty pleas, the first half of the Strickland v. Washington test is nothing more than a restatement of the standard of attorney competence already set forth in Tollett v. Henderson, [ 411 U.S. 258 , 93 S.Ct. 1602 , 36 L.Ed.2d 235 (1973) ], and McMann v. Richardson, [ 397 U.S. 759 , 90 S.Ct. 1441 , 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970)].” Hill, 474 U.S. at 58-59 , 106 S.Ct. 366 .

2015Hill noted that “[i]n the context of guilty pleas, the first half of the Strickland v. Washington test is nothing more than a restatement of the standard of attorney competence already set forth in Tollett v. Henderson, [ 411 U.S. 258 , 93 S.Ct. 1602 , 36 L.Ed.2d 235 (1973) ], and McMann v. Richardson, [ 397 U.S. 759 , 90 S.Ct. 1441 , 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970)].” Hill, 474 U.S. at 58-59 , 106 S.Ct. 366 .

2015Hill noted that “[i]n the context of guilty pleas, the first half of the Strickland v. Washington test is nothing more than a restatement of the standard of attorney competence already set forth in Tollett v. Henderson, [ 411 U.S. 258 , 93 S.Ct. 1602 , 36 L.Ed.2d 235 (1973) ], and McMann v. Richardson, [ 397 U.S. 759 , 90 S.Ct. 1441 , 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970)].” Hill, 474 U.S. at 58-59 , 106 S.Ct. 366 .

2015Hill noted that “[i]n the context of guilty pleas, the first half of the Strickland v. Washington test is nothing more than a restatement of the standard of attorney competence already set forth in Tollett v. Henderson, [ 411 U.S. 258 , 93 S.Ct. 1602 , 36 L.Ed.2d 235 (1973) ], and McMann v. Richardson, [ 397 U.S. 759 , 90 S.Ct. 1441 , 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970)].” Hill, 474 U.S. at 58-59 , 106 S.Ct. 366 .

2014In short, it is the right to be let alone.’ ” 238 Ky. at 228 , 37 S.W.2d at 47 (quoting Jones v. Herald Post Co., 230 Ky. 227 , 18 S.W.2d 972 (1929)). 5 More recently, the Kentucky Supreme Court adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652A in McCall v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co., 623 S.W.2d 882, 887 (Ky.1981), In so doing, the court incorporated the Restatement’s rule concerning Intrusion upon Seclusion, § 652B: “[o]ne who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the

2014In short, it is the right to be let alone.’ ” 238 Ky. at 228 , 37 S.W.2d at 47 (quoting Jones v. Herald Post Co., 230 Ky. 227 , 18 S.W.2d 972 (1929)). 5 More recently, the Kentucky Supreme Court adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652A in McCall v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co., 623 S.W.2d 882, 887 (Ky.1981), In so doing, the court incorporated the Restatement’s rule concerning Intrusion upon Seclusion, § 652B: “[o]ne who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the

2014In short, it is the right to be let alone.’ ” 238 Ky. at 228 , 37 S.W.2d at 47 (quoting Jones v. Herald Post Co., 230 Ky. 227 , 18 S.W.2d 972 (1929)). 5 More recently, the Kentucky Supreme Court adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652A in McCall v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co., 623 S.W.2d 882, 887 (Ky.1981), In so doing, the court incorporated the Restatement’s rule concerning Intrusion upon Seclusion, § 652B: “[o]ne who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the

2014In short, it is the right to be let alone.’ ” 238 Ky. at 228 , 37 S.W.2d at 47 (quoting Jones v. Herald Post Co., 230 Ky. 227 , 18 S.W.2d 972 (1929)). 5 More recently, the Kentucky Supreme Court adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652A in McCall v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co., 623 S.W.2d 882, 887 (Ky.1981), In so doing, the court incorporated the Restatement’s rule concerning Intrusion upon Seclusion, § 652B: “[o]ne who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the

1983The question is not whether we should change a basic concept of tort liability, but whether we should abandon a rule for construing contracts which adds to the contract where it is silent. *9 Our opinion in Kingins v. Hurt, supra, quotes as authority the first edition of the Restatement of Torts, Sec. 885(1), which then provided “that the release of one joint tortfeasor discharges all unless it is otherwise stated in the agreement.” We adopted the Restatement rule while acknowledging that “Prosser criticizes the latter requirement as ‘unfortunate.’ ” However, in the Restatement (Second) of Tor

1983The question is not whether we should change a basic concept of tort liability, but whether we should abandon a rule for construing contracts which adds to the contract where it is silent. *9 Our opinion in Kingins v. Hurt, supra, quotes as authority the first edition of the Restatement of Torts, Sec. 885(1), which then provided “that the release of one joint tortfeasor discharges all unless it is otherwise stated in the agreement.” We adopted the Restatement rule while acknowledging that “Prosser criticizes the latter requirement as ‘unfortunate.’ ” However, in the Restatement (Second) of Tor

1919Co. v. Stayton’s Admr., 163 Ky. 760 , 174 S. W. 1104 , is but the restatement of the rule thoroughly established in this state that: “Where it is sought to recover damages for negligence or wrongful acts there must be some evidence to show that deceased lost his life through the negligence of the defendant, and this evidence must be sufficient to charge the defendant with a breach of duty and recovery can not be had on mere surmises or speculation as to how the injury complained of happened, nor will it be presumed that the defendant was guilty of actionable negligence if the injury may as rea

1919Co. v. Stayton’s Admr., 163 Ky. 760 , 174 S. W. 1104 , is but the restatement of the rule thoroughly established in this state that: “Where it is sought to recover damages for negligence or wrongful acts there must be some evidence to show that deceased lost his life through the negligence of the defendant, and this evidence must be sufficient to charge the defendant with a breach of duty and recovery can not be had on mere surmises or speculation as to how the injury complained of happened, nor will it be presumed that the defendant was guilty of actionable negligence if the injury may as rea