47 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1946–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
LaFever v. Kemlite Co.green2 sentences2010App. 3d 45, 56 (1999), quoting LaFever, 185 Ill. 2d at 393 (explaining the scope of our supreme court’s holding in LaFever in the following manner: “In finding that the defendant owed a duty to the drivers of the disposal company, the supreme court rejected the defendant’s argument that a ‘deliberate encounter’ cannot give rise to liability unless there is no reasonable alternative available to the worker and the worker’s continued employment is at stake if he refuses to encounter the condition. [Citation.] The court [in LaFever] noted that the focus of the Restatement test is not the reasonab 2010App. 3d 45, 56 (1999), quoting LaFever, 185 Ill. 2d at 393 (explaining the scope of our supreme court’s holding in LaFever in the following manner: “In finding that the defendant owed a duty to the drivers of the disposal company, the supreme court rejected the defendant’s argument that a ‘deliberate encounter’ cannot give rise to liability unless there is no reasonable alternative available to the worker and the worker’s continued employment is at stake if he refuses to encounter the condition. [Citation.] The court [in LaFever] noted that the focus of the Restatement test is not the reasonab | 2 | 3 |
O'Casek v. Children's Home & Aid Societygreen2 sentences2016See O’Casek v. Children’s Home & Aid Society of Illinois, 229 Ill. 2d 421, 440 (2008) (stare decisis requires courts to follow the decisions of higher courts, but does not bind courts to the decisions of equal or inferior courts). ¶ 28 Heneghan and Concord concede that application of the first four Restatement factors indicates the demolition of the Wirt Dexter building was abnormally dangerous or ultrahazardous. 2015See O'Casek v. Children's Home & Aid Society of Illinois, 229 Ill. 2d 421, 440 (2008) (stare decisis requires courts to follow the decisions of higher courts, but does not bind courts to the decisions of equal or inferior courts). &28 Heneghan and Concord concede that application of the first four Restatement factors indicates the demolition of the Wirt Dexter building was abnormally dangerous or ultrahazardous. | 2 | 2 |
Loitz v. Remington Arms Co., Inc.green2 sentences2009See Loitz, 138 Ill. 2d at 415-16 . 2009See Loitz, 138 Ill. 2d at 415-16 . | 2 | 2 |
Downs v. Steel and Craft Builders, Inc.green2 sentences2008Downs v. Steel & Craft Builders, Inc., 358 Ill. 2008Downs v. Steel & Craft Builders, Inc., 358 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
Calhoun v. Ranegreen2 sentences2008See Calhoun v. Rane, 234 Ill. 2008See Calhoun v. Rane, 234 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
Martens v. MCL Construction Corp.green2 sentences2008We also observe that section 414 of the Restatement is an exception to the general rule that "one who employs an independent contractor is not liable for the acts or omissions of the latter." Martens v. MCL Construction Corp., 347 Ill.App.3d 303, 313 , 282 Ill.Dec. 856 , 807 N.E.2d 480 (2004). 2008We also observe that section 414 of the Restatement is an exception to the general rule that “one who employs an independent contractor is not hable for the acts or omissions of the latter.” Martens v. MCL Construction Corp., 347 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
Liebert Corp. v. Mazurgreen2 sentences2007See, e.g., Liebert, 357 Ill. 2007See, e.g., Liebert, 357 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
Blankenship v. Peoria Park Districtgreen2 sentences2005Accord Blankenship v. Peoria Park District , 269 Ill. 2005Accord Blankenship v. Peoria Park District, 269 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
M.P.M. Builders, LLC v. Dwyergreen2 sentences2009Builders, LLC v. Dwyer, 442 Mass. 87, 90-91 , 809 N.E.2d 1053, 1057 (2004) (adopting Restatement standard in light of the fact that it “maximizes the over-all property utility by increasing the value of the servient estate without diminishing the value of the dominant estate; minimizes the cost associated with an easement by reducing the risk that the easement will prevent future beneficial development of the servient estate; and encourages the use of easements”); Roaring Fork Club, L.P. v. St. 2009Builders, LLC v. Dwyer, 442 Mass. 87, 90-91 , 809 N.E.2d 1053, 1057 (2004) (adopting Restatement standard in light of the fact that it “maximizes the over-all property utility by increasing the value of the servient estate without diminishing the value of the dominant estate; minimizes the cost associated with an easement by reducing the risk that the easement will prevent future beneficial development of the servient estate; and encourages the use of easements”); Roaring Fork Club, L.P. v. St. | 1 | 1 |
Roaring Fork Club, L.P. v. St. Jude's Co.green2 sentences2009Jude’s Co., 36 P.3d 1229, 1237 (Colo. 2001) (adopting Restatement approach, reasoning that it “simply maximizes overall benefit by helping one party without hurting the other,” and remanding case for the lower court to determine whether modification of ditch easement was in conformity with the standards articulated in that section); Burkhart v. Lillehaug, 2003 S.D. 62 , ¶12, 664 N.W.2d 41, 43 (applying Restatement test to find that owners of servient estate were entitled to reshape a road easement on their property where the modification “provided access substantially similar to what the road 2009Jude’s Co., 36 P.3d 1229, 1237 (Colo. 2001) (adopting Restatement approach, reasoning that it “simply maximizes overall benefit by helping one party without hurting the other,” and remanding case for the lower court to determine whether modification of ditch easement was in conformity with the standards articulated in that section); Burkhart v. Lillehaug, 2003 S.D. 62 , ¶12, 664 N.W.2d 41, 43 (applying Restatement test to find that owners of servient estate were entitled to reshape a road easement on their property where the modification “provided access substantially similar to what the road | 1 | 1 |
Burkhart v. Lillehauggreen2 sentences2009Jude’s Co., 36 P.3d 1229, 1237 (Colo. 2001) (adopting Restatement approach, reasoning that it “simply maximizes overall benefit by helping one party without hurting the other,” and remanding case for the lower court to determine whether modification of ditch easement was in conformity with the standards articulated in that section); Burkhart v. Lillehaug, 2003 S.D. 62 , ¶12, 664 N.W.2d 41, 43 (applying Restatement test to find that owners of servient estate were entitled to reshape a road easement on their property where the modification “provided access substantially similar to what the road 2009Jude’s Co., 36 P.3d 1229, 1237 (Colo. 2001) (adopting Restatement approach, reasoning that it “simply maximizes overall benefit by helping one party without hurting the other,” and remanding case for the lower court to determine whether modification of ditch easement was in conformity with the standards articulated in that section); Burkhart v. Lillehaug, 2003 S.D. 62 , ¶12, 664 N.W.2d 41, 43 (applying Restatement test to find that owners of servient estate were entitled to reshape a road easement on their property where the modification “provided access substantially similar to what the road | 1 | 1 |
Wells v. Sanorgreen2 sentences2009Jude’s Co., 36 P.3d 1229, 1237 (Colo. 2001) (adopting Restatement approach, reasoning that it “simply maximizes overall benefit by helping one party without hurting the other,” and remanding case for the lower court to determine whether modification of ditch easement was in conformity with the standards articulated in that section); Burkhart v. Lillehaug, 2003 S.D. 62 , ¶12, 664 N.W.2d 41, 43 (applying Restatement test to find that owners of servient estate were entitled to reshape a road easement on their property where the modification “provided access substantially similar to what the road 2009Jude’s Co., 36 P.3d 1229, 1237 (Colo. 2001) (adopting Restatement approach, reasoning that it “simply maximizes overall benefit by helping one party without hurting the other,” and remanding case for the lower court to determine whether modification of ditch easement was in conformity with the standards articulated in that section); Burkhart v. Lillehaug, 2003 S.D. 62 , ¶12, 664 N.W.2d 41, 43 (applying Restatement test to find that owners of servient estate were entitled to reshape a road easement on their property where the modification “provided access substantially similar to what the road | 1 | 1 |
Lewis v. Younggreen2 sentences2009Jude’s Co., 36 P.3d 1229, 1237 (Colo. 2001) (adopting Restatement approach, reasoning that it “simply maximizes overall benefit by helping one party without hurting the other,” and remanding case for the lower court to determine whether modification of ditch easement was in conformity with the standards articulated in that section); Burkhart v. Lillehaug, 2003 S.D. 62 , ¶12, 664 N.W.2d 41, 43 (applying Restatement test to find that owners of servient estate were entitled to reshape a road easement on their property where the modification “provided access substantially similar to what the road 2009Jude’s Co., 36 P.3d 1229, 1237 (Colo. 2001) (adopting Restatement approach, reasoning that it “simply maximizes overall benefit by helping one party without hurting the other,” and remanding case for the lower court to determine whether modification of ditch easement was in conformity with the standards articulated in that section); Burkhart v. Lillehaug, 2003 S.D. 62 , ¶12, 664 N.W.2d 41, 43 (applying Restatement test to find that owners of servient estate were entitled to reshape a road easement on their property where the modification “provided access substantially similar to what the road | 1 | 1 |
R & S INVESTMENTS v. Auto Auctions, Ltd.green2 sentences2009Jude’s Co., 36 P.3d 1229, 1237 (Colo. 2001) (adopting Restatement approach, reasoning that it “simply maximizes overall benefit by helping one party without hurting the other,” and remanding case for the lower court to determine whether modification of ditch easement was in conformity with the standards articulated in that section); Burkhart v. Lillehaug, 2003 S.D. 62 , ¶12, 664 N.W.2d 41, 43 (applying Restatement test to find that owners of servient estate were entitled to reshape a road easement on their property where the modification “provided access substantially similar to what the road 2009App. 267, 278-79 , 725 N.W.2d 871, 880-81 (2006) (applying Restatement test to find that owner of servient estate was entitled to modify sewage easement on his property in the absence of any evidence in the record that the modification would lessen the easement’s utility or impair easement holder’s use and enjoyment of the easement). | 1 | 1 |
Rangel v. Brookhaven Constructors, Inc.green1 sentence2001Rangel v. Brookhaven Constructors, Inc., 307 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co.green2 sentences1991After repeating the Restatement rule, the dissent said this: “The policy justification for relaxing the causation requirement in alternative liability situations is that it would be unjust to permit ‘proved wrongdoers, who among them have inflicted an injury upon the entirely innocent plaintiff, to escape liability merely because the nature of their conduct and the resulting harm has made it difficult or impossible to prove which of them has caused the harm.’ (Restatement (Second) of Torts §433B, comment /, at 446.) Although the doctrines of res ipsa loquitur and alternative liability may not 1991After repeating the Restatement rule, the dissent said this: “The policy justification for relaxing the causation requirement in alternative liability situations is that it would be unjust to permit ‘proved wrongdoers, who among them have inflicted an injury upon the entirely innocent plaintiff, to escape liability merely because the nature of their conduct and the resulting harm has made it difficult or impossible to prove which of them has caused the harm.’ (Restatement (Second) of Torts §433B, comment /, at 446.) Although the doctrines of res ipsa loquitur and alternative liability may not | 1 | 1 |
| Talley v. Alton Box Board Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In Re Chicago Flood Litigation
green
2 sentences2016All of the factors are to be considered.” Chicago Flood Litigation, 176 Ill. 2d at 209 . 2015All of the factors are to be considered." Chicago Flood Litigation, 176 Ill. 2d at 209 . | 2 | 2015–2016 |
Adames v. Sheahan
green
2 sentences2014Id. at 290-95 . ¶ 52 Applying the three-part Restatement test, the supreme court found that the sheriff was not vicariously liable for the deputy’s conduct. 2014Id. at 290-95 . ¶ 52 Applying the three-part Restatement test, the supreme court found that the sheriff was not vicariously liable for the deputy’s conduct. | 2 | 2014–2014 |
Mahurin v. Lockhart
green
2 sentences2006Given the clearly rural nature of the property in question, neither the Restatement exception for possessors of urban land (see Restatement (Second) of Torts § 363(2), at 258 (1965)), nor the extension of that exception to owners of residential land (see Mahurin, 71 Ill. 2006Given the clearly rural nature of the property in question, neither the Restatement exception for possessors of urban land (see Restatement (Second) of Torts § 363(2), at 258 (1965)), nor the extension of that exception to owners of residential land (see Mahurin, 71 Ill. | 2 | 2006–2006 |
cluster 739992
green
2 sentences2002Similarly, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals acknowledged the Restatement exception in D&K Properties Crystal Lake v. Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York, 112 F.3d 257 (7th Cir. 1997). 2002Similarly, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals acknowledged the Restatement exception in D&K Properties Crystal Lake v. Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York, 112 F.3d 257 (7th Cir. 1997). | 2 | 2002–2002 |
River Park, Inc. v. City of Highland Park
green
2 sentences2000The Court stated that the Restatement also provides a claim is extinguished under these principles, "`even though the plaintiff is prepared in the second action (1) To present evidence or grounds or theories of the case not presented in the first action, or (2) To seek remedies or forms of relief not demanded in the first action.'" River Park , 184 Ill. 2d at 312 , quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments §25, at 209 (1982). 2000The court stated that the Restatement also provides a claim is extinguished under these principles: “ ‘even though the plaintiff is prepared in the second action (1) To present evidence or grounds or theories of the case not presented in the first action, or (2) To seek remedies or forms of relief not demanded in the first action.’ ” River Park, 184 Ill. 2d at 312 , quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 25, at 209 (1982). | 2 | 2000–2000 |
Clifford v. Cochrane
green
1 sentence2012Furthermore, there is some element of indecision reflected in Clifford, 10 Ill.App. at 576 , where the court did not rely entirely on the prevalence of the old rule, noting in its dictum that aside from the fact that the republication in that case had not been authorized, it could not be regarded as the "necessary, or the natural and proximate consequence" of the first publication. ¶ 75 There can be little doubt that under the majority Restatement rule, the pleadings in the plaintiff's complaint in this case are more than sufficient to allege entitlement to special damages as required to state | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Pavilon v. Kaferly
green
2 sentences2005Pavilon, 204 Ill. 2005Pavilon, 204 Ill. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Keller v. Mols
green
2 sentences1994Keller involved 14-year-old boys who were playing "floor hockey" on a neighbor's patio. ( Keller, 156 Ill.App.3d at 235-36 , 108 Ill.Dec. at 889 , 509 N.E.2d at 585 .) Children playing baseball in a backyard should be allowed to engage in conduct within the rules and usages of the game as do major leaguers, although there will be differences. 1994Keller involved 14-year-old boys who were playing "floor hockey" on a neighbor's patio. ( Keller, 156 Ill.App.3d at 235-36 , 108 Ill.Dec. at 889 , 509 N.E.2d at 585 .) Children playing baseball in a backyard should be allowed to engage in conduct within the rules and usages of the game as do major leaguers, although there will be differences. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Miller v. Motorola, Inc.
green
2 sentences1992Under the Restatement test, there is no “publicity” unless “the matter is made public, by communicating it to the public at large, or to so many persons that the matter must be regarded as substantially certain to become one of public knowledge.” (Restatement (Second) of Torts §652D, Comment a, at 384 (1977).) Under Miller, egregious conduct resulting in disclosure to a limited audience is actionable if “a special relationship exists between the plaintiff and the ‘public’ to whom the information has been disclosed [such that] the disclosure may be just as devastating to the [plaintiff].” Mille 1992Under the Restatement test, there is no “publicity” unless “the matter is made public, by communicating it to the public at large, or to so many persons that the matter must be regarded as substantially certain to become one of public knowledge.” (Restatement (Second) of Torts §652D, Comment a, at 384 (1977).) Under Miller, egregious conduct resulting in disclosure to a limited audience is actionable if “a special relationship exists between the plaintiff and the ‘public’ to whom the information has been disclosed [such that] the disclosure may be just as devastating to the [plaintiff].” Mille | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Wysocki v. Reed
green
2 sentences1992Acknowledging that problems might arise in claims involving more than two tortfeasors, the Wysocki court restricted the application of alternative liability to cases where all of the possible defendants are before the court (Wysocki, 222 Ill. 1992Acknowledging that problems might arise in claims involving more than two tortfeasors, the Wysocki court restricted the application of alternative liability to cases where all of the possible defendants are before the court (Wysocki, 222 Ill. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Summers v. Tice
green
2 sentences1991The genesis of the Restatement rule is Summers v. Tice (1948), 33 Cal. 2d 80 , 199 P.2d 1 . 1991The genesis of the Restatement rule is Summers v. Tice (1948), 33 Cal. 2d 80 , 199 P.2d 1 . | 1 | 1991–1991 |
In Re \Agent Orange\" Product Liability Litigation"
green
2 sentences1991The New York District Court, based on “federal or national consensus substantive law” ( 597 F. Supp. at 755 ), accepted the Restatement rule. 1991The New York District Court, based on “federal or national consensus substantive law” ( 597 F. Supp. at 755 ), accepted the Restatement rule. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Assn., Inc. v. Bresler
green
2 sentences1990Neither do we consider the complained-of statements to constitute colloquial statements within the meaning of Greenbelt ( 398 U.S. at 14 , 26 L. 1990Neither do we consider the complained-of statements to constitute colloquial statements within the meaning of Greenbelt ( 398 U.S. at 14 , 26 L. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Kirk v. Michael Reese Hospital & Medical Center
green
2 sentences1990These decisions upon which the plaintiff relies are primarily concerned with a custodian's duty and frequently rely on section 319 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965), concerning the `duty of those in charge of person having dangerous propensities.' There is no allegation here that the plaintiff was negligently released from the hospital, and there is no allegation that McCarthy had dangerous propensities of which the hospital and physicians were aware." ( 117 Ill.2d at 530-31 , 111 Ill.Dec. at 955, 513 N.E.2d at 398 .) In my judgment, the proper disposition of this appeal would be to 1990These decisions upon which the plaintiff relies are primarily concerned with a custodian's duty and frequently rely on section 319 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965), concerning the `duty of those in charge of person having dangerous propensities.' There is no allegation here that the plaintiff was negligently released from the hospital, and there is no allegation that McCarthy had dangerous propensities of which the hospital and physicians were aware." ( 117 Ill.2d at 530-31 , 111 Ill.Dec. at 955, 513 N.E.2d at 398 .) In my judgment, the proper disposition of this appeal would be to | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| People v. Andrews neutral | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Stewart v. Chicago Title Insurance Co. green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Bertell Ollman v. Rowland Evans, Robert Novak green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| City of Joliet v. Harwood green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Looger v. Reynolds green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Kelley v. Kelley green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Dudley v. Meadowbrook, Inc. green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| The People v. Couvion green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Barker v. Brown green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Dean v. Hershowitz green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| State v. Nieberg neutral | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Lulay v. SOUTH SIDE TRUST & SAV. BANK green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Ozan Lumber Company v. McNeely green | 1 | 1970–1970 |
| Dry v. Adams neutral | 1 | 1946–1946 |
| Mittel v. Karl neutral | 1 | 1946–1946 |
| Coogan v. Jones neutral | 1 | 1946–1946 |
| Duffield v. Duffield neutral | 1 | 1946–1946 |
| Duffield v. Duffield neutral | 1 | 1946–1946 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.