17 New Mexico opinions name it 2 courts 1916–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Mexico courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Stotlar v. Hestergreen2 sentences2013See Stotlar v. Hester, 1978-NMCA-067 ,¶ 13, 92 N.M. 26 , 582 P.2d 403 (adopting the Restatement standard); see also UJI 13-1632 NMRA, Comm. Commentary. 2013See Stotlar v. Hester, 1978-NMCA-067 ,¶ 13, 92 N.M. 26 , 582 P.2d 403 (adopting the Restatement standard); see also UJI 13-1632 NMRA, Comm. Commentary. | 2 | 2 |
Apodaca v. AAA Gas Co.green2 sentences2022The Restatement standard for abnormally dangerous activities that New Mexico has adopted requires the district court to ascribe to each factor listed above such weight as is warranted based “upon the facts in evidence.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 520 cmt. l; see also Apodaca, 2003-NMCA-085, ¶ 19 (noting the applicability of the six factors from the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 520). 2022The Restatement standard for abnormally dangerous activities that New Mexico has adopted requires the district court to ascribe to each factor listed above such weight as is warranted based “upon the facts in evidence.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 520 cmt. l; see also Apodaca, 2003-NMCA-085, ¶ 19 (noting the applicability of the six factors from the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 520). | 1 | 1 |
Lancellotti v. Thomasgreen2 sentences2011See id. at 119-20 . 2011See id. at 119-20 . | 1 | 1 |
Harger v. Structural Services, Inc.green2 sentences2010Rather, the totality of the circumstances should be considered in determining whether the employer has the right to exercise essential control over the work or workers of a particular contractor.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Harger v. Structural Servs., Inc., 121 N.M. 657, 667 , 916 P.2d 1324, 1334 (1996)). 2010Rather, the totality of the circumstances should be considered in determining whether the employer has the right to exercise essential control over the work or workers of a particular contractor.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Harger v. Structural Servs., Inc., 121 N.M. 657, 667 , 916 P.2d 1324, 1334 (1996)). | 1 | 1 |
Dominguez v. Stonegreen2 sentences2007See Dominguez, 97 N.M. at 214 , 638 P.2d at 426 . 5 . 2007See Dominguez, 97 N.M. at 214 , 638 P.2d at 426 . 5 . | 1 | 1 |
Venaglia v. Kropinakgreen2 sentences2005See Venaglia v. Kropinak, 1998-NMCA-043, ¶¶ 9, 29 , 125 N.M. 25 , 956 P.2d 824 (adopting the Restatement rule that a guarantor of a negotiable instrument is discharged to the extent that the payee impairs the guarantor's recourse against the payor); see also Restatement (Third) of Suretyship and Guaranty § 44 (stating that guarantor can be discharged if the creditor impairs a guarantor's right of restitution from the principal); Restatement (Third) of Suretyship and Guaranty § 50(1) (stating that a creditor's delay or failure to act against the principal does not discharge the guarantor). {21} 2005See Venaglia v. Kropinak, 1998-NMCA-043, ¶¶ 9, 29 , 125 N.M. 25 , 956 P.2d 824 (adopting the Restatement rule that a guarantor of a negotiable instrument is discharged to the extent that the payee impairs the guarantor's recourse against the payor); see also Restatement (Third) of Suretyship and Guaranty § 44 (stating that guarantor can be discharged if the creditor impairs a guarantor's right of restitution from the principal); Restatement (Third) of Suretyship and Guaranty § 50(1) (stating that a creditor's delay or failure to act against the principal does not discharge the guarantor). {21} | 1 | 1 |
Abshire v. Stollergreen2 sentences1996A managerial employee has been defined “as one who ‘formulates, determines and effectuates his employer’s policies, one with discretion or authority to make ultimate determinations independent of company consideration and approval of’ whether a policy should be adopted.’ ” Id. at 145 , 879 P.2d at 777 (quoting Abshire v. Stoller, 235 Ill.App.3d 849 , 176 Ill.Dec. 559, 565 , 601 N.E.2d 1257, 1263 (1992), appeal denied, 148 Ill.2d 639 , 183 Ill.Dec. 15 , 610 N.E.2d 1259 (1993)). 32. 1996A managerial employee has been defined “as one who ‘formulates, determines and effectuates his employer’s policies, one with discretion or authority to make ultimate determinations independent of company consideration and approval of’ whether a policy should be adopted.’ ” Id. at 145 , 879 P.2d at 777 (quoting Abshire v. Stoller, 235 Ill.App.3d 849 , 176 Ill.Dec. 559, 565 , 601 N.E.2d 1257, 1263 (1992), appeal denied, 148 Ill.2d 639 , 183 Ill.Dec. 15 , 610 N.E.2d 1259 (1993)). 32. | 1 | 1 |
Samedan Oil Corp. v. Neeldgreen2 sentences1994See, e.g., Samedan, 91 N.M. at 601, 603-04 , 577 P.2d at 1245, 1247-48 (Easley, J., dissenting) (implying that Restatement rule of managerial capacity is not applicable in New Mexico). 1994See, e.g., Samedan, 91 N.M. at 601, 603-04 , 577 P.2d at 1245, 1247-48 (Easley, J., dissenting) (implying that Restatement rule of managerial capacity is not applicable in New Mexico). | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. PRICE'S CREAMERIES, DIV., ETC.green2 sentences1985Smith v. Price's Creameries, Division of Creamland Dairies, Inc., 98 N.M. 541, 545 , 650 P.2d 825, 829 (1982). 1985Smith v. Price's Creameries, Division of Creamland Dairies, Inc., 98 N.M. 541, 545 , 650 P.2d 825, 829 (1982). | 1 | 1 |
Pedro Rodriquez Bustamante v. Harold J. Cardwell (Frank A. Eyman), Warden, Arizona State Prisongreen1 sentence1980See Bustamante v. Cardwell, 497 F.2d 556 (9th Cir. 1974); Jackson v. Hutto, 508 F.2d 890 (8th Cir. 1975); People v. Musser, 53 Mich.App. 683 , 219 N.W.2d 781 (1974). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Mexico. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Jackson v. State
green
2 sentences2024Cf. Hovey, 1986-NMSC-069 , ¶ 13 (holding that the Court of Appeals erred in determining that communications with the jury outside of the defendant’s presence were not prejudicial where the trial court’s answers to the jury’s questions improperly characterized the evidence and limited the scope of the jury’s deliberations). {10} The jury instruction submitted on CSP was based on the UJI and set out the elements of the offense, and the jury was instructed that it had to find each element in order to convict. [RP 213] See UJI 14-956A NMRA; see also State v. Ortega, 2014- NMSC-017, ¶ 32, 327 P.3d 2024Cf. Hovey, 1986-NMSC-069 , ¶ 13 (holding that the Court of Appeals erred in determining that communications with the jury outside of the defendant’s presence were not prejudicial where the trial court’s answers to the jury’s questions improperly characterized the evidence and limited the scope of the jury’s deliberations). {10} The jury instruction submitted on CSP was based on the UJI and set out the elements of the offense, and the jury was instructed that it had to find each element in order to convict. [RP 213] See UJI 14-956A NMRA; see also State v. Ortega, 2014- NMSC-017, ¶ 32, 327 P.3d | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Durham v. Guest
green
1 sentence2020Plaintiffs offer no reason why the Restatement’s framework should be rejected here. {39} Plaintiffs argue that our Supreme Court, in Durham, 2009-NMSC-007, ¶ 29 , “held that lack of probable cause is only a required element for an abuse of process claim that occurs at the initiation of a claim.” But this is incorrect; Durham simply held that a plaintiff alleging a procedural impropriety or wrongful use of proceedings (the second type of misuse of process) need not have initiated judicial proceedings. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Famiglietta v. Ivie-Miller Enterprises, Inc.
green
2 sentences2011We begin by examining these two cases. {11} In Famiglietta, two sellers sold a tortilla chip distributorship to a buyer in return for a series of installment payments. 1998-NMCA-155, ¶ 1 , 126 N.M. 69 , 966 P.2d 777 . 2011We begin by examining these two cases. {11} In Famiglietta, two sellers sold a tortilla chip distributorship to a buyer in return for a series of installment payments. 1998-NMCA-155, ¶ 1 , 126 N.M. 69 , 966 P.2d 777 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Solar Age Manufacturing, Inc. v. Employment Security Department
neutral
2 sentences2010Solar Age Mfg., Inc., 103 N.M. at 781-82 , 714 P.2d at 585-86 . 2010Solar Age Mfg., Inc., 103 N.M. at 781-82 , 714 P.2d at 585-86 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Albuquerque Concrete Coring Co. v. Pan Am World Services, Inc.
green
2 sentences1996We adopted the Restatement standard in Albuquerque Concrete, noting that “[w]hen a corporate agent with managerial capacity acts on behalf of the corporation, pursuant to the theoretical underpinnings of the Restatement rule of managerial capacity, his acts are the acts of the corporation; the corporation has participated.” Albuquerque Concrete, 118 N.M. at 146 , 879 P.2d at 778 . 1996We adopted the Restatement standard in Albuquerque Concrete, noting that “[w]hen a corporate agent with managerial capacity acts on behalf of the corporation, pursuant to the theoretical underpinnings of the Restatement rule of managerial capacity, his acts are the acts of the corporation; the corporation has participated.” Albuquerque Concrete, 118 N.M. at 146 , 879 P.2d at 778 . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
State v. McClure
green
2 sentences1986That burden was met in the following: State v. McClure, 94 N.M. 440 , 612 P.2d 232 (Ct.App.1980) (stating that the improper communication was merely a restatement of an instruction previously given); State v. Maes, 81 N.M. 550 , 469 P.2d 529 (Ct.App.1970) (stating that the improper communication was made after the jury was ready to return its verdict). 1986That burden was met in the following: State v. McClure, 94 N.M. 440 , 612 P.2d 232 (Ct.App.1980) (stating that the improper communication was merely a restatement of an instruction previously given); State v. Maes, 81 N.M. 550 , 469 P.2d 529 (Ct.App.1970) (stating that the improper communication was made after the jury was ready to return its verdict). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
State v. Maes
green
2 sentences1986That burden was met in the following: State v. McClure, 94 N.M. 440 , 612 P.2d 232 (Ct.App.1980) (stating that the improper communication was merely a restatement of an instruction previously given); State v. Maes, 81 N.M. 550 , 469 P.2d 529 (Ct.App.1970) (stating that the improper communication was made after the jury was ready to return its verdict). 1986That burden was met in the following: State v. McClure, 94 N.M. 440 , 612 P.2d 232 (Ct.App.1980) (stating that the improper communication was merely a restatement of an instruction previously given); State v. Maes, 81 N.M. 550 , 469 P.2d 529 (Ct.App.1970) (stating that the improper communication was made after the jury was ready to return its verdict). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Langan v. Valicopters, Inc.
green
2 sentences1980Langan v. Valicopters, Inc., 88 Wash.2d 855 , 567 P.2d 218 (1977). 1980Langan v. Valicopters, Inc., 88 Wash.2d 855 , 567 P.2d 218 (1977). | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Samuel S. Jackson v. Terrell Don Hutto, Commissioner, Arkansas Department of Correction
green
1 sentence1980See Bustamante v. Cardwell, 497 F.2d 556 (9th Cir. 1974); Jackson v. Hutto, 508 F.2d 890 (8th Cir. 1975); People v. Musser, 53 Mich.App. 683 , 219 N.W.2d 781 (1974). | 1 | 1980–1980 |
People v. Musser
green
2 sentences1980See Bustamante v. Cardwell, 497 F.2d 556 (9th Cir. 1974); Jackson v. Hutto, 508 F.2d 890 (8th Cir. 1975); People v. Musser, 53 Mich.App. 683 , 219 N.W.2d 781 (1974). 1980See Bustamante v. Cardwell, 497 F.2d 556 (9th Cir. 1974); Jackson v. Hutto, 508 F.2d 890 (8th Cir. 1975); People v. Musser, 53 Mich.App. 683 , 219 N.W.2d 781 (1974). | 1 | 1980–1980 |
MacLeod v. Tribune Publishing Co.
green
2 sentences1970Oregon adopted the Restatement rule in Hinkle v. Alexander, supra, without providing an exception like ours, but said: “In support of the libel per quod.rule it is contended by some, and as partially stated by Justice Traynor, in MacLeod v. Tribune Publishing Co., 1959, 52 Cal.2d 536, 550 , 343 P.2d 36, 43-44 , that the per quod rule protects the news media from vexatious actions for trifling claims of libel. 1970Oregon adopted the Restatement rule in Hinkle v. Alexander, supra, without providing an exception like ours, but said: “In support of the libel per quod.rule it is contended by some, and as partially stated by Justice Traynor, in MacLeod v. Tribune Publishing Co., 1959, 52 Cal.2d 536, 550 , 343 P.2d 36, 43-44 , that the per quod rule protects the news media from vexatious actions for trifling claims of libel. | 1 | 1970–1970 |
United States v. Cook
neutral
1 sentence1916In the case of United States v. Cook, 15 N. M. 124, 103 Pac. 305 , Mr. Chief Justice Mills, of the Territorial Supreme Court, stated the rule.in this regard as follows: “The court has often held that no alleged errors, unless they are jurisdictional, will be considered, except those which ' are set out in the motion for a new trial.” This was but a restatement of the rule laid down in former decisions of the territorial Supreme Court, and has been unformly adhered to by the territorial and state Supreme Court. | 1 | 1916–1916 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.