11 Rhode Island opinions name it 2 courts 1956–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Rhode Island courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Nycal Corp. v. KPMG Peat Marwick LLPgreen2 sentences2006See, e.g., Nycal Corp. v. KPMG Peat Marwick LLP., 688 N.E.2d 1368 , 1372 (Mass. 1998) (the Restatement test "properly balances the indeterminate liability of the foreseeability test and the restrictiveness of the near-privity rule); Badische Corp. v. Caylor, 356 S.E.2d 198 , 200 n. 2 (Ga. 1987) (finding the Restatement to be the appropriate "middle ground"). 2006See, e.g., Nycal Corp. v. KPMG Peat Marwick LLP., 688 N.E.2d 1368 , 1372 (Mass. 1998) (the Restatement test "properly balances the indeterminate liability of the foreseeability test and the restrictiveness of the near-privity rule); Badische Corp. v. Caylor, 356 S.E.2d 198 , 200 n. 2 (Ga. 1987) (finding the Restatement to be the appropriate "middle ground"). | 2 | 2 |
North American Specialty Insurance v. Lapalmegreen2 sentences2019The Restatement rule is set forth in the Restatement (Second) Torts § 552 at 126-27 (1977), as follows: "(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false information for the guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the information. "(2) * * * the liability stated in Subsection (1) is limited t 2019The Restatement rule is set forth in the Restatement (Second) Torts § 552 at 126-27 (1977), as follows: "(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false information for the guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the information. "(2) * * * the liability stated in Subsection (1) is limited t | 1 | 2 |
Bily v. Arthur Young & Co.green2 sentences2019See Raritan River Steel Co. , 367 S.E.2d at 617 ("[The Restatement rule] balances, more so than the other standards, the need to hold accountants to a standard that accounts for their contemporary role in the financial world with the need to protect them from liability that unreasonably exceeds the bounds of their real undertaking."); see also Bily v. Arthur Young & Co. , 3 Cal.4th 370 , 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 51 , 834 P.2d 745 , 769 (1992). 2019See Raritan River Steel Co. , 367 S.E.2d at 617 ("[The Restatement rule] balances, more so than the other standards, the need to hold accountants to a standard that accounts for their contemporary role in the financial world with the need to protect them from liability that unreasonably exceeds the bounds of their real undertaking."); see also Bily v. Arthur Young & Co. , 3 Cal.4th 370 , 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 51 , 834 P.2d 745 , 769 (1992). | 1 | 1 |
Ultramares Corp. v. Touchegreen2 sentences2019Ct. App. 1997) (addressing the reasonable foreseeability rule and the Restatement rule and stating that "[t]he foreseeable class of persons who can be adversely affected by reliance upon a lawyer or accountant's advice or opinion can be so large as to make liability to third parties a ruinous and catastrophic kind, a burden that cannot reasonably be imposed on the lawyer or the accountant except for fraud or other intentional misconduct") (quoting Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 107 at 747 (5th ed. 1984) ); cf. Ultramares , 174 N.E. at 444 (stating, in adopting the near-privity rule, 2019Ct. App. 1997) (addressing the reasonable foreseeability rule and the Restatement rule and stating that "[t]he foreseeable class of persons who can be adversely affected by reliance upon a lawyer or accountant's advice or opinion can be so large as to make liability to third parties a ruinous and catastrophic kind, a burden that cannot reasonably be imposed on the lawyer or the accountant except for fraud or other intentional misconduct") (quoting Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 107 at 747 (5th ed. 1984) ); cf. Ultramares , 174 N.E. at 444 (stating, in adopting the near-privity rule, | 1 | 1 |
Raritan River Steel Co. v. Cherry, Bekaert & Hollandgreen2 sentences2019See Raritan River Steel Co. , 367 S.E.2d at 617 ("[The Restatement rule] balances, more so than the other standards, the need to hold accountants to a standard that accounts for their contemporary role in the financial world with the need to protect them from liability that unreasonably exceeds the bounds of their real undertaking."); see also Bily v. Arthur Young & Co. , 3 Cal.4th 370 , 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 51 , 834 P.2d 745 , 769 (1992). 2019See Raritan River Steel Co. , 367 S.E.2d at 617 ("[The Restatement rule] balances, more so than the other standards, the need to hold accountants to a standard that accounts for their contemporary role in the financial world with the need to protect them from liability that unreasonably exceeds the bounds of their real undertaking."); see also Bily v. Arthur Young & Co. , 3 Cal.4th 370 , 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 51 , 834 P.2d 745 , 769 (1992). | 1 | 1 |
Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levingreen2 sentences2006See id. 2006See id. | 1 | 1 |
Crosby v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2004See Crosby v. United States, 48 F.Supp.2d 924, 926 (D.Alaska 1999). 8 . 2004See Crosby v. United States, 48 F.Supp.2d 924, 926 (D.Alaska 1999). 8 . | 1 | 1 |
People Ex Rel. Resnik v. Curtis & Davis, Architects & Planners, Inc.green2 sentences1999Group , 916 F.2d 637 , 640 (11th Cir. 1990); see People v. Curtis Davis, Architects Planners, Inc. , 400 N.E.2d 918 , 920 (Ill. 1980) (the intention of the parties, as evidenced by the contract, determines whether or not a third-party beneficiary may sue.) In People v. Curtis Davis, Architects Planners, Inc. , 400 N.E.2d 918 , 920 (Ill. 1980), the Illinois Supreme Court found that the State of Illinois was an intended third-party beneficiary of a contract executed by the Illinois Building Authority and several architects. 1999Group , 916 F.2d 637 , 640 (11th Cir. 1990); see People v. Curtis Davis, Architects Planners, Inc. , 400 N.E.2d 918 , 920 (Ill. 1980) (the intention of the parties, as evidenced by the contract, determines whether or not a third-party beneficiary may sue.) In People v. Curtis Davis, Architects Planners, Inc. , 400 N.E.2d 918 , 920 (Ill. 1980), the Illinois Supreme Court found that the State of Illinois was an intended third-party beneficiary of a contract executed by the Illinois Building Authority and several architects. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Rhode Island. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Forcier v. Cardello
green
2 sentences2004In determining whether a third party beneficiary is intended or incidental, the Rhode Island courts apply the test set forth in Section 302 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, which states: "(1) Unless otherwise agreed between promisor and promisee, a beneficiary of a promise is an intended beneficiary if recognition of a right to performance in the beneficiary is appropriate to effectuate the intention of the parties and either (a) the performance of the promise will satisfy an obligation of the promisee to pay money to the beneficiary; or (b) the circumstances indicate that the promise 2004In determining whether a third party beneficiary is intended or incidental, the Rhode Island courts apply the test set forth in Section 302 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, which states: "(1) Unless otherwise agreed between promisor and promisee, a beneficiary of a promise is an intended beneficiary if recognition of a right to performance in the beneficiary is appropriate to effectuate the intention of the parties and either (a) the performance of the promise will satisfy an obligation of the promisee to pay money to the beneficiary; or (b) the circumstances indicate that the promise | 2 | 1999–2004 |
Contois v. Town of West Warwick
green
2 sentences2012However, this Court has not adopted the more “relaxed” standards set forth in §§ 323 and 324 of the restatement, which speak also to the issue of proximate causation, and we decline to do so in the context of this appeal. 19 See Contois v. Town of West Warwick, 865 A.2d 1019 , 1024 n. 7 (R.I.2004) (“The Restatement standard [under § 323] is extremely relaxed, allowing for recovery *1260 when a defendant’s negligence increased the risk of harm by any degree.”). 2012However, this Court has not adopted the more “relaxed” standards set forth in §§ 323 and 324 of the restatement, which speak also to the issue of proximate causation, and we decline to do so in the context of this appeal. 19 See Contois v. Town of West Warwick, 865 A.2d 1019 , 1024 n. 7 (R.I.2004) (“The Restatement standard [under § 323] is extremely relaxed, allowing for recovery *1260 when a defendant’s negligence increased the risk of harm by any degree.”). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Danziger v. Ford Motor Co.
green
2 sentences2010Circuit has looked to the Restatement factors in applying D.C. [choice of] law." Id. 11 This Court acknowledges that although the Barbara's Sales Court analyzed all interested states under the most significant relationship test, the certified question on interlocutory appeal ultimately constrained that court from selecting a proper forum other than California and Illinois. 2010Circuit has looked to the Restatement factors in applying D.C. [choice of] law." Id. 11 This Court acknowledges that although the Barbara's Sales Court analyzed all interested states under the most significant relationship test, the certified question on interlocutory appeal ultimately constrained that court from selecting a proper forum other than California and Illinois. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Bowen Court Associates v. Ernst & Young, LLP
green
2 sentences2006Bowen Court Assocs. v. Ernst Young, 818 A.2d 721 , 728 n. 2 (R.I. 2003); see Carl Pacini et. al., At the Interface of Law and Accounting: An Examination of a Trend Toward a Reduction in the Scope of Auditor Liability to Third Parties in the Common Law Countries, 37 Am. 2006Bowen Court Assocs. v. Ernst Young, 818 A.2d 721 , 728 n. 2 (R.I. 2003); see Carl Pacini et. al., At the Interface of Law and Accounting: An Examination of a Trend Toward a Reduction in the Scope of Auditor Liability to Third Parties in the Common Law Countries, 37 Am. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Badische Corp. v. Caylor
green
2 sentences2006See, e.g., Nycal Corp. v. KPMG Peat Marwick LLP., 688 N.E.2d 1368 , 1372 (Mass. 1998) (the Restatement test "properly balances the indeterminate liability of the foreseeability test and the restrictiveness of the near-privity rule); Badische Corp. v. Caylor, 356 S.E.2d 198 , 200 n. 2 (Ga. 1987) (finding the Restatement to be the appropriate "middle ground"). 2006See, e.g., Nycal Corp. v. KPMG Peat Marwick LLP., 688 N.E.2d 1368 , 1372 (Mass. 1998) (the Restatement test "properly balances the indeterminate liability of the foreseeability test and the restrictiveness of the near-privity rule); Badische Corp. v. Caylor, 356 S.E.2d 198 , 200 n. 2 (Ga. 1987) (finding the Restatement to be the appropriate "middle ground"). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Haddad v. First National Stores, Inc.
green
2 sentences2003When, however, he knows or should know that children are likely to [be present] upon a part of the property on which he maintains an artificial condition which is likely to be dangerous to them, he may be hable for the harm resulting to them.” Haddad, 109 R.I. at 64 , 280 A.2d at 96 . 2003When, however, he knows or should know that children are likely to [be present] upon a part of the property on which he maintains an artificial condition which is likely to be dangerous to them, he may be hable for the harm resulting to them.” Haddad, 109 R.I. at 64 , 280 A.2d at 96 . | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Blu-J, Inc. v. Kemper C.P.A. Group
green
2 sentences1999Group , 916 F.2d 637 , 640 (11th Cir. 1990); see People v. Curtis Davis, Architects Planners, Inc. , 400 N.E.2d 918 , 920 (Ill. 1980) (the intention of the parties, as evidenced by the contract, determines whether or not a third-party beneficiary may sue.) In People v. Curtis Davis, Architects Planners, Inc. , 400 N.E.2d 918 , 920 (Ill. 1980), the Illinois Supreme Court found that the State of Illinois was an intended third-party beneficiary of a contract executed by the Illinois Building Authority and several architects. 1999Group , 916 F.2d 637 , 640 (11th Cir. 1990); see People v. Curtis Davis, Architects Planners, Inc. , 400 N.E.2d 918 , 920 (Ill. 1980) (the intention of the parties, as evidenced by the contract, determines whether or not a third-party beneficiary may sue.) In People v. Curtis Davis, Architects Planners, Inc. , 400 N.E.2d 918 , 920 (Ill. 1980), the Illinois Supreme Court found that the State of Illinois was an intended third-party beneficiary of a contract executed by the Illinois Building Authority and several architects. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Russell v. Books
green
2 sentences1987Id. 1987Id. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Haddad v. Clark
neutral
2 sentences1969Cohen v. Vivian, 141 Colo. 443 , 349 P.2d 366 ; Donovan v. Aeolian Co., 270 N.Y. 267 , 200 N.E. 815 ; Haddad v. Clark, 132 Conn. 229 , 43 A.2d 221 ; Johnson v. Metropolitan Ins. 1969Cohen v. Vivian, 141 Colo. 443 , 349 P.2d 366 ; Donovan v. Aeolian Co., 270 N.Y. 267 , 200 N.E. 815 ; Haddad v. Clark, 132 Conn. 229 , 43 A.2d 221 ; Johnson v. Metropolitan Ins. | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Donovan v. Aeolian Co.
green
2 sentences1969Cohen v. Vivian, 141 Colo. 443 , 349 P.2d 366 ; Donovan v. Aeolian Co., 270 N.Y. 267 , 200 N.E. 815 ; Haddad v. Clark, 132 Conn. 229 , 43 A.2d 221 ; Johnson v. Metropolitan Ins. 1969Cohen v. Vivian, 141 Colo. 443 , 349 P.2d 366 ; Donovan v. Aeolian Co., 270 N.Y. 267 , 200 N.E. 815 ; Haddad v. Clark, 132 Conn. 229 , 43 A.2d 221 ; Johnson v. Metropolitan Ins. | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Cohen v. Vivian
green
2 sentences1969Cohen v. Vivian, 141 Colo. 443 , 349 P.2d 366 ; Donovan v. Aeolian Co., 270 N.Y. 267 , 200 N.E. 815 ; Haddad v. Clark, 132 Conn. 229 , 43 A.2d 221 ; Johnson v. Metropolitan Ins. 1969Cohen v. Vivian, 141 Colo. 443 , 349 P.2d 366 ; Donovan v. Aeolian Co., 270 N.Y. 267 , 200 N.E. 815 ; Haddad v. Clark, 132 Conn. 229 , 43 A.2d 221 ; Johnson v. Metropolitan Ins. | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Universal Concrete Pipe Co. v. Bassett
green
2 sentences1956We are in agreement with the following statement in Universal Concrete Pipe Co. v. Bassett, 130 Ohio St. 567 , at page 580: “A party is either guilty of wanton misconduct or he is not, and to permit a litigant to' gamble with wanton misconduct until he sees he is going to lose, then fall back upon his action for ordinary negligence is subjecting the party sued to a hardship the law never intended.” Had the plaintiff in each case intended to rely upon the Restatement rule of discovered peril, she should have asked the superior court for permission to amend the declaration by adding a count base 1956We are in agreement with the following statement in Universal Concrete Pipe Co. v. Bassett, 130 Ohio St. 567 , at page 580: “A party is either guilty of wanton misconduct or he is not, and to permit a litigant to' gamble with wanton misconduct until he sees he is going to lose, then fall back upon his action for ordinary negligence is subjecting the party sued to a hardship the law never intended.” Had the plaintiff in each case intended to rely upon the Restatement rule of discovered peril, she should have asked the superior court for permission to amend the declaration by adding a count base | 1 | 1956–1956 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.