39 New York opinions name it 8 courts 1900–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's v. Foster Wheeler Corp.green2 sentences2024Unlike here, the claims at issue in Foster Wheeler were in many states so it was understandable why the First Department deviated from the typical "center of gravity" analysis to ensure "certainty, predictability and uniformity." ( 36 AD3d at 23 .) Zurich relies on two First Department decisions, issued after Foster Wheeler, that analyzed all the Restatement factors in the context of additional insureds added to policies to insure risks in specific locations, despite the presence of multistate risks. 2024Unlike here, the claims at issue in Foster Wheeler were in many states so it was understandable why the First Department deviated from the typical "center of gravity" analysis to ensure "certainty, predictability and uniformity." ( 36 AD3d at 23 .) Zurich relies on two First Department decisions, issued after Foster Wheeler, that analyzed all the Restatement factors in the context of additional insureds added to policies to insure risks in specific locations, despite the presence of multistate risks. | 1 | 2 |
Sinn v. Burdgreen1 sentence2021“The touchstone” of that test “is not a rigid requirement of sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident” or strict relational criteria, “but rather” whether there is a “reasonable foreseeability that the plaintiff-witness would suffer emotional harm” (Tommy’s Elbow Room, Inc. v Kavorkian, 727 P2d 1038, 1043 [Alaska 1986]; accord Leong, 55 Haw at 408; Sinn v Burd, 486 Pa 146, 172-173173, 404 A2d 672, 686 [1979]; Wages v First Nat. | 1 | 1 |
Jones v. City of Houstongreen1 sentence2021La Chusa, 48 Cal 3d at 647 [allowing bystanders “closely related” to direct victims to recover for “emotional distress beyond that which would be anticipated in a disinterested witness”]; Jones v City of Houston, 294 SW3d 917, 920 [Tex App 2009] [allowing bystanders who have “suffered shock as a result of a direct emotional impact” and are “closely related” to the direct victim to recover]; Cameron v Pepin, 610 A2d 279, 284-285 [Me 1992] [requiring that the plaintiff be “closely related to the victim”]; Satchfield v R.R. | 1 | 1 |
Cameron v. Pepingreen1 sentence2021La Chusa, 48 Cal 3d at 647 [allowing bystanders “closely related” to direct victims to recover for “emotional distress beyond that which would be anticipated in a disinterested witness”]; Jones v City of Houston, 294 SW3d 917, 920 [Tex App 2009] [allowing bystanders who have “suffered shock as a result of a direct emotional impact” and are “closely related” to the direct victim to recover]; Cameron v Pepin, 610 A2d 279, 284-285 [Me 1992] [requiring that the plaintiff be “closely related to the victim”]; Satchfield v R.R. | 1 | 1 |
Tommy's Elbow Room, Inc. v. Kavorkiangreen1 sentence2021“The touchstone” of that test “is not a rigid requirement of sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident” or strict relational criteria, “but rather” whether there is a “reasonable foreseeability that the plaintiff-witness would suffer emotional harm” (Tommy’s Elbow Room, Inc. v Kavorkian, 727 P2d 1038, 1043 [Alaska 1986]; accord Leong, 55 Haw at 408; Sinn v Burd, 486 Pa 146, 172-173173, 404 A2d 672, 686 [1979]; Wages v First Nat. | 1 | 1 |
Wolfgang Doerr v. Daniel Goldsmith / Cheryl Dobinski v. George O. Lockhartgreen2 sentences2017Although “the Restatement rule . . . does not treat a domestic pet’s untrammeled wanderings as actionable negligence” in all cases (Doerr, 25 NY3d at 1137 [Abdus-Salaam, J., concurring], citing Restatement [Second] of Torts § 518, Comment j), the Restatement does recognize that “[t]here may ... be circumstances under which it w[ould] be negligent to permit an animal to run at large, even though it is of a kind that customarily is allowed to do so [e.g., a dog] and under other circumstances there would be no negligence” (Restatement [Second] of Torts § 518, Comment ⅞). 2017Although “the Restatement rule . . . does not treat a domestic pet’s untrammeled wanderings as actionable negligence” in all cases (Doerr, 25 NY3d at 1137 [Abdus-Salaam, J., concurring], citing Restatement [Second] of Torts § 518, Comment j), the Restatement does recognize that “[t]here may ... be circumstances under which it w[ould] be negligent to permit an animal to run at large, even though it is of a kind that customarily is allowed to do so [e.g., a dog] and under other circumstances there would be no negligence” (Restatement [Second] of Torts § 518, Comment ⅞). | 1 | 1 |
Benoit v. . Troy Lansingburgh R.R. Co.green1 sentence2015Co., 154 NY 223, 225-227 [1897]) and which, as the Bard dissent conceded (see Bard, 6 NY3d at 601-602 [Smith, J., dissenting]), could be read as either implicitly supporting (see Hyland, 252 NY at 326-327 ) or rejecting (see Vrooman v Lawyer, 13 Johns 339, 339 [1816]; Kennett, 286 NY at 624 ; Brown, 303 NY at 728 ) the Restatement's rule. | 1 | 1 |
Bard v. Jahnkegreen1 sentence2015Co., 154 NY 223, 225-227 [1897]) and which, as the Bard dissent conceded (see Bard, 6 NY3d at 601-602 [Smith, J., dissenting]), could be read as either implicitly supporting (see Hyland, 252 NY at 326-327 ) or rejecting (see Vrooman v Lawyer, 13 Johns 339, 339 [1816]; Kennett, 286 NY at 624 ; Brown, 303 NY at 728 ) the Restatement's rule. | 1 | 1 |
Liberman v. Gelsteingreen2 sentences2013We have made clear that New York follows the Restatement rule (Liberman v Gelstein, 80 NY2d 429, 437 [1992]). 2013We have made clear that New York follows the Restatement rule (Liberman v Gelstein, 80 NY2d 429, 437 [1992]). | 1 | 1 |
Chapman v. Labonegreen2 sentences2013As Hall implies, the common interest privilege protects defendants in cases involving the allegedly defamatory reporting of test results (see Chapman v Labone, 460 F Supp 2d 989, 1003 [SD Iowa 2006] [interpreting Iowa law to establish a privilege for a laboratory conducting a random drug test of an employee of Union Pacific Railroad]). 2013As Hall implies, the common interest privilege protects defendants in cases involving the allegedly defamatory reporting of test results (see Chapman v Labone, 460 F Supp 2d 989, 1003 [SD Iowa 2006] [interpreting Iowa law to establish a privilege for a laboratory conducting a random drug test of an employee of Union Pacific Railroad]). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Santanagreen2 sentences2007No New York appellate court has discussed this issue, although our colleagues in the Appellate Division, First Department, appear to have accepted the Restatement rule (see GRG Group v Ravenal, 247 AD2d 201, 202 [1998]). 2007No New York appellate court has discussed this issue, although our colleagues in the Appellate Division, First Department, appear to have accepted the Restatement rule (see GRG Group v Ravenal, 247 AD2d 201, 202 [1998]). | 1 | 1 |
| Bodah v. Lakeville Motor Express, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Rotz v. City of New Yorkgreen | 1 | 1 |
| London v. Meryashgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Putnam v. Stout
green
2 sentences1986In Putnam v Stout (supra), the court adopted the Restatement’s exception to this general rule where the lessor has contracted to keep the land in repair (see, Restatement [Second] of Torts § 357 [1965]). 1981Thus, a prima facie case was made against the lessor under the holding of Putnam v Stout ( 38 NY2d 607, 611 ), which adopted the Restatement rule: “‘A lessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to his lessee and others upon the land with the consent of the lessee or his sublessee by a condition of disrepair existing before or arising after the lessee has taken possession if (a) the lessor, as such, has contracted by a covenant in the lease or otherwise, to keep the land in repair; and (b) the disrepair creates an unreasonable risk to persons upon the land which the perform | 2 | 1981–1986 |
Dickson v. . McCoy
green
2 sentences2015The horse was young and playful, rather than vicious in nature, but this Court deemed an allegation of harmful propensities to be unnecessary (see Dickson, 39 NY at 401 ) and affirmed the trial court’s judgment premised on a negligence-based jury verdict in the plaintiff’s favor (see id. at 403 ). 2015The horse was young and playful, rather than vicious in nature, but this Court deemed an allegation of harmful propensities to be unnecessary (see Dickson, 39 NY at 401 ) and affirmed the trial court’s judgment premised on a negligence-based jury verdict in the plaintiff’s favor (see id. at 403 ). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Kennet v. Sossnitz
green
2 sentences2015Co., 154 NY 223, 225-227 [1897]) and which, as the Bard dissent conceded (see Bard, 6 NY3d at 601-602 [Smith, J., dissenting]), could be read as either implicitly supporting (see Hyland, 252 NY at 326-327 ) or rejecting (see Vrooman v Lawyer, 13 Johns 339, 339 [1816]; Kennett, 286 NY at 624 ; Brown, 303 NY at 728 ) the Restatement's rule. 2015Smith, J., dissenting]), could be read as either implicitly supporting (see Hyland, 252 NY at 326-327 ) or rejecting (see Vrooman v Lawyer, 13 Johns 339, 339 [1816]; Rennet, 286 NY at 624 ; Brown, 303 NY at 728 ) the Restatement’s rule. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Hyland v. Cobb
green
2 sentences2015Co., 154 NY 223, 225-227 [1897]) and which, as the Bard dissent conceded (see Bard, 6 NY3d at 601-602 [Smith, J., dissenting]), could be read as either implicitly supporting (see Hyland, 252 NY at 326-327 ) or rejecting (see Vrooman v Lawyer, 13 Johns 339, 339 [1816]; Kennett, 286 NY at 624 ; Brown, 303 NY at 728 ) the Restatement's rule. 2015Smith, J., dissenting]), could be read as either implicitly supporting (see Hyland, 252 NY at 326-327 ) or rejecting (see Vrooman v Lawyer, 13 Johns 339, 339 [1816]; Rennet, 286 NY at 624 ; Brown, 303 NY at 728 ) the Restatement’s rule. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Brown v. Willard
green
2 sentences2015Co., 154 NY 223, 225-227 [1897]) and which, as the Bard dissent conceded (see Bard, 6 NY3d at 601-602 [Smith, J., dissenting]), could be read as either implicitly supporting (see Hyland, 252 NY at 326-327 ) or rejecting (see Vrooman v Lawyer, 13 Johns 339, 339 [1816]; Kennett, 286 NY at 624 ; Brown, 303 NY at 728 ) the Restatement's rule. 2015Smith, J., dissenting]), could be read as either implicitly supporting (see Hyland, 252 NY at 326-327 ) or rejecting (see Vrooman v Lawyer, 13 Johns 339, 339 [1816]; Rennet, 286 NY at 624 ; Brown, 303 NY at 728 ) the Restatement’s rule. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Bloomer v. Shauger
green
2 sentences2015The plaintiff reiterated this point in his reply brief (see reply brief for plaintiff-appellant in Bloomer, 21 NY3d 917 [2013], available at 2013 WL 3818045 , *1-3). 2015The plaintiff reiterated this point in his reply brief (see reply brief for plaintiff-appellant in Bloomer, 21 NY3d 917 [2013], available at 2013 WL 3818045 , *1-3). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Schoepflin v. . Coffey
green
2 sentences2010We seemed to adopt the Restatement rule in Karaduman v Newsday, Inc. ( 51 NY2d 531 , 541 n 2 [1980]), where we strongly implied that the original publishers of a libel could be “found legally responsible for the republication” if they had “participated in the original publication with ... a reasonable expectation that republication was likely.” But today the majority rejects this rule in favor of one followed in two older cases, Schoepflin v Coffey ( 162 NY 12 [1900]) and Macy v New York World-Tel. 2010We seemed to adopt the Restatement rule in Karaduman v Newsday, Inc. ( 51 NY2d 531 , 541 n 2 [1980]), where we strongly implied that the original publishers of a libel could be “found legally responsible for the republication” if they had “participated in the original publication with ... a reasonable expectation that republication was likely.” But today the majority rejects this rule in favor of one followed in two older cases, Schoepflin v Coffey ( 162 NY 12 [1900]) and Macy v New York World-Tel. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Macy v. New York World-Telegram Corp.
green
2 sentences2010Corp. ( 2 NY2d 416 [1957]): that one who defames another is not liable for repetition of the defamation without his consent by persons he does not control. 2010Corp. ( 2 NY2d 416 [1957]): that one who defames another is not liable for repetition of the defamation without his consent by persons he does not control. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Karaduman v. Newsday, Inc.
green
2 sentences2010We seemed to adopt the Restatement rule in Karaduman v Newsday, Inc. ( 51 NY2d 531 , 541 n 2 [1980]), where we strongly implied that the original publishers of a libel could be “found legally responsible for the republication” if they had “participated in the original publication with ... a reasonable expectation that republication was likely.” But today the majority rejects this rule in favor of one followed in two older cases, Schoepflin v Coffey ( 162 NY 12 [1900]) and Macy v New York World-Tel. 2010We seemed to adopt the Restatement rule in Karaduman v Newsday, Inc. ( 51 NY2d 531 , 541 n 2 [1980]), where we strongly implied that the original publishers of a libel could be “found legally responsible for the republication” if they had “participated in the original publication with ... a reasonable expectation that republication was likely.” But today the majority rejects this rule in favor of one followed in two older cases, Schoepflin v Coffey ( 162 NY 12 [1900]) and Macy v New York World-Tel. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
D'Amico v. Christie
green
2 sentences2009The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 317 posits that an employer has a duty to control the conduct of an employee, even outside the scope of employment, where the employee “is using a chattel of the master.” Even if the courts of this State were to adopt this Restatement rule (see D’Amico v Christie, 71 NY2d at 88 ), it is applicable only where, inter alia, the employer “knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising such control” (Restatement [Second] of Torts § 317). 2009The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 317 posits that an employer has a duty to control the conduct of an employee, even outside the scope of employment, where the employee “is using a chattel of the master.” Even if the courts of this State were to adopt this Restatement rule (see D’Amico v Christie, 71 NY2d at 88 ), it is applicable only where, inter alia, the employer “knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising such control” (Restatement [Second] of Torts § 317). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Malloy v. Trombley
green
2 sentences2008In Malloy v Trombley ( 50 NY2d 46 [1980]), however, we departed from the Restatement rule. 2008In Malloy v Trombley ( 50 NY2d 46 [1980]), however, we departed from the Restatement rule. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Zurich Insurance v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Duren v. Kunkel
green
2 sentences2006White v Leeder, 149 Wis 2d 948 , 440 NW2d 557 [1989]; Duren v Kunkel, 814 SW2d 935 [Mo 1991] [en banc]; Gardner v Koenig, 188 Kan 135, 360 P2d 1107 [1961]; Sybesma v Sybesma, 534 NW2d 355 [SD 1995]). * The only court outside New York to have ruled otherwise, so far as I know, is the Georgia Court of Appeals (Testamentary Trust of Moseley v Barnes, 245 Ga App 817, 538 SE2d 873 [2000]). 2006White v Leeder, 149 Wis 2d 948 , 440 NW2d 557 [1989]; Duren v Kunkel, 814 SW2d 935 [Mo 1991] [en banc]; Gardner v Koenig, 188 Kan 135, 360 P2d 1107 [1961]; Sybesma v Sybesma, 534 NW2d 355 [SD 1995]). * The only court outside New York to have ruled otherwise, so far as I know, is the Georgia Court of Appeals (Testamentary Trust of Moseley v Barnes, 245 Ga App 817, 538 SE2d 873 [2000]). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Ken Cowden Chevrolet, Inc v. Corts
green
2 sentences2006The states adopting the Restatement rule are Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi and Wisconsin (see Ken Cowden Chevrolet, Inc. v Corts, 112 Mich App 570 , 316 NW2d 259 [1982]; Holmberg v Bergin, 285 Minn 250, 172 NW2d 739 [1969], supra; Griefield v Gibraltar Fire & Mar. 2006The states adopting the Restatement rule are Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi and Wisconsin (see Ken Cowden Chevrolet, Inc. v Corts, 112 Mich App 570 , 316 NW2d 259 [1982]; Holmberg v Bergin, 285 Minn 250, 172 NW2d 739 [1969], supra; Griefield v Gibraltar Fire & Mar. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Testamentary Trust of Moseley v. Barnes
green
2 sentences2006White v Leeder, 149 Wis 2d 948 , 440 NW2d 557 [1989]; Duren v Kunkel, 814 SW2d 935 [Mo 1991] [en banc]; Gardner v Koenig, 188 Kan 135, 360 P2d 1107 [1961]; Sybesma v Sybesma, 534 NW2d 355 [SD 1995]). * The only court outside New York to have ruled otherwise, so far as I know, is the Georgia Court of Appeals (Testamentary Trust of Moseley v Barnes, 245 Ga App 817, 538 SE2d 873 [2000]). 2006White v Leeder, 149 Wis 2d 948 , 440 NW2d 557 [1989]; Duren v Kunkel, 814 SW2d 935 [Mo 1991] [en banc]; Gardner v Koenig, 188 Kan 135, 360 P2d 1107 [1961]; Sybesma v Sybesma, 534 NW2d 355 [SD 1995]). * The only court outside New York to have ruled otherwise, so far as I know, is the Georgia Court of Appeals (Testamentary Trust of Moseley v Barnes, 245 Ga App 817, 538 SE2d 873 [2000]). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Collier v. Zambito
green
2 sentences2006Our most recent case involving animal-inflicted injuries, Collier v Zambito ( 1 NY3d 444 [2004]), did not address the question of whether general negligence principles were applicable in such cases. 2006Our most recent case involving animal-inflicted injuries, Collier v Zambito ( 1 NY3d 444 [2004]), did not address the question of whether general negligence principles were applicable in such cases. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Fireman's Fund Insurance v. Schuster Films, Inc.
green
1 sentence2006Stated otherwise, the choice-of-law analysis is not “a mindless scavenger hunt to see which state can be found to have more contacts, but rather ... an effort to detect and analyze what interest the competing states have in enforcing their respective rules” (Fireman’s Fund, 811 F Supp at 984 ). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Gardner v. Koenig
green
2 sentences2006White v Leeder, 149 Wis 2d 948 , 440 NW2d 557 [1989]; Duren v Kunkel, 814 SW2d 935 [Mo 1991] [en banc]; Gardner v Koenig, 188 Kan 135, 360 P2d 1107 [1961]; Sybesma v Sybesma, 534 NW2d 355 [SD 1995]). * The only court outside New York to have ruled otherwise, so far as I know, is the Georgia Court of Appeals (Testamentary Trust of Moseley v Barnes, 245 Ga App 817, 538 SE2d 873 [2000]). 2006White v Leeder, 149 Wis 2d 948 , 440 NW2d 557 [1989]; Duren v Kunkel, 814 SW2d 935 [Mo 1991] [en banc]; Gardner v Koenig, 188 Kan 135, 360 P2d 1107 [1961]; Sybesma v Sybesma, 534 NW2d 355 [SD 1995]). * The only court outside New York to have ruled otherwise, so far as I know, is the Georgia Court of Appeals (Testamentary Trust of Moseley v Barnes, 245 Ga App 817, 538 SE2d 873 [2000]). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Holmberg v. Bergin
green
1 sentence2006The states adopting the Restatement rule are Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi and Wisconsin (see Ken Cowden Chevrolet, Inc. v Corts, 112 Mich App 570 , 316 NW2d 259 [1982]; Holmberg v Bergin, 285 Minn 250, 172 NW2d 739 [1969], supra; Griefield v Gibraltar Fire & Mar. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
White v. Leeder
green
2 sentences2006White v Leeder, 149 Wis 2d 948 , 440 NW2d 557 [1989]; Duren v Kunkel, 814 SW2d 935 [Mo 1991] [en banc]; Gardner v Koenig, 188 Kan 135, 360 P2d 1107 [1961]; Sybesma v Sybesma, 534 NW2d 355 [SD 1995]). * The only court outside New York to have ruled otherwise, so far as I know, is the Georgia Court of Appeals (Testamentary Trust of Moseley v Barnes, 245 Ga App 817, 538 SE2d 873 [2000]). 2006White v Leeder, 149 Wis 2d 948 , 440 NW2d 557 [1989]; Duren v Kunkel, 814 SW2d 935 [Mo 1991] [en banc]; Gardner v Koenig, 188 Kan 135, 360 P2d 1107 [1961]; Sybesma v Sybesma, 534 NW2d 355 [SD 1995]). * The only court outside New York to have ruled otherwise, so far as I know, is the Georgia Court of Appeals (Testamentary Trust of Moseley v Barnes, 245 Ga App 817, 538 SE2d 873 [2000]). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Sybesma v. Sybesma green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Busse v. Motorola, Inc. green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Bodah v. Lakeville Motor Express, Inc. green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| LAVON PHILLIPS v. MARY K. GRENDAHL ECON CONTROL, INC., DOING BUSINESS AS SHERLOCK INFORMATION SYSTEM MCDOWELL INVESTIGATIONS, — green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| In re Laura W. neutral | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Nykanen v. City of New York neutral | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| John R. Dudley Construction, Inc. v. Drott Manufacturing Co. green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| O'Connor v. G&R Packing Co. green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| MacLeod v. MacLeod green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Wilburn v. Wilburn green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Beggs v. McCrea green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Werking v. Amity Estates, Inc. green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Goldstein v. New York Life Insurance green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Mackowiak v. Polish Union of America neutral | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Haag v. Barnes green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Intercontinental Planning, Ltd. v. Daystrom Inc. green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Auten v. Auten green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Rubin v. Irving Trust Co. green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.