13 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1923–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Brown v. Stategreen2 sentences2022This is but a restatement of the principle that circumstantial evidence is sufficient to establish value.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Brown v. State, 237 Ga. App. 231, 232 (1) ( 517 SE2d 529 ) (1999). 2022This is but a restatement of the principle that circumstantial evidence is sufficient to establish value.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Brown v. State, 237 Ga. App. 231, 232 (1) ( 517 SE2d 529 ) (1999). | 1 | 1 |
Cook v. Stategreen2 sentences2010See also 6 LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 11.2 (f), p. 98 (4th ed. 2004) (noting that “[i]n those jurisdictions where the prosecution may take an interlocutory appeal, it is quite proper to view the failure to appeal as rendering the pretrial order [granting the motion to suppress] a final determination and res judicata, so that the order would be binding even in the event of a dismissal and reinstitution of the charges”) (punctuation and footnote omitted). 7 The result reached in this case is consistent with OCGA § 17-5-30 (b), which provides that if a motion to suppress is granted, the suppre 2010See also 6 LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 11.2 (f), p. 98 (4th ed. 2004) (noting that “[i]n those jurisdictions where the prosecution may take an interlocutory appeal, it is quite proper to view the failure to appeal as rendering the pretrial order [granting the motion to suppress] a final determination and res judicata, so that the order would be binding even in the event of a dismissal and reinstitution of the charges”) (punctuation and footnote omitted). 7 The result reached in this case is consistent with OCGA § 17-5-30 (b), which provides that if a motion to suppress is granted, the suppre | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Williamsgreen1 sentence2010See Briggs v. Dept. of Public Safety, 732 P2d 1078, 1081-1083 (III) (Alaska 1987) (applying Restatement factors to hold that, *722 where state did not appeal suppression ruling, it was collaterally estopped from relitigating the suppression issue); Illinois v. Williams, 322 NE2d 461 (Ill. 1976) (where state did not appeal from suppression order, but dismissed indictment with leave to reinstate, state was barred under doctrine of collateral estoppel from using suppressed evidence in the prosecution under the second indictment); Commonwealth v. Williams, 725 NE2d 217, 219-222 (1) (Mass. 2000) (w | 1 | 1 |
Briggs v. State, Department of Public Safety, Division of Motor Vehiclesgreen1 sentence2010See Briggs v. Dept. of Public Safety, 732 P2d 1078, 1081-1083 (III) (Alaska 1987) (applying Restatement factors to hold that, *722 where state did not appeal suppression ruling, it was collaterally estopped from relitigating the suppression issue); Illinois v. Williams, 322 NE2d 461 (Ill. 1976) (where state did not appeal from suppression order, but dismissed indictment with leave to reinstate, state was barred under doctrine of collateral estoppel from using suppressed evidence in the prosecution under the second indictment); Commonwealth v. Williams, 725 NE2d 217, 219-222 (1) (Mass. 2000) (w | 1 | 1 |
Rome Industries, Inc. v. Jonssongreen2 sentences1998Rome Indus, v. Jonsson, 202 Ga. App. 682, 684 ( 415 SE2d 651 ) (1992); U3S Corp. of America v. Parker, 202 Ga. App. 374, 379 ( 414 SE2d 513 ) (1991). 1998Rome Indus, v. Jonsson, 202 Ga. App. 682, 684 ( 415 SE2d 651 ) (1992); U3S Corp. of America v. Parker, 202 Ga. App. 374, 379 ( 414 SE2d 513 ) (1991). | 1 | 1 |
U3S Corp. of America v. Parkergreen2 sentences1998Rome Indus, v. Jonsson, 202 Ga. App. 682, 684 ( 415 SE2d 651 ) (1992); U3S Corp. of America v. Parker, 202 Ga. App. 374, 379 ( 414 SE2d 513 ) (1991). 1998Rome Indus, v. Jonsson, 202 Ga. App. 682, 684 ( 415 SE2d 651 ) (1992); U3S Corp. of America v. Parker, 202 Ga. App. 374, 379 ( 414 SE2d 513 ) (1991). | 1 | 1 |
Gibbons v. Stategreen2 sentences1987Joyner v. State, 208 Ga. 435, 438 ( 67 SE2d 221 ); Gibbons v. State, 136 Ga. App. 609, 610 ( 222 SE2d 55 ). 1987Joyner v. State, 208 Ga. 435, 438 ( 67 SE2d 221 ); Gibbons v. State, 136 Ga. App. 609, 610 ( 222 SE2d 55 ). | 1 | 1 |
Bunch v. Stantongreen2 sentences1987This Restatement rule is the basis for the legal liability of an owner or occupier because of his superior knowledge of the risk or danger, i.e.: "`The basis of the proprietor's liability is his superior knowledge and if his [licensee] knows of the condition or hazard there is no duty on the part of the proprietor to warn him and there is no liability for resulting injury because the [licensee] has as much knowledge as the proprietor does and then by voluntarily acting, in view of his knowledge, assumes the risks and dangers incident to the known condition. [Cits.] It is when the perilous inst 1987This Restatement rule is the basis for the legal liability of an owner or occupier because of his superior knowledge of the risk or danger, i.e.: "`The basis of the proprietor's liability is his superior knowledge and if his [licensee] knows of the condition or hazard there is no duty on the part of the proprietor to warn him and there is no liability for resulting injury because the [licensee] has as much knowledge as the proprietor does and then by voluntarily acting, in view of his knowledge, assumes the risks and dangers incident to the known condition. [Cits.] It is when the perilous inst | 1 | 1 |
Joyner v. Stategreen2 sentences1987Joyner v. State, 208 Ga. 435, 438 ( 67 SE2d 221 ); Gibbons v. State, 136 Ga. App. 609, 610 ( 222 SE2d 55 ). 1987Joyner v. State, 208 Ga. 435, 438 ( 67 SE2d 221 ); Gibbons v. State, 136 Ga. App. 609, 610 ( 222 SE2d 55 ). | 1 | 1 |
Fowler v. Stategreen2 sentences1984In Johnston , this court quoted the following language from Fowler v. State, 121 Ga. App. 22, 23 ( 172 SE2d 447 ) (1970), the leading "staleness" case: "[I]t was not necessary that the precise date of the occurrence be given but it should appear from the facts that the occurrence should be so near in point of time to the making of the affidavit and the execution of the search warrant as to create a reasonable belief that the same conditions described in the affidavit still prevailed at the time of the issuance of the warrant." (Emphasis supplied) (compare the majority's restatement of this rul 1984In Johnston , this court quoted the following language from Fowler v. State, 121 Ga. App. 22, 23 ( 172 SE2d 447 ) (1970), the leading "staleness" case: "[I]t was not necessary that the precise date of the occurrence be given but it should appear from the facts that the occurrence should be so near in point of time to the making of the affidavit and the execution of the search warrant as to create a reasonable belief that the same conditions described in the affidavit still prevailed at the time of the issuance of the warrant." (Emphasis supplied) (compare the majority's restatement of this rul | 1 | 1 |
Parker v. Stategreen2 sentences1984See Parker v. State, 142 Ga. App. 396 ( 236 SE2d 141 ). 1984See Parker v. State, 142 Ga. App. 396 ( 236 SE2d 141 ). | 1 | 1 |
Memphis Publishing Co. v. Nicholsgreen2 sentences1984See, e.g., Memphis Publishing Co. v. Nichols, 569 SW2d 412 (Tenn. 1978); Troman v. Wood, 62 I11.2d 184 ( 340 NE2d 292 ) (1976). 1984See, e.g., Memphis Publishing Co. v. Nichols, 569 SW2d 412 (Tenn. 1978); Troman v. Wood, 62 I11.2d 184 ( 340 NE2d 292 ) (1976). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Williams
green
1 sentence2010See Briggs v. Dept. of Public Safety, 732 P2d 1078, 1081-1083 (III) (Alaska 1987) (applying Restatement factors to hold that, *722 where state did not appeal suppression ruling, it was collaterally estopped from relitigating the suppression issue); Illinois v. Williams, 322 NE2d 461 (Ill. 1976) (where state did not appeal from suppression order, but dismissed indictment with leave to reinstate, state was barred under doctrine of collateral estoppel from using suppressed evidence in the prosecution under the second indictment); Commonwealth v. Williams, 725 NE2d 217, 219-222 (1) (Mass. 2000) (w | 1 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Swain
green
1 sentence2010See Briggs v. Dept. of Public Safety, 732 P2d 1078, 1081-1083 (III) (Alaska 1987) (applying Restatement factors to hold that, *722 where state did not appeal suppression ruling, it was collaterally estopped from relitigating the suppression issue); Illinois v. Williams, 322 NE2d 461 (Ill. 1976) (where state did not appeal from suppression order, but dismissed indictment with leave to reinstate, state was barred under doctrine of collateral estoppel from using suppressed evidence in the prosecution under the second indictment); Commonwealth v. Williams, 725 NE2d 217, 219-222 (1) (Mass. 2000) (w | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Nordson Corporation v. Joseph Plasschaert and Ranier Corporation
green
2 sentences2003Recognizing that "[e]ven when the contract provides for a choice of law under which the covenant would be enforceable, Georgia may elect not to enforce it," id. at 1374 , the Nordson court nonetheless looked to the "materially greater interest" test embodied in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 187(2) (1971), [3] and then *87 conducted its analysis based on the Restatement factors. 2003Recognizing that "[e]ven when the contract provides for a choice of law under which the covenant would be enforceable, Georgia may elect not to enforce it," id. at 1374 , the Nordson court nonetheless looked to the "materially greater interest" test embodied in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 187(2) (1971), [3] and then *87 conducted its analysis based on the Restatement factors. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Ragsdale v. State
green
1 sentence1999“It has been held that direct proof of value is not essential in prosecutions for theft by taking but proof of value may be shown by inference. [Cit.] This is but a restatement of the principle that circumstantial evidence is sufficient to establish value.” Id. at 450 . | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Troman v. Wood
green
2 sentences1984See, e.g., Memphis Publishing Co. v. Nichols, 569 SW2d 412 (Tenn. 1978); Troman v. Wood, 62 I11.2d 184 ( 340 NE2d 292 ) (1976). 1984See, e.g., Memphis Publishing Co. v. Nichols, 569 SW2d 412 (Tenn. 1978); Troman v. Wood, 62 I11.2d 184 ( 340 NE2d 292 ) (1976). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Sams v. State
green
2 sentences1980Appellants do not claim that the personal reliability of the informant (upon whose information the warrant was issued) was not established, but submit that the affidavit failed to satisfy the second prong of the Aguilar-Spinelli test (for a restatement of the test, see Sams v. State, 121 Ga. App. 46 (1) ( 172 SE2d 473 )), in that the affidavit did not specifically state how the informer obtained the information or describe the criminal activity in such detail “that the magistrate may know it is more than a ‘casual rumor circulating in the underworld or an accusation based merely on an individu 1980Appellants do not claim that the personal reliability of the informant (upon whose information the warrant was issued) was not established, but submit that the affidavit failed to satisfy the second prong of the Aguilar-Spinelli test (for a restatement of the test, see Sams v. State, 121 Ga. App. 46 (1) ( 172 SE2d 473 )), in that the affidavit did not specifically state how the informer obtained the information or describe the criminal activity in such detail “that the magistrate may know it is more than a ‘casual rumor circulating in the underworld or an accusation based merely on an individu | 1 | 1980–1980 |
McGinnis v. Foster
green
1 sentence1924The writer of this opinion, though inclined to adhere to the doctrine recognized by so many courts of this country, which, as we have pointed out above, is a restatement of the rule laid down in Fearne on Eemainders, yields with reluctance to the rule taken from the ease of McGinnis v. Foster, supra, and the cases following that decision. | 1 | 1924–1924 |
Underwood v. Thurman
green
2 sentences1923We content ourselves with this ruling without discussion of the question involved or elaboration of the principle ruled, in view of the fact that what is here laid down is in substance a restatement of the rule made in the case of Underwood v. Thurman, 111 Ga. 325 ( 36 S. E. 788 ), where the principle here ruled is laid down and elaborately discussed. 1923We content ourselves with this ruling without discussion of the question involved or elaboration of the principle ruled, in view of the fact that what is here laid down is in substance a restatement of the rule made in the case of Underwood v. Thurman, 111 Ga. 325 ( 36 S. E. 788 ), where the principle here ruled is laid down and elaborately discussed. | 1 | 1923–1923 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.