9 North Dakota opinions name it 1 courts 1976–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Dakota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Hennum v. City of Medinagreen2 sentences2024See Hennum v. City of Medina, 402 N.W.2d 327 , 338- 39 (N.D. 1987) (identifying Restatement factors without adopting the seven- factor test or applying every factor). 2024See Hennum v. City of Medina, 402 N.W.2d 327 , 338- 39 (N.D. 1987) (identifying Restatement factors without adopting the seven- factor test or applying every factor). | 2 | 2 |
Whitesell v. Houltongreen2 sentences2012Id. at 1079. [¶11] The “Restatement rule,” based upon the Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 839- 840 (1979), distinguishes between natural and artificial conditions on the land. 2012Id. at 1079. [¶ 11] The “Restatement rule,” based upon the Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 839-840 (1979), distinguishes between natural and artificial conditions on the land. | 2 | 2 |
Lane v. WJ. Curry & Sonsgreen2 sentences2012See Lane, 92 S.W.3d at 361-62 ; Fancher, 650 S.E.2d at 521 . [¶ 12] The “Virginia rule,” adopted in Smith v. Holt, 174 Va. 213 , 5 S.E.2d 492 (1939), makes a distinction between noxious and non-noxious trees. 2012See Lane, 92 S.W.3d at 361-62 ; Fancher, 650 S.E.2d at 521 . [¶ 12] The “Virginia rule,” adopted in Smith v. Holt, 174 Va. 213 , 5 S.E.2d 492 (1939), makes a distinction between noxious and non-noxious trees. | 2 | 2 |
Electric Short Line Terminal Co. v. City of Minneapolisgreen2 sentences1989Clearly such presumption is an illusory substitute for the notice required in eminent domain proceedings to apprise an owner of the invisible appropriation of his property to a future public use so that he may fairly be forewarned that he will lose his constitutional right to compensation if he fails to act within a prescribed period.” Electric Short Line Terminal Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 242 Minn. 1 , 64 N.W.2d 149, 153 (1954). 1989Clearly such presumption is an illusory substitute for the notice required in eminent domain proceedings to apprise an owner of the invisible appropriation of his property to a future public use so that he may fairly be forewarned that he will lose his constitutional right to compensation if he fails to act within a prescribed period.” Electric Short Line Terminal Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 242 Minn. 1 , 64 N.W.2d 149, 153 (1954). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Dakota. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Thimjon Farms Partnership v. First International Bank & Trust
green
2 sentences2024Rather, our case law consistently looks to “what is reasonable conduct under all the circumstances of the case.” Thimjon, 2013 ND 160 , ¶ 13. 2024Rather, our case law consistently looks to “what is reasonable conduct under all the circumstances of the case.” Thimjon, 2013 ND 160 , ¶ 13. | 2 | 2024–2024 |
Smith v. Holt
green
2 sentences2012See Lane, 92 S.W.3d at 361-62 ; Fancher, 650 S.E.2d at 521 . [¶ 12] The “Virginia rule,” adopted in Smith v. Holt, 174 Va. 213 , 5 S.E.2d 492 (1939), makes a distinction between noxious and non-noxious trees. 2012See Lane, 92 S.W.3d at 361-62 ; Fancher, 650 S.E.2d at 521 . [¶ 12] The “Virginia rule,” adopted in Smith v. Holt, 174 Va. 213 , 5 S.E.2d 492 (1939), makes a distinction between noxious and non-noxious trees. | 2 | 2012–2012 |
Fancher v. Fagella
green
2 sentences2012See Lane, 92 S.W.3d at 361-62 ; Fancher, 650 S.E.2d at 521 . [¶ 12] The “Virginia rule,” adopted in Smith v. Holt, 174 Va. 213 , 5 S.E.2d 492 (1939), makes a distinction between noxious and non-noxious trees. 2012See Lane, 92 S.W.3d at 361-62 ; Fancher, 650 S.E.2d at 521 . [¶ 12] The “Virginia rule,” adopted in Smith v. Holt, 174 Va. 213 , 5 S.E.2d 492 (1939), makes a distinction between noxious and non-noxious trees. | 2 | 2012–2012 |
Doe v. Samaritan Counseling Center
green
2 sentences1997The Alaska Supreme Court cited the Restatement test, but held its motivation-to-serve element is satisfied when the “tor-tious conduct arises out of and is reasonably incidental to the employee’s legitimate work activities-” Id. at 348 . 1997The Alaska Supreme Court cited the Restatement test, but held its motivation-to-serve element is satisfied when the “tor-tious conduct arises out of and is reasonably incidental to the employee’s legitimate work activities-” Id. at 348 . | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Hill v. Lockhart
green
2 sentences1992In other words, in order to satisfy the ‘prejudice’ requirement, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” 474 U.S. 52, 58-59 , 106 S.Ct. 366, 370 , 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985). 1992In other words, in order to satisfy the ‘prejudice’ requirement, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” 474 U.S. 52, 58-59 , 106 S.Ct. 366, 370 , 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Tollett v. Henderson
green
2 sentences1992In the context of guilty pleas, the first half of the Strickland v. Washington test is nothing more than a restatement of the standard of attorney competence already set forth in Tollett v. Henderson, supra, [ 411 U.S. 258 , 93 S.Ct. 1602 , 36 L.Ed.2d 235 (1973)] and McMann v. Richardson, supra. [ 397 U.S. 759 , 90 S.Ct. 1441 , 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970)] The second, or ‘prejudice,’ requirement, on the other hand, focuses on whether counsel’s constitutionally ineffective performance affected the outcome of the plea process. 1992In the context of guilty pleas, the first half of the Strickland v. Washington test is nothing more than a restatement of the standard of attorney competence already set forth in Tollett v. Henderson, supra, [ 411 U.S. 258 , 93 S.Ct. 1602 , 36 L.Ed.2d 235 (1973)] and McMann v. Richardson, supra. [ 397 U.S. 759 , 90 S.Ct. 1441 , 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970)] The second, or ‘prejudice,’ requirement, on the other hand, focuses on whether counsel’s constitutionally ineffective performance affected the outcome of the plea process. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
McMann v. Richardson
green
2 sentences1992In the context of guilty pleas, the first half of the Strickland v. Washington test is nothing more than a restatement of the standard of attorney competence already set forth in Tollett v. Henderson, supra, [ 411 U.S. 258 , 93 S.Ct. 1602 , 36 L.Ed.2d 235 (1973)] and McMann v. Richardson, supra. [ 397 U.S. 759 , 90 S.Ct. 1441 , 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970)] The second, or ‘prejudice,’ requirement, on the other hand, focuses on whether counsel’s constitutionally ineffective performance affected the outcome of the plea process. 1992In the context of guilty pleas, the first half of the Strickland v. Washington test is nothing more than a restatement of the standard of attorney competence already set forth in Tollett v. Henderson, supra, [ 411 U.S. 258 , 93 S.Ct. 1602 , 36 L.Ed.2d 235 (1973)] and McMann v. Richardson, supra. [ 397 U.S. 759 , 90 S.Ct. 1441 , 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970)] The second, or ‘prejudice,’ requirement, on the other hand, focuses on whether counsel’s constitutionally ineffective performance affected the outcome of the plea process. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Schlenk v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., Inc.
green
1 sentence1991Schlenk v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., Inc., 329 N.W.2d 605 (N.D.1983). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Schroeder v. City of New York
green
2 sentences1976The opinion in Mullane and the restatement of its rule in Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208, 212-213 , 83 S.Ct. 279, 282 , 9 L.Ed.2d 255 (1962), “that notice by publication is not enough with respect to a person whose name and address are known or very easily ascertainable and whose legally protected interests are directly affected by the proceedings in question” provide us with the constitutional perspective to this case. 1976The opinion in Mullane and the restatement of its rule in Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208, 212-213 , 83 S.Ct. 279, 282 , 9 L.Ed.2d 255 (1962), “that notice by publication is not enough with respect to a person whose name and address are known or very easily ascertainable and whose legally protected interests are directly affected by the proceedings in question” provide us with the constitutional perspective to this case. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.