Restatement rule in Delaware

2026The Restatement factors recognize that reality by taking into account (1) the nature of the act encouraged, (2) the amount of 297 Malpiede, 780 A.2d at 1098 . 298 Jacobs v. Meghji, 2020 WL 5951410 , at *7 (Del.

2026The Restatement factors recognize that reality by taking into account (1) the nature of the act encouraged, (2) the amount of 297 Malpiede, 780 A.2d at 1098 . 298 Jacobs v. Meghji, 2020 WL 5951410 , at *7 (Del.

2019Id.

2019Id.

1984Hanlon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corporation, et al., 599 F.Supp. 376 , D.C.

1984Hanlon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corporation, et al., 599 F.Supp. 376 , D.C.

2026Mkts., 129 A.3d at 865 ).

2026Mkts., 129 A.3d at 865 ).

2025For example, in Bell Helicopter Textron Inc., the Delaware Supreme Court reviewed whether Texas or Mexico law applied to a products liability case filed by Mexican citizens acting as the personal representatives of victims that died in a helicopter crash in Mexico from a defective seatbelt.43 Although the parties did not suggest Delaware law should be applied, the Court noted that the “only connection” the appellant had to Delaware was that it was incorporated there. 44 Delaware had “no relationship to the crash” because the appellant had “no operations in Delaware related to the helicopter cr

2025For example, in Bell Helicopter Textron Inc., the Delaware Supreme Court reviewed whether Texas or Mexico law applied to a products liability case filed by Mexican citizens acting as the personal representatives of victims that died in a helicopter crash in Mexico from a defective seatbelt.43 Although the parties did not suggest Delaware law should be applied, the Court noted that the “only connection” the appellant had to Delaware was that it was incorporated there. 44 Delaware had “no relationship to the crash” because the appellant had “no operations in Delaware related to the helicopter cr

2024The Restatement factors analyzed in Dole are the following: • The nature of the tortious act that the secondary actor participated in or encouraged, including its severity, the clarity of the violation, the extent of the consequences, and the secondary actor’s knowledge of these aspects; • The amount, kind, and duration of assistance given, including how directly involved the secondary actor was in the primary actor’s conduct; • The nature of the relationship between the secondary and primary actors; and • The secondary actor’s state of mind.104 Some Delaware trial courts have used the Restate

2024The Restatement factors analyzed in Dole are the following: • The nature of the tortious act that the secondary actor participated in or encouraged, including its severity, the clarity of the violation, the extent of the consequences, and the secondary actor’s knowledge of these aspects; • The amount, kind, and duration of assistance given, including how directly involved the secondary actor was in the primary actor’s conduct; • The nature of the relationship between the secondary and primary actors; and • The secondary actor’s state of mind.104 Some Delaware trial courts have used the Restate

2020The other exception is Hexion, where the parties argued about whether a no-MAE condition was a condition precedent or a condition subsequent, and the court sidestepped the issue by characterizing MAE conditions as “strange animals, sui generis among their contract clause brethren.” Hexion, 965 A.2d at 739 .

2019As noted, the result of that approach is a limited affiliate privilege that protects a parent entity that “pursues lawful 16 WaveDivision, 49 A.3d at 1174–75 (affirming trial court’s determination that four of the seven Restatement factors weighed against a finding of improper interference); Beard Research, Inc., 11 A.3d at 750–52 (describing trial court’s analysis of justification and the affiliate privilege as interpreting “too narrowly the nature and scope of a claim for tortious interference”); NAMA, 2014 WL 6436647 , at *28–36 (balancing the Restatement factors to determine whether the af

2019As noted, the result of that approach is a limited affiliate privilege that protects a parent entity that “pursues lawful 16 WaveDivision, 49 A.3d at 1174–75 (affirming trial court’s determination that four of the seven Restatement factors weighed against a finding of improper interference); Beard Research, Inc., 11 A.3d at 750–52 (describing trial court’s analysis of justification and the affiliate privilege as interpreting “too narrowly the nature and scope of a claim for tortious interference”); NAMA, 2014 WL 6436647 , at *28–36 (balancing the Restatement factors to determine whether the af

2019As noted, the result of that approach is a limited affiliate privilege that protects a parent entity that “pursues lawful 16 WaveDivision, 49 A.3d at 1174–75 (affirming trial court’s determination that four of the seven Restatement factors weighed against a finding of improper interference); Beard Research, Inc., 11 A.3d at 750–52 (describing trial court’s analysis of justification and the affiliate privilege as interpreting “too narrowly the nature and scope of a claim for tortious interference”); NAMA, 2014 WL 6436647 , at *28–36 (balancing the Restatement factors to determine whether the af

2019As noted, the result of that approach is a limited affiliate privilege that protects a parent entity that “pursues lawful 16 WaveDivision, 49 A.3d at 1174–75 (affirming trial court’s determination that four of the seven Restatement factors weighed against a finding of improper interference); Beard Research, Inc., 11 A.3d at 750–52 (describing trial court’s analysis of justification and the affiliate privilege as interpreting “too narrowly the nature and scope of a claim for tortious interference”); NAMA, 2014 WL 6436647 , at *28–36 (balancing the Restatement factors to determine whether the af

2018Ch. 2009)). 114 Id. 27 that the policy of [Nebraska] is that the contract at issue is abhorrent and void, and where, as here, the formation and enforcement of the contract relate overwhelmingly to [Nebraska], a general interest in freedom of contract is unlikely to be the equal of that public policy under the Restatement analysis.”115 Because Nebraska has a greater material interest in the agreements and application of Delaware law would violate a fundamental policy of Nebraska law, I apply Nebraska law to the question of the validity and enforceability of the nonsolicitation and noncompete pr

2018Ch. 2009)). 114 Id. 27 that the policy of [Nebraska] is that the contract at issue is abhorrent and void, and where, as here, the formation and enforcement of the contract relate overwhelmingly to [Nebraska], a general interest in freedom of contract is unlikely to be the equal of that public policy under the Restatement analysis.”115 Because Nebraska has a greater material interest in the agreements and application of Delaware law would violate a fundamental policy of Nebraska law, I apply Nebraska law to the question of the validity and enforceability of the nonsolicitation and noncompete pr

2015I find that the Plaintiff lacks standing to enforce the Ground Lease, to the 50 See Triple C Railcar Service, 630 A.2d at 634 . 51 See Ground Lease ¶ 5.A. 52 630 A.2d 629 (Del. 1993). 53 Id. at 633 (citing Restatement of the Law: Contracts § 145). 12 extent it forms a contract between the City and the DNREC Department of Parks and Recreation, of which the Plaintiff is only one among a large and poorly defined group of incidental beneficiaries, namely, the public at large, or all residents of the City of Lewes.54 Therefore, I dismiss the claims arising from the Ground Lease in Count I.

2015I find that the Plaintiff lacks standing to enforce the Ground Lease, to the 50 See Triple C Railcar Service, 630 A.2d at 634 . 51 See Ground Lease ¶ 5.A. 52 630 A.2d 629 (Del. 1993). 53 Id. at 633 (citing Restatement of the Law: Contracts § 145). 12 extent it forms a contract between the City and the DNREC Department of Parks and Recreation, of which the Plaintiff is only one among a large and poorly defined group of incidental beneficiaries, namely, the public at large, or all residents of the City of Lewes.54 Therefore, I dismiss the claims arising from the Ground Lease in Count I.

2014However, the Court instructed the use of the Restatement factors “when the issue is whether a claimant is an employee or independent contractor of a single business.” Falconi, 902 A.2d at 1100 . 21 Valentine v. Walford, 1984 WL 553521 , at *1 (Del.

2014However, the Court instructed the use of the Restatement factors “when the issue is whether a claimant is an employee or independent contractor of a single business.” Falconi, 902 A.2d at 1100 . 21 Valentine v. Walford, 1984 WL 553521 , at *1 (Del.

2011In Riedel , we declined to adopt the proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts provisions relevant to these facts. [10] Id. at 22 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 284 (1965)). [11] Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 302 cmt. a). [12] Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 302 cmt. a). [13] Id. at 19. [14] Id. [15] Id. at 23 ("Although the trial judge did not explicitly address whether Mrs. Riedel alleged misfeasance or nonfeasance, he considered Mrs. Riedel's claim in a manner consistent with the (Second) Restatement's analysis of nonfeasance."). [16] Id. at 25 ("[W]e are n

2010For example, in that case, the court acknowledged the Restatement’s rule that "[a] term exempting a party from tort liability for harm caused intentionally or recklessly is unenforceable on grounds of public policy.” Id. at 1059 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts 195 (1981)).

2009Cf., Turner v. Lipschultz, 619 A.2d 912 , 916 n. 6 (Del.1992) (using Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws § 146 cmt. d (1971)); VantagePoint, 871 A.2d at 1113 n. 13 (applying Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws § 303 cmt. d). 204 .

2009Cf., Turner v. Lipschultz, 619 A.2d 912 , 916 n. 6 (Del.1992) (using Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws § 146 cmt. d (1971)); VantagePoint, 871 A.2d at 1113 n. 13 (applying Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws § 303 cmt. d). 204 .

1995This claim is simply a restatement of his claim that the jury was not impartial, which was raised and rejected in Dawson I, 581 A.2d at 1088-91 .

1994The Chancellor’s restatement of the rule — to require Cinerama to prove a proximate cause relationship between the Technicolor board’s presumed breach of its duty of care and the shareholder’s resultant loss — is contrary to well-established Delaware precedent, irreconcilable with Van Gorkom , and contrary to the tenets of Unocal and Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Del.Supr., 506 A.2d 173 (1986).

1993Pajewski, 363 A.2d at 431 .

1993Pajewski, 363 A.2d at 431 .

1991The Court, employing a hypothetical where two Delaware residents sued each other for negligence inflicted in another state, claimed that adopting the Restatement test would drive the Delaware residents to seek relief in a state that recognized lex loci. 211 A.2d at 597 .

1991The Court, employing a hypothetical where two Delaware residents sued each other for negligence inflicted in another state, claimed that adopting the Restatement test would drive the Delaware residents to seek relief in a state that recognized lex loci. 211 A.2d at 597 .