Restatement factors in District of Columbia

2022Groover, Christie & Merritt, P.C. v. Burke, 917 A.2d 1110, 1117 (D.C. 2007) (“The Restatement factors help to identify the jurisdiction with the ‘most significant relationship to the dispute,’ that presumptively being the jurisdiction whose policy would be more advanced by application of its law.” (quoting Hercules & Co. v. Shama Rest.

2022Groover, Christie & Merritt, P.C. v. Burke, 917 A.2d 1110, 1117 (D.C. 2007) (“The Restatement factors help to identify the jurisdiction with the ‘most significant relationship to the dispute,’ that presumptively being the jurisdiction whose policy would be more advanced by application of its law.” (quoting Hercules & Co. v. Shama Rest.

2016Co. v. Whiteman, 802 N.E.2d 886, 893 (Ind. 2004) (following the Restatement (Third) and rejecting application of voluntary payment doctrine to bar plaintiffs‟ unjust enrichment challenge to unlawful late fee provision and 22 noting that it would be absurd to allow the commercial defendant “to take financial advantage of its own wrongdoing”).8 I agree we need not definitively decide this question, but our forbearance should not be mistaken for agreement with the trial court‟s premature conclusion that voluntary payment barred Ms. Falconi-Sachs‟s unjust enrichment claim. 8 The trial court cited

2016Co. v. Whiteman, 802 N.E.2d 886, 893 (Ind. 2004) (following the Restatement (Third) and rejecting application of voluntary payment doctrine to bar plaintiffs‟ unjust enrichment challenge to unlawful late fee provision and 22 noting that it would be absurd to allow the commercial defendant “to take financial advantage of its own wrongdoing”).8 I agree we need not definitively decide this question, but our forbearance should not be mistaken for agreement with the trial court‟s premature conclusion that voluntary payment barred Ms. Falconi-Sachs‟s unjust enrichment claim. 8 The trial court cited

2015See Onyeoziri, supra, 44 A.3d at 291 (citation omitted) (“All the circumstances must be analyzed and considered with reference to the type of relation disrupted, the means employed and the purpose of the actor’s interference.”).

2015See Onyeoziri, supra, 44 A.3d at 291 (citation omitted) (“All the circumstances must be analyzed and considered with reference to the type of relation disrupted, the means employed and the purpose of the actor’s interference.”).

2025Washkoviak, 900 A.2d at 181 .

2025Washkoviak, 900 A.2d at 181 .

2025Preservation This court adheres to “the basic principle that, absent a manifest miscarriage of justice, appellate courts need not, and usually will not, reverse a trial court ruling in a civil case on the basis of arguments made for the first time on appeal.” District of Columbia v. Murphy, 631 A.2d 34, 39 (D.C. 1993).

2025Preservation This court adheres to “the basic principle that, absent a manifest miscarriage of justice, appellate courts need not, and usually will not, reverse a trial court ruling in a civil case on the basis of arguments made for the first time on appeal.” District of Columbia v. Murphy, 631 A.2d 34, 39 (D.C. 1993).

2023Co. v. Reddick, 398 A.2d 27, 29 (D.C. 1979) (“[T]he determination of scope of employment is dependent upon the facts and circumstances of each case.”). 6 We further caution that although this opinion details all aspects of the respondeat superior inquiry, we expect in many cases not all elements outlined in the Restatement framework will be subject to dispute.

2023Co. v. Reddick, 398 A.2d 27, 29 (D.C. 1979) (“[T]he determination of scope of employment is dependent upon the facts and circumstances of each case.”). 6 We further caution that although this opinion details all aspects of the respondeat superior inquiry, we expect in many cases not all elements outlined in the Restatement framework will be subject to dispute.

2022See Guttenberg, 41 F. Supp. 3d at 71–72 (District law applied and precluded the application of the Virginia business conspiracy statute where the case involved a “D.C. injury resulting from conduct mostly occurring in Virginia; plaintiffs [who] reside and do business in D.C.; defendants [who] reside in Virginia and do business in D.C. . . . ; and [a] relationship between the parties . . . centered in D.C.”); B&H Nat’l Place, 850 F. Supp. 2d at 262 n.19 (Va. Code § 18.2-499 did not apply to case where “the essence of the alleged harm,” the opening of a restaurant franchise in violation of a con

2022See Guttenberg, 41 F. Supp. 3d at 71–72 (District law applied and precluded the application of the Virginia business conspiracy statute where the case involved a “D.C. injury resulting from conduct mostly occurring in Virginia; plaintiffs [who] reside and do business in D.C.; defendants [who] reside in Virginia and do business in D.C. . . . ; and [a] relationship between the parties . . . centered in D.C.”); B&H Nat’l Place, 850 F. Supp. 2d at 262 n.19 (Va. Code § 18.2-499 did not apply to case where “the essence of the alleged harm,” the opening of a restaurant franchise in violation of a con

2022The Restatement advises that the plaintiff’s principal place of business is the “most important contact for determining the state of the applicable law” where a tort causes primarily a “financial injury.” 66 That is the situation here, because Cygnacom’s 64 Coleman, 667 A.2d at 816 (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). 65 This case is thus factually distinguishable from the cases on which Iron Vine and Second Factor relied at trial, in which an analysis of the Restatement factors showed that the District had the greater interest in the controversies at issue.

2022The Restatement advises that the plaintiff’s principal place of business is the “most important contact for determining the state of the applicable law” where a tort causes primarily a “financial injury.” 66 That is the situation here, because Cygnacom’s 64 Coleman, 667 A.2d at 816 (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). 65 This case is thus factually distinguishable from the cases on which Iron Vine and Second Factor relied at trial, in which an analysis of the Restatement factors showed that the District had the greater interest in the controversies at issue.

2022Corp., 566 A.2d 31 , 41 & n.18 (D.C. 1989)). 63 Jones v. Clinch, 73 A.3d 80, 83 (D.C. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). 40 by the application of its law, a false conflict appears and the law of the interested jurisdiction prevails.” 64 Consideration of the Restatement factors in this case persuades us that Virginia, not the District, is the jurisdiction with a substantial interest in Cygnacom’s conspiracy claim. 65 The first and third Restatement factors weigh heavily in our analysis.

2022Corp., 566 A.2d 31 , 41 & n.18 (D.C. 1989)). 63 Jones v. Clinch, 73 A.3d 80, 83 (D.C. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). 40 by the application of its law, a false conflict appears and the law of the interested jurisdiction prevails.” 64 Consideration of the Restatement factors in this case persuades us that Virginia, not the District, is the jurisdiction with a substantial interest in Cygnacom’s conspiracy claim. 65 The first and third Restatement factors weigh heavily in our analysis.

2006The weight of a particular state's contacts must be measured on a qualitative rather than quantitative scale." LeJeune v. Bliss-Salem, Inc., 85 F.3d 1069, 1072 (3d Cir.1996) (citing Cipolla v. Shaposka, 439 Pa. 563 , 267 A.2d 854, 856 (1970)); accord Danner v. Staggs, 680 F.2d 427, 431 (5th Cir.1982); Lange v. Penn Mut.

2006The weight of a particular state's contacts must be measured on a qualitative rather than quantitative scale." LeJeune v. Bliss-Salem, Inc., 85 F.3d 1069, 1072 (3d Cir.1996) (citing Cipolla v. Shaposka, 439 Pa. 563 , 267 A.2d 854, 856 (1970)); accord Danner v. Staggs, 680 F.2d 427, 431 (5th Cir.1982); Lange v. Penn Mut.

2006The weight of a particular state's contacts must be measured on a qualitative rather than quantitative scale." LeJeune v. Bliss-Salem, Inc., 85 F.3d 1069, 1072 (3d Cir.1996) (citing Cipolla v. Shaposka, 439 Pa. 563 , 267 A.2d 854, 856 (1970)); accord Danner v. Staggs, 680 F.2d 427, 431 (5th Cir.1982); Lange v. Penn Mut.

2006The weight of a particular state's contacts must be measured on a qualitative rather than quantitative scale." LeJeune v. Bliss-Salem, Inc., 85 F.3d 1069, 1072 (3d Cir.1996) (citing Cipolla v. Shaposka, 439 Pa. 563 , 267 A.2d 854, 856 (1970)); accord Danner v. Staggs, 680 F.2d 427, 431 (5th Cir.1982); Lange v. Penn Mut.

2006The weight of a particular state's contacts must be measured on a qualitative rather than quantitative scale." LeJeune v. Bliss-Salem, Inc., 85 F.3d 1069, 1072 (3d Cir.1996) (citing Cipolla v. Shaposka, 439 Pa. 563 , 267 A.2d 854, 856 (1970)); accord Danner v. Staggs, 680 F.2d 427, 431 (5th Cir.1982); Lange v. Penn Mut.

2006The weight of a particular state's contacts must be measured on a qualitative rather than quantitative scale." LeJeune v. Bliss-Salem, Inc., 85 F.3d 1069, 1072 (3d Cir.1996) (citing Cipolla v. Shaposka, 439 Pa. 563 , 267 A.2d 854, 856 (1970)); accord Danner v. Staggs, 680 F.2d 427, 431 (5th Cir.1982); Lange v. Penn Mut.

2004But as a theory of common-law liability, it is only nominally distinguishable from the endeav- or in Delahanty, supra, to extend the RESTATEMENT doctrine of “abnormally dangerous activity” to the manufacture and sale of particular handguns, a claim we rejected because of the remoteness of the link between the activity — “not dangerous in and of itself’ — and the harm that results from the criminal misuse of guns.

2004But as a theory of common-law liability, it is only nominally distinguishable from the endeav- or in Delahanty, supra, to extend the RESTATEMENT doctrine of “abnormally dangerous activity” to the manufacture and sale of particular handguns, a claim we rejected because of the remoteness of the link between the activity — “not dangerous in and of itself’ — and the harm that results from the criminal misuse of guns.

2003In Bennett v. Westfall, 186 Md. 148 , 46 A.2d 358, 361 (1946), the court emphasized, in somewhat sardonic fashion, the lack of any prejudice to junior lienors where a refinancing lender failed to examine title before releasing a second lien and taking a new mortgage: It is clear that appellee’s failure to consult the Land Records in no way affected the appellant.

2003In Bennett v. Westfall, 186 Md. 148 , 46 A.2d 358, 361 (1946), the court emphasized, in somewhat sardonic fashion, the lack of any prejudice to junior lienors where a refinancing lender failed to examine title before releasing a second lien and taking a new mortgage: It is clear that appellee’s failure to consult the Land Records in no way affected the appellant.

1994In Brown v. Matthews Mortuary, Inc., 118 Idaho 830 , 801 P.2d 37, 43-44 (1990), the Supreme Court of Idaho adopted the Restatement rule and identified a substantial number of decisions which recognized an exception for “dead body” cases from otherwise applicable restrictive doctrines governing recovery for the negligent infliction of emotional distress.

1994In Brown v. Matthews Mortuary, Inc., 118 Idaho 830 , 801 P.2d 37, 43-44 (1990), the Supreme Court of Idaho adopted the Restatement rule and identified a substantial number of decisions which recognized an exception for “dead body” cases from otherwise applicable restrictive doctrines governing recovery for the negligent infliction of emotional distress.

1992Likewise, in Funkhouser v. Hurricane Fence Co., 524 S.W.2d 780, 782 (Tex.Civ.App.1975), cited post at 35, a Texas court of appeals relied on cases cited in Annotation, Splitting Causes —Waiving Objection, 40 A.L.R.3d 108 (1971), in applying the Restatement rule.

1992Likewise, in Funkhouser v. Hurricane Fence Co., 524 S.W.2d 780, 782 (Tex.Civ.App.1975), cited post at 35, a Texas court of appeals relied on cases cited in Annotation, Splitting Causes —Waiving Objection, 40 A.L.R.3d 108 (1971), in applying the Restatement rule.