Restatement rule in Iowa

2024See Schwennen v. Abell, 471 N.W.2d 880, 884 (Iowa 1991) (“adopt[ing] the Restatement rule for voluntary payment cases involving reversed judgments” where a defendant paid a judgment to avoid accruing additional interest pending appeal).

2024See Schwennen v. Abell, 471 N.W.2d 880, 884 (Iowa 1991) (“adopt[ing] the Restatement rule for voluntary payment cases involving reversed judgments” where a defendant paid a judgment to avoid accruing additional interest pending appeal).

2006We follow the Restatement’s rule concerning the effect of duress on the enforceability of a contract: “If a party’s manifestation of assent is induced by an improper threat by the other party that leaves the victim no reasonable alternative, the contract is voidable by the victim.” Turner, 387 N.W.2d at 598 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 175(1), at 475 (1981)) (emphasis added).

2006We follow the Restatement’s rule concerning the effect of duress on the enforceability of a contract: “If a party’s manifestation of assent is induced by an improper threat by the other party that leaves the victim no reasonable alternative, the contract is voidable by the victim.” Turner, 387 N.W.2d at 598 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 175(1), at 475 (1981)) (emphasis added).

2016Rohlin, 476 N.W.2d at 80 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 356 cmt. b); see also City of Davenport v. Shewry Corp., 674 N.W.2d 79, 85 (Iowa 2004) (“We adopted the Restatement test for a penalty, which focuses on two factors: (1) ‘the anticipated or actual loss caused by the breach’; and (2) ‘the difficulty of proof of loss.’” (citation omitted)).

2016Rohlin, 476 N.W.2d at 80 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 356 cmt. b); see also City of Davenport v. Shewry Corp., 674 N.W.2d 79, 85 (Iowa 2004) (“We adopted the Restatement test for a penalty, which focuses on two factors: (1) ‘the anticipated or actual loss caused by the breach’; and (2) ‘the difficulty of proof of loss.’” (citation omitted)).

2026See Porter, 217 N.W.2d at 230 (“The generally accepted rule is that retention of the right to inspect work under construction to see that the provisions of the contract are carried out and to stop 14 work if they are not is insufficient in itself to constitute retention of control of any part of the work within the meaning of the restatement principle.”).

2025Restatement (Second) of Torts § 598; see also Brown v. First Nat’l Bank, 193 N.W.2d 547 , 552–53 (Iowa 1972) (discussing a former version of this rule but 7 See, e.g., Kelley v. Tanoos, 865 N.E.2d 593, 600 (Ind. 2007); Kennedy v. Sheriff of E.

2025Restatement (Second) of Torts § 598; see also Brown v. First Nat’l Bank, 193 N.W.2d 547 , 552–53 (Iowa 1972) (discussing a former version of this rule but 7 See, e.g., Kelley v. Tanoos, 865 N.E.2d 593, 600 (Ind. 2007); Kennedy v. Sheriff of E.

2025Restatement (Second) of Torts § 598; see also Brown v. First Nat’l Bank, 193 N.W.2d 547 , 552–53 (Iowa 1972) (discussing a former version of this rule but 7 See, e.g., Kelley v. Tanoos, 865 N.E.2d 593, 600 (Ind. 2007); Kennedy v. Sheriff of E.

2025Restatement (Second) of Torts § 598; see also Brown v. First Nat’l Bank, 193 N.W.2d 547 , 552–53 (Iowa 1972) (discussing a former version of this rule but 7 See, e.g., Kelley v. Tanoos, 865 N.E.2d 593, 600 (Ind. 2007); Kennedy v. Sheriff of E.

2020See Midwest Dredging Co., 424 N.W.2d at 224 (finding prior Restatement framework “still instructional” because section 302 and section 133 approaches “were substantially compatible”).

2017“The ‘good faith’ requirement has been variously interpreted, with jurisdictions applying definitions that can be categorized along a continuum from a subjective to an objective standard . . . .” Wilson v. Dallas, 743 S.E.2d 746, 759 (S.C. 2013).

2017A factor that bears on the existence of probable cause is whether the beneficiary relied upon the advice of independent legal counsel sought in good faith after a full disclosure of the facts.”); see also In re Estate of Shumway, 9 P.3d 1062, 1066 (Ariz. 2000) (quoting Restatement standard); Parker, 160 So. 3d at 206 (same).

2017A factor that bears on the existence of probable cause is whether the beneficiary relied upon the advice of independent legal counsel sought in good faith after a full disclosure of the facts.”); see also In re Estate of Shumway, 9 P.3d 1062, 1066 (Ariz. 2000) (quoting Restatement standard); Parker, 160 So. 3d at 206 (same).

2016Rohlin, 476 N.W.2d at 80 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 356 cmt. b); see also City of Davenport v. Shewry Corp., 674 N.W.2d 79, 85 (Iowa 2004) (“We adopted the Restatement test for a penalty, which focuses on two factors: (1) ‘the anticipated or actual loss caused by the breach’; and (2) ‘the difficulty of proof of loss.’” (citation omitted)).

2016Rohlin, 476 N.W.2d at 80 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 356 cmt. b); see also City of Davenport v. Shewry Corp., 674 N.W.2d 79, 85 (Iowa 2004) (“We adopted the Restatement test for a penalty, which focuses on two factors: (1) ‘the anticipated or actual loss caused by the breach’; and (2) ‘the difficulty of proof of loss.’” (citation omitted)).

2011Palmer v. Unisys Corp., 637 N.W.2d 142, 156-57 (Iowa 2001) (citing unjust enrichment under Restatement section 1); Schwennen v. Abell, 471 N.W.2d 880, 883-84 (Iowa 1991) (adopting the Restatement rule for voluntary payment cases involving reversed judgments); Nachazel v. Mira Co., Mfg., 466 N.W.2d 248, 253 (Iowa 1991) (citing Restatement for equitable liens).

2011Palmer v. Unisys Corp., 637 N.W.2d 142, 156-57 (Iowa 2001) (citing unjust enrichment under Restatement section 1); Schwennen v. Abell, 471 N.W.2d 880, 883-84 (Iowa 1991) (adopting the Restatement rule for voluntary payment cases involving reversed judgments); Nachazel v. Mira Co., Mfg., 466 N.W.2d 248, 253 (Iowa 1991) (citing Restatement for equitable liens).

2011Palmer v. Unisys Corp., 637 N.W.2d 142, 156-57 (Iowa 2001) (citing unjust enrichment under Restatement section 1); Schwennen v. Abell, 471 N.W.2d 880, 883-84 (Iowa 1991) (adopting the Restatement rule for voluntary payment cases involving reversed judgments); Nachazel v. Mira Co., Mfg., 466 N.W.2d 248, 253 (Iowa 1991) (citing Restatement for equitable liens).

2011Palmer v. Unisys Corp., 637 N.W.2d 142, 156-57 (Iowa 2001) (citing unjust enrichment under Restatement section 1); Schwennen v. Abell, 471 N.W.2d 880, 883-84 (Iowa 1991) (adopting the Restatement rule for voluntary payment cases involving reversed judgments); Nachazel v. Mira Co., Mfg., 466 N.W.2d 248, 253 (Iowa 1991) (citing Restatement for equitable liens).

2004Park Assocs., L.P. v. Michael Albert, Inc., 548 N.W.2d 153, 156-57 (Iowa 1996). “ ‘The greater the difficulty either of proving that loss has occurred or of establishing its amount with the requisite certainty, the easier it is to show that the amount fixed is reasonable.’ ” Rohlin, 476 N.W.2d at 80 (quoting Restatement § 356(1) cmt. b).

2004Park Assocs., L.P. v. Michael Albert, Inc., 548 N.W.2d 153, 156-57 (Iowa 1996). “ ‘The greater the difficulty either of proving that loss has occurred or of establishing its amount with the requisite certainty, the easier it is to show that the amount fixed is reasonable.’ ” Rohlin, 476 N.W.2d at 80 (quoting Restatement § 356(1) cmt. b).

2004Harrison v. Keller, 254 Iowa 267, 271 , 117 N.W.2d 477, 480 (1962).

2004Harrison v. Keller, 254 Iowa 267, 271 , 117 N.W.2d 477, 480 (1962).

1999See Patton, 861 P.2d at 1315 .

1999See Patton, 861 P.2d at 1315 .

1996Several of our recent cases define the causation requirement solely as conduct which “is a substantial factor in producing damage and when the damage would not have happened except for the conduct.” Spaur v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 510 N.W.2d 854, 858 (Iowa 1994); accord Johnson v. Interstate Power Co., 481 N.W.2d 310, 323 (Iowa 1992) (citing Iowa Civ.

1996Co., 526 N.W.2d 845, 853 (Iowa 1995) (following Marti’s formulation of “factual causation” (an issue of fact) and “legal causation” (an issue of law)); Sumpter v. City of Moulton, 519 N.W.2d 427, 434 (Iowa App.1994) (applying Marti’s but-for test to determine “actual cause” and applying Restatement test to determine “legal” or “proximate cause”).

1996Several of our recent cases define the causation requirement solely as conduct which “is a substantial factor in producing damage and when the damage would not have happened except for the conduct.” Spaur v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 510 N.W.2d 854, 858 (Iowa 1994); accord Johnson v. Interstate Power Co., 481 N.W.2d 310, 323 (Iowa 1992) (citing Iowa Civ.

1996Co., 526 N.W.2d 845, 853 (Iowa 1995) (following Marti’s formulation of “factual causation” (an issue of fact) and “legal causation” (an issue of law)); Sumpter v. City of Moulton, 519 N.W.2d 427, 434 (Iowa App.1994) (applying Marti’s but-for test to determine “actual cause” and applying Restatement test to determine “legal” or “proximate cause”).

1993See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 927(2)(b) (1977). *769 In General Insurance Co. v. Dyer, 7 Wash. App. 411, 412 , 499 P.2d 910, 911 (1972), a town treasurer was sued for conversion.

1993See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 927(2)(b) (1977). *769 In General Insurance Co. v. Dyer, 7 Wash. App. 411, 412 , 499 P.2d 910, 911 (1972), a town treasurer was sued for conversion.

1990See Fitzpatrick v. State, 439 N.W.2d 663, 667-68 (Iowa 1989) (parole officer had no legal duty to police officer injured by parolee given lack of special relationship between actor and victim); Ewoldt v. City of Iowa City, 438 N.W.2d 843, 844-45 (Iowa App.1989) (city had no duty to detain mentally ill person absent special relationship); Hildenbrand v. Cox, 369 N.W.2d 411, 415 (Iowa 1985) (no special relationship existed between motorist and investigating officer that would give rise to liability toward motorist who subsequently drove auto to his death); Smith v. State, 324 N.W.2d 299, 302 (Io

1990See Fitzpatrick v. State, 439 N.W.2d 663, 667-68 (Iowa 1989) (parole officer had no legal duty to police officer injured by parolee given lack of special relationship between actor and victim); Ewoldt v. City of Iowa City, 438 N.W.2d 843, 844-45 (Iowa App.1989) (city had no duty to detain mentally ill person absent special relationship); Hildenbrand v. Cox, 369 N.W.2d 411, 415 (Iowa 1985) (no special relationship existed between motorist and investigating officer that would give rise to liability toward motorist who subsequently drove auto to his death); Smith v. State, 324 N.W.2d 299, 302 (Io

1990See Fitzpatrick v. State, 439 N.W.2d 663, 667-68 (Iowa 1989) (parole officer had no legal duty to police officer injured by parolee given lack of special relationship between actor and victim); Ewoldt v. City of Iowa City, 438 N.W.2d 843, 844-45 (Iowa App.1989) (city had no duty to detain mentally ill person absent special relationship); Hildenbrand v. Cox, 369 N.W.2d 411, 415 (Iowa 1985) (no special relationship existed between motorist and investigating officer that would give rise to liability toward motorist who subsequently drove auto to his death); Smith v. State, 324 N.W.2d 299, 302 (Io

1990See Fitzpatrick v. State, 439 N.W.2d 663, 667-68 (Iowa 1989) (parole officer had no legal duty to police officer injured by parolee given lack of special relationship between actor and victim); Ewoldt v. City of Iowa City, 438 N.W.2d 843, 844-45 (Iowa App.1989) (city had no duty to detain mentally ill person absent special relationship); Hildenbrand v. Cox, 369 N.W.2d 411, 415 (Iowa 1985) (no special relationship existed between motorist and investigating officer that would give rise to liability toward motorist who subsequently drove auto to his death); Smith v. State, 324 N.W.2d 299, 302 (Io

1990See Fitzpatrick v. State, 439 N.W.2d 663, 667-68 (Iowa 1989) (parole officer had no legal duty to police officer injured by parolee given lack of special relationship between actor and victim); Ewoldt v. City of Iowa City, 438 N.W.2d 843, 844-45 (Iowa App.1989) (city had no duty to detain mentally ill person absent special relationship); Hildenbrand v. Cox, 369 N.W.2d 411, 415 (Iowa 1985) (no special relationship existed between motorist and investigating officer that would give rise to liability toward motorist who subsequently drove auto to his death); Smith v. State, 324 N.W.2d 299, 302 (Io

1990See Fitzpatrick v. State, 439 N.W.2d 663, 667-68 (Iowa 1989) (parole officer had no legal duty to police officer injured by parolee given lack of special relationship between actor and victim); Ewoldt v. City of Iowa City, 438 N.W.2d 843, 844-45 (Iowa App.1989) (city had no duty to detain mentally ill person absent special relationship); Hildenbrand v. Cox, 369 N.W.2d 411, 415 (Iowa 1985) (no special relationship existed between motorist and investigating officer that would give rise to liability toward motorist who subsequently drove auto to his death); Smith v. State, 324 N.W.2d 299, 302 (Io

1990See Fitzpatrick v. State, 439 N.W.2d 663, 667-68 (Iowa 1989) (parole officer had no legal duty to police officer injured by parolee given lack of special relationship between actor and victim); Ewoldt v. City of Iowa City, 438 N.W.2d 843, 844-45 (Iowa App.1989) (city had no duty to detain mentally ill person absent special relationship); Hildenbrand v. Cox, 369 N.W.2d 411, 415 (Iowa 1985) (no special relationship existed between motorist and investigating officer that would give rise to liability toward motorist who subsequently drove auto to his death); Smith v. State, 324 N.W.2d 299, 302 (Io

1990See Fitzpatrick v. State, 439 N.W.2d 663, 667-68 (Iowa 1989) (parole officer had no legal duty to police officer injured by parolee given lack of special relationship between actor and victim); Ewoldt v. City of Iowa City, 438 N.W.2d 843, 844-45 (Iowa App.1989) (city had no duty to detain mentally ill person absent special relationship); Hildenbrand v. Cox, 369 N.W.2d 411, 415 (Iowa 1985) (no special relationship existed between motorist and investigating officer that would give rise to liability toward motorist who subsequently drove auto to his death); Smith v. State, 324 N.W.2d 299, 302 (Io

1988This court adopted the Restatement rule in Ryan v. Kanne, 170 N.W.2d 395, 403 (Iowa 1969), where we said: “[W]e believe the position announce[d] in the Restatement proposed draft [which is identical to present section 552] may be accepted to the extent that it extends the right to recover for negligence to persons for whose benefit and guidance the accountant knows the information is intended, especially when the party to be benefited is identified before the statement or report is submitted by the accountant.” We did not set the outer perimeters of liability in Ryan , because in that case the

1988This court adopted the Restatement rule in Ryan v. Kanne, 170 N.W.2d 395, 403 (Iowa 1969), where we said: “[W]e believe the position announce[d] in the Restatement proposed draft [which is identical to present section 552] may be accepted to the extent that it extends the right to recover for negligence to persons for whose benefit and guidance the accountant knows the information is intended, especially when the party to be benefited is identified before the statement or report is submitted by the accountant.” We did not set the outer perimeters of liability in Ryan , because in that case the

1986In the comment to this section, the draftsmen of the Restatement rule note that “[a] threat, even if improper, does not amount to duress if the victim has a reasonable alternative to succumbing and fails to take advantage of it.” On the general principle of economic duress, see 13 Willi-ston on Contracts § 1617, at 704; Totem Marine Tug & Barge Inc. v. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co., 584 P.2d 15, 22-23 (Alaska 1978); Note, Economic Duress After The Demise of Freewill Theory: A Proposed Tort Analysis, 53 Iowa L.Rev. 892, 899 (1968).

1985The above Restatement rule was adopted early by this court, McGulpin v. Bessmer, 241 Iowa 1119, 1131 , 43 N.W.2d 121, 126-28 (1950); see Bartholomew v. Butts, 232 Iowa 776, 779 , 5 N.W.2d 7, 9 (1942), 2 and is conceded in defendants’ brief to be the applicable law.

1985The above Restatement rule was adopted early by this court, McGulpin v. Bessmer, 241 Iowa 1119, 1131 , 43 N.W.2d 121, 126-28 (1950); see Bartholomew v. Butts, 232 Iowa 776, 779 , 5 N.W.2d 7, 9 (1942), 2 and is conceded in defendants’ brief to be the applicable law.