Restatement rule in Indiana

1997To do so effectively, the employee must plead or assert the doctrine with particularity. 6 The employee must assert and demonstrate that the employer made a promise to the employee; that the employee relied on that promise to his detriment; and that the promise otherwise fits within the Restatement test for promissory estoppel. 7 See Jarboe v. Landmark Community Newspapers of Indiana, Inc., 644 N.E.2d 118, 121 (Ind.l995)(adopting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90(1) (1981)). 8 In their opposition to Westminster’s transfer petition before this Court, plaintiffs do not rely on the public po

1997To do so effectively, the employee must plead or assert the doctrine with particularity. 6 The employee must assert and demonstrate that the employer made a promise to the employee; that the employee relied on that promise to his detriment; and that the promise otherwise fits within the Restatement test for promissory estoppel. 7 See Jarboe v. Landmark Community Newspapers of Indiana, Inc., 644 N.E.2d 118, 121 (Ind.l995)(adopting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90(1) (1981)). 8 In their opposition to Westminster’s transfer petition before this Court, plaintiffs do not rely on the public po

2019See Coca-Cola Co. v. Babyback’s Int’l, Inc., 806 N.E.2d 37, 49-52 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), vacated on other grounds by Coca-Cola v. Babyback’s Int’l, Inc., 841 N.E.2d 557, 560 (Ind. 2006) (outlining the five Restatement elements for tortious interference with a business relationship).

2019See Coca-Cola Co. v. Babyback’s Int’l, Inc., 806 N.E.2d 37, 49-52 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), vacated on other grounds by Coca-Cola v. Babyback’s Int’l, Inc., 841 N.E.2d 557, 560 (Ind. 2006) (outlining the five Restatement elements for tortious interference with a business relationship).

2000Bailey v. Martz, 488 N.E.2d 716, 721 (Ind. Ct.App.1986) (citing Smith v. Diamond, 421 N.E.2d 1172, 1177-79 (Ind.Ct.App. 1981)), transfer denied. [3] In the age seven to fourteen category, Indiana applies the Restatement standard and ascertains whether the child exercised the care under the circumstances of a child of like age, knowledge, judgment, and experience.

2000Bailey v. Martz, 488 N.E.2d 716, 721 (Ind. Ct.App.1986) (citing Smith v. Diamond, 421 N.E.2d 1172, 1177-79 (Ind.Ct.App. 1981)), transfer denied. [3] In the age seven to fourteen category, Indiana applies the Restatement standard and ascertains whether the child exercised the care under the circumstances of a child of like age, knowledge, judgment, and experience.

2000Bailey v. Martz, 488 N.E.2d 716, 721 (Ind. Ct.App.1986) (citing Smith v. Diamond, 421 N.E.2d 1172, 1177-79 (Ind.Ct.App. 1981)), transfer denied. [3] In the age seven to fourteen category, Indiana applies the Restatement standard and ascertains whether the child exercised the care under the circumstances of a child of like age, knowledge, judgment, and experience.

2000Bailey v. Martz, 488 N.E.2d 716, 721 (Ind. Ct.App.1986) (citing Smith v. Diamond, 421 N.E.2d 1172, 1177-79 (Ind.Ct.App. 1981)), transfer denied. [3] In the age seven to fourteen category, Indiana applies the Restatement standard and ascertains whether the child exercised the care under the circumstances of a child of like age, knowledge, judgment, and experience.

2019To prevail under a theory of promissory estoppel, Miranda "must assert and demonstrate that the employer made a promise to the employee; that the employee relied on that promise to [her] detriment; and that the promise otherwise fits within the Restatement test for promissory estoppel." Orr , 689 N.E.2d at 718 . [28] Miranda asserts that, in addition to the discipline procedures as set forth in the handbook, Miranda's "glowing review" that she received shortly before her suspension demonstrates that she met the standards of Defendants' employment.

2019To prevail under a theory of promissory estoppel, Miranda "must assert and demonstrate that the employer made a promise to the employee; that the employee relied on that promise to [her] detriment; and that the promise otherwise fits within the Restatement test for promissory estoppel." Orr , 689 N.E.2d at 718 . [28] Miranda asserts that, in addition to the discipline procedures as set forth in the handbook, Miranda's "glowing review" that she received shortly before her suspension demonstrates that she met the standards of Defendants' employment.

2019See Coca-Cola Co. v. Babyback’s Int’l, Inc., 806 N.E.2d 37, 49-52 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), vacated on other grounds by Coca-Cola v. Babyback’s Int’l, Inc., 841 N.E.2d 557, 560 (Ind. 2006) (outlining the five Restatement elements for tortious interference with a business relationship).

2019See Coca-Cola Co. v. Babyback’s Int’l, Inc., 806 N.E.2d 37, 49-52 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), vacated on other grounds by Coca-Cola v. Babyback’s Int’l, Inc., 841 N.E.2d 557, 560 (Ind. 2006) (outlining the five Restatement elements for tortious interference with a business relationship).

2009We also noted that, "[iln the age seven to fourteen category, Indiana applies the Restatement standard and ascertains whether the child exercised the care under the cireumstances of a child of like age, knowledge, judgment, and experience." Creasy, 730 N.E.2d at 662 .

2009We also noted that, "[iln the age seven to fourteen category, Indiana applies the Restatement standard and ascertains whether the child exercised the care under the cireumstances of a child of like age, knowledge, judgment, and experience." Creasy, 730 N.E.2d at 662 .

2018See also Offshore Systems-Kenai v. State, Dep't of Transp. & Public Facilities , 282 P.3d 348 , 357 (Alaska 2012) (adding in dicta that Restatement applies only when easement is not fixed); Lewis , 92 N.Y.2d 443 , 682 N.Y.S.2d 657 , 705 N.E.2d 649 , 653-54 (applying draft version of § 4.8 to non-fixed easement); Stanga , 694 N.W.2d at 718-19 (applying § 4.8 because right-of-way easement was not described in deed and had changed course and form over time).

2018See also Offshore Systems-Kenai v. State, Dep't of Transp. & Public Facilities , 282 P.3d 348 , 357 (Alaska 2012) (adding in dicta that Restatement applies only when easement is not fixed); Lewis , 92 N.Y.2d 443 , 682 N.Y.S.2d 657 , 705 N.E.2d 649 , 653-54 (applying draft version of § 4.8 to non-fixed easement); Stanga , 694 N.W.2d at 718-19 (applying § 4.8 because right-of-way easement was not described in deed and had changed course and form over time).

2018See also Offshore Systems-Kenai v. State, Dep't of Transp. & Public Facilities , 282 P.3d 348 , 357 (Alaska 2012) (adding in dicta that Restatement applies only when easement is not fixed); Lewis , 92 N.Y.2d 443 , 682 N.Y.S.2d 657 , 705 N.E.2d 649 , 653-54 (applying draft version of § 4.8 to non-fixed easement); Stanga , 694 N.W.2d at 718-19 (applying § 4.8 because right-of-way easement was not described in deed and had changed course and form over time).

2018See also Offshore Systems-Kenai v. State, Dep't of Transp. & Public Facilities , 282 P.3d 348 , 357 (Alaska 2012) (adding in dicta that Restatement applies only when easement is not fixed); Lewis , 92 N.Y.2d 443 , 682 N.Y.S.2d 657 , 705 N.E.2d 649 , 653-54 (applying draft version of § 4.8 to non-fixed easement); Stanga , 694 N.W.2d at 718-19 (applying § 4.8 because right-of-way easement was not described in deed and had changed course and form over time).

2017See Page Two, 517 N.E.2d at 108 (finding the factors set forth in § 275 of the Restatement of Contracts reasonably supported the trial court’s determination that any breach of a covenant to maintain insurance upon the premises was not sufficiently material to justify termination of the lease), 2 reh’g denied.

2017See Page Two, 517 N.E.2d at 108 (finding the factors set forth in § 275 of the Restatement of Contracts reasonably supported the trial court’s determination that any breach of a covenant to maintain insurance upon the premises was not sufficiently material to justify termination of the lease), 2 reh’g denied.

2017See id. at 517 ; S. Shore Baseball, LLC v. DeJesus, 11 N.E.3d 903 , 910–11 (Ind. 2014) (citing Yost as adopting the Restatement’s test).

2017See id. at 517 ; S. Shore Baseball, LLC v. DeJesus, 11 N.E.3d 903, 910-11 (Ind. 2014) (citing Yost as adopting the Restatement’s test).

2017See id. at 517 ; S. Shore Baseball, LLC v. DeJesus, 11 N.E.3d 903 , 910–11 (Ind. 2014) (citing Yost as adopting the Restatement’s test).

2017See id. at 517 ; S. Shore Baseball, LLC v. DeJesus, 11 N.E.3d 903, 910-11 (Ind. 2014) (citing Yost as adopting the Restatement’s test).

2015Our supreme court has recognized that an employee may invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel by “pleading the doctrine with particularity, demonstrating that the employer made a promise to the employee, the employee relied on the promise to his detriment, and the promise otherwise fits within the Restatement test for promissory estoppel.” Peru School Corp., 969 N.E.2d at 133 -34 (citing Baker v. Tremco, Inc., 917 N.E.2d 660, 654 (Ind.2009)).

2015Our supreme court has recognized that an employee may invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel by “pleading the doctrine with particularity, demonstrating that the employer made a promise to the employee, the employee relied on the promise to his detriment, and the promise otherwise fits within the Restatement test for promissory estoppel.” Peru School Corp., 969 N.E.2d at 133 -34 (citing Baker v. Tremco, Inc., 917 N.E.2d 660, 654 (Ind.2009)).

2013Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 241 (1981); see also Frazier v. Mellowitz, 804 N.E.2d 796, 804 (Ind.Ct.App.2004) (applying the Restatement factors). 13 Dan claims that, under the facts of the present case, these circumstances do not support a finding of a material breach.

2013Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 241 (1981); see also Frazier v. Mellowitz, 804 N.E.2d 796, 804 (Ind.Ct.App.2004) (applying the Restatement factors). 13 Dan claims that, under the facts of the present case, these circumstances do not support a finding of a material breach.

2012Hinkel v. Sataria Distribution & Packaging, Inc., 920 N.E.2d 766, 771 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (internal citations omitted).

2012Hinkel v. Sataria Distribution & Packaging, Inc., 920 N.E.2d 766, 771 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (internal citations omitted).

2010In Valinet v. Eskew, our supreme court adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 363 (the "Restatement rule"), which states: (1) Except as stated in Subsection (2), neither a possessor of land, nor a vendor, lessor, or other transferor, is liable for physical harm caused to others outside of the land by a natural condition of the land. (2) A possessor of land in an urban area is subject to liability to persons using a public highway for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to prevent an unreasonable risk of harm arising from the condition of trees on the