Restatement test in Montana

2015In more recent cases, we have retained this test while restating it as “testamentary capacity requires that the testator be aware of three elements: (1) the nature of the act to be performed, (2) the nature and the extent of the property to be disposed of, and (3) the objects of his or her bounty.” Lightfield, ¶ 28; In re Estate of Harms, 2006 MT 320, ¶ 14 , 335 Mont. 66 , 149 P.3d 557; Prescott, ¶ 34. ¶15 Speiser contends that awareness of these three elements is an additional component rather than a restatement of the test for testamentary capacity.

2015In more recent cases, we have retained this test while restating it as “testamentary capacity requires that the testator be aware of three elements: (1) the nature of the act to be performed, (2) the nature and the extent of the property to be disposed of, and (3) the objects of his or her bounty.” Lightfield, ¶ 28; In re Estate of Harms, 2006 MT 320, ¶ 14 , 335 Mont. 66 , 149 P.3d 557; Prescott, ¶ 34. ¶15 Speiser contends that awareness of these three elements is an additional component rather than a restatement of the test for testamentary capacity.

2010NOTES [1] Josephson subsequently sent another letter to Mersen expressing Walkers' election to close without satisfaction of the contract contingencies by Emmerson, in accordance with the contract. [2] "If one party to a like-kind exchange also contributes some other property, then that property is called `boot.'" Drayton v. U.S., 801 F.2d 117 , 126 n. 7 (3d Cir.1986). [3] During cross-examination at trial, Johnson withdrew his request for these costs. [4] We have not adopted the precise language of the Restatement's test for tortious interference with a contract but have nevertheless used its

2000McJunkin, 229 Mont. at 443-44 , 748 P.2d at 917 . ¶21 The McAlpines point out that McJunkin was decided at a time when Montana utilized the common law test for strict products liability set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965), and that the 1987 Legislature statutorily adopted the Restatement test by enacting § 27-1-719, MCA, which provides: (1) As used in this section, “seller” means a manufacturer, wholesaler, or retailer. (2) A person who sells a product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to a user or consumer or to the property of a user or consumer is liab

2000McJunkin, 229 Mont. at 443-44 , 748 P.2d at 917 . ¶21 The McAlpines point out that McJunkin was decided at a time when Montana utilized the common law test for strict products liability set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965), and that the 1987 Legislature statutorily adopted the Restatement test by enacting § 27-1-719, MCA, which provides: (1) As used in this section, “seller” means a manufacturer, wholesaler, or retailer. (2) A person who sells a product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to a user or consumer or to the property of a user or consumer is liab

1990However, though I would not recognize status in "land possessor's liability," I feel the rule to be applicable to facts such as those at bar. 637 P.2d at 512 .

1990However, though I would not recognize status in "land possessor's liability," I feel the rule to be applicable to facts such as those at bar. 637 P.2d at 512 .

1984Olson Corporation (1972), 8 Cal.3d 121 , 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 , 501 P.2d 1153 .

1984Olson Corporation (1972), 8 Cal.3d 121 , 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 , 501 P.2d 1153 .

1958Without burdening this opinion with a discussion of whether or not the court in that case found that one of the purposes of licensing the profession of optometry was to protect against unauthorized competition, it would be well to point out that New Hampshire Board v. Scott Jewelry Co., 90 N.H. 368 , 9 A. (2d) 513, 517, and MacBeth v. Gerber’s Inc., 72 R.I. 102 , 48 A. (2d) 366, 367, are both cases in which the courts have followed the Restatement test of whether the legislature had, in licensing optometrists, for one of its purposes the protection of optometrists from the unauthorized competi

1958Without burdening this opinion with a discussion of whether or not the court in that case found that one of the purposes of licensing the profession of optometry was to protect against unauthorized competition, it would be well to point out that New Hampshire Board v. Scott Jewelry Co., 90 N.H. 368 , 9 A. (2d) 513, 517, and MacBeth v. Gerber’s Inc., 72 R.I. 102 , 48 A. (2d) 366, 367, are both cases in which the courts have followed the Restatement test of whether the legislature had, in licensing optometrists, for one of its purposes the protection of optometrists from the unauthorized competi

1958Other cases utilizing the restatement rule are: In re Del Drago’s Estate, 179 Misc. 383, 389 , 36 N.Y.S. (2d) 811; In re Davies’ Estate, 197 Misc. 827 , 96 N.Y.S. (2d) 191, 199, 200, affirmed 277 App. Div. 1021 , 100 N.Y.S. (2d) 710; see also Newbury v. United States, 57 F. Supp. 168, 175 , 102 Ct. Cl. 192 , where the rule is applied in the concurring opinion.

1958Other cases utilizing the restatement rule are: In re Del Drago’s Estate, 179 Misc. 383, 389 , 36 N.Y.S. (2d) 811; In re Davies’ Estate, 197 Misc. 827 , 96 N.Y.S. (2d) 191, 199, 200, affirmed 277 App. Div. 1021 , 100 N.Y.S. (2d) 710; see also Newbury v. United States, 57 F. Supp. 168, 175 , 102 Ct. Cl. 192 , where the rule is applied in the concurring opinion.

1958Without burdening this opinion with a discussion of whether or not the court in that case found that one of the purposes of licensing the profession of optometry was to protect against unauthorized competition, it would be well to point out that New Hampshire Board v. Scott Jewelry Co., 90 N.H. 368 , 9 A. (2d) 513, 517, and MacBeth v. Gerber’s Inc., 72 R.I. 102 , 48 A. (2d) 366, 367, are both cases in which the courts have followed the Restatement test of whether the legislature had, in licensing optometrists, for one of its purposes the protection of optometrists from the unauthorized competi

1958Without burdening this opinion with a discussion of whether or not the court in that case found that one of the purposes of licensing the profession of optometry was to protect against unauthorized competition, it would be well to point out that New Hampshire Board v. Scott Jewelry Co., 90 N.H. 368 , 9 A. (2d) 513, 517, and MacBeth v. Gerber’s Inc., 72 R.I. 102 , 48 A. (2d) 366, 367, are both cases in which the courts have followed the Restatement test of whether the legislature had, in licensing optometrists, for one of its purposes the protection of optometrists from the unauthorized competi

1955Lindblom v. Employers' Liability Assurance Corp., supra, which is the classic authority in this court defining the doctrine of equitable estoppel, is but a restatement of the rule elaborated in Waddell v. School District No. 2, 74 Mont. 91 , 238 Pac. 884 ; and both of these decisions are only judicial applications of our controlling statute, R.C.M. 1947, sec. 93-1301-6, subd. 3.

1955Lindblom v. Employers' Liability Assurance Corp., supra, which is the classic authority in this court defining the doctrine of equitable estoppel, is but a restatement of the rule elaborated in Waddell v. School District No. 2, 74 Mont. 91 , 238 Pac. 884 ; and both of these decisions are only judicial applications of our controlling statute, R.C.M. 1947, sec. 93-1301-6, subd. 3.