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25 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1968–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Fuchsgreen1 sentence2021See State v. Fuchs, 769 So. 2d 1006, 1008 (Fla. 2000) (“It is well -14- established that, where reasonably possible, a statute will be interpreted in a manner that resolves all doubts in favor of its constitutionality.”); State v. Lick, 390 So. 2d 52, 53 (Fla. 1980) (“[W]here the statute is reasonably susceptible of two interpretations, one of which would render it invalid and the other valid, we must adopt the constitutional construction.”); Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 66 (2012) (“An interpretation that validates outweighs one that invalida | 1 | 1 |
State v. Lickgreen1 sentence2021See State v. Fuchs, 769 So. 2d 1006, 1008 (Fla. 2000) (“It is well -14- established that, where reasonably possible, a statute will be interpreted in a manner that resolves all doubts in favor of its constitutionality.”); State v. Lick, 390 So. 2d 52, 53 (Fla. 1980) (“[W]here the statute is reasonably susceptible of two interpretations, one of which would render it invalid and the other valid, we must adopt the constitutional construction.”); Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 66 (2012) (“An interpretation that validates outweighs one that invalida | 1 | 1 |
William P. Aubin v. Union Carbide Corporationgreen2 sentences2020Thus, the supreme court held that “the Third District erred in determining that the Third Restatement’s test for a defective design exclusively applied to a claim of strict products liability, which generally requires plaintiffs to establish a reasonable alternative of how a product could be designed.” Id. at 519–20. 2020The supreme court explained that “[t]he critical difference regarding design defects between the Second Restatement and the Third Restatement is that the Third Restatement not only replaces the consumer expectations test with the risk utility test, but also requires the plaintiff to demonstrate the existence of a reasonable alternative design.” Id. at 505 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Pate v. Gilmoregreen2 sentences2012See Alexander v. Morton, 595 So.2d 1015, 1016-18 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992) (reversing a final summary judgment predicated on a finding that an air-conditioning installer was an independent contractor where several of the Restatement factors raised a fact question about the existence of an employer-employee relationship); Pate v. Gilmore, 647 So.2d 235, 236 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (reversing a final summary judgment based on a finding that a part-time stable hand was an independent contractor where several of the Restatement factors were more consistent with the status of an employee than an independent c 2012See Alexander v. Morton, 595 So.2d 1015, 1016-18 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992) (reversing a final summary judgment predicated on a finding that an air-conditioning installer was an independent contractor where several of the Restatement factors raised a fact question about the existence of an employer-employee relationship); Pate v. Gilmore, 647 So.2d 235, 236 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (reversing a final summary judgment based on a finding that a part-time stable hand was an independent contractor where several of the Restatement factors were more consistent with the status of an employee than an independent c | 1 | 1 |
Kane Furniture Corp. v. Mirandagreen2 sentences2012See Alexander v. Morton, 595 So.2d 1015, 1016-18 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992) (reversing a final summary judgment predicated on a finding that an air-conditioning installer was an independent contractor where several of the Restatement factors raised a fact question about the existence of an employer-employee relationship); Pate v. Gilmore, 647 So.2d 235, 236 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (reversing a final summary judgment based on a finding that a part-time stable hand was an independent contractor where several of the Restatement factors were more consistent with the status of an employee than an independent c 2012See Alexander v. Morton, 595 So.2d 1015, 1016-18 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992) (reversing a final summary judgment predicated on a finding that an air-conditioning installer was an independent contractor where several of the Restatement factors raised a fact question about the existence of an employer-employee relationship); Pate v. Gilmore, 647 So.2d 235, 236 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (reversing a final summary judgment based on a finding that a part-time stable hand was an independent contractor where several of the Restatement factors were more consistent with the status of an employee than an independent c | 1 | 1 |
Alexander v. Mortongreen2 sentences2012See Alexander v. Morton, 595 So.2d 1015, 1016-18 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992) (reversing a final summary judgment predicated on a finding that an air-conditioning installer was an independent contractor where several of the Restatement factors raised a fact question about the existence of an employer-employee relationship); Pate v. Gilmore, 647 So.2d 235, 236 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (reversing a final summary judgment based on a finding that a part-time stable hand was an independent contractor where several of the Restatement factors were more consistent with the status of an employee than an independent c 2012See Alexander v. Morton, 595 So.2d 1015, 1016-18 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992) (reversing a final summary judgment predicated on a finding that an air-conditioning installer was an independent contractor where several of the Restatement factors raised a fact question about the existence of an employer-employee relationship); Pate v. Gilmore, 647 So.2d 235, 236 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (reversing a final summary judgment based on a finding that a part-time stable hand was an independent contractor where several of the Restatement factors were more consistent with the status of an employee than an independent c | 1 | 1 |
Anderson v. Rosetree Village Ass'n, Inc.green2 sentences1992See Anderson v. Rosetree Village Ass'n, 540 So.2d 173, 174 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989) ("`if the record raises even the slightest doubt that an issue [of material fact] might exist,' summary judgment is improper") (quoting Snyder v. Cheezem Dev. 1992See Anderson v. Rosetree Village Ass'n, 540 So.2d 173, 174 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989) ("`if the record raises even the slightest doubt that an issue [of material fact] might exist,' summary judgment is improper") (quoting Snyder v. Cheezem Dev. | 1 | 1 |
Lynch v. Browngreen2 sentences1989See Lynch v. Brown, 489 So.2d 65, 66 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). 1989See Lynch v. Brown, 489 So.2d 65, 66 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). | 1 | 1 |
Krasnosky v. Meredithgreen2 sentences1987See Krasnosky v. Meredith, 447 So.2d 232 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (applying Florida law to determine driver's liability based on host-guest relationship which arose between the passenger and driver in Florida, since the "only relationship of Georgia to the personal injury action is the mere `happenstance' of the automobile coming into contact with a Georgia tree"); *416 Harris v. Berkowitz, 433 So.2d 613 (Florida wrongful death law permitting full recovery of damages, rather than law of Maine limiting recovery, is applicable where accident involving Florida residents occurred during trip in Maine b 1987See Krasnosky v. Meredith, 447 So.2d 232 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (applying Florida law to determine driver's liability based on host-guest relationship which arose between the passenger and driver in Florida, since the "only relationship of Georgia to the personal injury action is the mere `happenstance' of the automobile coming into contact with a Georgia tree"); *416 Harris v. Berkowitz, 433 So.2d 613 (Florida wrongful death law permitting full recovery of damages, rather than law of Maine limiting recovery, is applicable where accident involving Florida residents occurred during trip in Maine b | 1 | 1 |
Brady v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1984Indeed, as stated in Harris v. State, 438 So.2d 787, 797 (Fla. 1983), for a plea to be effective, "there must be an express waiver of the right ... by the defendant, and the record must reflect that it was knowingly and intelligently made." (Emphasis in original.) This is a restatement of the rule applied in Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 , 90 S.Ct. 1463, 1472 , 25 L.Ed.2d 747, 760 (1970), holding that in order for a plea to be voluntary, it must be made by one fully aware of the consequences. 1984Indeed, as stated in Harris v. State, 438 So.2d 787, 797 (Fla. 1983), for a plea to be effective, "there must be an express waiver of the right ... by the defendant, and the record must reflect that it was knowingly and intelligently made." (Emphasis in original.) This is a restatement of the rule applied in Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 , 90 S.Ct. 1463, 1472 , 25 L.Ed.2d 747, 760 (1970), holding that in order for a plea to be voluntary, it must be made by one fully aware of the consequences. | 1 | 1 |
Harris v. Stategreen1 sentence1984Indeed, as stated in Harris v. State, 438 So.2d 787, 797 (Fla. 1983), for a plea to be effective, "there must be an express waiver of the right ... by the defendant, and the record must reflect that it was knowingly and intelligently made." (Emphasis in original.) This is a restatement of the rule applied in Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 , 90 S.Ct. 1463, 1472 , 25 L.Ed.2d 747, 760 (1970), holding that in order for a plea to be voluntary, it must be made by one fully aware of the consequences. | 1 | 1 |
Barker v. Lull Engineering Co.green2 sentences1981Additionally, one court has stated that the Restatement standard is unfair because it treats a "consumer's expectations as a `ceiling' ... rather that as a `floor.'" Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., Inc., 20 Cal.3d 413 , 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 , 573 P.2d 443, 451, note 7 (1978). [9] See, e.g., Wade, supra, note one, at 837-38; Fischer, Products Liability The Meaning of Defect, 39 Mo.L.Rev. 339, 359 (1974); Dickerson, How Good Does a Product Have To Be?, 42 Ind.L.J. 301 (1967); Montgomery & Owen, Reflection on the Theory and Administration of Strict Liability for Defective Products, 27 S.C.L. 1981Additionally, one court has stated that the Restatement standard is unfair because it treats a "consumer's expectations as a `ceiling' ... rather that as a `floor.'" Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., Inc., 20 Cal.3d 413 , 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 , 573 P.2d 443, 451, note 7 (1978). [9] See, e.g., Wade, supra, note one, at 837-38; Fischer, Products Liability The Meaning of Defect, 39 Mo.L.Rev. 339, 359 (1974); Dickerson, How Good Does a Product Have To Be?, 42 Ind.L.J. 301 (1967); Montgomery & Owen, Reflection on the Theory and Administration of Strict Liability for Defective Products, 27 S.C.L. | 1 | 1 |
| Thompson v. Taylorgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Cassisi v. Maytag Co.
green
2 sentences1994We continued, saying: "[W]hen a product malfunctions during normal operation, a legal inference, which is in effect a mirror reflection of the Restatement's standard of product defectiveness, *89 arises, and the injured plaintiff thereby establishes a prima facie case for jury consideration." Id. at 1148 . 1990In Cassisi , we approved the rule announced in Greco v. Bucciconi Engineering Co., 283 F. Supp. 978 (W.D.Pa. 1967), aff'd, 407 F.2d 87 (3rd Cir.1969), that "when a product malfunctions during normal operation, a legal inference which is, in effect, a mirror reflection of the Restatement standard of product defectiveness, arises, and the injured plaintiff thereby establishes a prima facie case for jury consideration." [1] Cassisi, 396 So.2d at 1148 . | 4 | 1984–1994 |
Greco v. Bucciconi Engineering Company
green
2 sentences1990In Cassisi , we approved the rule announced in Greco v. Bucciconi Engineering Co., 283 F. Supp. 978 (W.D.Pa. 1967), aff'd, 407 F.2d 87 (3rd Cir.1969), that "when a product malfunctions during normal operation, a legal inference which is, in effect, a mirror reflection of the Restatement standard of product defectiveness, arises, and the injured plaintiff thereby establishes a prima facie case for jury consideration." [1] Cassisi, 396 So.2d at 1148 . 1990In Cassisi , we approved the rule announced in Greco v. Bucciconi Engineering Co., 283 F. Supp. 978 (W.D.Pa. 1967), aff'd, 407 F.2d 87 (3rd Cir.1969), that "when a product malfunctions during normal operation, a legal inference which is, in effect, a mirror reflection of the Restatement standard of product defectiveness, arises, and the injured plaintiff thereby establishes a prima facie case for jury consideration." [1] Cassisi, 396 So.2d at 1148 . | 3 | 1984–1990 |
cluster 283548
green
2 sentences1990In Cassisi , we approved the rule announced in Greco v. Bucciconi Engineering Co., 283 F. Supp. 978 (W.D.Pa. 1967), aff'd, 407 F.2d 87 (3rd Cir.1969), that "when a product malfunctions during normal operation, a legal inference which is, in effect, a mirror reflection of the Restatement standard of product defectiveness, arises, and the injured plaintiff thereby establishes a prima facie case for jury consideration." [1] Cassisi, 396 So.2d at 1148 . 1990In Cassisi , we approved the rule announced in Greco v. Bucciconi Engineering Co., 283 F. Supp. 978 (W.D.Pa. 1967), aff'd, 407 F.2d 87 (3rd Cir.1969), that "when a product malfunctions during normal operation, a legal inference which is, in effect, a mirror reflection of the Restatement standard of product defectiveness, arises, and the injured plaintiff thereby establishes a prima facie case for jury consideration." [1] Cassisi, 396 So.2d at 1148 . | 3 | 1984–1990 |
Maldonado v. Jack M. Berry Grove Corp.
green
2 sentences1984Berry Groves Corp., 351 So.2d 967 (Fla. 1977). 1984Berry Groves Corp., 351 So.2d 967 (Fla.1977). | 2 | 1984–1984 |
Tollett v. Henderson
green
2 sentences2002In the context of guilty pleas, the first half of the Strickland v. Washington test is nothing more than a restatement of the standard of attorney competence already set forth in Tollett v. Henderson, supra [ 411 U.S. 258 , 93 S.Ct. 1602 , 36 L.Ed.2d 235 (1973)], and McMann v. Richardson, supra [ 397 U.S. 759 , 90 S.Ct. 1441 , 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970)]. 2002In the context of guilty pleas, the first half of the Strickland v. Washington test is nothing more than a restatement of the standard of attorney competence already set forth in Tollett v. Henderson, supra [ 411 U.S. 258 , 93 S.Ct. 1602 , 36 L.Ed.2d 235 (1973)], and McMann v. Richardson, supra [ 397 U.S. 759 , 90 S.Ct. 1441 , 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970)]. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
McMann v. Richardson
green
2 sentences2002In the context of guilty pleas, the first half of the Strickland v. Washington test is nothing more than a restatement of the standard of attorney competence already set forth in Tollett v. Henderson, supra [ 411 U.S. 258 , 93 S.Ct. 1602 , 36 L.Ed.2d 235 (1973)], and McMann v. Richardson, supra [ 397 U.S. 759 , 90 S.Ct. 1441 , 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970)]. 2002In the context of guilty pleas, the first half of the Strickland v. Washington test is nothing more than a restatement of the standard of attorney competence already set forth in Tollett v. Henderson, supra [ 411 U.S. 258 , 93 S.Ct. 1602 , 36 L.Ed.2d 235 (1973)], and McMann v. Richardson, supra [ 397 U.S. 759 , 90 S.Ct. 1441 , 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970)]. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Walker v. Palm Beach Newspapers, Inc.
green
2 sentences1996See Keith v. News & Sun Sentinel Co., 659 So.2d 1074 (Fla.1995); Kendall; Chambers; and Walker v. Palm Beach Newspapers, Inc., 561 So.2d 1198 (Fla. 5th DCA), appeal dismissed, 576 So.2d 294 (Fla. 1990). 1996See Keith v. News & Sun Sentinel Co., 659 So.2d 1074 (Fla.1995); Kendall; Chambers; and Walker v. Palm Beach Newspapers, Inc., 561 So.2d 1198 (Fla. 5th DCA), appeal dismissed, 576 So.2d 294 (Fla. 1990). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. King
green
2 sentences1990E.g., Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. King, 557 So.2d 574 (Fla. 1990); Swinarski v. Keller, 529 So.2d 1208 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988), rev. denied, 541 So.2d 1172 (Fla. 1989); Food Fair, Inc. v. Anderson, 382 So.2d 150 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). 1990E.g., Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. King, 557 So.2d 574 (Fla. 1990); Swinarski v. Keller, 529 So.2d 1208 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988), rev. denied, 541 So.2d 1172 (Fla. 1989); Food Fair, Inc. v. Anderson, 382 So.2d 150 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Lashley v. Bowman
green
2 sentences1990In Lashley v. Bowman, 561 So.2d 406 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990), another case alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress, the Fifth District indicated that the Restatement's standard set forth in Metropolitan v. McCarson was subject to inconsistent subjective application by the courts. 1990The court stated, "The Restatement, the commentators and this court all agree that outrageousness is more likely to be found where some relationship exists that gives the defendant actual or apparent authority over another or power to affect his interests." Lashley v. Bowman, 561 So.2d 406 -410. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Swinarski v. Keller
green
2 sentences1990E.g., Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. King, 557 So.2d 574 (Fla. 1990); Swinarski v. Keller, 529 So.2d 1208 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988), rev. denied, 541 So.2d 1172 (Fla. 1989); Food Fair, Inc. v. Anderson, 382 So.2d 150 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). 1990E.g., Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. King, 557 So.2d 574 (Fla. 1990); Swinarski v. Keller, 529 So.2d 1208 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988), rev. denied, 541 So.2d 1172 (Fla. 1989); Food Fair, Inc. v. Anderson, 382 So.2d 150 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Food Fair, Inc. v. Anderson
green
2 sentences1990E.g., Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. King, 557 So.2d 574 (Fla. 1990); Swinarski v. Keller, 529 So.2d 1208 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988), rev. denied, 541 So.2d 1172 (Fla. 1989); Food Fair, Inc. v. Anderson, 382 So.2d 150 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). 1990E.g., Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. King, 557 So.2d 574 (Fla. 1990); Swinarski v. Keller, 529 So.2d 1208 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988), rev. denied, 541 So.2d 1172 (Fla. 1989); Food Fair, Inc. v. Anderson, 382 So.2d 150 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Bishop v. Florida Specialty Paint Co.
green
2 sentences1988As this Court noted in Bishop v. Florida Specialty Paint Co., 389 So.2d 999 (Fla. 1980), under the Restatement test, the contacts listed in § 145(2) should be evaluated with an eye to the following factors, important choice-of-law considerations in all areas of the law: (a) the needs of the interstate and international systems, (b) the relevant policies of the forum, (c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interest of those states in the determination of the particular issue, (d) the protection of justified expectations, (e) the basic policies underlying the parti 1988As this Court noted in Bishop v. Florida Specialty Paint Co., 389 So.2d 999 (Fla. 1980), under the Restatement test, the contacts listed in § 145(2) should be evaluated with an eye to the following factors, important choice-of-law considerations in all areas of the law: (a) the needs of the interstate and international systems, (b) the relevant policies of the forum, (c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interest of those states in the determination of the particular issue, (d) the protection of justified expectations, (e) the basic policies underlying the parti | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Harris v. Berkowitz
green
2 sentences1987See Krasnosky v. Meredith, 447 So.2d 232 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (applying Florida law to determine driver's liability based on host-guest relationship which arose between the passenger and driver in Florida, since the "only relationship of Georgia to the personal injury action is the mere `happenstance' of the automobile coming into contact with a Georgia tree"); *416 Harris v. Berkowitz, 433 So.2d 613 (Florida wrongful death law permitting full recovery of damages, rather than law of Maine limiting recovery, is applicable where accident involving Florida residents occurred during trip in Maine b 1987See Krasnosky v. Meredith, 447 So.2d 232 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (applying Florida law to determine driver's liability based on host-guest relationship which arose between the passenger and driver in Florida, since the "only relationship of Georgia to the personal injury action is the mere `happenstance' of the automobile coming into contact with a Georgia tree"); *416 Harris v. Berkowitz, 433 So.2d 613 (Florida wrongful death law permitting full recovery of damages, rather than law of Maine limiting recovery, is applicable where accident involving Florida residents occurred during trip in Maine b | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Johns-Manville Sales Corp. v. Janssens
green
1 sentence1986Adopting language from Johns-Manville Sales Corp. v. Janssens, 463 So.2d 242 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), review denied, 467 So.2d 999 (Fla. 1985), the district court stated: A legal basis for punitive damages is established in products liability cases where the manufacturer is shown to have knowledge that its product is inherently dangerous to persons or property and that its continued use is likely to cause injury or death, but nevertheless continues to market the product without making feasible modifications to eliminate the danger or making adequate disclosure and warning of such danger. 474 So.2d | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Wolmer v. Chrysler Corp.
green
1 sentence1986Adopting language from Johns-Manville Sales Corp. v. Janssens, 463 So.2d 242 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), review denied, 467 So.2d 999 (Fla. 1985), the district court stated: A legal basis for punitive damages is established in products liability cases where the manufacturer is shown to have knowledge that its product is inherently dangerous to persons or property and that its continued use is likely to cause injury or death, but nevertheless continues to market the product without making feasible modifications to eliminate the danger or making adequate disclosure and warning of such danger. 474 So.2d | 1 | 1986–1986 |
West v. Caterpillar Tractor Company, Inc.
green
2 sentences1986In West we stated that "[t]he ordinary rules of causation and the defenses applicable to negligence are available under our adoption of the Restatement rule." 336 So.2d at 90 . 1986In West we stated that "[t]he ordinary rules of causation and the defenses applicable to negligence are available under our adoption of the Restatement rule." 336 So.2d at 90 . | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Keller v. Keller
green
2 sentences1984E.g., Keller v. Keller, 284 Ill. 1984E.g., Keller v. Keller, 284 Ill. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Phipps v. General Motors Corp.
green
2 sentences1981As stated in Phipps v. General Motors Corp., supra, 278 Md. 337 , 363 A.2d at 959 : [T]here are those kinds of conditions which, whether caused by design or manufacture, can never be said to involve a reasonable risk. 1981As stated in Phipps v. General Motors Corp., supra, 278 Md. 337 , 363 A.2d at 959 : [T]here are those kinds of conditions which, whether caused by design or manufacture, can never be said to involve a reasonable risk. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Ronald G. Davis v. Fox River Tractor Company, a Division of Koehring Company green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| Cockerham v. RE Vaughan, Inc. green | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.