16 Tennessee opinions name it 3 courts 1952–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Ferrell v. Elrodgreen2 sentences2001Cf. Ferrell v. Elrod, 63 Tenn.App. 129 , 469 S.W.2d 678, 690 (1971) (permitting, among other things, loss rent from a breach of a lease). 2001Cf. Ferrell v. Elrod, 63 Tenn.App. 129 , 469 S.W.2d 678, 690 (1971) (permitting, among other things, loss rent from a breach of a lease). | 2 | 2 |
Miller v. Willbanksgreen2 sentences2005See Miller, 8 S.W.3d at 612 (stating that this Court has “ground[ed] the cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress within the Restatement framework”); Medlin, 398 S.W.2d at 274 (basing its holding on the Second Restatement). 2005See Miller, 8 S.W.3d at 612 (stating that this Court has “ground[ed] the cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress within the Restatement framework”); Medlin, 398 S.W.2d at 274 (basing its holding on the Second Restatement). | 1 | 2 |
Waste Management, Inc. v. South Central Bell Telephone Co.green1 sentence2019Co., 15 S.W.3d 425, 432 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997) (considering provisions of a Restatement in analysis); Rose v. Third Nat. | 1 | 1 |
Rose v. Third Nat. Bankgreen2 sentences2019Bank, 183 S.W.2d 1, 9 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1944) (considering provisions of a Restatement in analysis). 2019Bank, 183 S.W.2d 1, 9 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1944) (considering provisions of a Restatement in analysis). | 1 | 1 |
Medlin v. Allied Investment Companygreen2 sentences2005See Miller, 8 S.W.3d at 612 (stating that this Court has “ground[ed] the cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress within the Restatement framework”); Medlin, 398 S.W.2d at 274 (basing its holding on the Second Restatement). 2005See Miller, 8 S.W.3d at 612 (stating that this Court has “ground[ed] the cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress within the Restatement framework”); Medlin, 398 S.W.2d at 274 (basing its holding on the Second Restatement). | 1 | 1 |
Metropolitan Government of Nashville v. Countsgreen2 sentences2002Metropolitan Gov’t of Nashville and Davidson County v. Counts, 541 S.W.2d 133, 136 (Tenn. 1976) (citations omitted). 2002Metropolitan Gov’t of Nashville and Davidson County v. Counts, 541 S.W.2d 133, 136 (Tenn. 1976) (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Harvey v. Hansengreen2 sentences2002See Harvey v. Hansen, 299 Pa.Super. 474 , 445 A.2d 1228, 1231 (1982) (distinguishing between artificial and natural vegetation is “arbitrary at best”). 2002See Harvey v. Hansen, 299 Pa.Super. 474 , 445 A.2d 1228, 1231 (1982) (distinguishing between artificial and natural vegetation is “arbitrary at best”). | 1 | 1 |
Raritan River Steel Co. v. Cherry, Bekaert & Hollandgreen2 sentences1991See Raritan River Steel, 367 S.E.2d at 617 . 1991See Raritan River Steel, 367 S.E.2d at 617 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Waggonergreen2 sentences1952See Knott v. Stewart County, 185 Tenn. 623 , 207 S. W. (2d) 337 , for a restatement of the rule in State v. Waggoner, 88 Tenn. 290 , 12 S. W. 721 , cited in our original opinion. 1952See Knott v. Stewart County, 185 Tenn. 623 , 207 S.W. (2d) 337 , for a restatement of the rule in State v. Waggoner, 88 Tenn. 290 , 12 S.W. 721 , cited in our original opinion. | 1 | 1 |
Knott v. Stewart Countygreen2 sentences1952See Knott v. Stewart County, 185 Tenn. 623 , 207 S. W. (2d) 337 , for a restatement of the rule in State v. Waggoner, 88 Tenn. 290 , 12 S. W. 721 , cited in our original opinion. 1952See Knott v. Stewart County, 185 Tenn. 623 , 207 S. W. (2d) 337 , for a restatement of the rule in State v. Waggoner, 88 Tenn. 290 , 12 S. W. 721 , cited in our original opinion. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hornwood v. Smith's Food King No. 1
green
2 sentences2001As the cases cited by the majority recognize, diminution-in-value damages are in fact a measure of special damages, see Hornwood v. Smith's Food King No. 1, 105 Nev. 188 , 772 P.2d 1284 (1989); Lechmere, Inc., 464 S.E.2d at 62-63 , and as such, these damages are properly awarded in this state only when the damages are (1) plead with specificity, Tenn. R. 2001As the cases cited by the majority recognize, diminution-in-value damages are in fact a measure of special damages, see Hornwood v. Smith's Food King No. 1, 105 Nev. 188 , 772 P.2d 1284 (1989); Lechmere, Inc., 464 S.E.2d at 62-63 , and as such, these damages are properly awarded in this state only when the damages are (1) plead with specificity, Tenn. R. | 2 | 2000–2001 |
Tollett v. Henderson
green
2 sentences2001In the context of guilty pleas, the first half of the Strickland v. Washington test is nothing more than a restatement of the standard of attorney competence already set forth in Tollett v. Henderson, [ 411 U.S. 258 , 93 S. Ct. 1602 (1973)], and McMann v. Richardson, [ 397 U.S. 759 , 90 S. Ct. 1441 (1970)]. 2001In the context of guilty pleas, the first half of the Strickland v. Washington test is nothing more than a restatement of the standard of attorney competence already set forth in Tollett v. Henderson, [ 411 U.S. 258 , 93 S. Ct. 1602 (1973)], and McMann v. Richardson, [ 397 U.S. 759 , 90 S. Ct. 1441 (1970)]. | 2 | 2001–2001 |
McMann v. Richardson
green
2 sentences2001In the context of guilty pleas, the first half of the Strickland v. Washington test is nothing more than a restatement of the standard of attorney competence already set forth in Tollett v. Henderson, [ 411 U.S. 258 , 93 S. Ct. 1602 (1973)], and McMann v. Richardson, [ 397 U.S. 759 , 90 S. Ct. 1441 (1970)]. 2001In the context of guilty pleas, the first half of the Strickland v. Washington test is nothing more than a restatement of the standard of attorney competence already set forth in Tollett v. Henderson, [ 411 U.S. 258 , 93 S. Ct. 1602 (1973)], and McMann v. Richardson, [ 397 U.S. 759 , 90 S. Ct. 1441 (1970)]. | 2 | 2001–2001 |
Pleasant Valley Promenade v. Lechmere, Inc.
green
2 sentences2001As the cases cited by the majority recognize, diminution-in-value damages are in fact a measure of special damages, see Hornwood v. Smith's Food King No. 1, 105 Nev. 188 , 772 P.2d 1284 (1989); Lechmere, Inc., 464 S.E.2d at 62-63 , and as such, these damages are properly awarded in this state only when the damages are (1) plead with specificity, Tenn. R. 2001As the cases cited by the majority recognize, diminution-in-value damages are in fact a measure of special damages, see Hornwood v. Smith's Food King No. 1, 105 Nev. 188 , 772 P.2d 1284 (1989); Lechmere, Inc., 464 S.E.2d at 62-63 , and as such, these damages are properly awarded in this state only when the damages are (1) plead with specificity, Tenn. R. | 2 | 2000–2001 |
State v. Stephenson
green
1 sentence2013There, the petitioner asserted that “nullification of the sentence of life without parole necessarily negated the agreement regarding the conspiracy sentence.” Stephenson, 195 S.W.3d at 596 n.16. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Gentry
green
2 sentences2006A later restatement of this rule by the Court of Appeals of Georgia occurred in Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v. Gentry, 254 Ga.App. 888 , 564 S.E.2d 733 (2002). 2006A later restatement of this rule by the Court of Appeals of Georgia occurred in Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v. Gentry, 254 Ga.App. 888 , 564 S.E.2d 733 (2002). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
State v. Blackwell
green
1 sentence1991Rule 606(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence, a restatement of the rule adopted by this Court in State v. Blackwell, 664 S.W.2d 686 (Tenn.1984), lists those factors that invalidate a verdict: extraneous prejudicial information, improper outside influence, and an agreement to be bound by a quotient or gambling verdict. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Stinson v. Brand
green
2 sentences1991One such case was Stinson v. Brand, 738 S.W.2d 186 (Tenn.1987), which found that an attorney may be liable to a third party for negligence even if no attorney-client relationship was intended. 1991One such case was Stinson v. Brand, 738 S.W.2d 186 (Tenn.1987), which found that an attorney may be liable to a third party for negligence even if no attorney-client relationship was intended. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Crabtree Masonry Co. v. C & R Construction, Inc.
green
2 sentences1984For a restatement of the rule by which we are governed in conducting our review in this case we quote from Crabtree Masonry Co. v. C & R Const., Inc., Tenn., 575 S.W.2d 4 (1978), as follows: “It is the time honored rule in this State that in reviewing a judgment based upon a jury verdict the appellate courts are not at liberty to weigh the evidence or to decide where the preponderance lies, but are limited to determining whether there is material evidence to support the verdict; and in determining whether there is material evidence to support the verdict, the appellate court is required to tak 1984Having thus examined the record, if there be any material evidence to support the verdict, it must be affirmed; if it were otherwise, the parties would be deprived of their constitutional right to trial by jury.” (Citations omitted.) 575 S.W.2d at 5 . | 1 | 1984–1984 |
O'Quin v. Baptist Memorial Hospital
green
2 sentences1983Baptist Memorial Hospital, (1947 Tenn.) 184 Tenn. 570 , 201 S.W.2d 694 , and reiterated in Spivey vs. 1983Baptist Memorial Hospital, (1947 Tenn.) 184 Tenn. 570 , 201 S.W.2d 694 , and reiterated in Spivey vs. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.