9 Arkansas opinions name it 1 courts 1907–2014 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arkansas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
No. 99-1081green2 sentences2014The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has emphasized, however, that such a restatement of the standard is incomplete: “Courts deciding questions of qualified immunity must also recognize that ‘whether summary judgment on grounds of qualified immunity is appropriate from a particular set of facts is a question of law’.” Pace v. City of Des Moines, 201 F.3d at 1056 (citing Lambert v. City of Dumas, 187 F.3d 931, 935 (1999)). 2014The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has emphasized, however, that such a restatement of the standard is incomplete: “Courts deciding questions of qualified immunity must also recognize that ‘whether summary judgment on grounds of qualified immunity is appropriate from a particular set of facts is a question of law’.” Pace v. City of Des Moines, 201 F.3d at 1056 (citing Lambert v. City of Dumas, 187 F.3d 931, 935 (1999)). | 4 | 4 |
Elmer Pace and Linda Pace v. City of Des Moines, Iowa, and Brian Dannergreen2 sentences2014The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has emphasized, however, that such a restatement of the standard is incomplete: “Courts deciding questions of qualified immunity must also recognize that ‘whether summary judgment on grounds of qualified immunity is appropriate from a particular set of facts is a question of law’.” Pace v. City of Des Moines, 201 F.3d at 1056 (citing Lambert v. City of Dumas, 187 F.3d 931, 935 (1999)). 2014The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has emphasized, however, that such a restatement of the standard is incomplete: “Courts deciding questions of qualified immunity must also recognize that ‘whether summary judgment on grounds of qualified immunity is appropriate from a particular set of facts is a question of law’.” Pace v. City of Des Moines, 201 F.3d at 1056 (citing Lambert v. City of Dumas, 187 F.3d 931, 935 (1999)). | 4 | 4 |
Brandon v. Gazette Publishing Co.green2 sentences2001The original Restatement applied the privilege if it was an “accurate and complete or fair abridgment of such proceedings,” but the privilege could be lost if the report was “made solely for the purpose of causing harm to the person defamed.” Brandon v. Gazette Publishing Co., 234 Ark. 332, 334 , 352 S.W.2d 92, 94 (1961) (quoting the first Restatement of the Law of Torts, Vol. 3, § 611). 2001The original Restatement applied the privilege if it was an “accurate and complete or fair abridgment of such proceedings,” but the privilege could be lost if the report was “made solely for the purpose of causing harm to the person defamed.” Brandon v. Gazette Publishing Co., 234 Ark. 332, 334 , 352 S.W.2d 92, 94 (1961) (quoting the first Restatement of the Law of Torts, Vol. 3, § 611). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arkansas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Smith v. BRT
green
2 sentences2014Smith, 363 Ark. at 130-31 , 211 S.W.3d at 488-89 . | ^Therefore, “[a]n official is immune from suit if his or her actions did not violate clearly established principles of law of which a reasonable person would have knowledge. 2014Smith, 363 Ark. at 130-31 , 211 S.W.3d at 488-89 . | ^Therefore, “[a]n official is immune from suit if his or her actions did not violate clearly established principles of law of which a reasonable person would have knowledge. | 3 | 2006–2014 |
Linda Fletcher, Appellant/cross-Appellee v. Price Chopper Foods of Trumann, Inc., Appellee/cross-Appellant
green
2 sentences2012Fletcher v. Price Chopper Foods of Trumann, Inc., 220 F.3d 871 (8th Cir.2000). 2002Fletcher v. Price Chopper Foods of Trumann, Inc., 220 F.3d 871 (8th Cir. 2000). | 2 | 2002–2012 |
Berka v. Woodward
green
2 sentences1962Such contracts being illegal, no court can enforce them, for to do so would be for ‘the law to aid in its own undoing.’ Berka v. Woodward, 125 Cal. 119 , 45 L. 1907Such contracts being illegal, no court can enforce them, for to do so would be for “the law to aid in its own undoing.” Berka v. Woodward, 125 Cal. 119 , 45 L. | 2 | 1907–1962 |
Smith v. Daniel
green
1 sentence2014Smith, 363 Ark. at 130–31, 211 S.W.3d at 488–89. 27 Cite as 2014 Ark. 519 Therefore, “[a]n official is immune from suit if his or her actions did not violate clearly established principles of law of which a reasonable person would have knowledge. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
City of Farmington v. Smith
green
2 sentences2008City of Farmington v. Smith, 366 Ark. at 478-79 , 237 S.W.3d at 5-6 ; Smith v. Brt, 363 Ark. at 131 , 211 S.W.3d at 489 . 2008City of Farmington v. Smith, 366 Ark. at 478-79 , 237 S.W.3d at 5-6 ; Smith v. Brt, 363 Ark. at 131 , 211 S.W.3d at 489 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.