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7 Idaho opinions name it 1 courts 1983–2005 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Idaho courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Idaho Bank & Trust Co. v. First Bancorp of Idahogreen2 sentences1990Idaho Bank & Trust v. First Bancorp, 115 Idaho 1082, 1084 , 772 P.2d 720, 722 (1989) (“We decline to adopt the Restatement standard,” [regarding liability of a professional for negligent misrepresentation].). 1990Idaho Bank & Trust v. First Bancorp, 115 Idaho 1082, 1084 , 772 P.2d 720, 722 (1989) (“We decline to adopt the Restatement standard,” [regarding liability of a professional for negligent misrepresentation].). | 1 | 3 |
Smith v. Combsgreen2 sentences2005See, e.g., Smith v. Combs, 554 S.W.2d 412, 414 (Ky.Ct.App.1977) (“Extending the use of a roadway easement to land not a part of the original tract constitutes an unreasonable burden”); Mancini v. Bard, 42 N.Y.2d 28 , 396 N.Y.S.2d 621 , 364 N.E.2d 1313, 1315 (1977) (easement could not be used to benefit parcels not part of original dominant estate); Leffingwell Ranch, Inc. v. Cieri, 276 Mont. 421 , 916 P.2d 751, 758 (1996) (easements at issue were appurtenant only to lands that grantor owned at the time of creation and could not be enlarged to access after-acquired property); Gojmerac v. Mahn, 2005See, e.g., Smith v. Combs, 554 S.W.2d 412, 414 (Ky.Ct.App.1977) (“Extending the use of a roadway easement to land not a part of the original tract constitutes an unreasonable burden”); Mancini v. Bard, 42 N.Y.2d 28 , 396 N.Y.S.2d 621 , 364 N.E.2d 1313, 1315 (1977) (easement could not be used to benefit parcels not part of original dominant estate); Leffingwell Ranch, Inc. v. Cieri, 276 Mont. 421 , 916 P.2d 751, 758 (1996) (easements at issue were appurtenant only to lands that grantor owned at the time of creation and could not be enlarged to access after-acquired property); Gojmerac v. Mahn, | 1 | 1 |
Mancini v. Bardgreen2 sentences2005See, e.g., Smith v. Combs, 554 S.W.2d 412, 414 (Ky.Ct.App.1977) (“Extending the use of a roadway easement to land not a part of the original tract constitutes an unreasonable burden”); Mancini v. Bard, 42 N.Y.2d 28 , 396 N.Y.S.2d 621 , 364 N.E.2d 1313, 1315 (1977) (easement could not be used to benefit parcels not part of original dominant estate); Leffingwell Ranch, Inc. v. Cieri, 276 Mont. 421 , 916 P.2d 751, 758 (1996) (easements at issue were appurtenant only to lands that grantor owned at the time of creation and could not be enlarged to access after-acquired property); Gojmerac v. Mahn, 2005See, e.g., Smith v. Combs, 554 S.W.2d 412, 414 (Ky.Ct.App.1977) (“Extending the use of a roadway easement to land not a part of the original tract constitutes an unreasonable burden”); Mancini v. Bard, 42 N.Y.2d 28 , 396 N.Y.S.2d 621 , 364 N.E.2d 1313, 1315 (1977) (easement could not be used to benefit parcels not part of original dominant estate); Leffingwell Ranch, Inc. v. Cieri, 276 Mont. 421 , 916 P.2d 751, 758 (1996) (easements at issue were appurtenant only to lands that grantor owned at the time of creation and could not be enlarged to access after-acquired property); Gojmerac v. Mahn, | 1 | 1 |
Leffingwell Ranch, Inc. v. Cierigreen2 sentences2005See, e.g., Smith v. Combs, 554 S.W.2d 412, 414 (Ky.Ct.App.1977) (“Extending the use of a roadway easement to land not a part of the original tract constitutes an unreasonable burden”); Mancini v. Bard, 42 N.Y.2d 28 , 396 N.Y.S.2d 621 , 364 N.E.2d 1313, 1315 (1977) (easement could not be used to benefit parcels not part of original dominant estate); Leffingwell Ranch, Inc. v. Cieri, 276 Mont. 421 , 916 P.2d 751, 758 (1996) (easements at issue were appurtenant only to lands that grantor owned at the time of creation and could not be enlarged to access after-acquired property); Gojmerac v. Mahn, 2005See, e.g., Smith v. Combs, 554 S.W.2d 412, 414 (Ky.Ct.App.1977) (“Extending the use of a roadway easement to land not a part of the original tract constitutes an unreasonable burden”); Mancini v. Bard, 42 N.Y.2d 28 , 396 N.Y.S.2d 621 , 364 N.E.2d 1313, 1315 (1977) (easement could not be used to benefit parcels not part of original dominant estate); Leffingwell Ranch, Inc. v. Cieri, 276 Mont. 421 , 916 P.2d 751, 758 (1996) (easements at issue were appurtenant only to lands that grantor owned at the time of creation and could not be enlarged to access after-acquired property); Gojmerac v. Mahn, | 1 | 1 |
Gojmerac v. Mahngreen2 sentences2005See, e.g., Smith v. Combs, 554 S.W.2d 412, 414 (Ky.Ct.App.1977) (“Extending the use of a roadway easement to land not a part of the original tract constitutes an unreasonable burden”); Mancini v. Bard, 42 N.Y.2d 28 , 396 N.Y.S.2d 621 , 364 N.E.2d 1313, 1315 (1977) (easement could not be used to benefit parcels not part of original dominant estate); Leffingwell Ranch, Inc. v. Cieri, 276 Mont. 421 , 916 P.2d 751, 758 (1996) (easements at issue were appurtenant only to lands that grantor owned at the time of creation and could not be enlarged to access after-acquired property); Gojmerac v. Mahn, 2005See, e.g., Smith v. Combs, 554 S.W.2d 412, 414 (Ky.Ct.App.1977) (“Extending the use of a roadway easement to land not a part of the original tract constitutes an unreasonable burden”); Mancini v. Bard, 42 N.Y.2d 28 , 396 N.Y.S.2d 621 , 364 N.E.2d 1313, 1315 (1977) (easement could not be used to benefit parcels not part of original dominant estate); Leffingwell Ranch, Inc. v. Cieri, 276 Mont. 421 , 916 P.2d 751, 758 (1996) (easements at issue were appurtenant only to lands that grantor owned at the time of creation and could not be enlarged to access after-acquired property); Gojmerac v. Mahn, | 1 | 1 |
Optic Graphics, Inc. v. Ageegreen2 sentences1999“Although all of the Restatement’s factors no longer are required to find a trade secret, those factors still provide helpful guidance to determine whether the information in a given case constitutes ‘trade secrets’ within the definition of the statute.” Optic Graphics v. Agee, 87 Md.App. 770 , 591 A.2d 578, 585 (1991). 2 The Restatement offers six additional factors that can be used to show that given information is a trade secret: (1) the extent to which the information is known outside [the plaintiffs] business; (2) the extent to which it is known by employees and others involved in the bus 1999“Although all of the Restatement’s factors no longer are required to find a trade secret, those factors still provide helpful guidance to determine whether the information in a given case constitutes ‘trade secrets’ within the definition of the statute.” Optic Graphics v. Agee, 87 Md.App. 770 , 591 A.2d 578, 585 (1991). 2 The Restatement offers six additional factors that can be used to show that given information is a trade secret: (1) the extent to which the information is known outside [the plaintiffs] business; (2) the extent to which it is known by employees and others involved in the bus | 1 | 1 |
Shields v. Morton Chemical Companygreen2 sentences1990See e.g., Shields v. Morton Chemical Co., 95 Idaho 674 , 518 P.2d 857 (1974) (adopting Section 402A, Restatement (Second) of Torts, without adopting all the comments thereto); Toner v. Lederle Laboratories, 112 Idaho 328 , 732 P.2d 297 (1987) (adopting comment k to Section 402A and noting that “courts must decide the applicability of comment k case by case, and only after taking evidence related to the various factors” related to the comment); Idaho Bank & Trust v. First Bancorp, 115 Idaho 1082 , 772 P.2d 720 (1989) (declining to adopt the Restatement standard regarding liability of a professi 1990See e.g., Shields v. Morton Chemical Co., 95 Idaho 674 , 518 P.2d 857 (1974) (adopting Section 402A, Restatement (Second) of Torts, without adopting all the comments thereto); Toner v. Lederle Laboratories, 112 Idaho 328 , 732 P.2d 297 (1987) (adopting comment k to Section 402A and noting that “courts must decide the applicability of comment k case by case, and only after taking evidence related to the various factors” related to the comment); Idaho Bank & Trust v. First Bancorp, 115 Idaho 1082 , 772 P.2d 720 (1989) (declining to adopt the Restatement standard regarding liability of a professi | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Idaho. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Toner v. Lederle Laboratories
green
2 sentences1990See e.g., Shields v. Morton Chemical Co., 95 Idaho 674 , 518 P.2d 857 (1974) (adopting Section 402A, Restatement (Second) of Torts, without adopting all the comments thereto); Toner v. Lederle Laboratories, 112 Idaho 328 , 732 P.2d 297 (1987) (adopting comment k to Section 402A and noting that “courts must decide the applicability of comment k case by case, and only after taking evidence related to the various factors” related to the comment); Idaho Bank & Trust v. First Bancorp, 115 Idaho 1082 , 772 P.2d 720 (1989) (declining to adopt the Restatement standard regarding liability of a professi 1990See e.g., Shields v. Morton Chemical Co., 95 Idaho 674 , 518 P.2d 857 (1974) (adopting Section 402A, Restatement (Second) of Torts, without adopting all the comments thereto); Toner v. Lederle Laboratories, 112 Idaho 328 , 732 P.2d 297 (1987) (adopting comment k to Section 402A and noting that “courts must decide the applicability of comment k case by case, and only after taking evidence related to the various factors” related to the comment); Idaho Bank & Trust v. First Bancorp, 115 Idaho 1082 , 772 P.2d 720 (1989) (declining to adopt the Restatement standard regarding liability of a professi | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Conover v. Northern States Power Co.
green
2 sentences1987“Conceptually at least, to adopt here the Restatement rule results in one nondelegable duty too many.” Id. 1987“Conceptually at least, to adopt here the Restatement rule results in one nondelegable duty too many.” Id. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp.
green
2 sentences1983Olson Corp., 8 Cal.3d 121 , 104 Cal.Rptr. 433 , 501 P.2d 1153 (1972), which rejected the portion of the Restatement rule adopted in Shields requiring the plaintiff to prove not only that the product was in a defective condition, but also that it was unreasonably dangerous. 1983Olson Corp., 8 Cal.3d 121 , 104 Cal.Rptr. 433 , 501 P.2d 1153 (1972), which rejected the portion of the Restatement rule adopted in Shields requiring the plaintiff to prove not only that the product was in a defective condition, but also that it was unreasonably dangerous. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Farmer v. International Harvester Company
green
2 sentences1983However, Cronin’s elimination of the unreasonably dangerous requirement is inconsistent with our prior decisions in Shields v. Morton Chemical Co., supra, and Farmer v. International Harvester Co., 97 Idaho 742 , 553 P.2d 1306 (1976), and has been rejected by nearly every other jurisdiction which has considered the question, together with innumerable legal commentators. 1983However, Cronin’s elimination of the unreasonably dangerous requirement is inconsistent with our prior decisions in Shields v. Morton Chemical Co., supra, and Farmer v. International Harvester Co., 97 Idaho 742 , 553 P.2d 1306 (1976), and has been rejected by nearly every other jurisdiction which has considered the question, together with innumerable legal commentators. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.