13 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1986–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Durbin v. Bonanza Corp.green2 sentences2020She wasn’t saying that the adversity requirement is the same in both contexts in all respects. 15 (1947); LR Smith Invs., ¶ 15; Durbin v. Bonanza Corp., 716 P.2d 1124, 1129 (Colo. App. 1986); see Brown v. Faatz, 197 P.3d 245, 250 (Colo. App. 2008); Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 2.16 cmt. g, § 2.17 cmt. g. 2020She wasn’t saying that the adversity requirement is the same in both contexts in all respects. 15 (1947); LR Smith Invs., ¶ 15; Durbin v. Bonanza Corp., 716 P.2d 1124, 1129 (Colo. App. 1986); see Brown v. Faatz, 197 P.3d 245, 250 (Colo. App. 2008); Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 2.16 cmt. g, § 2.17 cmt. g. | 1 | 1 |
Brown v. Faatzgreen2 sentences2020She wasn’t saying that the adversity requirement is the same in both contexts in all respects. 15 (1947); LR Smith Invs., ¶ 15; Durbin v. Bonanza Corp., 716 P.2d 1124, 1129 (Colo. App. 1986); see Brown v. Faatz, 197 P.3d 245, 250 (Colo. App. 2008); Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 2.16 cmt. g, § 2.17 cmt. g. 2020She wasn’t saying that the adversity requirement is the same in both contexts in all respects. 15 (1947); LR Smith Invs., ¶ 15; Durbin v. Bonanza Corp., 716 P.2d 1124, 1129 (Colo. App. 1986); see Brown v. Faatz, 197 P.3d 245, 250 (Colo. App. 2008); Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 2.16 cmt. g, § 2.17 cmt. g. | 1 | 1 |
Lobato v. Taylorgreen2 sentences2020See id. at 971 (“Thus, the adoption of the second prong of the Restatement test, which can create a prescriptive right in the context of permissive, consensual use is contrary to our law, and I would decline to engraft it.”). 2020See id. at 971 (“Thus, the adoption of the second prong of the Restatement test, which can create a prescriptive right in the context of permissive, consensual use is contrary to our law, and I would decline to engraft it.”). | 1 | 1 |
Mann v. Thompsongreen1 sentence2005See Mann v. Thompson, 118 So.2d 112 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1960)Gudgment creditor only liable for benefits received, not all resulting damages to judgment debtor); Reese v. Reese, 696 N.E.2d 460 (Ind.Ct.App.1998)(judgment creditor liable for benefits received plus interest); State v. A.N.W. | 1 | 1 |
Fowler Irrevocable Trust 1992-1 v. City of Bouldergreen2 sentences2001See Fowler, 992 P.2d at 1198 . 2001See Fowler, 992 P.2d at 1198 . | 1 | 1 |
Willard v. First Church of Christ, Scientistgreen2 sentences1995See Willard v. First Church of Christ Scientist, 7 Cal.3d 473 , 102 Cal.Rptr. 739 , 498 P.2d 987 (1972) (noting that the traditional rule had been avoided by the California courts if its application would have frustrated the clear intent of the grantor); Mott v. Stanlake, 63 Mich.App. 440 , 234 N.W.2d 667 (1975) (noting that an express provision for third parties indicates that an easement clause in a deed was intended to be an exception and not a reservation and renders the traditional rule virtually meaningless); Medhus v. Dutter, 184 Mont. 437 , 603 P.2d 669 (1979) (without adopting the Res 1995See Willard v. First Church of Christ Scientist, 7 Cal.3d 473 , 102 Cal.Rptr. 739 , 498 P.2d 987 (1972) (noting that the traditional rule had been avoided by the California courts if its application would have frustrated the clear intent of the grantor); Mott v. Stanlake, 63 Mich.App. 440 , 234 N.W.2d 667 (1975) (noting that an express provision for third parties indicates that an easement clause in a deed was intended to be an exception and not a reservation and renders the traditional rule virtually meaningless); Medhus v. Dutter, 184 Mont. 437 , 603 P.2d 669 (1979) (without adopting the Res | 1 | 1 |
Aszmus v. Nelsongreen2 sentences1995See O’Brien v. Village Land Co., supra; Corlett v. Cox, 138 Colo. 325 , 333 P.2d 619 (1958); see also Aszmus v. Nelson, 743 P.2d 377 (Alaska 1987) (refusing to adopt traditional rule and finding the Restatement position preferable); Katkish v. Pearce, 490 A.2d 626 (D.C.App.1985) (finding that the Restatement rule is a more enlightened view than the traditional rule); Townsend v. Cable, 378 S.W.2d 806 (Ky.1964) (finding the traditional rule entirely inconsistent with the principle of determining the intent of the grantor from the four corners of the deed); Borough of Wildwood Crest v. Smith, 21 1995See O’Brien v. Village Land Co., supra; Corlett v. Cox, 138 Colo. 325 , 333 P.2d 619 (1958); see also Aszmus v. Nelson, 743 P.2d 377 (Alaska 1987) (refusing to adopt traditional rule and finding the Restatement position preferable); Katkish v. Pearce, 490 A.2d 626 (D.C.App.1985) (finding that the Restatement rule is a more enlightened view than the traditional rule); Townsend v. Cable, 378 S.W.2d 806 (Ky.1964) (finding the traditional rule entirely inconsistent with the principle of determining the intent of the grantor from the four corners of the deed); Borough of Wildwood Crest v. Smith, 21 | 1 | 1 |
O'BRIEN v. Village Land Co.green2 sentences1995See O’Brien v. Village Land Co., supra; Corlett v. Cox, 138 Colo. 325 , 333 P.2d 619 (1958); see also Aszmus v. Nelson, 743 P.2d 377 (Alaska 1987) (refusing to adopt traditional rule and finding the Restatement position preferable); Katkish v. Pearce, 490 A.2d 626 (D.C.App.1985) (finding that the Restatement rule is a more enlightened view than the traditional rule); Townsend v. Cable, 378 S.W.2d 806 (Ky.1964) (finding the traditional rule entirely inconsistent with the principle of determining the intent of the grantor from the four corners of the deed); Borough of Wildwood Crest v. Smith, 21 1995See O’Brien v. Village Land Co., supra; Corlett v. Cox, 138 Colo. 325 , 333 P.2d 619 (1958); see also Aszmus v. Nelson, 743 P.2d 377 (Alaska 1987) (refusing to adopt traditional rule and finding the Restatement position preferable); Katkish v. Pearce, 490 A.2d 626 (D.C.App.1985) (finding that the Restatement rule is a more enlightened view than the traditional rule); Townsend v. Cable, 378 S.W.2d 806 (Ky.1964) (finding the traditional rule entirely inconsistent with the principle of determining the intent of the grantor from the four corners of the deed); Borough of Wildwood Crest v. Smith, 21 | 1 | 1 |
Brademas v. Hartwiggreen2 sentences1995See Brademas v. Hartwig, 175 Ind.App. 4 , 369 N.E.2d 954 (1977) (adopting Restatement rule and finding the description of property in deed sufficient to designate a dominant estate to be served by the easement); Pennsylvania Game Commission v. Bowman, 81 Pa.Commw. 381, 474 A.2d 383 (1984) (finding description of property in deed sufficient to create easement in favor of owners of adjoining lots). 1995See Brademas v. Hartwig, 175 Ind.App. 4 , 369 N.E.2d 954 (1977) (adopting Restatement rule and finding the description of property in deed sufficient to designate a dominant estate to be served by the easement); Pennsylvania Game Commission v. Bowman, 81 Pa.Commw. 381, 474 A.2d 383 (1984) (finding description of property in deed sufficient to create easement in favor of owners of adjoining lots). | 1 | 1 |
Wolther v. Schaarschmidtgreen2 sentences1992Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552 comment i (1977); see also Wolther v. Schaarschmidt, 738 P.2d 25 (Colo.App.1986). 1992Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552 comment i (1977); see also Wolther v. Schaarschmidt, 738 P.2d 25 (Colo.App.1986). | 1 | 1 |
| Panitz v. Orengegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ember v. B.F.D., Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Erickson v. Laviellegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
AE, INC. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.
green
2 sentences2024Lien Mgmt., Inc., 2015 CO 32, ¶ 10 ; AE, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 168 P.3d 507 , 509 n.1 (Colo. 2007). 11 ¶ 26 And though not directly on point, Colorado case law is consistent with the Restatement rule. 2024Lien Mgmt., Inc., 2015 CO 32, ¶ 10 ; AE, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 168 P.3d 507 , 509 n.1 (Colo. 2007). 11 ¶ 26 And though not directly on point, Colorado case law is consistent with the Restatement rule. | 2 | 2024–2024 |
Allstate Insurance Co. v. Medical Lien Management, Inc.
green
2 sentences2024Lien Mgmt., Inc., 2015 CO 32, ¶ 10 ; AE, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 168 P.3d 507 , 509 n.1 (Colo. 2007). 11 ¶ 26 And though not directly on point, Colorado case law is consistent with the Restatement rule. 2024Lien Mgmt., Inc., 2015 CO 32, ¶ 10 ; AE, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 168 P.3d 507 , 509 n.1 (Colo. 2007). 11 ¶ 26 And though not directly on point, Colorado case law is consistent with the Restatement rule. | 2 | 2024–2024 |
Reese v. Reese
green
1 sentence2005See Mann v. Thompson, 118 So.2d 112 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1960)Gudgment creditor only liable for benefits received, not all resulting damages to judgment debtor); Reese v. Reese, 696 N.E.2d 460 (Ind.Ct.App.1998)(judgment creditor liable for benefits received plus interest); State v. A.N.W. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Roaring Fork Club, L.P. v. St. Jude's Co.
green
2 sentences2003And the supreme court in Roaring Fork recognized that those cases “essentially applied the Restatement rule.” Roaring Fork, supra, 36 P.3d at 1236 . 2003And the supreme court in Roaring Fork recognized that those cases “essentially applied the Restatement rule.” Roaring Fork, supra, 36 P.3d at 1236 . | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Vista Village Mobile Home Park v. Basnett
neutral
1 sentence1998Vista Village Mobile Home Park v. Basnett, 731 P.2d 700 (Colo.l987)(Basnett II). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Medhus v. Dutter
green
2 sentences1995See Willard v. First Church of Christ Scientist, 7 Cal.3d 473 , 102 Cal.Rptr. 739 , 498 P.2d 987 (1972) (noting that the traditional rule had been avoided by the California courts if its application would have frustrated the clear intent of the grantor); Mott v. Stanlake, 63 Mich.App. 440 , 234 N.W.2d 667 (1975) (noting that an express provision for third parties indicates that an easement clause in a deed was intended to be an exception and not a reservation and renders the traditional rule virtually meaningless); Medhus v. Dutter, 184 Mont. 437 , 603 P.2d 669 (1979) (without adopting the Res 1995See Willard v. First Church of Christ Scientist, 7 Cal.3d 473 , 102 Cal.Rptr. 739 , 498 P.2d 987 (1972) (noting that the traditional rule had been avoided by the California courts if its application would have frustrated the clear intent of the grantor); Mott v. Stanlake, 63 Mich.App. 440 , 234 N.W.2d 667 (1975) (noting that an express provision for third parties indicates that an easement clause in a deed was intended to be an exception and not a reservation and renders the traditional rule virtually meaningless); Medhus v. Dutter, 184 Mont. 437 , 603 P.2d 669 (1979) (without adopting the Res | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Borough of Wildwood Crest v. Smith
green
2 sentences1995See O’Brien v. Village Land Co., supra; Corlett v. Cox, 138 Colo. 325 , 333 P.2d 619 (1958); see also Aszmus v. Nelson, 743 P.2d 377 (Alaska 1987) (refusing to adopt traditional rule and finding the Restatement position preferable); Katkish v. Pearce, 490 A.2d 626 (D.C.App.1985) (finding that the Restatement rule is a more enlightened view than the traditional rule); Townsend v. Cable, 378 S.W.2d 806 (Ky.1964) (finding the traditional rule entirely inconsistent with the principle of determining the intent of the grantor from the four corners of the deed); Borough of Wildwood Crest v. Smith, 21 1995See O’Brien v. Village Land Co., supra; Corlett v. Cox, 138 Colo. 325 , 333 P.2d 619 (1958); see also Aszmus v. Nelson, 743 P.2d 377 (Alaska 1987) (refusing to adopt traditional rule and finding the Restatement position preferable); Katkish v. Pearce, 490 A.2d 626 (D.C.App.1985) (finding that the Restatement rule is a more enlightened view than the traditional rule); Townsend v. Cable, 378 S.W.2d 806 (Ky.1964) (finding the traditional rule entirely inconsistent with the principle of determining the intent of the grantor from the four corners of the deed); Borough of Wildwood Crest v. Smith, 21 | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Mott v. Stanlake
neutral
2 sentences1995See Willard v. First Church of Christ Scientist, 7 Cal.3d 473 , 102 Cal.Rptr. 739 , 498 P.2d 987 (1972) (noting that the traditional rule had been avoided by the California courts if its application would have frustrated the clear intent of the grantor); Mott v. Stanlake, 63 Mich.App. 440 , 234 N.W.2d 667 (1975) (noting that an express provision for third parties indicates that an easement clause in a deed was intended to be an exception and not a reservation and renders the traditional rule virtually meaningless); Medhus v. Dutter, 184 Mont. 437 , 603 P.2d 669 (1979) (without adopting the Res 1995See Willard v. First Church of Christ Scientist, 7 Cal.3d 473 , 102 Cal.Rptr. 739 , 498 P.2d 987 (1972) (noting that the traditional rule had been avoided by the California courts if its application would have frustrated the clear intent of the grantor); Mott v. Stanlake, 63 Mich.App. 440 , 234 N.W.2d 667 (1975) (noting that an express provision for third parties indicates that an easement clause in a deed was intended to be an exception and not a reservation and renders the traditional rule virtually meaningless); Medhus v. Dutter, 184 Mont. 437 , 603 P.2d 669 (1979) (without adopting the Res | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Pennsylvania Game Commission v. Bowman
green
1 sentence1995See Brademas v. Hartwig, 175 Ind.App. 4 , 369 N.E.2d 954 (1977) (adopting Restatement rule and finding the description of property in deed sufficient to designate a dominant estate to be served by the easement); Pennsylvania Game Commission v. Bowman, 81 Pa.Commw. 381, 474 A.2d 383 (1984) (finding description of property in deed sufficient to create easement in favor of owners of adjoining lots). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Malloy v. Boettcher
green
2 sentences1995See O’Brien v. Village Land Co., supra; Corlett v. Cox, 138 Colo. 325 , 333 P.2d 619 (1958); see also Aszmus v. Nelson, 743 P.2d 377 (Alaska 1987) (refusing to adopt traditional rule and finding the Restatement position preferable); Katkish v. Pearce, 490 A.2d 626 (D.C.App.1985) (finding that the Restatement rule is a more enlightened view than the traditional rule); Townsend v. Cable, 378 S.W.2d 806 (Ky.1964) (finding the traditional rule entirely inconsistent with the principle of determining the intent of the grantor from the four corners of the deed); Borough of Wildwood Crest v. Smith, 21 1995See O’Brien v. Village Land Co., supra; Corlett v. Cox, 138 Colo. 325 , 333 P.2d 619 (1958); see also Aszmus v. Nelson, 743 P.2d 377 (Alaska 1987) (refusing to adopt traditional rule and finding the Restatement position preferable); Katkish v. Pearce, 490 A.2d 626 (D.C.App.1985) (finding that the Restatement rule is a more enlightened view than the traditional rule); Townsend v. Cable, 378 S.W.2d 806 (Ky.1964) (finding the traditional rule entirely inconsistent with the principle of determining the intent of the grantor from the four corners of the deed); Borough of Wildwood Crest v. Smith, 21 | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Simpson v. Kistler Investment Co.
green
2 sentences1995See O’Brien v. Village Land Co., supra; Corlett v. Cox, 138 Colo. 325 , 333 P.2d 619 (1958); see also Aszmus v. Nelson, 743 P.2d 377 (Alaska 1987) (refusing to adopt traditional rule and finding the Restatement position preferable); Katkish v. Pearce, 490 A.2d 626 (D.C.App.1985) (finding that the Restatement rule is a more enlightened view than the traditional rule); Townsend v. Cable, 378 S.W.2d 806 (Ky.1964) (finding the traditional rule entirely inconsistent with the principle of determining the intent of the grantor from the four corners of the deed); Borough of Wildwood Crest v. Smith, 21 1995See O’Brien v. Village Land Co., supra; Corlett v. Cox, 138 Colo. 325 , 333 P.2d 619 (1958); see also Aszmus v. Nelson, 743 P.2d 377 (Alaska 1987) (refusing to adopt traditional rule and finding the Restatement position preferable); Katkish v. Pearce, 490 A.2d 626 (D.C.App.1985) (finding that the Restatement rule is a more enlightened view than the traditional rule); Townsend v. Cable, 378 S.W.2d 806 (Ky.1964) (finding the traditional rule entirely inconsistent with the principle of determining the intent of the grantor from the four corners of the deed); Borough of Wildwood Crest v. Smith, 21 | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Katkish v. Pearce
green
2 sentences1995See O’Brien v. Village Land Co., supra; Corlett v. Cox, 138 Colo. 325 , 333 P.2d 619 (1958); see also Aszmus v. Nelson, 743 P.2d 377 (Alaska 1987) (refusing to adopt traditional rule and finding the Restatement position preferable); Katkish v. Pearce, 490 A.2d 626 (D.C.App.1985) (finding that the Restatement rule is a more enlightened view than the traditional rule); Townsend v. Cable, 378 S.W.2d 806 (Ky.1964) (finding the traditional rule entirely inconsistent with the principle of determining the intent of the grantor from the four corners of the deed); Borough of Wildwood Crest v. Smith, 21 1995See O’Brien v. Village Land Co., supra; Corlett v. Cox, 138 Colo. 325 , 333 P.2d 619 (1958); see also Aszmus v. Nelson, 743 P.2d 377 (Alaska 1987) (refusing to adopt traditional rule and finding the Restatement position preferable); Katkish v. Pearce, 490 A.2d 626 (D.C.App.1985) (finding that the Restatement rule is a more enlightened view than the traditional rule); Townsend v. Cable, 378 S.W.2d 806 (Ky.1964) (finding the traditional rule entirely inconsistent with the principle of determining the intent of the grantor from the four corners of the deed); Borough of Wildwood Crest v. Smith, 21 | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Corlett v. Cox
green
2 sentences1995See O’Brien v. Village Land Co., supra; Corlett v. Cox, 138 Colo. 325 , 333 P.2d 619 (1958); see also Aszmus v. Nelson, 743 P.2d 377 (Alaska 1987) (refusing to adopt traditional rule and finding the Restatement position preferable); Katkish v. Pearce, 490 A.2d 626 (D.C.App.1985) (finding that the Restatement rule is a more enlightened view than the traditional rule); Townsend v. Cable, 378 S.W.2d 806 (Ky.1964) (finding the traditional rule entirely inconsistent with the principle of determining the intent of the grantor from the four corners of the deed); Borough of Wildwood Crest v. Smith, 21 1995See O’Brien v. Village Land Co., supra; Corlett v. Cox, 138 Colo. 325 , 333 P.2d 619 (1958); see also Aszmus v. Nelson, 743 P.2d 377 (Alaska 1987) (refusing to adopt traditional rule and finding the Restatement position preferable); Katkish v. Pearce, 490 A.2d 626 (D.C.App.1985) (finding that the Restatement rule is a more enlightened view than the traditional rule); Townsend v. Cable, 378 S.W.2d 806 (Ky.1964) (finding the traditional rule entirely inconsistent with the principle of determining the intent of the grantor from the four corners of the deed); Borough of Wildwood Crest v. Smith, 21 | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Townsend v. Cable
green
2 sentences1995See O’Brien v. Village Land Co., supra; Corlett v. Cox, 138 Colo. 325 , 333 P.2d 619 (1958); see also Aszmus v. Nelson, 743 P.2d 377 (Alaska 1987) (refusing to adopt traditional rule and finding the Restatement position preferable); Katkish v. Pearce, 490 A.2d 626 (D.C.App.1985) (finding that the Restatement rule is a more enlightened view than the traditional rule); Townsend v. Cable, 378 S.W.2d 806 (Ky.1964) (finding the traditional rule entirely inconsistent with the principle of determining the intent of the grantor from the four corners of the deed); Borough of Wildwood Crest v. Smith, 21 1995See O’Brien v. Village Land Co., supra; Corlett v. Cox, 138 Colo. 325 , 333 P.2d 619 (1958); see also Aszmus v. Nelson, 743 P.2d 377 (Alaska 1987) (refusing to adopt traditional rule and finding the Restatement position preferable); Katkish v. Pearce, 490 A.2d 626 (D.C.App.1985) (finding that the Restatement rule is a more enlightened view than the traditional rule); Townsend v. Cable, 378 S.W.2d 806 (Ky.1964) (finding the traditional rule entirely inconsistent with the principle of determining the intent of the grantor from the four corners of the deed); Borough of Wildwood Crest v. Smith, 21 | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Zurn Industries, Inc. v. Lawyers Title Insurance
green
2 sentences1995See O’Brien v. Village Land Co., supra; Corlett v. Cox, 138 Colo. 325 , 333 P.2d 619 (1958); see also Aszmus v. Nelson, 743 P.2d 377 (Alaska 1987) (refusing to adopt traditional rule and finding the Restatement position preferable); Katkish v. Pearce, 490 A.2d 626 (D.C.App.1985) (finding that the Restatement rule is a more enlightened view than the traditional rule); Townsend v. Cable, 378 S.W.2d 806 (Ky.1964) (finding the traditional rule entirely inconsistent with the principle of determining the intent of the grantor from the four corners of the deed); Borough of Wildwood Crest v. Smith, 21 1995See O’Brien v. Village Land Co., supra; Corlett v. Cox, 138 Colo. 325 , 333 P.2d 619 (1958); see also Aszmus v. Nelson, 743 P.2d 377 (Alaska 1987) (refusing to adopt traditional rule and finding the Restatement position preferable); Katkish v. Pearce, 490 A.2d 626 (D.C.App.1985) (finding that the Restatement rule is a more enlightened view than the traditional rule); Townsend v. Cable, 378 S.W.2d 806 (Ky.1964) (finding the traditional rule entirely inconsistent with the principle of determining the intent of the grantor from the four corners of the deed); Borough of Wildwood Crest v. Smith, 21 | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Austell v. Rice green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Wilson v. Byrd
green
2 sentences1990For cases following the majority rule that damages must be shown in defense of a fraud claim as well as in support of such a claim, see Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Palermo, 815 F.2d 1329 (10th Cir. 1987); Imperial Insurance Co. v. Supornick & Sons, Inc., 184 F.2d 930 (8th Cir. 1950); Grosen Wilson v. Byrd, 79 Ariz. 302 , 288 P.2d 1079 (1955); Austell v. Rice, 5 Ga. 472 (1848); Guerten v. Zachas, 256 Ill.App. 386 (1930); Neidefer v. Chastain, 71 Ind. 363 (1880); Missouri Valley Land Co. v. Bushnell, 11 Neb. 192 , 8 N.W. 389 (1881); Holland & Furnace Co. v. Rounds, 139 Mont. 75 , 360 P.2d 1990For cases following the majority rule that damages must be shown in defense of a fraud claim as well as in support of such a claim, see Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Palermo, 815 F.2d 1329 (10th Cir. 1987); Imperial Insurance Co. v. Supornick & Sons, Inc., 184 F.2d 930 (8th Cir. 1950); Grosen Wilson v. Byrd, 79 Ariz. 302 , 288 P.2d 1079 (1955); Austell v. Rice, 5 Ga. 472 (1848); Guerten v. Zachas, 256 Ill.App. 386 (1930); Neidefer v. Chastain, 71 Ind. 363 (1880); Missouri Valley Land Co. v. Bushnell, 11 Neb. 192 , 8 N.W. 389 (1881); Holland & Furnace Co. v. Rounds, 139 Mont. 75 , 360 P.2d | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Imperial Assur. Co. Of New York v. Joseph Supornick & Son, Inc green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Dungan v. Smith green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Carter v. Barclay green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, as Receiver for Penn Square Bank, N.A. v. Myron J. Palermo green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Bank v. . Yelverton
neutral
2 sentences1990For cases following the majority rule that damages must be shown in defense of a fraud claim as well as in support of such a claim, see Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Palermo, 815 F.2d 1329 (10th Cir. 1987); Imperial Insurance Co. v. Supornick & Sons, Inc., 184 F.2d 930 (8th Cir. 1950); Grosen Wilson v. Byrd, 79 Ariz. 302 , 288 P.2d 1079 (1955); Austell v. Rice, 5 Ga. 472 (1848); Guerten v. Zachas, 256 Ill.App. 386 (1930); Neidefer v. Chastain, 71 Ind. 363 (1880); Missouri Valley Land Co. v. Bushnell, 11 Neb. 192 , 8 N.W. 389 (1881); Holland & Furnace Co. v. Rounds, 139 Mont. 75 , 360 P.2d 1990For cases following the majority rule that damages must be shown in defense of a fraud claim as well as in support of such a claim, see Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Palermo, 815 F.2d 1329 (10th Cir. 1987); Imperial Insurance Co. v. Supornick & Sons, Inc., 184 F.2d 930 (8th Cir. 1950); Grosen Wilson v. Byrd, 79 Ariz. 302 , 288 P.2d 1079 (1955); Austell v. Rice, 5 Ga. 472 (1848); Guerten v. Zachas, 256 Ill.App. 386 (1930); Neidefer v. Chastain, 71 Ind. 363 (1880); Missouri Valley Land Co. v. Bushnell, 11 Neb. 192 , 8 N.W. 389 (1881); Holland & Furnace Co. v. Rounds, 139 Mont. 75 , 360 P.2d | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Missouri Valley Land Co. v. Bushnell neutral | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Holland Furnace Co. v. Rounds green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Guerten v. Zachas
neutral
2 sentences1990For cases following the majority rule that damages must be shown in defense of a fraud claim as well as in support of such a claim, see Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Palermo, 815 F.2d 1329 (10th Cir. 1987); Imperial Insurance Co. v. Supornick & Sons, Inc., 184 F.2d 930 (8th Cir. 1950); Grosen Wilson v. Byrd, 79 Ariz. 302 , 288 P.2d 1079 (1955); Austell v. Rice, 5 Ga. 472 (1848); Guerten v. Zachas, 256 Ill.App. 386 (1930); Neidefer v. Chastain, 71 Ind. 363 (1880); Missouri Valley Land Co. v. Bushnell, 11 Neb. 192 , 8 N.W. 389 (1881); Holland & Furnace Co. v. Rounds, 139 Mont. 75 , 360 P.2d 1990For cases following the majority rule that damages must be shown in defense of a fraud claim as well as in support of such a claim, see Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Palermo, 815 F.2d 1329 (10th Cir. 1987); Imperial Insurance Co. v. Supornick & Sons, Inc., 184 F.2d 930 (8th Cir. 1950); Grosen Wilson v. Byrd, 79 Ariz. 302 , 288 P.2d 1079 (1955); Austell v. Rice, 5 Ga. 472 (1848); Guerten v. Zachas, 256 Ill.App. 386 (1930); Neidefer v. Chastain, 71 Ind. 363 (1880); Missouri Valley Land Co. v. Bushnell, 11 Neb. 192 , 8 N.W. 389 (1881); Holland & Furnace Co. v. Rounds, 139 Mont. 75 , 360 P.2d | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Planters Bank & Trust Co. v. Yelverton
neutral
2 sentences1990For cases following the majority rule that damages must be shown in defense of a fraud claim as well as in support of such a claim, see Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Palermo, 815 F.2d 1329 (10th Cir. 1987); Imperial Insurance Co. v. Supornick & Sons, Inc., 184 F.2d 930 (8th Cir. 1950); Grosen Wilson v. Byrd, 79 Ariz. 302 , 288 P.2d 1079 (1955); Austell v. Rice, 5 Ga. 472 (1848); Guerten v. Zachas, 256 Ill.App. 386 (1930); Neidefer v. Chastain, 71 Ind. 363 (1880); Missouri Valley Land Co. v. Bushnell, 11 Neb. 192 , 8 N.W. 389 (1881); Holland & Furnace Co. v. Rounds, 139 Mont. 75 , 360 P.2d 1990For cases following the majority rule that damages must be shown in defense of a fraud claim as well as in support of such a claim, see Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Palermo, 815 F.2d 1329 (10th Cir. 1987); Imperial Insurance Co. v. Supornick & Sons, Inc., 184 F.2d 930 (8th Cir. 1950); Grosen Wilson v. Byrd, 79 Ariz. 302 , 288 P.2d 1079 (1955); Austell v. Rice, 5 Ga. 472 (1848); Guerten v. Zachas, 256 Ill.App. 386 (1930); Neidefer v. Chastain, 71 Ind. 363 (1880); Missouri Valley Land Co. v. Bushnell, 11 Neb. 192 , 8 N.W. 389 (1881); Holland & Furnace Co. v. Rounds, 139 Mont. 75 , 360 P.2d | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Coral Gables, Inc. v. Schmieding
neutral
2 sentences1990For cases following the majority rule that damages must be shown in defense of a fraud claim as well as in support of such a claim, see Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Palermo, 815 F.2d 1329 (10th Cir. 1987); Imperial Insurance Co. v. Supornick & Sons, Inc., 184 F.2d 930 (8th Cir. 1950); Grosen Wilson v. Byrd, 79 Ariz. 302 , 288 P.2d 1079 (1955); Austell v. Rice, 5 Ga. 472 (1848); Guerten v. Zachas, 256 Ill.App. 386 (1930); Neidefer v. Chastain, 71 Ind. 363 (1880); Missouri Valley Land Co. v. Bushnell, 11 Neb. 192 , 8 N.W. 389 (1881); Holland & Furnace Co. v. Rounds, 139 Mont. 75 , 360 P.2d 1990For cases following the majority rule that damages must be shown in defense of a fraud claim as well as in support of such a claim, see Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Palermo, 815 F.2d 1329 (10th Cir. 1987); Imperial Insurance Co. v. Supornick & Sons, Inc., 184 F.2d 930 (8th Cir. 1950); Grosen Wilson v. Byrd, 79 Ariz. 302 , 288 P.2d 1079 (1955); Austell v. Rice, 5 Ga. 472 (1848); Guerten v. Zachas, 256 Ill.App. 386 (1930); Neidefer v. Chastain, 71 Ind. 363 (1880); Missouri Valley Land Co. v. Bushnell, 11 Neb. 192 , 8 N.W. 389 (1881); Holland & Furnace Co. v. Rounds, 139 Mont. 75 , 360 P.2d | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Neidefer v. Chastain green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Brochner v. Western Insurance Co. green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Western Insurance Co. v. Brochner green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Slovek v. BD. OF CTY. COM'RS OF WELD CTY. green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Miller v. Carnation Co. green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.