Restatement rule in Washington

2016Again, we note the nature of that duty: “to exercise reasonable care to control the third person to prevent him from doing such harm.” Id. (emphasis added). ¶12 We adopted the Restatement’s rule for take charge relationships in Taggart, 118 Wn.2d at 219-20 .

2016We adopted the Restatement's rule for take charge relationships in Taggart, 118 Wn.2d at 219-20 .

2015To the contrary, the court in Nivens clearly connected our precedent defining "foreseeability" with the test set forth in section 344 of the Restatement. !d. at 205 & n.3 (describing the Restatement's test as imposing the duty to protect invitees "from imminent criminal harm and reasonably foreseeable criminal conduct by third persons"; rejecting liability for criminal conduct that is '"so highly extraordinary or improbable as to be wholly beyond the range of expectability'" (quoting Jones v. Leon, 3 Wn.

2015Id. at 205 & n.3 (describing the Restatement’s test as imposing the duty to protect invitees “from imminent criminal harm and reasonably foreseeable criminal conduct by third persons”; rejecting liability for criminal conduct that is “ ‘so highly extraordinary or improbable as to be wholly beyond the range of expectability’ ” (quoting Jones v. Leon, 3 Wn.

2016Section 315 of the Restatement is an exception to the general common law rule of nonliability for the criminal or tortious acts of third parties and defines a "special relation." Petersen, 100 Wn.2d at 426 (citing Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 497 F. Supp. 185, 188 (D.

2016Section 315 of the Restatement is an exception to the general common law rule of nonliability for the criminal or tortious acts of third parties and defines a "special relation." Petersen, 100 Wn.2d at 426 (citing Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 497 F. Supp. 185, 188 (D.

2009Schooley v. Pinch’s Deli Mkt., Inc., 134 Wn.2d 468 , 475 & n.2, 951 P.2d 749 (1998); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 286.

2009Schooley v. Pinch’s Deli Mkt., Inc., 134 Wn.2d 468 , 475 & n.2, 951 P.2d 749 (1998); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 286.

2009Schooley v. Pinch’s Deli Mkt., Inc., 134 Wn.2d 468 , 475 & n.2, 951 P.2d 749 (1998); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 286.

2009Schooley v. Pinch’s Deli Mkt., Inc., 134 Wn.2d 468 , 475 & n.2, 951 P.2d 749 (1998); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 286.

2008Esmieu, 92 Wn.2d at 535 . ¶41 The Restatement rule for “reasonable value” recovery contemplates this flexible approach to calculating awards.

2008Esmieu, 92 Wn.2d at 535 . ¶41 The Restatement rule for “reasonable value” recovery contemplates this flexible approach to calculating awards.

2007A contrary result would bestow an unsupportable windfall on [the defendant], unjustly enriching him” but declining to “decide whether to follow the majority rule or the Restatement” in regard to actual knowledge of intervening interests), vacated in part on other grounds by 271 Mich. App. 801 , 726 N.W.2d 424 (2006).

2007A contrary result would bestow an unsupportable windfall on [the defendant], unjustly enriching him” but declining to “decide whether to follow the majority rule or the Restatement” in regard to actual knowledge of intervening interests), vacated in part on other grounds by 271 Mich. App. 801 , 726 N.W.2d 424 (2006).

2005Bank, FSB v. Pappas, 829 A.2d 953, 961 (D.C. 2003) (granting subrogation based on the Restatement’s analysis); Suntrust Bank v. Riverside Nat’l Bank of Fla., 792 So. 2d 1222 (Fla. Dist.

2005Bank of Florida, 792 So.2d 1222 (2001) (granting subrogation based on the Restatements analysis). [11] We also find no case approving subrogation that contemplates facts similar to those presented here.

2004The fourth and final inquiry under the Restatement test is whether the statute aimed to protect Barrett’s interest in his welfare, health, and safety “against the particular hazard from which the harm results.” As noted above, this court has already recognized that RCW 66.44.200(1) aimed to protect against the particular peril that caused Barrett’s harm — “alcohol-induced driver error.” Christen, 113 Wn.2d at 495 (citing Burkhart v. Harrod, 110 Wn.2d 381, 395 , 755 P.2d 759 (1988) (Utter, J., concurring) (describing the spectrum of foreseeable consequences of drinking and driving as “some driv

2004The fourth and final inquiry under the Restatement test is whether the statute aimed to protect Barrett’s interest in his welfare, health, and safety “against the particular hazard from which the harm results.” As noted above, this court has already recognized that RCW 66.44.200(1) aimed to protect against the particular peril that caused Barrett’s harm — “alcohol-induced driver error.” Christen, 113 Wn.2d at 495 (citing Burkhart v. Harrod, 110 Wn.2d 381, 395 , 755 P.2d 759 (1988) (Utter, J., concurring) (describing the spectrum of foreseeable consequences of drinking and driving as “some driv

2004The fourth and final inquiry under the Restatement test is whether the statute aimed to protect Barrett’s interest in his welfare, health, and safety “against the particular hazard from which the harm results.” As noted above, this court has already recognized that RCW 66.44.200(1) aimed to protect against the particular peril that caused Barrett’s harm — “alcohol-induced driver error.” Christen, 113 Wn.2d at 495 (citing Burkhart v. Harrod, 110 Wn.2d 381, 395 , 755 P.2d 759 (1988) (Utter, J., concurring) (describing the spectrum of foreseeable consequences of drinking and driving as “some driv

2004The fourth and final inquiry under the Restatement test is whether the statute aimed to protect Barrett’s interest in his welfare, health, and safety “against the particular hazard from which the harm results.” As noted above, this court has already recognized that RCW 66.44.200(1) aimed to protect against the particular peril that caused Barrett’s harm — “alcohol-induced driver error.” Christen, 113 Wn.2d at 495 (citing Burkhart v. Harrod, 110 Wn.2d 381, 395 , 755 P.2d 759 (1988) (Utter, J., concurring) (describing the spectrum of foreseeable consequences of drinking and driving as “some driv

1998The court applied the Restatement test and found that RCW 66.44.270 was designed “to protect minors from injuries resulting from their abuse of alcoholic beverages, not to protect third parties injured by intoxicated minors.” Id. at 354 .

1998The court applied the Restatement test and found that RCW 66.44.270 was designed “to protect minors from injuries resulting from their abuse of alcoholic beverages, not to protect third parties injured by intoxicated minors.” Id. at 354 .

1950We quote from 4 Tiffany on Real Property (3d ed.) 441, § 1147: “ ‘It has been asserted, by many of the courts in this country, that in order that the statute of limitations may run in favor of one in possession of land, the possession must *646 be under claim of right or title. [Citing, among other cases, Skansi v. Novak, 84 Wash. 39 , 146 Pac. 160 .] There would seem to be reason to doubt, however, whether, in asserting this requirement, the courts ordinarily have in mind anything more than a restatement of the requirement of hostility of possession.

1950We quote from 4 Tiffany on Real Property (3d ed.) 441, § 1147: “ ‘It has been asserted, by many of the courts in this country, that in order that the statute of limitations may run in favor of one in possession of land, the possession must *646 be under claim of right or title. [Citing, among other cases, Skansi v. Novak, 84 Wash. 39 , 146 Pac. 160 .] There would seem to be reason to doubt, however, whether, in asserting this requirement, the courts ordinarily have in mind anything more than a restatement of the requirement of hostility of possession.

1950They do not ordinarily undertake to explain why a claim of title on the part of the possessor is necessary, and it appears that the rightful owner is quite sufficiently protected by the requirement of adverseness or hostility of possession.’ “The Texas court, in the case of Houston Oil Co. v. Jones, 109 Tex. 89 , 198 S. W. 290 , discusses the term ‘claim of right.’ Texas has a statute which defines adverse possession as follows: “ ‘ “Adverse possession” is an actual and visible appropriation of the land, commenced and continued under a claim of right inconsistent with and hostile to the claim

1950They do not ordinarily undertake to explain why a claim of title on the part of the possessor is necessary, and it appears that the rightful owner is quite sufficiently protected by the requirement of adverseness or hostility of possession.’ “The Texas court, in the case of Houston Oil Co. v. Jones, 109 Tex. 89 , 198 S. W. 290 , discusses the term ‘claim of right.’ Texas has a statute which defines adverse possession as follows: “ ‘ “Adverse possession” is an actual and visible appropriation of the land, commenced and continued under a claim of right inconsistent with and hostile to the claim

2017Hendrickson, 176 Wn.

2017Hendrickson, 176 Wn.

2016And interpreting the predecessor statute to RCW 9.94A.535(3)(e),6 our Supreme Court held in State v. Solberg, 122 Wn.2d at 707 , that "a properly supported finding of anyone of the statutory aggravating circumstances"-by which it was referring to the enumerated circumstances now set forth in RCW 9.94A.535(3)(e)(i) through (vi)-"may elevate a drug offense to a "major violation' which allows a trial court, in its discretion, to impose an exceptional sentence." Only the three-member dissent in Solberg viewed showing that the current offense was more onerous than typical as an additional element t

2016Essentially, the phrase "more onerous than typical" is not an additional requirement, rather it is a restatement of the requirement ofa "major violation." Id.

2016Hertog v. City of Seattle, 138 Wn.2d 265, 276 , 979 P.2d 400 (1999) (citing Taggart v. State, 118 Wn.2d 195, 218 , 822 P.2d 243 (1992)). ¶27 Section 315 of the Restatement is an exception to the general common law rule of nonliability for the criminal or tortious acts of third parties and defines a “special relation.” Petersen, 100 Wn.2d at 426 (citing Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 497 F. Supp. 185, 188 (D.

2016Hertog v. City of Seattle, 138 Wn.2d 265, 276 , 979 P.2d 400 (1999) (citing Taggart v. State, 118 Wn.2d 195, 218 , 822 P.2d 243 (1992)). ¶27 Section 315 of the Restatement is an exception to the general common law rule of nonliability for the criminal or tortious acts of third parties and defines a “special relation.” Petersen, 100 Wn.2d at 426 (citing Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 497 F. Supp. 185, 188 (D.

2015Id. at 205 & n.3 (describing the Restatement’s test as imposing the duty to protect invitees “from imminent criminal harm and reasonably foreseeable criminal conduct by third persons”; rejecting liability for criminal conduct that is “ ‘so highly extraordinary or improbable as to be wholly beyond the range of expectability’ ” (quoting Jones v. Leon, 3 Wn.

2014Id.

2013"To determine whether a duty of care exists based upon a statutory violation [the supreme court] has adopted the Restatement test, which, among 36 Keller v. City of Spokane. 146 Wn.2d 237, 242 , 44 P.3d 845 (2002). 37 Jackson v. City of Seattle. 158 Wn.

2013"To determine whether a duty of care exists based upon a statutory violation [the supreme court] has adopted the Restatement test, which, among 36 Keller v. City of Spokane. 146 Wn.2d 237, 242 , 44 P.3d 845 (2002). 37 Jackson v. City of Seattle. 158 Wn.

2013"To determine whether a duty of care exists based upon a statutory violation [the supreme court] has adopted the Restatement test, which, among 36 Keller v. City of Spokane. 146 Wn.2d 237, 242 , 44 P.3d 845 (2002). 37 Jackson v. City of Seattle. 158 Wn.

2013"To determine whether a duty of care exists based upon a statutory violation [the supreme court] has adopted the Restatement test, which, among 36 Keller v. City of Spokane. 146 Wn.2d 237, 242 , 44 P.3d 845 (2002). 37 Jackson v. City of Seattle. 158 Wn.