53 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1957–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Li Fu v. Hong Fugreen2 sentences2016T.V. v. Camp Jaycee, 197 N.J. 132, 135-36 , 962 A.2d 453 (2008); see also Erny v. Estate of Merola, 171 N.J. 86, 95-97 , 792 A.2d 1208 (2002) (employing Restatement factors in choice-of-law analysis); Fu v. Fu, 160 N.J. 108, 119 , 733 *12 A.2d 1133 (1999) (same). 2008The New Jersey Experience, 36 Rutgers L.J. 527 , 530 (2005) (footnotes omitted).] In other words, “rather than the Second Restatement being intended to provide a metric for determining the strength of state interests, the respective strength of the states’ interests is a factor to be considered in measuring the significance of the contacts of the relevant states.” Id. at 546. 4 Following the promulgation of the Second Restatement, we again modified our analysis, using the Second Restatement framework as our methodology in Fu, supra, 160 N.J. at 119-39 , 733 A. 2d 1133 . | 1 | 4 |
Erny v. Estate of Merolagreen2 sentences2016T.V. v. Camp Jaycee, 197 N.J. 132, 135-36 , 962 A.2d 453 (2008); see also Erny v. Estate of Merola, 171 N.J. 86, 95-97 , 792 A.2d 1208 (2002) (employing Restatement factors in choice-of-law analysis); Fu v. Fu, 160 N.J. 108, 119 , 733 *12 A.2d 1133 (1999) (same). 2016T.V. v. Camp Jaycee, 197 N.J. 132, 135-36 , 962 A.2d 453 (2008); see also Erny v. Estate of Merola, 171 N.J. 86, 95-97 , 792 A.2d 1208 (2002) (employing Restatement factors in choice-of-law analysis); Fu v. Fu, 160 N.J. 108, 119 , 733 *12 A.2d 1133 (1999) (same). | 1 | 3 |
Rogers v. Jordangreen2 sentences2026Super. 561, 562-63 (App. Div. 1987); DiCosala v. Kay, 91 N.J. 159, 169 (1982); see also Rogers v. Jordan, 339 N.J. 2026Super. 561, 562-63 (App. Div. 1987); DiCosala v. Kay, 91 N.J. 159, 169 (1982); see also Rogers v. Jordan, 339 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
Davis v. Devereux Foundationgreen2 sentences2026See Davis, 209 N.J. at 303 (applying the Restatement standard); accord Cosgrove v. Lawrence, 215 N.J. 2026See Davis, 209 N.J. at 303 (applying the Restatement standard); accord Cosgrove v. Lawrence, 215 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
Cosgrove v. Lawrencegreen2 sentences2026See Davis, 209 N.J. at 303 (applying the Restatement standard); accord Cosgrove v. Lawrence, 215 N.J. 2026See Davis, 209 N.J. at 303 (applying the Restatement standard); accord Cosgrove v. Lawrence, 215 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
Di Cosala v. Kaygreen2 sentences2026Super. 581, 586 (App. Div. 2001) (noting, in a case applying N.J.S.A. 59:2- 2(a), that this Court “has turned to the Restatement when the issue is whether an employee has acted within the scope of . . . employment”) (citing DiCosala, 91 N.J. at 169 ). 50 As this Court explained more than forty years ago, under the Restatement test, “[c]onduct is generally considered to be within the scope of employment if[] ‘it is of the kind [that the employee] is employed to perform; it occurs substantially within the authorized time and space limits; [and] it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to s 2026Super. 581, 586 (App. Div. 2001) (noting, in a case applying N.J.S.A. 59:2- 2(a), that this Court “has turned to the Restatement when the issue is whether an employee has acted within the scope of . . . employment”) (citing DiCosala, 91 N.J. at 169 ). 50 As this Court explained more than forty years ago, under the Restatement test, “[c]onduct is generally considered to be within the scope of employment if[] ‘it is of the kind [that the employee] is employed to perform; it occurs substantially within the authorized time and space limits; [and] it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to s | 1 | 1 |
Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories Inc.green1 sentence2020See Perez v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 161 N.J. 1, 14-15 (1999) (recognizing the complementary role of the Restatements of law with common law); see also Ross v. Lowitz, 222 N.J. 494, 506, 510 (2013) ("[o]ur courts have adopted the standard of Restatement section 822 to assess liability for private A-0943-19T4 18 nuisance" and "also apply the Restatement's standard of liability where a plaintiff pursues a trespass claim"). | 1 | 1 |
John Ross v. Karen A. Lowitz (074200)green1 sentence2020See Perez v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 161 N.J. 1, 14-15 (1999) (recognizing the complementary role of the Restatements of law with common law); see also Ross v. Lowitz, 222 N.J. 494, 506, 510 (2013) ("[o]ur courts have adopted the standard of Restatement section 822 to assess liability for private A-0943-19T4 18 nuisance" and "also apply the Restatement's standard of liability where a plaintiff pursues a trespass claim"). | 1 | 1 |
Do-Wop Corp. v. City of Rahwaygreen2 sentences2019A-4375-17T1 23 taken from orders and judgments and not from opinions," Do-Wop Corp. v. City of Rahway, 168 N.J. 191, 199 (2001), we decline to invoke our original jurisdiction to make the factual findings necessary to affirm the April 27, 2018 and May 25, 2018 orders. 2019A-4375-17T1 23 taken from orders and judgments and not from opinions," Do-Wop Corp. v. City of Rahway, 168 N.J. 191, 199 (2001), we decline to invoke our original jurisdiction to make the factual findings necessary to affirm the April 27, 2018 and May 25, 2018 orders. | 1 | 1 |
Brown v. Dillard's, Inc.green1 sentence2017Brown, supra, 430 F.3d at 1012. | 1 | 1 |
Pre-Paid Legal Services, Inc. v. Cahillgreen1 sentence2017Pre-Paid Legal Servs., Inc. v. Cahill, 786 F.3d 1287, 1295 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 373 , 193 L.Ed.2d 292 (2015). 5 In its letter acknowledging receipt of Jackson’s arbitration demand, the AAA confirmed that its Commercial Arbitration Rules, as opposed to its Consumer Arbitration or other rules, would apply to the arbitration. 6 We find that the Second Restatement’s factors in Section 241(a) and (e) heavily favor the result here and are not undercut by the other Section 241 *181 factors. | 1 | 1 |
Siddons v. Cookgreen2 sentences2015See Siddons v. Cook, 382 N.J.Super. 1, 11-12 , 887 A.2d 689 (App.Div.2005); Burke, supra, 239 N.J.Super. at 272-73 , 571 A.2d 296 . 2015See Siddons v. Cook, 382 N.J.Super. 1, 11-12 , 887 A.2d 689 (App.Div.2005); Burke, supra, 239 N.J.Super. at 272-73 , 571 A.2d 296 . | 1 | 1 |
Rosen v. Keelergreen2 sentences2013See Rosen, supra, 411 N.J. 2013See Rosen, supra, 411 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
| MacDougall v. Weichertgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Green v. General Motors Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| A. Johnson & Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Gilbert Spruance Co. v. Pennsylvania Manufacturers' Ass'n.green | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Gonzalezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Romaine v. Kallingergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Height v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., Ltd.green | 1 | 1 |
| Eickelberg v. Deere & Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Lovelace v. Astra Trading Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| AUBURN MACH. WORKS, CO., INC. v. Jonesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Phipps v. General Motors Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Hunt v. Blasiusgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Helen L. Huff, Administratrix of the Estate of Jessee Huff, Deceased v. White Motor Corporationgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Vineyard v. Empire MacH. Co., Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Fox v. Passaic General Hospitalgreen | 1 | 1 |
| MORAN v. Napolitanogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lopez v. Swyergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Yerzy v. Levinegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Farrell v. Votator Division of Chemetron Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Yerzy v. Levinegreen | 1 | 1 |
| WALSH v. Madison Park Properties, Ltd.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
PV Ex Rel. TV v. Camp Jaycee
green
2 sentences2016T.V. v. Camp Jaycee, 197 N.J. 132, 135-36 , 962 A.2d 453 (2008); see also Erny v. Estate of Merola, 171 N.J. 86, 95-97 , 792 A.2d 1208 (2002) (employing Restatement factors in choice-of-law analysis); Fu v. Fu, 160 N.J. 108, 119 , 733 *12 A.2d 1133 (1999) (same). 2016T.V. v. Camp Jaycee, 197 N.J. 132, 135-36 , 962 A.2d 453 (2008); see also Erny v. Estate of Merola, 171 N.J. 86, 95-97 , 792 A.2d 1208 (2002) (employing Restatement factors in choice-of-law analysis); Fu v. Fu, 160 N.J. 108, 119 , 733 *12 A.2d 1133 (1999) (same). | 2 | 2010–2016 |
State, Dept. of Environ. Protect. v. Ventron Corp.
green
2 sentences1991As Ventrón makes clear, “[u]nder Restatement analysis, whether an activity is abnormally dangerous is to be determined on a case-by-case basis, taking all relevant circumstances into consideration.” Id. at 491 , 468 A.2d 150 . 1991As Ventrón makes clear, “[u]nder Restatement analysis, whether an activity is abnormally dangerous is to be determined on a case-by-case basis, taking all relevant circumstances into consideration.” Id. at 491 , 468 A.2d 150 . | 2 | 1991–1995 |
T & E IND. v. Safety Light Corp.
green
2 sentences1991This interpretation of the holding in Ventron is supported by the decision of T & E Industries, Inc. v. Safety Light Corp., 227 N.J. 1991This interpretation of the holding in Ventron is supported by the decision of T & E Industries, Inc. v. Safety Light Corp., 227 N.J. | 2 | 1989–1991 |
In re Accutane Litig.
green
1 sentence2019For example, our Supreme Court in In re Accutane, 235 N.J. at 254 , recently ruled that the terms of the New Jersey Product Liability Act ("NJPLA") do not automatically apply to all plaintiffs from all jurisdictions who may be injured by products made in New Jersey but, instead, that the appropriate choice-of- law depends upon a balancing of Second Restatement factors under sections (continued) states. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Andrew McCarrell v. Hoffman-La Roach, Inc.(076524)
green
2 sentences2017Stated another way, under section 142, the forum state "presumptively applies its own statute of limitations unless . . . [it] has no significant interest in the maintenance of the claim and the other state, whose statute has expired, has 'a more significant relationship to the parties and the occurrence,' . . . or . . . given 'the exceptional circumstances of the case,' following the Second Restatement rule would lead to an unreasonable result." McCarrell, supra, 227 N.J. at 597 . 2017Stated another way, under section 142, the forum state "presumptively applies its own statute of limitations unless . . . [it] has no significant interest in the maintenance of the claim and the other state, whose statute has expired, has 'a more significant relationship to the parties and the occurrence,' . . . or . . . given 'the exceptional circumstances of the case,' following the Second Restatement rule would lead to an unreasonable result." McCarrell, supra, 227 N.J. at 597 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Huggins v. Florida
green
1 sentence2017Pre-Paid Legal Servs., Inc. v. Cahill, 786 F.3d 1287, 1295 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 373 , 193 L.Ed.2d 292 (2015). 5 In its letter acknowledging receipt of Jackson’s arbitration demand, the AAA confirmed that its Commercial Arbitration Rules, as opposed to its Consumer Arbitration or other rules, would apply to the arbitration. 6 We find that the Second Restatement’s factors in Section 241(a) and (e) heavily favor the result here and are not undercut by the other Section 241 *181 factors. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Myers v. United States
green
1 sentence2017Pre-Paid Legal Servs., Inc. v. Cahill, 786 F.3d 1287, 1295 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 373 , 193 L.Ed.2d 292 (2015). 5 In its letter acknowledging receipt of Jackson’s arbitration demand, the AAA confirmed that its Commercial Arbitration Rules, as opposed to its Consumer Arbitration or other rules, would apply to the arbitration. 6 We find that the Second Restatement’s factors in Section 241(a) and (e) heavily favor the result here and are not undercut by the other Section 241 *181 factors. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton
green
2 sentences2015Ed. 2d at 686 (footnote omitted). 32 The Supreme Court identified two “basic alternatives” by which Meritor’s rejection of strict liability could be reconciled with the Restatement’s analysis: a requirement that a plaintiff provide proof that the supervisor affirmatively invoked his or her authority, or the recognition of “an affirmative defense to liability in some circumstances, even when a supervisor has created the actionable environment.” Ibid. 2015The Supreme Court identified two “basic alternatives” by which Meritor’s rejection of strict liability could be reconciled with the Restatement’s analysis: a requirement that a plaintiff provide proof that the supervisor affirmatively invoked his or her authority, or the recognition of “an affirmative defense to liability in some circumstances, even when a supervisor has created the actionable environment.” Ibid. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Burke v. Briggs
green
2 sentences2015See Siddons v. Cook, 382 N.J.Super. 1, 11-12 , 887 A.2d 689 (App.Div.2005); Burke, supra, 239 N.J.Super. at 272-73 , 571 A.2d 296 . 2015See Siddons v. Cook, 382 N.J.Super. 1, 11-12 , 887 A.2d 689 (App.Div.2005); Burke, supra, 239 N.J.Super. at 272-73 , 571 A.2d 296 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Salzano v. North Jersey Media Group Inc.
green
2 sentences2010Its reliance, for example, on this Court's opinion in Costello v. Ocean County Observer, 136 N.J. 594, 607-09 , 643 A. 2d 1012 (1994), including that decision's references to the Restatement test, see Restatement (Second) of Torts § 611 comment f (1976) (describing accuracy and fairness requirements of fair reporting privilege), ante at 522-24, 993 A. 2d at 792-93 , is hardly controversial. 2010Its reliance, for example, on this Court's opinion in Costello v. Ocean County Observer, 136 N.J. 594, 607-09 , 643 A. 2d 1012 (1994), including that decision's references to the Restatement test, see Restatement (Second) of Torts § 611 comment f (1976) (describing accuracy and fairness requirements of fair reporting privilege), ante at 522-24, 993 A. 2d at 792-93 , is hardly controversial. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Costello v. Ocean County Observer
green
2 sentences2010Its reliance, for example, on this Court’s opinion in Costello v. Ocean County Observer, 136 N.J. 594, 607-09 , 643 A.2d 1012 (1994), including that decision’s references to the Restatement test, see Restatement (Second) of Torts § 611 comment f (1976) (describing accuracy and fairness requirements of fair reporting privilege), ante at 522-24, 993 A.2d at 791-93, is hardly controversial. 2010Its reliance, for example, on this Court’s opinion in Costello v. Ocean County Observer, 136 N.J. 594, 607-09 , 643 A.2d 1012 (1994), including that decision’s references to the Restatement test, see Restatement (Second) of Torts § 611 comment f (1976) (describing accuracy and fairness requirements of fair reporting privilege), ante at 522-24, 993 A.2d at 791-93, is hardly controversial. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
United Stations of Nj v. Wm. Kingsley
green
2 sentences2009Our courts have adopted the Restatement principle set forth above in Morella v. Machu, 235 N.J.Super. 604, 610 , 563 A. 2d 881 (App.Div.1989) and United Stations of N.J. v. Kingsley, 99 N.J.Super. 574, 582 , 240 A. 2d 702 (Ch.Div.1968), aff'd by, Del Spina v. Getty Oil Co., 54 N.J. 150 , 253 A. 2d 813 (1969). 2009Our courts have adopted the Restatement principle set forth above in Morella v. Machu, 235 N.J.Super. 604, 610 , 563 A. 2d 881 (App.Div.1989) and United Stations of N.J. v. Kingsley, 99 N.J.Super. 574, 582 , 240 A. 2d 702 (Ch.Div.1968), aff'd by, Del Spina v. Getty Oil Co., 54 N.J. 150 , 253 A. 2d 813 (1969). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Del Spina v. Getty Oil Co.
neutral
2 sentences2009Our courts have adopted the Restatement principle set forth above in Morella v. Machu, 235 N.J.Super. 604, 610 , 563 A. 2d 881 (App.Div.1989) and United Stations of N.J. v. Kingsley, 99 N.J.Super. 574, 582 , 240 A. 2d 702 (Ch.Div.1968), aff'd by, Del Spina v. Getty Oil Co., 54 N.J. 150 , 253 A. 2d 813 (1969). 2009Our courts have adopted the Restatement principle set forth above in Morella v. Machu, 235 N.J.Super. 604, 610 , 563 A. 2d 881 (App.Div.1989) and United Stations of N.J. v. Kingsley, 99 N.J.Super. 574, 582 , 240 A. 2d 702 (Ch.Div.1968), aff'd by, Del Spina v. Getty Oil Co., 54 N.J. 150 , 253 A. 2d 813 (1969). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Morella v. MacHu
green
2 sentences2009Our courts have adopted the Restatement principle set forth above in Morella v. Machu, 235 N.J.Super. 604, 610 , 563 A. 2d 881 (App.Div.1989) and United Stations of N.J. v. Kingsley, 99 N.J.Super. 574, 582 , 240 A. 2d 702 (Ch.Div.1968), aff'd by, Del Spina v. Getty Oil Co., 54 N.J. 150 , 253 A. 2d 813 (1969). 2009Our courts have adopted the Restatement principle set forth above in Morella v. Machu, 235 N.J.Super. 604, 610 , 563 A. 2d 881 (App.Div.1989) and United Stations of N.J. v. Kingsley, 99 N.J.Super. 574, 582 , 240 A. 2d 702 (Ch.Div.1968), aff'd by, Del Spina v. Getty Oil Co., 54 N.J. 150 , 253 A. 2d 813 (1969). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Strickland v. Washington
green
2 sentences2007NOTES [1] This test requires that it first be ascertained whether "counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness," Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 688 , 104 S.Ct. at 2064 , 80 L.Ed. 2d at 693 , and, if so, whether "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different," id. at 694 , 104 S.Ct. at 2068 , 80 L.Ed. 2d at 698 . [2] As held in Hill v. Lockhart, supra, 474 U.S. at 58-59 , 106 S.Ct. at 370 , 88 L.Ed. 2d at 210 , when applied to a matter in which a defendant has pled guilty, t 2007NOTES [1] This test requires that it first be ascertained whether "counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness," Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 688 , 104 S.Ct. at 2064 , 80 L.Ed. 2d at 693 , and, if so, whether "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different," id. at 694 , 104 S.Ct. at 2068 , 80 L.Ed. 2d at 698 . [2] As held in Hill v. Lockhart, supra, 474 U.S. at 58-59 , 106 S.Ct. at 370 , 88 L.Ed. 2d at 210 , when applied to a matter in which a defendant has pled guilty, t | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| McMann v. Richardson green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Tollett v. Henderson green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Hardwicke v. American Boychoir School
green
1 sentence2007Ibid. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Hill v. Lockhart
green
2 sentences2007NOTES [1] This test requires that it first be ascertained whether "counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness," Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 688 , 104 S.Ct. at 2064 , 80 L.Ed. 2d at 693 , and, if so, whether "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different," id. at 694 , 104 S.Ct. at 2068 , 80 L.Ed. 2d at 698 . [2] As held in Hill v. Lockhart, supra, 474 U.S. at 58-59 , 106 S.Ct. at 370 , 88 L.Ed. 2d at 210 , when applied to a matter in which a defendant has pled guilty, t 2007NOTES [1] This test requires that it first be ascertained whether "counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness," Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 688 , 104 S.Ct. at 2064 , 80 L.Ed. 2d at 693 , and, if so, whether "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different," id. at 694 , 104 S.Ct. at 2068 , 80 L.Ed. 2d at 698 . [2] As held in Hill v. Lockhart, supra, 474 U.S. at 58-59 , 106 S.Ct. at 370 , 88 L.Ed. 2d at 210 , when applied to a matter in which a defendant has pled guilty, t | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Chrisanthis v. County of Atl. green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Anicet v. Gant green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Lehmann v. Toys 'R' US, Inc. green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Stuyvesant Assocs. v. Doe green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Pashman v. Friedbauer green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Georgia v. Suruda green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Perez v. WYETH LABORATORIES, INC. green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Johnson Matthey Inc. v. PA. MFRS.'ASS'N INS. CO. green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Leksi, Inc. v. Federal Insurance green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| A. Johnson & Co., Inc., and A. Johnson Energy Marketing, Inc. v. The Aetna Casualty and Surety Company green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Kortenhaus v. Eli Lilly & Co. green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Bahrle v. Exxon Corp. green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Electronics Corp. green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Levin v. Devoe green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Amland Properties Corp. v. Aluminum Co. of America green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| T & E Industries, Inc. v. Safety Light Corp. green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| General Foods Corp. v. United States green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Langeveld v. L. R. Z. H. Corp. green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Kinsman Transit Company v. City of Buffalo green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Union Oil Company v. James J. Oppen and John J. Masterson green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Just's, Inc. v. Arrington Construction Co. green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.