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19 Vermont opinions name it 2 courts 1991–2026 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Vermont courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Hathaway v. Tuckergreen2 sentences2018Put another way, the right-to-control test is the "general standard" and "the remaining Restatement factors are supplementary to [that] test, particularly in a close case." Hathaway , 2010 VT 114 , ¶ 32, 189 Vt. 126 , 14 A.3d 968 . 2018Put another way, the right-to-control test is the "general standard" and "the remaining Restatement factors are supplementary to [that] test, particularly in a close case." Hathaway , 2010 VT 114 , ¶ 32, 189 Vt. 126 , 14 A.3d 968 . | 1 | 2 |
Kneebinding, Inc., John Springer-Miller, Tina Springer-Miller and ACL Investments, LLC v. Richard Howellgreen2 sentences2026Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766; see also Kneebinding, Inc. v. Howell, 2018 VT 101, 93 , 208 Vt. 578 (explaining that under this Restatement section, the plaintiff must prove actual harm as a result of defendant’s interference). 2026Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766; see also Kneebinding, Inc. v. Howell, 2018 VT 101, 93 , 208 Vt. 578 (explaining that under this Restatement section, the plaintiff must prove actual harm as a result of defendant’s interference). | 1 | 1 |
Gregg Beldock v. VWSD, LLCgreen2 sentences2024“A valid contract defines the obligations of the parties as to matters within its scope, displacing to that extent any inquiry into unjust enrichment.” Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 2(2) (2011); see Beldock v. VWSD, LLC, 2023 VT 35, ¶ 78 , 307 A.3d 209 (adopting Restatement rule). 2024“A valid contract defines the obligations of the parties as to matters within its scope, displacing to that extent any inquiry into unjust enrichment.” Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 2(2) (2011); see Beldock v. VWSD, LLC, 2023 VT 35, ¶ 78 , 307 A.3d 209 (adopting Restatement rule). | 1 | 1 |
Trepanier v. Getting Organized, Inc.green2 sentences2018See Trepanier, 155 Vt. at 265 ; Ball, 163 Vt. at 470 . 2018See Trepanier, 155 Vt. at 265 ; Ball, 163 Vt. at 470 . | 1 | 1 |
United States Ex Rel. Trane Co. v. Bondgreen1 sentence2015Bd., 723 N.W.2d 188, 200 (Iowa 2006) (“We follow the Restatement’s rule concerning the effect of duress on the enforceability of a contract . . . .”); Trane, 586 A.2d at 738-40 (adopting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 174 as to what renders agreement void, but modified such that “duress sufficient to render a contract void consists of the actual application of physical force that is sufficient to, and does, cause the person unwillingly to execute the document; as well as the threat of application of immediate physical force sufficient to place a person in the position of the signer in act | 1 | 1 |
Andreini v. Hultgrengreen1 sentence2015Bd., 723 N.W.2d 188, 200 (Iowa 2006) (“We follow the Restatement’s rule concerning the effect of duress on the enforceability of a contract . . . .”); Trane, 586 A.2d at 738-40 (adopting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 174 as to what renders agreement void, but modified such that “duress sufficient to render a contract void consists of the actual application of physical force that is sufficient to, and does, cause the person unwillingly to execute the document; as well as the threat of application of immediate physical force sufficient to place a person in the position of the signer in act | 1 | 1 |
City of Asbury v. Iowa City Development Boardgreen1 sentence2015Bd., 723 N.W.2d 188, 200 (Iowa 2006) (“We follow the Restatement’s rule concerning the effect of duress on the enforceability of a contract . . . .”); Trane, 586 A.2d at 738-40 (adopting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 174 as to what renders agreement void, but modified such that “duress sufficient to render a contract void consists of the actual application of physical force that is sufficient to, and does, cause the person unwillingly to execute the document; as well as the threat of application of immediate physical force sufficient to place a person in the position of the signer in act | 1 | 1 |
Myers v. Langloisgreen1 sentence2013See id. at 435–36. | 1 | 1 |
Sweet v. Roygreen2 sentences2005GMAC argues that it cannot be held vicariously liable for punitive damages awarded to punish the conduct of other actors and entities such as WNC because plaintiffs’ evidence did not satisfy the Restatement standard for vicarious liability as discussed in Sweet v. Roy, 173 Vt. 418, 444-45 , 801 A.2d 694, 713-14 (2002). 2005GMAC argues that it cannot be held vicariously liable for punitive damages awarded to punish the conduct of other actors and entities such as WNC because plaintiffs’ evidence did not satisfy the Restatement standard for vicarious liability as discussed in Sweet v. Roy, 173 Vt. 418, 444-45 , 801 A.2d 694, 713-14 (2002). | 1 | 1 |
State Farm Fire and Cas. Co. v. Fullertongreen1 sentence2005Id. at 686 ; Fullerton, 118 F.3d at 381. | 1 | 1 |
Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Assn.green2 sentences2004Indeed, the trend has been toward a broader approach, embodied in the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, requiring a plaintiff to áddress in one lawsuit all injuries emanating from “all or any part of the transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which the action arose.” Restatement (Second) of Judgments §24(1) (1982) [hereinafter Restatement (Second)]; see also 18 Wright et al., supra, § 4407 n.22 (observing that “[t]oo many states have adopted the Restatement test to provide a complete list” and collecting examples); Note, Claim Preclusion in Modem Latent Disease Cases: A Prop 2004Indeed, the trend has been toward a broader approach, embodied in the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, requiring a plaintiff to áddress in one lawsuit all injuries emanating from “all or any part of the transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which the action arose.” Restatement (Second) of Judgments §24(1) (1982) [hereinafter Restatement (Second)]; see also 18 Wright et al., supra, § 4407 n.22 (observing that “[t]oo many states have adopted the Restatement test to provide a complete list” and collecting examples); Note, Claim Preclusion in Modem Latent Disease Cases: A Prop | 1 | 1 |
State v. Cartergreen2 sentences2002See State v. Carter, 164 Vt. 545, 553-57 , 674 A.2d 1258, 1264-66 (1996) (adopting the standard applied in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), for constitutional and nonconstitutional error and noting standard was a restatement of principle that error “could not be harmless if there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Fuller, 168 Vt. at 408 , 721 A.2d at 484 (“Harmless error analysis requires the reviewing court to inquire if, absent the alleged error, it is clear 2002See State v. Carter, 164 Vt. 545, 553-57 , 674 A.2d 1258, 1264-66 (1996) (adopting the standard applied in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), for constitutional and nonconstitutional error and noting standard was a restatement of principle that error “could not be harmless if there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Fuller, 168 Vt. at 408 , 721 A.2d at 484 (“Harmless error analysis requires the reviewing court to inquire if, absent the alleged error, it is clear | 1 | 1 |
State v. Fullergreen2 sentences2002See State v. Carter, 164 Vt. 545, 553-57 , 674 A.2d 1258, 1264-66 (1996) (adopting the standard applied in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), for constitutional and nonconstitutional error and noting standard was a restatement of principle that error “could not be harmless if there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Fuller, 168 Vt. at 408 , 721 A.2d at 484 (“Harmless error analysis requires the reviewing court to inquire if, absent the alleged error, it is clear 2002See State v. Carter, 164 Vt. 545, 553-57 , 674 A.2d 1258, 1264-66 (1996) (adopting the standard applied in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), for constitutional and nonconstitutional error and noting standard was a restatement of principle that error “could not be harmless if there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Fuller, 168 Vt. at 408 , 721 A.2d at 484 (“Harmless error analysis requires the reviewing court to inquire if, absent the alleged error, it is clear | 1 | 1 |
Chapman v. Californiayellow1 sentence2002See State v. Carter, 164 Vt. 545, 553-57 , 674 A.2d 1258, 1264-66 (1996) (adopting the standard applied in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), for constitutional and nonconstitutional error and noting standard was a restatement of principle that error “could not be harmless if there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Fuller, 168 Vt. at 408 , 721 A.2d at 484 (“Harmless error analysis requires the reviewing court to inquire if, absent the alleged error, it is clear | 1 | 1 |
Trudo v. Lazarusgreen2 sentences1998See Trudo v. Lazarus, 116 Vt. 221, 224 , 73 A.2d 306, 308 (1950); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 329, cmt. c. (1965). 1998See Trudo v. Lazarus, 116 Vt. 221, 224 , 73 A.2d 306, 308 (1950); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 329, cmt. c. (1965). | 1 | 1 |
Levinsky v. Diamondgreen2 sentences1996We have been consistent that a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim may not be granted “unless it appears beyond doubt that there exist no circumstances or facts which the plaintiff could prove about the claim made in his complaint which would entitle him to relief.” Levinsky v. Diamond, 140 Vt. 595, 600-01 , 442 A.2d 1277, 1280-81 (1982). 1996We have been consistent that a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim may not be granted “unless it appears beyond doubt that there exist no circumstances or facts which the plaintiff could prove about the claim made in his complaint which would entitle him to relief.” Levinsky v. Diamond, 140 Vt. 595, 600-01 , 442 A.2d 1277, 1280-81 (1982). | 1 | 1 |
Wilson v. Whinerygreen2 sentences1991App. 1987) (repurchase option for grantors’ lifetimes at purchase price plus “an additional fair amount for any improvements” held not an unreasonable promissory restraint on alienation under Restatement rule); Wilson v. Whinery, 37 Wash. App. 24, 27 , 678 P.2d 354, 356 (1984) (disparity between purchase price provided in right of first refusal and the subsequent market price of the property did not invalidate the right of first refusal). 1991App. 1987) (repurchase option for grantors’ lifetimes at purchase price plus “an additional fair amount for any improvements” held not an unreasonable promissory restraint on alienation under Restatement rule); Wilson v. Whinery, 37 Wash. App. 24, 27 , 678 P.2d 354, 356 (1984) (disparity between purchase price provided in right of first refusal and the subsequent market price of the property did not invalidate the right of first refusal). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Vermont. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Carole Kuligoski, Individually and on behalf of Michael J. Kuligoski, and Mark Kuligoski and James M. Kuligoski v. Evan M. Rapoza, John E. Rapoza, Anne M. Rapoza, John A. Rapoza and Christine M. Rapoza
green
2 sentences2025In addition to the extent of control, the Restatement factors examine whether the worker is engaged in a distinct occupation, “whether the kind of occupation engaged in is usually done under the direction of an employer, the skill required, whether the worker supplies the tools for the work, the length of time the worker is employed, whether payment is by time or by the job, whether the work is part of the regular business of the principal, whether the parties believe they are creating an employer-employee relationship, and whether the principal is or is not in business.” Kuligoski v. Rapoza, 2025In addition to the extent of control, the Restatement factors examine whether the worker is engaged in a distinct occupation, “whether the kind of occupation engaged in is usually done under the direction of an employer, the skill required, whether the worker supplies the tools for the work, the length of time the worker is employed, whether payment is by time or by the job, whether the work is part of the regular business of the principal, whether the parties believe they are creating an employer-employee relationship, and whether the principal is or is not in business.” Kuligoski v. Rapoza, | 2 | 2024–2025 |
Herrera v. Union No. 39 School Dist.
green
2 sentences2026Dist., 2006 VT 83 , ¶ 21, 181 Vt. 198 (2006) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 346)); see also Ely-Cruikshank Co. v. Bank of Montreal, 65 N.E.2d 985 , 986-87 (N.Y.) (holding that, under New York law, breach of contract accrues at the time of the breach and noting that, because “nominal damages are always available in breach of contract actions,” all necessary elements of claim were present at the time of the alleged breach even if damages accrued later). 2026Dist., 2006 VT 83 , ¶ 21, 181 Vt. 198 (2006) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 346)); see also Ely-Cruikshank Co. v. Bank of Montreal, 65 N.E.2d 985 , 986-87 (N.Y.) (holding that, under New York law, breach of contract accrues at the time of the breach and noting that, because “nominal damages are always available in breach of contract actions,” all necessary elements of claim were present at the time of the alleged breach even if damages accrued later). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Sean Kelly v. The University of Vermont Medical Center
green
2 sentences2026Ctr., 2022 VT 26, ¶ 36 , 216 Vt. 445 , it has also endorsed the Restatement principle that “if a breach of contract ‘caused no loss or if the amount of the loss is not proved . . . a small sum fixed without regard to the amount of loss will be awarded as nominal damages,” Herrera v. Union No. 39 Sch. 2026Ctr., 2022 VT 26, ¶ 36 , 216 Vt. 445 , it has also endorsed the Restatement principle that “if a breach of contract ‘caused no loss or if the amount of the loss is not proved . . . a small sum fixed without regard to the amount of loss will be awarded as nominal damages,” Herrera v. Union No. 39 Sch. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
RLI Insurance v. Agency of Transportation
green
2 sentences2018Indeed, discussing the Restatement factors, we have stated that "[i]f the work is neither ancillary nor independent of the employer's business, it is likely that the worker is an employee." RLI Ins. , 171 Vt. at 555 , 762 A.2d at 478 ; see Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220(2) cmt. i ("[I]f the occupation is one which ordinarily is considered as a function of the regular members of the household staff or incident of the business establishment of the employer, there is an inference that the actor is a servant."); id . cmt. l ("If the work is done upon the premises of the employer with his mac 2018Indeed, discussing the Restatement factors, we have stated that "[i]f the work is neither ancillary nor independent of the employer's business, it is likely that the worker is an employee." RLI Ins. , 171 Vt. at 555 , 762 A.2d at 478 ; see Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220(2) cmt. i ("[I]f the occupation is one which ordinarily is considered as a function of the regular members of the household staff or incident of the business establishment of the employer, there is an inference that the actor is a servant."); id . cmt. l ("If the work is done upon the premises of the employer with his mac | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Cold Springs Farm Development, Inc. v. Ball
green
2 sentences2018See Trepanier, 155 Vt. at 265 ; Ball, 163 Vt. at 470 . 2018See Trepanier, 155 Vt. at 265 ; Ball, 163 Vt. at 470 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Brod v. Agency of Natural Resources
green
2 sentences2015Div. Nov. 1, 2011) (Durkin, J.) (citing Brod v. Agency of Natural Resources, 2007 VT 87, ¶ 9 , 182 Vt. 234 ) (“Appellants’ bare assertion that they are ‘adjoining property owners’ is more akin to a restatement of the rule itself than a factual allegation describing what property they own or where their property is located in relation to the property on which the project is being constructed.”). 2015Div. Nov. 1, 2011) (Durkin, J.) (citing Brod v. Agency of Natural Resources, 2007 VT 87, ¶ 9 , 182 Vt. 234 ) (“Appellants’ bare assertion that they are ‘adjoining property owners’ is more akin to a restatement of the rule itself than a factual allegation describing what property they own or where their property is located in relation to the property on which the project is being constructed.”). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Sweezey v. Neel
green
2 sentences2009We declined to adopt the Restatement rule in Sweezey , explaining that this rule would cause uncertainty, increase litigation, and confer a windfall on the servient owner to the detriment of the dominant owner. 2006 VT 38, ¶¶ 24-25 . ¶ 39. 2009We declined to adopt the Restatement rule in Sweezey , explaining that this rule would cause uncertainty, increase litigation, and confer a windfall on the servient owner to the detriment of the dominant owner. 2006 VT 38, ¶¶ 24-25 . ¶ 39. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
James v. Paul
green
2 sentences2005Id. at 686 ; Fullerton, 118 F.3d at 381. 2005The Restatement’s analysis of the issue has been called into question, however, James, 49 S.W.3d at 686-87 , and the general trend is toward applying collateral estoppel in a civil proceeding following a plea of guilty. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Serfass v. United States
green
2 sentences1999The State, basing its response primarily on the specific issue raised by defendant in the trial court, argues that because jeopardy did not attach to the burglary charges — the dismissal of those charges having occurred before a jury was empaneled, see Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377 (1975) — prosecution on the trespass charges does not subject defendant to double jeopardy. 1999The State, basing its response primarily on the specific issue raised by defendant in the trial court, argues that because jeopardy did not attach to the burglary charges — the dismissal of those charges having occurred before a jury was empaneled, see Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377 (1975) — prosecution on the trespass charges does not subject defendant to double jeopardy. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.