Restatement rule in Texas

2009See Bostrom Seating, Inc. v. Crane Carrier Co., 140 S.W.3d 681 (Tex.2004); Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Martinez, 977 S.W.2d 328, 335 (Tex.1998).

2009See Bostrom Seating, Inc. v. Crane Carrier Co., 140 S.W.3d 681 (Tex.2004); Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Martinez, 977 S.W.2d 328, 335 (Tex.1998).

2015We agreed with the Restatement that warnings and safer alternative designs are merely “factors, among others, for the jury to consider in determining whether the product as designed is reasonably safe.” Id. at 337 .

2015We agreed with the Restatement that warnings and safer alternative designs are merely “factors, among others, for the jury to consider in determining whether the product as designed is reasonably safe.” Id. at 337 .

2010“Where it was supposed to be” TCAG also contends that because VanHouten did not prove the dog had dangerous propensities that were abnormal for that class of animal, it cannot be held liable for the incident because the dog “was where it was supposed to be.” The “where it is supposed to be” rule is simply a restatement of the test for strict liability. 8 This rule was first stated in Lewis v. Great Southwest Corporation, 473 S.W.2d 228, 231 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.) in that portion of the opinion analyzing the plaintiffs strict liability claim as follows: With regard to

2010"Where it was supposed to be" TCAG also contends that because VanHouten did not prove the dog had dangerous propensities that were abnormal for that class of animal, it cannot be held liable for the incident because the dog "was where it was supposed to be." The "where it is supposed to be" rule is simply a restatement of the test for strict liability. 8 This rule was first stated in Lewis v. Great Southwest Corporation, 473 S.W.2d 228, 231 (Tex.Civ.App.--Fort Worth 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.) in that portion of the opinion analyzing the plaintiff's strict liability claim as follows: With regard

2012Seidler , 277 S.W.Sd at 556 (citing Able, 35 S.W.3d at 613 ).

2009Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. Able , 35 S.W.3d 608, 613 (Tex. 2000); Shoemaker v. Estate of Whistler , 513 S.W.2d 10, 14 (Tex. 1974).

1992Gutierrez v. Collins, supra. The Restatement rule lists the relevant factors to be considered in determining the choice of law.

1992Gutierrez v. Collins, supra. The Restatement rule lists the relevant factors to be considered in determining the choice of law.

2009See, e.g., State v. Jeffries, 430 N.W.2d 728, 730 (Iowa 1988) (noting that the lesser-included-offense doctrine is "fraught with confusion because of the doctrine’s elusiveness in its definition and application.”); State v. Fike, 243 Kan. 365 , 757 P.2d 724, 725 (1988) ("there are very few areas of the criminal law which have given the appellate courts more difficulty than the problem of lesser offenses”); State v. Keffer, 860 P.2d 1118, 1128 (Wyo.1993) ("the uncertainty evolving from various precedents and variable application suggests the necessity for a restatement of the rule.

2009See, e.g., State v. Jeffries, 430 N.W.2d 728, 730 (Iowa 1988) (noting that the lesser-included-offense doctrine is "fraught with confusion because of the doctrine’s elusiveness in its definition and application.”); State v. Fike, 243 Kan. 365 , 757 P.2d 724, 725 (1988) ("there are very few areas of the criminal law which have given the appellate courts more difficulty than the problem of lesser offenses”); State v. Keffer, 860 P.2d 1118, 1128 (Wyo.1993) ("the uncertainty evolving from various precedents and variable application suggests the necessity for a restatement of the rule.

2009See, e.g., State v. Jeffries, 430 N.W.2d 728, 730 (Iowa 1988) (noting that the lesser-included-offense doctrine is "fraught with confusion because of the doctrine’s elusiveness in its definition and application.”); State v. Fike, 243 Kan. 365 , 757 P.2d 724, 725 (1988) ("there are very few areas of the criminal law which have given the appellate courts more difficulty than the problem of lesser offenses”); State v. Keffer, 860 P.2d 1118, 1128 (Wyo.1993) ("the uncertainty evolving from various precedents and variable application suggests the necessity for a restatement of the rule.

2009See, e.g., State v. Jeffries, 430 N.W.2d 728, 730 (Iowa 1988) (noting that the lesser-included-offense doctrine is "fraught with confusion because of the doctrine's elusiveness in its definition and application."); State v. Fike, 243 Kan. 365 , 757 P.2d 724, 725 (1988) ("there are very few areas of the criminal law which have given the appellate courts more difficulty than the problem of lesser offenses"); State v. Keffer, 860 P.2d 1118, 1128 (Wyo.1993) ("the uncertainty evolving from various precedents and variable application suggests the necessity for a restatement of the rule.

2009See, e.g., State v. Jeffries, 430 N.W.2d 728, 730 (Iowa 1988) (noting that the lesser-included-offense doctrine is "fraught with confusion because of the doctrine’s elusiveness in its definition and application.”); State v. Fike, 243 Kan. 365 , 757 P.2d 724, 725 (1988) ("there are very few areas of the criminal law which have given the appellate courts more difficulty than the problem of lesser offenses”); State v. Keffer, 860 P.2d 1118, 1128 (Wyo.1993) ("the uncertainty evolving from various precedents and variable application suggests the necessity for a restatement of the rule.

2009See, e.g., State v. Jeffries, 430 N.W.2d 728, 730 (Iowa 1988) (noting that the lesser-included-offense doctrine is "fraught with confusion because of the doctrine's elusiveness in its definition and application."); State v. Fike, 243 Kan. 365 , 757 P.2d 724, 725 (1988) ("there are very few areas of the criminal law which have given the appellate courts more difficulty than the problem of lesser offenses"); State v. Keffer, 860 P.2d 1118, 1128 (Wyo.1993) ("the uncertainty evolving from various precedents and variable application suggests the necessity for a restatement of the rule.

2009Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. Able , 35 S.W.3d 608, 613 (Tex. 2000); Shoemaker v. Estate of Whistler , 513 S.W.2d 10, 14 (Tex. 1974).

2009Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. Able, 35 S.W.3d 608, 613 (Tex. 2000); Shoemaker v. Estate of Whistler, 513 S.W.2d 10, 14 (Tex. 1974).

2002See DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 677-78 . *199 Louisiana has a materially greater interest than Texas in determining these issues.

2002See DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 677-78 .

2024The Texas Supreme Court in Mustang Pipe identified several Restatement factors that are “significant in determining whether a failure to perform is material.” 134 S.W.3d at 199 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 241 (AM.

2015Prior to trial, Duncan submitted requested issues and instructions which included a question asking whether Duncan’s *901 failure to comply was “material.” That question included an instruction reciting four of the five Restatement factors for determining materiality. 12 He omitted the “standards of good faith and fair dealing” element contained in the Restatement, which is also contained in the suggested definition of materiality from the Texas Pattern Jury Charges and recited in the Mustang opinion. 13 Comm. On Pattern Jury Charges, State Bar of Tex., Texas Pattern Jury Charges: Business PJC

2002Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 2001.033; NAII, 925 S.W.2d at 669 .

2002In addition to a reasoned justification, the order adopting the rule must include a summary of the comments the agency received from interested parties, a restatement of the rule's factual basis, and the reasons why the agency disagrees with the comments. *73 Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 2001.033 ; NAII, 925 S.W.2d at 669 .

2020See, e.g., Crews v. Dkasi Corp., 469 S.W.3d 194, 204 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2015, pet. denied) (party seeking declaration that a partnership agreement terminated on a certain date was no more than a restatement of defense that no agreement existed or that the agreement terminated on a certain date and the trial court could resolve the issue through defenses raised rather than through declaration).

2019See, e.g., Crews v. Dkasi Corp., 469 S.W.3d 194, 204 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2015, pet. denied) (party seeking declaration that a partnership agreement terminated on a certain date was no more than a restatement of defense that no agreement existed or that the agreement terminated on a certain date and the trial court could resolve the issue through defenses raised rather than through declaration).

2015See, e.g., id. (party seeking declaration that a partnership agreement terminated on a certain date was no more than a restatement of defense that no agreement existed or that agreement terminated on a certain date and trial court could resolve issue through defenses raised rather than through declaration).

2015See, e.g., id. (party seeking declaration that a partnership agreement terminated on a certain date was no more than a restatement of defense that no agreement existed or that agreement terminated on a certain date and trial court could resolve issue through defenses raised rather than through declaration). .

2008Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 113 Nev. 393, 404 , 935 P.2d 1154, 1161 (Nev.1997).

2008Sav. & Loan Ass’n , 113 Nev. 393, 404 , 935 P.2d 1154, 1161 (Nev. 1997).

2007See County of Dakota v. Glidden, 113 U.S. 222, 224 , 5 S.Ct. 428, 429 , 28 L.Ed. 981 (1885) (stating that a judgment debtor can recover money paid under a judgment that has subsequently been reversed); Bank of the U.S. v. Bank of Wash., 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 8, 17 , 8 L.Ed. 299 (1832) (noting that, on the reversal of a judgment, the law raises an obligation on the party who has received the benefit of an erroneous judgment to make restitution to the other party for what he has lost).

2007See County of Dakota v. Glidden, 113 U.S. 222, 224 , 5 S.Ct. 428, 429 , 28 L.Ed. 981 (1885) (stating that a judgment debtor can recover money paid under a judgment that has subsequently been reversed); Bank of the U.S. v. Bank of Wash., 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 8, 17 , 8 L.Ed. 299 (1832) (noting that, on the reversal of a judgment, the law raises an obligation on the party who has received the benefit of an erroneous judgment to make restitution to the other party for what he has lost).

2003If it does, we disagree with our sister court’s Restatement analysis, which we believe incorrectly de-emphasized the importance of each consumer’s residence by (1) focusing on the breach of contract claims that require no reliance, even though the class alleged numerous other claims that do, id. at 297; and (2) emphasizing where the defendant “maintained” the contracts (Texas) rather than where the goods were bought and sold (forty other states), id. at 301. [73] See Schein , 2002 WL 31426407, at *13 . [74] See Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc ., 288 F.3d at 1015 . [75] See Schein , 2002 WL 31426407

2003If it does, we disagree with our sister court’s Restatement analysis, which we believe incorrectly de-emphasized the importance of each consumer’s residence by (1) focusing on the breach of contract claims that require no reliance, even though the class alleged numerous other claims that do, id. at 297; and (2) emphasizing where the defendant “maintained” the contracts (Texas) rather than where the goods were bought and sold (forty other states), id. at 301. [73] See Schein , 2002 WL 31426407, at *13 . [74] See Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc ., 288 F.3d at 1015 . [75] See Schein , 2002 WL 31426407

2010Cayman had no prior connection to Epic or Grant Thornton, and predicating scope of liability on Grant Thornton’s general knowledge that investors may purchase Epic bonds would “eviscerate the Restatement rule in favor of a de facto foreseeabilify approach — an approach [we] have refused to embrace.” See id.

2010Cayman had no prior connection to Epic or Grant Thornton, and predicating scope of liability on Grant Thornton’s general knowledge that investors may purchase Epic bonds would “eviscerate the Restatement rule in favor of a de facto foreseeabilify approach — an approach [we] have refused to embrace.” See id.

2007See County of Dakota v. Glidden, 113 U.S. 222, 224 , 5 S.Ct. 428, 429 , 28 L.Ed. 981 (1885) (stating that a judgment debtor can recover money paid under a judgment that has subsequently been reversed); Bank of the U.S. v. Bank of Wash., 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 8, 17 , 8 L.Ed. 299 (1832) (noting that, on the reversal of a judgment, the law raises an obligation on the party who has received the benefit of an erroneous judgment to make restitution to the other party for what he has lost).

2007See County of Dakota v. Glidden, 113 U.S. 222, 224 , 5 S.Ct. 428, 429 , 28 L.Ed. 981 (1885) (stating that a judgment debtor can recover money paid under a judgment that has subsequently been reversed); Bank of the U.S. v. Bank of Wash., 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 8, 17 , 8 L.Ed. 299 (1832) (noting that, on the reversal of a judgment, the law raises an obligation on the party who has received the benefit of an erroneous judgment to make restitution to the other party for what he has lost).

2003If it does, we disagree with our sister court’s Restatement analysis, which we believe incorrectly de-em-phasized the importance of each consumer's residence by (1) focusing on the breach of contract claims that require no reliance, even though the class alleged numerous other claims that do, id. at 297 ; and (2) emphasizing where the defendant "maintained” the contracts (Texas) rather than where the goods were bought and sold (forty other states), id. at 301 . 73 .

2003If it does, we disagree with our sister court’s Restatement analysis, which we believe incorrectly de-em-phasized the importance of each consumer's residence by (1) focusing on the breach of contract claims that require no reliance, even though the class alleged numerous other claims that do, id. at 297 ; and (2) emphasizing where the defendant "maintained” the contracts (Texas) rather than where the goods were bought and sold (forty other states), id. at 301 . 73 .

2025Pipeline, LLC, 407 S.W.3d 342, 368 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th 6 Indeed, Mustang Pipeline also enumerated additional Restatement factors that could be significant in determining the materiality of a party’s breach.

2022Law Inst. 1971); see Torrington, 46 S.W.3d at 848 ; Hughes Wood Prods., 18 S.W.3d at 206 & n.2 (holding that court must apply issue-specific Restatement test and noting that the issue-specific test “articulates and applies the [general choice-of-law] principles of section 6”).

2016Co. v. Holder, 5 S.W.3d 654, 657 (Tex.1999) (explaining the rape of the plaintiff "simply was not foreseeable, beyond a remote philosophic sense” because the plaintiff "was not so situated that injury to her might reasonably have been foreseen” despite the evidence that it was foreseeable that violent crimes would occur in the parking garage due to the defendant’s failure to secure it); see also Hawley, 284 S.W.3d at 857 (looking to the Restatement factors for guidance); Dew, 208 S.W.3d at 452 (considering relevant Restatement factors); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 442(b) (1965) (including

2016Co. v. Holder, 5 S.W.3d 654, 657 (Tex.1999) (explaining the rape of the plaintiff "simply was not foreseeable, beyond a remote philosophic sense” because the plaintiff "was not so situated that injury to her might reasonably have been foreseen” despite the evidence that it was foreseeable that violent crimes would occur in the parking garage due to the defendant’s failure to secure it); see also Hawley, 284 S.W.3d at 857 (looking to the Restatement factors for guidance); Dew, 208 S.W.3d at 452 (considering relevant Restatement factors); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 442(b) (1965) (including

2016Co. v. Holder, 5 S.W.3d 654, 657 (Tex.1999) (explaining the rape of the plaintiff "simply was not foreseeable, beyond a remote philosophic sense” because the plaintiff "was not so situated that injury to her might reasonably have been foreseen” despite the evidence that it was foreseeable that violent crimes would occur in the parking garage due to the defendant’s failure to secure it); see also Hawley, 284 S.W.3d at 857 (looking to the Restatement factors for guidance); Dew, 208 S.W.3d at 452 (considering relevant Restatement factors); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 442(b) (1965) (including

2016Co. v. Holder, 5 S.W.3d 654, 657 (Tex.1999) (explaining the rape of the plaintiff "simply was not foreseeable, beyond a remote philosophic sense” because the plaintiff "was not so situated that injury to her might reasonably have been foreseen” despite the evidence that it was foreseeable that violent crimes would occur in the parking garage due to the defendant’s failure to secure it); see also Hawley, 284 S.W.3d at 857 (looking to the Restatement factors for guidance); Dew, 208 S.W.3d at 452 (considering relevant Restatement factors); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 442(b) (1965) (including

2016Co. v. Holder, 5 S.W.3d 654, 657 (Tex.1999) (explaining the rape of the plaintiff "simply was not foreseeable, beyond a remote philosophic sense” because the plaintiff "was not so situated that injury to her might reasonably have been foreseen” despite the evidence that it was foreseeable that violent crimes would occur in the parking garage due to the defendant’s failure to secure it); see also Hawley, 284 S.W.3d at 857 (looking to the Restatement factors for guidance); Dew, 208 S.W.3d at 452 (considering relevant Restatement factors); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 442(b) (1965) (including

2016Co. v. Holder, 5 S.W.3d 654, 657 (Tex.1999) (explaining the rape of the plaintiff "simply was not foreseeable, beyond a remote philosophic sense” because the plaintiff "was not so situated that injury to her might reasonably have been foreseen” despite the evidence that it was foreseeable that violent crimes would occur in the parking garage due to the defendant’s failure to secure it); see also Hawley, 284 S.W.3d at 857 (looking to the Restatement factors for guidance); Dew, 208 S.W.3d at 452 (considering relevant Restatement factors); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 442(b) (1965) (including