Barker factors in New Mexico

2026Length of delay 4 {14} The initial Barker factor, the length of delay, serves “a dual function: it acts 5 as a triggering mechanism for considering the four Barker factors if the delay crosses 6 the threshold of being ‘presumptively prejudicial,’ and it is an independent factor to 7 consider in evaluating whether a speedy trial violation has occurred.” Serros, 2016- 8 NMSC-008, ¶ 22 (quoting Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶¶ 21, 23 ).

2026See, e.g., State v. Samora, 2016- 8 NMSC-031, ¶ 23, 387 P.3d 230 (“To find a speedy trial violation without a showing 9 of actual prejudice, the Court must find that the three other Barker factors weigh 10 heavily against the [s]tate.” (citing Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 39 )). 11 {41} Judicial insistence on the use of this all-or-nothing, three-factor approach, 12 assuming it to be sound when applied to a typical speedy trial scenario, 5 is 13 unreasonable in the limited circumstances presented here as well as those presented 14 in Stock, where fairness dictates us to be “unwilling to put a great

2026When reviewing a decision to grant or deny a motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds, “we give deference to the district court’s factual findings, but we review the weighing and the balancing of the Barker factors de novo.” State v. Spearman, 2012-NMSC-023, ¶ 9 , 283 P.3d 272 (text only) (citation omitted). {10} “The right of the accused to a speedy trial is guaranteed by both the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 14 of the New Mexico Constitution.” Id. ¶ 16. “[B]ecause of the . . . societal interest in bringing an accused to trial[,] . . . we must scr

2026When reviewing a decision to grant or deny a motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds, “we give deference to the district court’s factual findings, but we review the weighing and the balancing of the Barker factors de novo.” State v. Spearman, 2012-NMSC-023, ¶ 9 , 283 P.3d 272 (text only) (citation omitted). {10} “The right of the accused to a speedy trial is guaranteed by both the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 14 of the New Mexico Constitution.” Id. ¶ 16. “[B]ecause of the . . . societal interest in bringing an accused to trial[,] . . . we must scr

2024The victims’ testimony received at trial was sufficient to support the verdicts reached below. {5} Defendant next asserts that his right to a speedy trial was violated and proceeds to argue the four-factor test set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972). [BIC 19- 25] Defendant did file a motion to dismiss below, relying on the six-month rule from Rule 6-506 NMRA, Rule 7-506 NMRA, and Rule 8-506 NMRA. [1 RP 180] Defendant did not, however, proffer any argument regarding the Barker factors and, instead, his motion to dismiss “was couched in a belief that the six-month rule . . . applied t

2024The victims’ testimony received at trial was sufficient to support the verdicts reached below. {5} Defendant next asserts that his right to a speedy trial was violated and proceeds to argue the four-factor test set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972). [BIC 19- 25] Defendant did file a motion to dismiss below, relying on the six-month rule from Rule 6-506 NMRA, Rule 7-506 NMRA, and Rule 8-506 NMRA. [1 RP 180] Defendant did not, however, proffer any argument regarding the Barker factors and, instead, his motion to dismiss “was couched in a belief that the six-month rule . . . applied t

2026Prejudice and balancing the Barker factors 10 {39} As for the fourth and final factor, this Court recognized in Serros that, 11 “[o]rdinarily, a defendant bears the burden of proof on this factor by showing 12 ‘particularized prejudice’ when claiming a speedy trial violation.” 2016-NMSC-008 , 13 ¶ 86 (citation omitted).

2026Prejudice and balancing the Barker factors 10 {39} As for the fourth and final factor, this Court recognized in Serros that, 11 “[o]rdinarily, a defendant bears the burden of proof on this factor by showing 12 ‘particularized prejudice’ when claiming a speedy trial violation.” 2016-NMSC-008 , 13 ¶ 86 (citation omitted).

2010Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972); Zurla v. State, 2 109 N.M. 640, 642 , 789 P.2d 588, 590 (1990) (adopting the balancing test in Barker). 3 In Garza, our Supreme Court recently clarified, however, that a “‘presumptively 4 prejudicial’ length of delay is simply a triggering mechanism, requiring further inquiry 5 into the Barker factors,” not a delay that carries forward a presumption of prejudice. 6 Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 21 . 7 Reasons for the Delay 8 In this case, the record proper indicates that the first trial setting was February 9 16, 2009, which was vacated due to the district

2010Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972); Zurla v. State, 2 109 N.M. 640, 642 , 789 P.2d 588, 590 (1990) (adopting the balancing test in Barker). 3 In Garza, our Supreme Court recently clarified, however, that a “‘presumptively 4 prejudicial’ length of delay is simply a triggering mechanism, requiring further inquiry 5 into the Barker factors,” not a delay that carries forward a presumption of prejudice. 6 Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 21 . 7 Reasons for the Delay 8 In this case, the record proper indicates that the first trial setting was February 9 16, 2009, which was vacated due to the district

2017Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 39 (stating that “in some circumstances, prejudice may be presumed” and that “[t]he presumption that pretrial delay has prejudiced the accused intensifies over time” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); id. (recognizing that a defendant need not show prejudice when the other three Barker factors weigh strongly in his favor (citing United States v. Mendoza, 530 F.3d 758, 764 (9th Cir. 2008))); see also Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25, 26 (1973) (per curiam) (“Barker v. Wingo expressly rejected the notion that an affirmative demonstrat

2016Weighing and Balancing the Four Barker Factors 1 Doggett, 505 U.S. at 654 ; Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 39 ; Taylor, 2015-NMCA- 012, ¶ 25. 9 {32} As this case illustrates, the weighing and balancing of the Barker factors is a difficult and sensitive process.

2019See, e.g., Lopez, 2018-NMCA-002, ¶ 14 (adopting the Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 , due process framework in evaluating sentencing delay, looking 6See, e.g., Alston, 412 A.2d at 356-57 (stating that “from a due process perspective, the one, indispensable concern during an appeal period is prejudice, since the focus shifts from a ‘speedy’ to a ‘fair’ trial”); see also Chapple, 660 P.2d at 1225 (applying reasoning set forth in Alston); see also DeLeon, 444 F.3d at 57-58 (rejecting any “direct analogy made to tests involving the Sixth Amendment speedy trial right” in favor of a “threshold requirement” th

2019See, e.g., Lopez, 2018-NMCA-002, ¶ 14 (adopting the Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 , due process framework in evaluating sentencing delay, looking 6See, e.g., Alston, 412 A.2d at 356-57 (stating that “from a due process perspective, the one, indispensable concern during an appeal period is prejudice, since the focus shifts from a ‘speedy’ to a ‘fair’ trial”); see also Chapple, 660 P.2d at 1225 (applying reasoning set forth in Alston); see also DeLeon, 444 F.3d at 57-58 (rejecting any “direct analogy made to tests involving the Sixth Amendment speedy trial right” in favor of a “threshold requirement” th

2025See State v. Samora, 2016-NMSC-031, ¶ 23 , 387 P.3d 230 (“To find a speedy trial violation without a showing of actual prejudice, the Court must find that the three other Barker factors weigh heavily against the [s]tate.”).

2024See Samora, 2016-NMSC-031, ¶ 23 (“To find a speedy trial violation without a showing of actual prejudice, the Court must find that the three other Barker factors weigh heavily against the [s]tate.”).

2026Villalobos, A-1-CA-39820, mem. op. ¶ 30. 6 {44} This self-limiting, hands-off approach taken by the Court of Appeals runs 7 counter to the well-established practice of New Mexico appellate courts to consider 8 the Barker factors on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis and to examine “the interests of 9 defendants which the speedy trial right was designed to protect . . . in light of the 10 specific facts and circumstances of each case.” Ochoa, 2017-NMSC-031, ¶¶ 5 , 48 11 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see Stock, 2006- 12 NMCA-140, ¶ 45 (recognizing that a “speedy tr

2026Villalobos, A-1-CA-39820, mem. op. ¶ 30. 6 {44} This self-limiting, hands-off approach taken by the Court of Appeals runs 7 counter to the well-established practice of New Mexico appellate courts to consider 8 the Barker factors on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis and to examine “the interests of 9 defendants which the speedy trial right was designed to protect . . . in light of the 10 specific facts and circumstances of each case.” Ochoa, 2017-NMSC-031, ¶¶ 5 , 48 11 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see Stock, 2006- 12 NMCA-140, ¶ 45 (recognizing that a “speedy tr

2015See State v. Maddox, 2008-NMSC-062, ¶¶ 12, 37 , 145 N.M. 242 , 195 P.3d 1254 (addressing a twenty-eight month delay as “extraordinary” and evaluating all four Barker factors in detail to determine whether the unique facts significantly tempered the prejudice to the defendant), abrogated on other grounds by Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶¶ 47-48 .

2015See State v. Maddox, 2008-NMSC-062, ¶¶ 12, 37 , 145 N.M. 242 , 195 P.3d 1254 (addressing a twenty-eight month delay as “extraordinary” and evaluating all four Barker factors in detail to determine whether the unique facts significantly tempered the prejudice to the defendant), abrogated on other grounds by Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶¶ 47-48 .

2013See Coffin, 1999-NMSC-038, ¶ 71 (concluding that to prove prejudice resulting from the unavailability of a witness, the defendant must show that the witness’s testimony would have benefitted his case). {26} We note that a defendant is not required to make a particularized showing of prejudice where the other Barker factors weigh heavily in his favor.

2013See Coffin, 1999-NMSC-038, ¶ 71 (concluding that to prove prejudice resulting from the unavailability of a witness, the defendant must show that the witness’s testimony would have benefitted his case). {26} We note that a defendant is not required to make a particularized showing of prejudice where the other Barker factors weigh heavily in his favor.

2015We must determine whether this sixteen-month delay weighs against the State. {28} “The Barker test furnishes the flexibility to take account of the competing concerns of orderly appellate review on the one hand, and a speedy trial on the other.” Unites States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 314 (1986).

2015We must determine whether this sixteen-month delay weighs against the State. {28} “The Barker test furnishes the flexibility to take account of the competing concerns of orderly appellate review on the one hand, and a speedy trial on the other.” Unites States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 314 (1986).

2023Speedy Trial {4} In reviewing a speedy trial ruling, “we defer to the district court’s factual findings that are supported by substantial evidence, but we independently review the record to determine whether a defendant was denied his speedy trial right and we weigh and balance the Barker factors de novo.” State v. Flores, 2015-NMCA-081, ¶ 4 , 355 P.3d 81 .

2023Speedy Trial {4} In reviewing a speedy trial ruling, “we defer to the district court’s factual findings that are supported by substantial evidence, but we independently review the record to determine whether a defendant was denied his speedy trial right and we weigh and balance the Barker factors de novo.” State v. Flores, 2015-NMCA-081, ¶ 4 , 355 P.3d 81 .

2024The victims’ testimony received at trial was sufficient to support the verdicts reached below. {5} Defendant next asserts that his right to a speedy trial was violated and proceeds to argue the four-factor test set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972). [BIC 19- 25] Defendant did file a motion to dismiss below, relying on the six-month rule from Rule 6-506 NMRA, Rule 7-506 NMRA, and Rule 8-506 NMRA. [1 RP 180] Defendant did not, however, proffer any argument regarding the Barker factors and, instead, his motion to dismiss “was couched in a belief that the six-month rule . . . applied t

2024The victims’ testimony received at trial was sufficient to support the verdicts reached below. {5} Defendant next asserts that his right to a speedy trial was violated and proceeds to argue the four-factor test set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972). [BIC 19- 25] Defendant did file a motion to dismiss below, relying on the six-month rule from Rule 6-506 NMRA, Rule 7-506 NMRA, and Rule 8-506 NMRA. [1 RP 180] Defendant did not, however, proffer any argument regarding the Barker factors and, instead, his motion to dismiss “was couched in a belief that the six-month rule . . . applied t

2023“Under the Barker framework, courts weigh the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant under the guidance of four factors: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the timeliness and manner in which the defendant asserted his speedy trial right; and (4) the particular prejudice that the defendant actually suffered.” State v. Smith, 2016-NMSC-007, ¶ 58 , 367 P.3d 420 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2023“Under the Barker framework, courts weigh the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant under the guidance of four factors: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the timeliness and manner in which the defendant asserted his speedy trial right; and (4) the particular prejudice that the defendant actually suffered.” State v. Smith, 2016-NMSC-007, ¶ 58 , 367 P.3d 420 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2019See, e.g., State v. Smith, 2016-NMSC-007, ¶ 56 , 367 P.3d 420 (including eight-month competency period in total period of delay in speedy-trial analysis); State v. Stock, 2006-NMCA-140, ¶¶ 19-22 , 140 N.M. 676 , 147 P.3d 885 (including all competency evaluation time periods in total delay, and analyzing them for purposes of determining reasons for delay). {8} On remand, the district court held a hearing, entered factual findings and legal conclusions applying the Barker factors, and ruled that Defendant’s speedy trial rights were not violated. [Speedy Trial Order 1-4] Consistent with instructi

2019See, e.g., State v. Smith, 2016-NMSC-007, ¶ 56 , 367 P.3d 420 (including eight-month competency period in total period of delay in speedy-trial analysis); State v. Stock, 2006-NMCA-140, ¶¶ 19-22 , 140 N.M. 676 , 147 P.3d 885 (including all competency evaluation time periods in total delay, and analyzing them for purposes of determining reasons for delay). {8} On remand, the district court held a hearing, entered factual findings and legal conclusions applying the Barker factors, and ruled that Defendant’s speedy trial rights were not violated. [Speedy Trial Order 1-4] Consistent with instructi

2019Because the delay was presumptively prejudicial, we 13 continue to a full Barker analysis. 14 {45} This forty-month delay, more than twice as long as the presumptively 15 prejudicial delay period, weighs heavily against the State and in Defendant’s favor. 16 See State v. Taylor, 2015-NMCA-012, ¶ 9 , 343 P.3d 199 (holding that a twenty- 17 four-month delay in a simple case weighed heavily against the state); see also State 18 v. Brown, 2017-NMCA-046, ¶ 17 , 396 P.3d 171 (weighing forty-two-month delay 19 in a complex case, which was approximately twice as long as the presumptively 20 prejudicia

2019Because the delay was presumptively prejudicial, we 13 continue to a full Barker analysis. 14 {45} This forty-month delay, more than twice as long as the presumptively 15 prejudicial delay period, weighs heavily against the State and in Defendant’s favor. 16 See State v. Taylor, 2015-NMCA-012, ¶ 9 , 343 P.3d 199 (holding that a twenty- 17 four-month delay in a simple case weighed heavily against the state); see also State 18 v. Brown, 2017-NMCA-046, ¶ 17 , 396 P.3d 171 (weighing forty-two-month delay 19 in a complex case, which was approximately twice as long as the presumptively 20 prejudicia

2024Consequently, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion. {5} Next, Defendant argues that the State violated his right to a speedy trial. [BIC 1] However, Defendant acknowledges that he “did not raise a speedy trial argument below and thus the district court did not conduct a Barker analysis.” [BIC 10] “If a defendant does not raise a constitutional speedy trial issue before the district court, there is nothing for an appellate court to review.” State v. Collier, 2013-NMSC-015, ¶ 41 , 301 P.3d 370 ; see State v. Lopez, 2008-NMCA-002, ¶ 25 , 143 N.M. 274 , 175 P.3d 942 (“It is

2024Consequently, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion. {5} Next, Defendant argues that the State violated his right to a speedy trial. [BIC 1] However, Defendant acknowledges that he “did not raise a speedy trial argument below and thus the district court did not conduct a Barker analysis.” [BIC 10] “If a defendant does not raise a constitutional speedy trial issue before the district court, there is nothing for an appellate court to review.” State v. Collier, 2013-NMSC-015, ¶ 41 , 301 P.3d 370 ; see State v. Lopez, 2008-NMCA-002, ¶ 25 , 143 N.M. 274 , 175 P.3d 942 (“It is

2020See State v. Vigil- Giron, 2014-NMCA-069, ¶ 60 , 327 P.3d 1129 (“[A]ppellate courts will not consider an issue if no authority is cited in support of the issue and that, given no cited authority, we assume no such authority exists.”); see also State v. Radler, 2019-NMCA-052 , ¶ 16, 448 P.3d 613, 618 (concluding that the speedy trial guidelines, not the six-month magistrate court rule, is the applicable measuring stick for our speedy trial analysis). balancing the Barker factors, Defendant’s right to a speedy trial was not violated.

2020See State v. Vigil- Giron, 2014-NMCA-069, ¶ 60 , 327 P.3d 1129 (“[A]ppellate courts will not consider an issue if no authority is cited in support of the issue and that, given no cited authority, we assume no such authority exists.”); see also State v. Radler, 2019-NMCA-052 , ¶ 16, 448 P.3d 613, 618 (concluding that the speedy trial guidelines, not the six-month magistrate court rule, is the applicable measuring stick for our speedy trial analysis). balancing the Barker factors, Defendant’s right to a speedy trial was not violated.

2025See State v. Wood, 2022-NMCA-009, ¶ 21 , 504 P.3d 579 (“In a speedy trial analysis, if any one of the three Barker factors does not weigh heavily in favor of a defendant, as is the case here, [the d]efendant must show particularized prejudice in order to prove their speedy trial was violated.”).

2025See State v. Wood, 2022-NMCA-009, ¶ 21 , 504 P.3d 579 (“In a speedy trial analysis, if any one of the three Barker factors does not weigh heavily in favor of a defendant, as is the case here, [the d]efendant must show particularized prejudice in order to prove their speedy trial was violated.”).

2021See State v. Brown, 2017-NMCA-046, ¶ 28 , 396 P.3d 171 (explaining that where forty-two months of delay occurred—of which five months weighed in favor of the state, approximately eighteen months weighed in favor of the defendant, and approximately nineteen months weighed neutrally—the reasons for delay factor weighed only slightly to moderately, but not heavily, in favor of the defendant). {21} In a speedy trial analysis, if any one of the three Barker factors does not weigh heavily in favor of a defendant, as is the case here, Defendant must show particularized prejudice in order to prove the

2019Because the delay was presumptively prejudicial, we 13 continue to a full Barker analysis. 14 {45} This forty-month delay, more than twice as long as the presumptively 15 prejudicial delay period, weighs heavily against the State and in Defendant’s favor. 16 See State v. Taylor, 2015-NMCA-012, ¶ 9 , 343 P.3d 199 (holding that a twenty- 17 four-month delay in a simple case weighed heavily against the state); see also State 18 v. Brown, 2017-NMCA-046, ¶ 17 , 396 P.3d 171 (weighing forty-two-month delay 19 in a complex case, which was approximately twice as long as the presumptively 20 prejudicia

2016The district court determined, and the parties agree, that this 5 is a simple case; twenty months elapsed from the date of Defendant’s arrest to the date 6 of the last scheduled jury trial; and a delay of twenty months is presumptively 7 prejudicial in simple cases, thus triggering a need to consider all of the Barker factors. 8 See State v. Manzanares, 1996-NMSC-028 , ¶ 9, 121 N.M. 798 , 918 P.2d 714 (“The 9 question of the complexity of a case is best answered by a trial court familiar with the 10 factual circumstances, the contested issues and available evidence, the local judicial 11 machi

2016The district court determined, and the parties agree, that this 5 is a simple case; twenty months elapsed from the date of Defendant’s arrest to the date 6 of the last scheduled jury trial; and a delay of twenty months is presumptively 7 prejudicial in simple cases, thus triggering a need to consider all of the Barker factors. 8 See State v. Manzanares, 1996-NMSC-028 , ¶ 9, 121 N.M. 798 , 918 P.2d 714 (“The 9 question of the complexity of a case is best answered by a trial court familiar with the 10 factual circumstances, the contested issues and available evidence, the local judicial 11 machi

2021See Ochoa, 2017-NMSC-031, ¶ 64 (presuming prejudice where defendant was continuously incarcerated for two years but weighing prejudice only slightly in the defendants favor in the absence of a showing of particularized prejudice); State v. Urban, 2004-NMSC-007, ¶¶ 17 , 135 N.M. 279 , 87 P.3d 1061 (presuming prejudice where the defendant was incarcerated for twenty- seven months but concluding that the defendant was not subject to oppressive pretrial incarceration because he was incarcerated on other charges and determining that this factor did not weigh heavily against the State). {21} Because

2021See Ochoa, 2017-NMSC-031, ¶ 64 (presuming prejudice where defendant was continuously incarcerated for two years but weighing prejudice only slightly in the defendants favor in the absence of a showing of particularized prejudice); State v. Urban, 2004-NMSC-007, ¶¶ 17 , 135 N.M. 279 , 87 P.3d 1061 (presuming prejudice where the defendant was incarcerated for twenty- seven months but concluding that the defendant was not subject to oppressive pretrial incarceration because he was incarcerated on other charges and determining that this factor did not weigh heavily against the State). {21} Because

2019See, e.g., State v. Smith, 2016-NMSC-007, ¶ 56 , 367 P.3d 420 (including eight-month competency period in total period of delay in speedy-trial analysis); State v. Stock, 2006-NMCA-140, ¶¶ 19-22 , 140 N.M. 676 , 147 P.3d 885 (including all competency evaluation time periods in total delay, and analyzing them for purposes of determining reasons for delay). {8} On remand, the district court held a hearing, entered factual findings and legal conclusions applying the Barker factors, and ruled that Defendant’s speedy trial rights were not violated. [Speedy Trial Order 1-4] Consistent with instructi

2019See, e.g., State v. Smith, 2016-NMSC-007, ¶ 56 , 367 P.3d 420 (including eight-month competency period in total period of delay in speedy-trial analysis); State v. Stock, 2006-NMCA-140, ¶¶ 19-22 , 140 N.M. 676 , 147 P.3d 885 (including all competency evaluation time periods in total delay, and analyzing them for purposes of determining reasons for delay). {8} On remand, the district court held a hearing, entered factual findings and legal conclusions applying the Barker factors, and ruled that Defendant’s speedy trial rights were not violated. [Speedy Trial Order 1-4] Consistent with instructi

2021See State v. Fierro, ¶¶ 52- 55, 2012-NMCA-054 , 278 P.3d 541 (concluding that the assertion of the right to speedy trial weighed only slightly in the defendant’s favor where pro forma demands accompanied multiple entries of appearance and the defendant contributed in part to the delay). {24} As discussed above, absent a showing of particularized prejudice the three other Barker factors must weigh heavily against the State in order to establish a speedy trial violation.

2015See, e.g., State v. Fierro, 2012-NMCA-054, ¶ 36 , 278 P.3d 541 (holding that a period of almost 55 months between the defendant’s arrest and trial weighed heavily in his favor); cf. Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 24 (holding that a delay of one month and six days beyond the guideline for presumptive prejudice “was not extraordinary and [did] not weigh heavily in Defendant’s favor”). {25} We pause before turning to the other Barker factors to address the Court of Appeals majority’s analysis on this point.

2024“Before applying this balancing test, we first assess whether the length of the delay was ‘presumptively prejudicial,’ depending on the complexity of the case.” State v. Montoya, 2015-NMCA-056, ¶ 11 , 348 P.3d 1057 . “[A] ‘presumptively prejudicial’ length of delay is simply a triggering mechanism, requiring further inquiry into the Barker factors.” State v. Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 21 , 146 N.M. 499 , 212 P.3d 387 .

2024“Before applying this balancing test, we first assess whether the length of the delay was ‘presumptively prejudicial,’ depending on the complexity of the case.” State v. Montoya, 2015-NMCA-056, ¶ 11 , 348 P.3d 1057 . “[A] ‘presumptively prejudicial’ length of delay is simply a triggering mechanism, requiring further inquiry into the Barker factors.” State v. Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 21 , 146 N.M. 499 , 212 P.3d 387 .