42 Kansas opinions name it 2 courts 1979–2026 12 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kansas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Barker v. Wingogreen2 sentences2022Yet the Barker factors are nonexclusive, 407 U.S. at 530 , and our speedy trial assessment considers totality of the circumstances. 2022Yet the Barker factors are nonexclusive, 407 U.S. at 530 , and our speedy trial assessment considers totality of the circumstances. | 5 | 14 |
State v. Davisgreen2 sentences2026Until the delay rises to the level of being presumptively prejudicial, it is not necessary to inquire into the other Barker factors." State v. Davis, 277 Kan. 309, 334 , 85 P.3d 1164 (2004). 2026Until the delay rises to the level of being presumptively prejudicial, it is not necessary to inquire into the other Barker factors." State v. Davis, 277 Kan. 309, 334 , 85 P.3d 1164 (2004). | 2 | 4 |
State v. Owensgreen2 sentences2025See State v. Owens, 310 Kan. 865 , 871-81, 451 P.3d 467 (2019) (applying the Barker factors to state and federal constitutional speedy trial claims). 2025See State v. Owens, 310 Kan. 865 , 871-81, 451 P.3d 467 (2019) (applying the Barker factors to state and federal constitutional speedy trial claims). | 2 | 4 |
State v. Fitchgreen2 sentences2016Cir. 2006) (reviewing "the district court's factual findings for clear error and its application of the Barker factors to the facts de novo"); State v. Fitch, 249 Kan. 562, 565 , 819 P.2d 1225 (1991) (noting trial court concluded reason for delay was "more neutral" than deliberate hampering of defense and therefore weighed less heavily against State, and that "the record amply supports that finding"). 2016Cir. 2006) (reviewing "the district court's factual findings for clear error and its application of the Barker factors to the facts de novo"); State v. Fitch, 249 Kan. 562, 565 , 819 P.2d 1225 (1991) (noting trial court concluded reason for delay was "more neutral" than deliberate hampering of defense and therefore weighed less heavily against State, and that "the record amply supports that finding"). | 2 | 4 |
State v. Oterogreen2 sentences2018See State v. Otero , 210 Kan. 530 , 532-33, 502 P.2d 763 (1972) (adopting Barker test in Kansas). 2018See State v. Otero , 210 Kan. 530 , 532-33, 502 P.2d 763 (1972) (adopting Barker test in Kansas). | 2 | 3 |
State v. Rosinegreen2 sentences1991See, e.g., State v. Rosine, 233 Kan. at 666. 1985In State v. Rosine, 233 Kan. 663 , it was held that in each case a court must balance the action or inaction of the State with that of the accused and consider the four Barker factors, including the length of the delay, defendant’s assertion of his right to a speedy trial, the reason for the delay, and the prejudice resulting to the defendant. | 2 | 3 |
State v. Riveragreen2 sentences2006Sixth Amendment Speedy Trial Analysis Our Supreme Court adopted the four-part Barker test for violations of the constitutional right to a speedy trial in Rivera, 277 Kan. at 113 . 2006Sixth Amendment Speedy Trial Analysis Our Supreme Court adopted the four-part Barker test for violations of the constitutional right to a speedy trial in Rivera, 277 Kan. at 113 . | 1 | 5 |
State v. Weavergreen2 sentences2006This court found that this was an intolerable delay, but, after considering the other Barker factors, held that Weaver's constitutional right to a speedy trial was not violated. 276 Kan. at 512 . 2006This court found that this was an intolerable delay, but, after considering the other Barker factors, held that Weaver's constitutional right to a speedy trial was not violated. 276 Kan. at 512 . | 1 | 5 |
State v. Haydengreen2 sentences2026State v. Ford, 316 Kan. 558 , 561, 519 P.3d 456 (2022); State v. Hayden, 281 Kan. 112, 127 , 130 P.3d 24 (2006) (observing this court adopted Barker factors in Otero). 2026State v. Ford, 316 Kan. 558 , 561, 519 P.3d 456 (2022); State v. Hayden, 281 Kan. 112, 127 , 130 P.3d 24 (2006) (observing this court adopted Barker factors in Otero). | 1 | 3 |
State v. Greengreen2 sentences1997We discussed the Barker test in Green, 260 Kan. at 473-74 . 1997We discussed the Barker test in Green, 260 Kan. at 473-74 . | 1 | 3 |
Harris v. Ron Championgreen2 sentences2015Those four factors, known as the Barker test, are: (1) the length of the delay; (2) tire reason for the delay; (3) the defendant’s assertion of his or her right; and (4) prejudice to the defendant. 15 F.3d at 1559 (adopting factors from Barker, 407 U.S. at 530 ). 2015Those four factors, known as the Barker test, are: (1) the length of the delay; (2) tire reason for the delay; (3) the defendant’s assertion of his or her right; and (4) prejudice to the defendant. 15 F.3d at 1559 (adopting factors from Barker, 407 U.S. at 530 ). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Manngreen2 sentences2006We have also held that, "[u]ntil the delay rises to the level of being presumptively prejudicial, it is not necessary to inquire into the other Barker factors." State v. Mann, 274 Kan. 670, 701 , 56 P.3d 212 (2002). 2006We have also held that, "[u]ntil the delay rises to the level of being presumptively prejudicial, it is not necessary to inquire into the other Barker factors." State v. Mann, 274 Kan. 670, 701 , 56 P.3d 212 (2002). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Finkgreen2 sentences1979Perhaps the most complete analysis of the Barker factors to be found in the Kansas cases is in State v. Fink, 217 Kan. at 678-679 . 1979Perhaps the most complete analysis of the Barker factors to be found in the Kansas cases is in State v. Fink, 217 Kan. at 678-679 . | 1 | 2 |
| United States v. Ghailanigreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Tchibassa, Arturgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Molina-Soloriogreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Friberggreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Walkergreen | 1 | 1 |
Joshua Hurst v. State of Mississippigreen2 sentences2016See United States v. Ghailani, 733 F.3d 29 , 30 44 (2d Cir. 2013) (recognizing that although other panels in the Second Circuit had previously used an abuse of discretion standard, "a district court is in no better position than a reviewing court to undertake the required balancing"); People v. Crane, 195 Ill. 2d 42, 51-52 , 743 N.E.2d 555 (2001) (reasoning that because the trial court is in no better position than the reviewing court to apply the Barker factors, appellate courts should review a defendant's constitutional speedy trial challenge de novo); see also Hurst v. State, 195 So. 3d 736 2016See United States v. Ghailani, 733 F.3d 29 , 30 44 (2d Cir. 2013) (recognizing that although other panels in the Second Circuit had previously used an abuse of discretion standard, "a district court is in no better position than a reviewing court to undertake the required balancing"); People v. Crane, 195 Ill. 2d 42, 51-52 , 743 N.E.2d 555 (2001) (reasoning that because the trial court is in no better position than the reviewing court to apply the Barker factors, appellate courts should review a defendant's constitutional speedy trial challenge de novo); see also Hurst v. State, 195 So. 3d 736 | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Pierregreen | 1 | 1 |
| Morel v. Wilkinsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Matheniagreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Smithgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kansas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Marion
green
2 sentences2012Reason for the Delay In Barker, 404 U.S. at 531 , the Supreme Court stated drat “different weights should be assigned to different reasons” for the delay in bringing a defendant to trial: “A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense should be weighted heavily against the government. 2012Reason for the Delay In Barker, 404 U.S. at 531 , the Supreme Court stated drat “different weights should be assigned to different reasons” for the delay in bringing a defendant to trial: “A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense should be weighted heavily against the government. | 2 | 2002–2012 |
State v. Goss
green
2 sentences2003State v. Goss, 245 Kan. 189, 193 , 777 P.2d 781 [1989], We find that, clearly, a 14-month delay qualifies as ‘a little over a year,’ thereby negating further analysis of other Barker factors.”). 2003State v. Goss, 245 Kan. 189, 193 , 777 P.2d 781 [1989], We find that, clearly, a 14-month delay qualifies as ‘a little over a year,’ thereby negating further analysis of other Barker factors.”). | 2 | 2003–2006 |
State v. Hill
green
2 sentences2006See Mann, 274 Kan. at 701 ; see also State v. Green, 260 Kan. 471 , 920 P.2d 414 (1996) (15 months between filing of complaint, trial; 1-year delay between arraignment, trial; no presumptive prejudice); State v. Hill, 257 Kan. 774, 779 , 895 P.2d 1238 (1995) (less than 11-month delay not presumptively prejudicial); State v. Goss, 245 Kan. 189, 193 , 777 P.2d 781 (slightly more than 1-year delay not presumptively prejudicial). *128 We have resisted using our previous cases to set a specific time limit. 2006See Mann, 274 Kan. at 701 ; see also State v. Green, 260 Kan. 471 , 920 P.2d 414 (1996) (15 months between filing of complaint, trial; 1-year delay between arraignment, trial; no presumptive prejudice); State v. Hill, 257 Kan. 774, 779 , 895 P.2d 1238 (1995) (less than 11-month delay not presumptively prejudicial); State v. Goss, 245 Kan. 189, 193 , 777 P.2d 781 (slightly more than 1-year delay not presumptively prejudicial). *128 We have resisted using our previous cases to set a specific time limit. | 2 | 2002–2006 |
State v. Ruff
green
2 sentences2003Unless we find the delay in this case to be presumptively prejudicial, there is no need to inquire further into the other factors in the Barker analysis. 266 Kan. at 32 ; see State v. Smith, 271 Kan. 666, 682 , 24 P.3d 727 (2001). 2003Unless we find the delay in this case to be presumptively prejudicial, there is no need to inquire further into the other factors in the Barker analysis. 266 Kan. at 32 ; see State v. Smith, 271 Kan. 666, 682 , 24 P.3d 727 (2001). | 2 | 2002–2003 |
State v. Hunt
green
2 sentences1985E.g., State v. Calderon, 233 Kan. 87, 94 , 661 P.2d 781 (1983); State v. Hunt, 8 Kan. 1985E.g., State v. Calderon, 233 Kan. 87, 94 , 661 P.2d 781 (1983); State v. Hunt, 8 Kan. | 2 | 1983–1985 |
State v. Calderon
green
2 sentences1985E.g., State v. Calderon, 233 Kan. 87, 94 , 661 P.2d 781 (1983); State v. Hunt, 8 Kan. 1985E.g., State v. Calderon, 233 Kan. 87, 94 , 661 P.2d 781 (1983); State v. Hunt, 8 Kan. | 2 | 1983–1985 |
Doggett v. United States
green
2 sentences2026The length of the delay When reviewing the length of the delay, we first determine "whether the relevant interval [between the filing of charges and trial] 'has crossed the threshold dividing ordinary from presumptively prejudicial delay.'" Cherry, 320 Kan. at 800 (citing Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651-52 , 112 S. Ct. 2686 , 120 L. 2026The length of the delay When reviewing the length of the delay, we first determine "whether the relevant interval [between the filing of charges and trial] 'has crossed the threshold dividing ordinary from presumptively prejudicial delay.'" Cherry, 320 Kan. at 800 (citing Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651-52 , 112 S. Ct. 2686 , 120 L. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
United States v. Loud Hawk
green
2 sentences2026The reason for the delay The second factor is known as the "'flag all litigants seek to capture.'" Cherry, 320 Kan. at 801 (quoting United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 315 , 106 S. Ct. 648 , 88 L. 2026The reason for the delay The second factor is known as the "'flag all litigants seek to capture.'" Cherry, 320 Kan. at 801 (quoting United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 315 , 106 S. Ct. 648 , 88 L. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State v. McDonald
green
1 sentence2024Owens, 310 Kan. at 869; State v. McDonald, 62 Kan. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Moncla
green
2 sentences2024The State points to State v. Moncla, 269 Kan. 61, 65 , 4 P.3d 618 (2000), where the Kansas Supreme Court found the district court's approach impeded appellate review because it did not state its findings or conclusions of law. 2024The State points to State v. Moncla, 269 Kan. 61, 65 , 4 P.3d 618 (2000), where the Kansas Supreme Court found the district court's approach impeded appellate review because it did not state its findings or conclusions of law. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Queen
green
2 sentences2022State v. Queen, 313 Kan. 12 , 16, 482 P.3d 1117 (2021) ("[Defendant] has not argued . . . that he could meet his burden to establish any of [the Barker] factors".). 2022State v. Queen, 313 Kan. 12 , 16, 482 P.3d 1117 (2021) ("[Defendant] has not argued . . . that he could meet his burden to establish any of [the Barker] factors".). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Taylor
green
2 sentences2022The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution grants every defendant the "right to a speedy and public trial." Similarly, section 10 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights guarantees Kansas defendants "[i]n all prosecutions . . . a speedy public trial by an impartial jury." See Owens, 310 Kan. at 869. "'The constitutional protection of a speedy trial attaches when one becomes accused and the criminal prosecution begins, usually by either an indictment, an information, or an arrest, whichever first occurs.' State v. Taylor, 3 Kan. 2022The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution grants every defendant the "right to a speedy and public trial." Similarly, section 10 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights guarantees Kansas defendants "[i]n all prosecutions . . . a speedy public trial by an impartial jury." See Owens, 310 Kan. at 869. "'The constitutional protection of a speedy trial attaches when one becomes accused and the criminal prosecution begins, usually by either an indictment, an information, or an arrest, whichever first occurs.' State v. Taylor, 3 Kan. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Vaughn
green
2 sentences2020Vaughn, 254 Kan. at 195-96 . 2020Vaughn, 254 Kan. at 195-96 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Rizal
green
2 sentences2020And "it is not our job to engage in fact-finding." State v. Rizal, 310 Kan. 199 , 204, 445 P.3d 734 (2019). 2020And "it is not our job to engage in fact-finding." State v. Rizal, 310 Kan. 199 , 204, 445 P.3d 734 (2019). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Bloom
green
2 sentences2019The State in this case largely blurs the distinction between the first and second Barker factors, suggesting this court did so in 11 State v. Davis, 277 Kan. 309 , 85 P.3d 1164 (2004), State v. Bloom, 273 Kan. 291 , 44 P.3d 305 (2002), and State v. Smallwood, 264 Kan. 69 , 955 P.2d 1209 (1998). 2019The State in this case largely blurs the distinction between the first and second Barker factors, suggesting this court did so in 11 State v. Davis, 277 Kan. 309 , 85 P.3d 1164 (2004), State v. Bloom, 273 Kan. 291 , 44 P.3d 305 (2002), and State v. Smallwood, 264 Kan. 69 , 955 P.2d 1209 (1998). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Smallwood
green
2 sentences2019The State in this case largely blurs the distinction between the first and second Barker factors, suggesting this court did so in 11 State v. Davis, 277 Kan. 309 , 85 P.3d 1164 (2004), State v. Bloom, 273 Kan. 291 , 44 P.3d 305 (2002), and State v. Smallwood, 264 Kan. 69 , 955 P.2d 1209 (1998). 2019The State in this case largely blurs the distinction between the first and second Barker factors, suggesting this court did so in 11 State v. Davis, 277 Kan. 309 , 85 P.3d 1164 (2004), State v. Bloom, 273 Kan. 291 , 44 P.3d 305 (2002), and State v. Smallwood, 264 Kan. 69 , 955 P.2d 1209 (1998). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| State v. Mossman green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| State v. Porter green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| People v. Crane green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| State v. Selvage green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| In Re the Care & Treatment of Ellison green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Lamb green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| People v. Litmon green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| State v. Bussart-Savaloja green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| United States v. William John Yehling green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| State v. Galloway green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.