Barker factors in Maine

2023See supra ¶ 3. 26 prejudicial applying the Barker test), with State v. Willoughby, 507 A.2d 1060, 1065 (Me. 1986) (concluding that a fourteen-month delay was sufficient to trigger review under Barker). [¶43] Analyzing this factor further, it is relevant that the charges against Winchester did not involve complex matters.

2023See supra ¶ 3. 26 prejudicial applying the Barker test), with State v. Willoughby, 507 A.2d 1060, 1065 (Me. 1986) (concluding that a fourteen-month delay was sufficient to trigger review under Barker). [¶43] Analyzing this factor further, it is relevant that the charges against Winchester did not involve complex matters.

2012State v. Murphy, 496 A.2d 623, 627 (Me.1985). [¶ 12] In denying the motion to dismiss, the trial court determined that the length of delay was sufficient to create a presumption of prejudice, and therefore analyzed the case using the four Barker factors.

1993The Barker test is a “ ‘delicate balancing test that takes into account all of the circumstances of the case at hand.’ ” Id. (quoting State v. Murphy, 496 A.2d 623, 627 (Me.1985)).

1985A. Length of the Delay We have held that “[t]he Barker analysis ... need be undertaken only when the length of delay is so presumptively prejudicial as to warrant consideration of the three remaining factors.” State v. Dudley, 433 A.2d 711, 713 (Me.1981).

1981State v. Dudley, Me., 433 A.2d 711 at 713 (1981).

1992Mindful of the fact that “these factors have no talismanic qualities,” Barker, 407 U.S. at 533 , 92 S.Ct. at 2193 ; see also Beauchene, 541 A.2d at 915 , but rather are part of a sensitive and delicate ad hoc balancing, we conclude from a full *864 Barker analysis that Joubert’s right to a speedy trial was not violated.

1992Mindful of the fact that “these factors have no talismanic qualities,” Barker, 407 U.S. at 533 , 92 S.Ct. at 2193 ; see also Beauchene, 541 A.2d at 915 , but rather are part of a sensitive and delicate ad hoc balancing, we conclude from a full *864 Barker analysis that Joubert’s right to a speedy trial was not violated.

1993The Barker test is a “ ‘delicate balancing test that takes into account all of the circumstances of the case at hand.’ ” Id. (quoting State v. Murphy, 496 A.2d 623, 627 (Me.1985)).

1993The Barker test is a “ ‘delicate balancing test that takes into account all of the circumstances of the case at hand.’ ” Id. (quoting State v. Murphy, 496 A.2d 623, 627 (Me.1985)).

2023Compare State v. Kopelow, 126 Me. 384, 386 , 138 A. 625 (1927) (“If [the 13 See, e.g., State v. Gutierrez-Fuentes, 508 P.3d 378 , 383 (Kan. 2022) (“[I]n terms of a defendant’s constitutional speedy trial right, neither the United States nor the Kansas Constitutions impose specific time requirements for bringing a criminal defendant to trial, which is why courts utilize the constitutional balancing test of the Barker factors.”); Glover v. State, 792 A.2d 1160, 1166 (Md. 2002) (“We consistently have applied the Barker factors when considering alleged violations of both the Sixth Amendment of the

2023Compare State v. Kopelow, 126 Me. 384, 386 , 138 A. 625 (1927) (“If [the 13 See, e.g., State v. Gutierrez-Fuentes, 508 P.3d 378 , 383 (Kan. 2022) (“[I]n terms of a defendant’s constitutional speedy trial right, neither the United States nor the Kansas Constitutions impose specific time requirements for bringing a criminal defendant to trial, which is why courts utilize the constitutional balancing test of the Barker factors.”); Glover v. State, 792 A.2d 1160, 1166 (Md. 2002) (“We consistently have applied the Barker factors when considering alleged violations of both the Sixth Amendment of the

2023See, e.g., State v. Little, 435 A.2d 517, 521 (N.H. 1981). 22 accused] does not make a demand for trial, he will not be in a position to demand a discharge because of delay in prosecution.”), with Barker, 407 U.S. at 528 (“We reject . . . the rule that a defendant who fails to demand a speedy trial forever waives his right.”).

2023See, e.g., State v. Little, 435 A.2d 517, 521 (N.H. 1981). 22 accused] does not make a demand for trial, he will not be in a position to demand a discharge because of delay in prosecution.”), with Barker, 407 U.S. at 528 (“We reject . . . the rule that a defendant who fails to demand a speedy trial forever waives his right.”).

2023Compare State v. Kopelow, 126 Me. 384, 386 , 138 A. 625 (1927) (“If [the 13 See, e.g., State v. Gutierrez-Fuentes, 508 P.3d 378 , 383 (Kan. 2022) (“[I]n terms of a defendant’s constitutional speedy trial right, neither the United States nor the Kansas Constitutions impose specific time requirements for bringing a criminal defendant to trial, which is why courts utilize the constitutional balancing test of the Barker factors.”); Glover v. State, 792 A.2d 1160, 1166 (Md. 2002) (“We consistently have applied the Barker factors when considering alleged violations of both the Sixth Amendment of the

2023Compare State v. Kopelow, 126 Me. 384, 386 , 138 A. 625 (1927) (“If [the 13 See, e.g., State v. Gutierrez-Fuentes, 508 P.3d 378 , 383 (Kan. 2022) (“[I]n terms of a defendant’s constitutional speedy trial right, neither the United States nor the Kansas Constitutions impose specific time requirements for bringing a criminal defendant to trial, which is why courts utilize the constitutional balancing test of the Barker factors.”); Glover v. State, 792 A.2d 1160, 1166 (Md. 2002) (“We consistently have applied the Barker factors when considering alleged violations of both the Sixth Amendment of the

2023Compare State v. Kopelow, 126 Me. 384, 386 , 138 A. 625 (1927) (“If [the 13 See, e.g., State v. Gutierrez-Fuentes, 508 P.3d 378 , 383 (Kan. 2022) (“[I]n terms of a defendant’s constitutional speedy trial right, neither the United States nor the Kansas Constitutions impose specific time requirements for bringing a criminal defendant to trial, which is why courts utilize the constitutional balancing test of the Barker factors.”); Glover v. State, 792 A.2d 1160, 1166 (Md. 2002) (“We consistently have applied the Barker factors when considering alleged violations of both the Sixth Amendment of the

2023Compare State v. Kopelow, 126 Me. 384, 386 , 138 A. 625 (1927) (“If [the 13 See, e.g., State v. Gutierrez-Fuentes, 508 P.3d 378 , 383 (Kan. 2022) (“[I]n terms of a defendant’s constitutional speedy trial right, neither the United States nor the Kansas Constitutions impose specific time requirements for bringing a criminal defendant to trial, which is why courts utilize the constitutional balancing test of the Barker factors.”); Glover v. State, 792 A.2d 1160, 1166 (Md. 2002) (“We consistently have applied the Barker factors when considering alleged violations of both the Sixth Amendment of the

2023Compare State v. Kopelow, 126 Me. 384, 386 , 138 A. 625 (1927) (“If [the 13 See, e.g., State v. Gutierrez-Fuentes, 508 P.3d 378 , 383 (Kan. 2022) (“[I]n terms of a defendant’s constitutional speedy trial right, neither the United States nor the Kansas Constitutions impose specific time requirements for bringing a criminal defendant to trial, which is why courts utilize the constitutional balancing test of the Barker factors.”); Glover v. State, 792 A.2d 1160, 1166 (Md. 2002) (“We consistently have applied the Barker factors when considering alleged violations of both the Sixth Amendment of the

2023Compare State v. Kopelow, 126 Me. 384, 386 , 138 A. 625 (1927) (“If [the 13 See, e.g., State v. Gutierrez-Fuentes, 508 P.3d 378 , 383 (Kan. 2022) (“[I]n terms of a defendant’s constitutional speedy trial right, neither the United States nor the Kansas Constitutions impose specific time requirements for bringing a criminal defendant to trial, which is why courts utilize the constitutional balancing test of the Barker factors.”); Glover v. State, 792 A.2d 1160, 1166 (Md. 2002) (“We consistently have applied the Barker factors when considering alleged violations of both the Sixth Amendment of the

2023Compare State v. Kopelow, 126 Me. 384, 386 , 138 A. 625 (1927) (“If [the 13 See, e.g., State v. Gutierrez-Fuentes, 508 P.3d 378 , 383 (Kan. 2022) (“[I]n terms of a defendant’s constitutional speedy trial right, neither the United States nor the Kansas Constitutions impose specific time requirements for bringing a criminal defendant to trial, which is why courts utilize the constitutional balancing test of the Barker factors.”); Glover v. State, 792 A.2d 1160, 1166 (Md. 2002) (“We consistently have applied the Barker factors when considering alleged violations of both the Sixth Amendment of the

2023Compare State v. Kopelow, 126 Me. 384, 386 , 138 A. 625 (1927) (“If [the 13 See, e.g., State v. Gutierrez-Fuentes, 508 P.3d 378 , 383 (Kan. 2022) (“[I]n terms of a defendant’s constitutional speedy trial right, neither the United States nor the Kansas Constitutions impose specific time requirements for bringing a criminal defendant to trial, which is why courts utilize the constitutional balancing test of the Barker factors.”); Glover v. State, 792 A.2d 1160, 1166 (Md. 2002) (“We consistently have applied the Barker factors when considering alleged violations of both the Sixth Amendment of the

2023Compare State v. Kopelow, 126 Me. 384, 386 , 138 A. 625 (1927) (“If [the 13 See, e.g., State v. Gutierrez-Fuentes, 508 P.3d 378 , 383 (Kan. 2022) (“[I]n terms of a defendant’s constitutional speedy trial right, neither the United States nor the Kansas Constitutions impose specific time requirements for bringing a criminal defendant to trial, which is why courts utilize the constitutional balancing test of the Barker factors.”); Glover v. State, 792 A.2d 1160, 1166 (Md. 2002) (“We consistently have applied the Barker factors when considering alleged violations of both the Sixth Amendment of the

2023Compare State v. Kopelow, 126 Me. 384, 386 , 138 A. 625 (1927) (“If [the 13 See, e.g., State v. Gutierrez-Fuentes, 508 P.3d 378 , 383 (Kan. 2022) (“[I]n terms of a defendant’s constitutional speedy trial right, neither the United States nor the Kansas Constitutions impose specific time requirements for bringing a criminal defendant to trial, which is why courts utilize the constitutional balancing test of the Barker factors.”); Glover v. State, 792 A.2d 1160, 1166 (Md. 2002) (“We consistently have applied the Barker factors when considering alleged violations of both the Sixth Amendment of the

1992See State v. Carisio, 552 A.2d at 26 (16-month delay triggers presumption of prejudice); State v. Willoughby, 507 A.2d 1060, 1065 (Me.1986) (14-month delay presumptively prejudicial).

1992See State v. Carisio, 552 A.2d at 26 (16-month delay triggers presumption of prejudice); State v. Willoughby, 507 A.2d 1060, 1065 (Me.1986) (14-month delay presumptively prejudicial).

1992Mindful of the fact that “these factors have no talismanic qualities,” Barker, 407 U.S. at 533 , 92 S.Ct. at 2193 ; see also Beauchene, 541 A.2d at 915 , but rather are part of a sensitive and delicate ad hoc balancing, we conclude from a full *864 Barker analysis that Joubert’s right to a speedy trial was not violated.

1992Mindful of the fact that “these factors have no talismanic qualities,” Barker, 407 U.S. at 533 , 92 S.Ct. at 2193 ; see also Beauchene, 541 A.2d at 915 , but rather are part of a sensitive and delicate ad hoc balancing, we conclude from a full *864 Barker analysis that Joubert’s right to a speedy trial was not violated.

1986See State v. Cadman, 476 A.2d at 1151.

1985While that length of time is not unusually egregious, see State v. Smith, 400 A.2d at 752 (25-month delay), and cases cited therein, here, as in Smith , we find that it does generate a presumption of sufficient prejudice to necessitate the Barker analysis.

1985While that length of time is not unusually egregious, see State v. Smith, 400 A.2d at 752 (25-month delay), and cases cited therein, here, as in Smith , we find that it does generate a presumption of sufficient prejudice to necessitate the Barker analysis.