Barker factors in North Carolina

2025Whether the length of the delay warrants a full Barker analysis is fact-specific and “dependent upon the peculiar circumstances of the case,” Barker, 407 U.S. at 530–31; the determination of which is “within the sound discretion of the trial court,” State v. Pippin, 72 N.C.

2025Whether the length of the delay warrants a full Barker analysis is fact-specific and “dependent upon the peculiar circumstances of the case,” Barker, 407 U.S. at 530–31; the determination of which is “within the sound discretion of the trial court,” State v. Pippin, 72 N.C.

2025Farook, 381 N.C. at 178-79, 871 S.E.2d at 746 (citations omitted); e.g., State v. Webster, 337 N.C. 674, 679 , 447 S.E.2d 349, 351 (1994) (delay of sixteen months triggered examination of other Barker factors). - 12 - STATE V.

2025Farook, 381 N.C. at 178-79, 871 S.E.2d at 746 (citations omitted); e.g., State v. Webster, 337 N.C. 674, 679 , 447 S.E.2d 349, 351 (1994) (delay of sixteen months triggered examination of other Barker factors). - 12 - STATE V.

2022In other words, a proper Barker inquiry merely proceeds to analysis of the remaining factors following a post- accusation delay of more than one year. ¶ 83 As to the second factor—the reason for delay—this Court has consistently held that a “defendant has the burden of showing that the delay was caused by the neglect or willfulness of the prosecution.” Farmer, 376 N.C. at 415, 852 S.E.2d at 341 (quoting State v. Spivey, 357 N.C. 114, 119 , 579 S.E.2d 251, 255 (2003)); see also Webster, 337 N.C. at 679 , 447 S.E.2d at 351 ; State v. McKoy, 294 N.C. 134, 141 , 240 S.E.2d 383, 388 (1978) (“Thus t

2022In other words, a proper Barker inquiry merely proceeds to analysis of the remaining factors following a post- accusation delay of more than one year. ¶ 83 As to the second factor—the reason for delay—this Court has consistently held that a “defendant has the burden of showing that the delay was caused by the neglect or willfulness of the prosecution.” Farmer, 376 N.C. at 415, 852 S.E.2d at 341 (quoting State v. Spivey, 357 N.C. 114, 119 , 579 S.E.2d 251, 255 (2003)); see also Webster, 337 N.C. at 679 , 447 S.E.2d at 351 ; State v. McKoy, 294 N.C. 134, 141 , 240 S.E.2d 383, 388 (1978) (“Thus t

2024See also State v. Grooms, 353 N.C. 50, 62 (2000) (recognizing that we employ the Barker analysis in reviewing speedy trial motions under the North Carolina constitution).

2024See also State v. Grooms, 353 N.C. 50, 62 (2000) (recognizing that we employ the Barker analysis in reviewing speedy trial motions under the North Carolina constitution).

2026However, a post-accusation delay of one year “marks the point at which courts deem the delay unreasonable enough to trigger the Barker inquiry.” Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 , 652 n.1 (1992).

2026However, a post-accusation delay of one year “marks the point at which courts deem the delay unreasonable enough to trigger the Barker inquiry.” Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 , 652 n.1 (1992).

2022Id. “[A]lmost nine years elapsed between the time the State indicted Defendant in 2004 and the time of the June 2013 hearing on his motion to dismiss [based upon a speedy trial violation.]” Id. at 401 , 777 S.E.2d at 84 . ¶ 54 The State asserts the Court in Carvalho did not discuss in great detail how the issue of this nine-year delay impacts the Barker analysis.

2022Id. “[A]lmost nine years elapsed between the time the State indicted Defendant in 2004 and the time of the June 2013 hearing on his motion to dismiss [based upon a speedy trial violation.]” Id. at 401 , 777 S.E.2d at 84 . ¶ 54 The State asserts the Court in Carvalho did not discuss in great detail how the issue of this nine-year delay impacts the Barker analysis.

2025The majority relies on State v. Wilkerson, to hold: a trial court errs when making determinations “without considering all of the Barker factors and making appropriate findings.” State v. Wilkerson, 257 N.C.

2025The case returned to this Court which then held the trial court erred in its finding and made it clear that no specific length of time is “per se prejudicial,” but the analysis of this first factor was in favor of the Defendant and therefore “triggers the need for analysis of the remaining three Barker factors.” State v. Wilkerson, 257 N.C.

2021See id. (finding 22-month delay “unusual” and sufficiently lengthy to trigger a Barker analysis); Chaplin, 122 N.C.

2021See id. (finding 22-month delay “unusual” and sufficiently lengthy to trigger a Barker analysis); Chaplin, 122 N.C.

2022In other words, a proper Barker inquiry merely proceeds to analysis of the remaining factors following a post- accusation delay of more than one year. ¶ 83 As to the second factor—the reason for delay—this Court has consistently held that a “defendant has the burden of showing that the delay was caused by the neglect or willfulness of the prosecution.” Farmer, 376 N.C. at 415, 852 S.E.2d at 341 (quoting State v. Spivey, 357 N.C. 114, 119 , 579 S.E.2d 251, 255 (2003)); see also Webster, 337 N.C. at 679 , 447 S.E.2d at 351 ; State v. McKoy, 294 N.C. 134, 141 , 240 S.E.2d 383, 388 (1978) (“Thus t

2022In other words, a proper Barker inquiry merely proceeds to analysis of the remaining factors following a post- accusation delay of more than one year. ¶ 83 As to the second factor—the reason for delay—this Court has consistently held that a “defendant has the burden of showing that the delay was caused by the neglect or willfulness of the prosecution.” Farmer, 376 N.C. at 415, 852 S.E.2d at 341 (quoting State v. Spivey, 357 N.C. 114, 119 , 579 S.E.2d 251, 255 (2003)); see also Webster, 337 N.C. at 679 , 447 S.E.2d at 351 ; State v. McKoy, 294 N.C. 134, 141 , 240 S.E.2d 383, 388 (1978) (“Thus t

2022AMBRIZ 2022-NCCOA-711 Opinion of the Court then determined the nine-year “delay clearly passes the demarcation into presumptively prejudicial territory and triggers the Barker analysis.” Id. at 401 , 777 S.E.2d at 84 (citing Flowers, 347 N.C. at 27 , 489 S.E.2d at 406 ).

2022AMBRIZ 2022-NCCOA-711 Opinion of the Court then determined the nine-year “delay clearly passes the demarcation into presumptively prejudicial territory and triggers the Barker analysis.” Id. at 401 , 777 S.E.2d at 84 (citing Flowers, 347 N.C. at 27 , 489 S.E.2d at 406 ).

2025Accordingly, we held “[i]n order to conclude there has been a Sixth Amendment violation of a defendant’s right to a speedy trial, the trial court must examine and consider all the Barker factors listed above.” Id. at 618 , 711 S.E.2d at 449 (citation omitted).

2025Accordingly, we held “[i]n order to conclude there has been a Sixth Amendment violation of a defendant’s right to a speedy trial, the trial court must examine and consider all the Barker factors listed above.” Id. at 618 , 711 S.E.2d at 449 (citation omitted).

2022App. 387, 392 (1985) (delay of fourteen months prompted consideration of Barker factors); State v. McCoy, 303 N.C. 1, 12 (1981) (delay of eleven months was not presumptively prejudicial for a murder case).

2022App. 387, 392 (1985) (delay of fourteen months prompted consideration of Barker factors); State v. McCoy, 303 N.C. 1, 12 (1981) (delay of eleven months was not presumptively prejudicial for a murder case).

2022This ensures that “[a] defendant who has himself caused the delay, or acquiesced in it, will not be allowed to convert the guarantee [of a speedy trial], designed for his protection, into a vehicle to escape justice.” State v. Johnson, 275 N.C. 264, 269 , 167 S.E.2d 274, 278 (1969). ¶ 84 “Only after the defendant has carried his burden of proof by offering prima facie evidence showing that the delay was caused by the neglect or willfulness of the prosecution must the State offer evidence fully explaining the reasons for the delay STATE V.

2022This ensures that “[a] defendant who has himself caused the delay, or acquiesced in it, will not be allowed to convert the guarantee [of a speedy trial], designed for his protection, into a vehicle to escape justice.” State v. Johnson, 275 N.C. 264, 269 , 167 S.E.2d 274, 278 (1969). ¶ 84 “Only after the defendant has carried his burden of proof by offering prima facie evidence showing that the delay was caused by the neglect or willfulness of the prosecution must the State offer evidence fully explaining the reasons for the delay STATE V.

2021See id. (finding 22-month delay “unusual” and sufficiently lengthy to trigger a Barker analysis); Chaplin, 122 N.C.

2021See id. (finding 22-month delay “unusual” and sufficiently lengthy to trigger a Barker analysis); Chaplin, 122 N.C.

2006See, e.g., State v. Spivey, 357 N.C. 114, 118 , 579 S.E.2d 251, 254 (2003); State v. Grooms, 353 N.C. 50, 62 , 540 S.E.2d 713, 721 (2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 838 , 122 S.Ct. 93 , 151 L.Ed.2d 54 (2001); State v. Jones, 310 N.C. 716, 721 , 314 S.E.2d 529, 532-33 (1984); State v. O'Kelly, 285 N.C. 368, 371 , 204 S.E.2d 672, 674 (1974).

2006See, e.g., State v. Spivey, 357 N.C. 114, 118 , 579 S.E.2d 251, 254 (2003); State v. Grooms, 353 N.C. 50, 62 , 540 S.E.2d 713, 721 (2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 838 , 122 S.Ct. 93 , 151 L.Ed.2d 54 (2001); State v. Jones, 310 N.C. 716, 721 , 314 S.E.2d 529, 532-33 (1984); State v. O'Kelly, 285 N.C. 368, 371 , 204 S.E.2d 672, 674 (1974).

2025Whether the length of the delay warrants a full Barker analysis is fact-specific and “dependent upon the peculiar circumstances of the case,” Barker, 407 U.S. at 530–31; the determination of which is “within the sound discretion of the trial court,” State v. Pippin, 72 N.C.

2025Whether the length of the delay warrants a full Barker analysis is fact-specific and “dependent upon the peculiar circumstances of the case,” Barker, 407 U.S. at 530–31; the determination of which is “within the sound discretion of the trial court,” State v. Pippin, 72 N.C.

2018These Barker factors include: "(1) the length of delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant's assertion of his right to a speedy trial, and (4) prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay." Id . (quoting State v. Groves , 324 N.C. 360 , 365, 378 S.E.2d 763 , 767 (1989) ).

2018These Barker factors include: "(1) the length of delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant's assertion of his right to a speedy trial, and (4) prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay." Id . (quoting State v. Groves , 324 N.C. 360 , 365, 378 S.E.2d 763 , 767 (1989) ).

2015See State v. Flowers, 347 N.C. 1 , 27, 489 S.E.2d 391 , 406 (1997) (explaining "presumptive prejudice does not necessarily indicate a statistical probability of prejudice; it simply marks the point at which courts deem the delay unreasonable enough to trigger the Barker enquiry" (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1135 , 118 S.Ct. 1094 , 140 L.Ed.2d 150 (1998) ; see, e.g., Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652 , 112 S.Ct. at 2691 , 120 L.Ed.2d at 528 (calling an eight-and-one-half-year-long delay "extraordinary").

2015See State v. Flowers, 347 N.C. 1 , 27, 489 S.E.2d 391 , 406 (1997) (explaining "presumptive prejudice does not necessarily indicate a statistical probability of prejudice; it simply marks the point at which courts deem the delay unreasonable enough to trigger the Barker enquiry" (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1135 , 118 S.Ct. 1094 , 140 L.Ed.2d 150 (1998) ; see, e.g., Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652 , 112 S.Ct. at 2691 , 120 L.Ed.2d at 528 (calling an eight-and-one-half-year-long delay "extraordinary").

2015See State v. Flowers, 347 N.C. 1 , 27, 489 S.E.2d 391 , 406 (1997) (explaining "presumptive prejudice does not necessarily indicate a statistical probability of prejudice; it simply marks the point at which courts deem the delay unreasonable enough to trigger the Barker enquiry" (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1135 , 118 S.Ct. 1094 , 140 L.Ed.2d 150 (1998) ; see, e.g., Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652 , 112 S.Ct. at 2691 , 120 L.Ed.2d at 528 (calling an eight-and-one-half-year-long delay "extraordinary").

2015See State v. Flowers, 347 N.C. 1 , 27, 489 S.E.2d 391 , 406 (1997) (explaining "presumptive prejudice does not necessarily indicate a statistical probability of prejudice; it simply marks the point at which courts deem the delay unreasonable enough to trigger the Barker enquiry" (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1135 , 118 S.Ct. 1094 , 140 L.Ed.2d 150 (1998) ; see, e.g., Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652 , 112 S.Ct. at 2691 , 120 L.Ed.2d at 528 (calling an eight-and-one-half-year-long delay "extraordinary").

2026Trial courts are required to provide written findings of fact and conclusions of law when the allegations in the motion are not “conjectural and conclusory [in] nature[.]” State v. Dietz, 289 N.C. 488, 495 (1976).

2026See State v. Sheridan, 263 N.C.

2026See State v. Sheridan, 263 N.C.

2025Both the law of North Carolina and the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution “guarantee those persons formally accused of crime the right to a speedy trial.” State v. Avery, 302 N.C. 517, 521 , 276 S.E.2d 699, 702 (1981) (citations omitted).

2025Both the law of North Carolina and the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution “guarantee those persons formally accused of crime the right to a speedy trial.” State v. Avery, 302 N.C. 517, 521 , 276 S.E.2d 699, 702 (1981) (citations omitted).

2025The Barker factors require analysis of: ‘“(1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay. (3) the defendant’s assertion of the right to a speedy [appeal], and (4) prejudice resulting from the delay.”’ State v. Webster, 337 N.C. 674, 678 , 447 S.E.2d 349, 351 (1994) (quoting State v. Willis, 332 N.C. 151, 164 , 420 S.E.2d 158, 163 (1992)).

2025The Barker factors require analysis of: ‘“(1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay. (3) the defendant’s assertion of the right to a speedy [appeal], and (4) prejudice resulting from the delay.”’ State v. Webster, 337 N.C. 674, 678 , 447 S.E.2d 349, 351 (1994) (quoting State v. Willis, 332 N.C. 151, 164 , 420 S.E.2d 158, 163 (1992)).