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28 Delaware opinions name it 3 courts 1987–2026 14 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Delaware courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Barker v. Wingogreen2 sentences2026Middlebrook v. State, 802 A.2d 268 (Del. 2002); Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (Defendant does not address all four of the Barker factors). 2 the denial of traditional Sixth Amendment rights and the other alleging “unnecessary delay” under Criminal Rule 48(b) of the various trial courts.? 2026Middlebrook v. State, 802 A.2d 268 (Del. 2002); Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (Defendant does not address all four of the Barker factors). 2 the denial of traditional Sixth Amendment rights and the other alleging “unnecessary delay” under Criminal Rule 48(b) of the various trial courts.? | 11 | 19 |
Middlebrook v. Stategreen2 sentences2026Middlebrook v. State, 802 A.2d 268 (Del. 2002); Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (Defendant does not address all four of the Barker factors). 2 the denial of traditional Sixth Amendment rights and the other alleging “unnecessary delay” under Criminal Rule 48(b) of the various trial courts.? 2026Middlebrook v. State, 802 A.2d 268 (Del. 2002); Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (Defendant does not address all four of the Barker factors). 2 the denial of traditional Sixth Amendment rights and the other alleging “unnecessary delay” under Criminal Rule 48(b) of the various trial courts.? | 11 | 14 |
Johnson v. Stategreen2 sentences2024See Johnson v. State, 305 A.2d 622, 623 (Del. 1973) (adopting the Barker framework for evaluating speedy-trial claims). 36 Johnson, 305 A.2d at 623 (citing Barker). 37 Dabney v. State, 953 A.2d 159, 164 (Del. 2008). 38 McGriff v. State, 2023 WL 600118 , at *3 (Del. 2024See Johnson v. State, 305 A.2d 622, 623 (Del. 1973) (adopting the Barker framework for evaluating speedy-trial claims). 36 Johnson, 305 A.2d at 623 (citing Barker). 37 Dabney v. State, 953 A.2d 159, 164 (Del. 2008). 38 McGriff v. State, 2023 WL 600118 , at *3 (Del. | 10 | 10 |
Cooper v. Stategreen2 sentences2025Due to the almost two- 36 D.I. 33. 37 Id. 38 Cooper v. State, 2011 WL 6039613, at *7 (Del. 2011). 8 year delay in this matter, this factor weighs in favor of Aiken, and this Court will consider the remaining Barker factors. 2025Due to the almost two- 36 D.I. 33. 37 Id. 38 Cooper v. State, 2011 WL 6039613, at *7 (Del. 2011). 8 year delay in this matter, this factor weighs in favor of Aiken, and this Court will consider the remaining Barker factors. | 8 | 8 |
Dabney v. Stategreen2 sentences2026As in Harris v. State, her silence in the matter is weighed against her,”” and the Court finds the third Barker factor weighs '6 Middlebrook, 802 A.2d at 275 . "” Bailey v. State, 521 A.2d 1069, 1082 (Del. 1987). '8 Barker, 407 U.S. at 529 . '9 Harris, 956 A.2d at 1277 (applying the Barker factors in a sentencing case). 20 Middlebrook, 802 A.2d at 271 ; Dabney v. State, 953 A.2d 159, 167-68 (Del. 2008). 21 Barker, 407 U.S. at 529 . 22 Harris, 956 A.2d at 1277 . heavily in favor of the State. . 2026As in Harris v. State, her silence in the matter is weighed against her,”” and the Court finds the third Barker factor weighs '6 Middlebrook, 802 A.2d at 275 . "” Bailey v. State, 521 A.2d 1069, 1082 (Del. 1987). '8 Barker, 407 U.S. at 529 . '9 Harris, 956 A.2d at 1277 (applying the Barker factors in a sentencing case). 20 Middlebrook, 802 A.2d at 271 ; Dabney v. State, 953 A.2d 159, 167-68 (Del. 2008). 21 Barker, 407 U.S. at 529 . 22 Harris, 956 A.2d at 1277 . heavily in favor of the State. . | 5 | 6 |
Bailey v. Stategreen2 sentences2026As in Harris v. State, her silence in the matter is weighed against her,”” and the Court finds the third Barker factor weighs '6 Middlebrook, 802 A.2d at 275 . "” Bailey v. State, 521 A.2d 1069, 1082 (Del. 1987). '8 Barker, 407 U.S. at 529 . '9 Harris, 956 A.2d at 1277 (applying the Barker factors in a sentencing case). 20 Middlebrook, 802 A.2d at 271 ; Dabney v. State, 953 A.2d 159, 167-68 (Del. 2008). 21 Barker, 407 U.S. at 529 . 22 Harris, 956 A.2d at 1277 . heavily in favor of the State. . 2026As in Harris v. State, her silence in the matter is weighed against her,”” and the Court finds the third Barker factor weighs '6 Middlebrook, 802 A.2d at 275 . "” Bailey v. State, 521 A.2d 1069, 1082 (Del. 1987). '8 Barker, 407 U.S. at 529 . '9 Harris, 956 A.2d at 1277 (applying the Barker factors in a sentencing case). 20 Middlebrook, 802 A.2d at 271 ; Dabney v. State, 953 A.2d 159, 167-68 (Del. 2008). 21 Barker, 407 U.S. at 529 . 22 Harris, 956 A.2d at 1277 . heavily in favor of the State. . | 3 | 3 |
Page v. Stategreen2 sentences2009This Court adopted the Barker analysis in Johnson v. State, 305 A.2d 622, 623 (Del. 1973). [8] Barker, 407 U.S. at 530-31 ; accord Dabney, 953 A.2d at 163; Page v. State, 934 A.2d 891, 896 (Del. 2007); Middlebrook v. State, 802 A.2d 268, 273 (Del. 2002); Skinner v. State, 575 A.2d 1108, 1115 (Del. 1990); Johnson, 305 A.2d at 623 . 2009This Court adopted the Barker analysis in Johnson v. State, 305 A.2d 622, 623 (Del. 1973). [8] Barker, 407 U.S. at 530-31 ; accord Dabney, 953 A.2d at 163; Page v. State, 934 A.2d 891, 896 (Del. 2007); Middlebrook v. State, 802 A.2d 268, 273 (Del. 2002); Skinner v. State, 575 A.2d 1108, 1115 (Del. 1990); Johnson, 305 A.2d at 623 . | 3 | 3 |
Harris v. Stategreen2 sentences2026As in Harris v. State, her silence in the matter is weighed against her,”” and the Court finds the third Barker factor weighs '6 Middlebrook, 802 A.2d at 275 . "” Bailey v. State, 521 A.2d 1069, 1082 (Del. 1987). '8 Barker, 407 U.S. at 529 . '9 Harris, 956 A.2d at 1277 (applying the Barker factors in a sentencing case). 20 Middlebrook, 802 A.2d at 271 ; Dabney v. State, 953 A.2d 159, 167-68 (Del. 2008). 21 Barker, 407 U.S. at 529 . 22 Harris, 956 A.2d at 1277 . heavily in favor of the State. . 2026As in Harris v. State, her silence in the matter is weighed against her,”” and the Court finds the third Barker factor weighs '6 Middlebrook, 802 A.2d at 275 . "” Bailey v. State, 521 A.2d 1069, 1082 (Del. 1987). '8 Barker, 407 U.S. at 529 . '9 Harris, 956 A.2d at 1277 (applying the Barker factors in a sentencing case). 20 Middlebrook, 802 A.2d at 271 ; Dabney v. State, 953 A.2d 159, 167-68 (Del. 2008). 21 Barker, 407 U.S. at 529 . 22 Harris, 956 A.2d at 1277 . heavily in favor of the State. . | 2 | 2 |
State v. Korotkigreen2 sentences2026The States apply this right through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.’ The Delaware Constitution provides the same rights to criminal defendants under Article I, Section 7.° In Barker, the United States Supreme Court established a totality-of- the-circumstances balancing test for Courts to determine whether a speedy-trial violation has occurred.° Under the Barker test, the Court weighs the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant by considering the following factors: “(1) the length of delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant’s assertion of the right to 2026The States apply this right through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.’ The Delaware Constitution provides the same rights to criminal defendants under Article I, Section 7.° In Barker, the United States Supreme Court established a totality-of- the-circumstances balancing test for Courts to determine whether a speedy-trial violation has occurred.° Under the Barker test, the Court weighs the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant by considering the following factors: “(1) the length of delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant’s assertion of the right to | 2 | 2 |
Hughey v. Stategreen2 sentences2009Barker, 407 U.S. at 533 . [9] Middlebrook, 802 A.2d at 273 (citing U.S. v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971)) [10] 953 A.2d at 164 (quoting Hughey v. State, 522 A.2d 335, 341 (Del. 1987)); accord Barker, 407 U.S. at 530 . [11] Barker, 407 U.S. at 530 ; Marion, 404 U.S. at 320 . [12] Hughey, 522 A.2d 335 (finding ten month delay "was not presumptively prejudicial or sufficient to trigger an inquiry into the remaining three Barker factors"). [13] See Dabney, 953 A.2d at 165 (noting delay in excess of one year between arrest and trial compels review of other factors); Skinner, 575 A.2d at 1116 (no 2009Barker, 407 U.S. at 533 . [9] Middlebrook, 802 A.2d at 273 (citing U.S. v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971)) [10] 953 A.2d at 164 (quoting Hughey v. State, 522 A.2d 335, 341 (Del. 1987)); accord Barker, 407 U.S. at 530 . [11] Barker, 407 U.S. at 530 ; Marion, 404 U.S. at 320 . [12] Hughey, 522 A.2d 335 (finding ten month delay "was not presumptively prejudicial or sufficient to trigger an inquiry into the remaining three Barker factors"). [13] See Dabney, 953 A.2d at 165 (noting delay in excess of one year between arrest and trial compels review of other factors); Skinner, 575 A.2d at 1116 (no | 2 | 2 |
Skinner v. Stategreen2 sentences2009This Court adopted the Barker analysis in Johnson v. State, 305 A.2d 622, 623 (Del. 1973). [8] Barker, 407 U.S. at 530-31 ; accord Dabney, 953 A.2d at 163; Page v. State, 934 A.2d 891, 896 (Del. 2007); Middlebrook v. State, 802 A.2d 268, 273 (Del. 2002); Skinner v. State, 575 A.2d 1108, 1115 (Del. 1990); Johnson, 305 A.2d at 623 . 2009This Court adopted the Barker analysis in Johnson v. State, 305 A.2d 622, 623 (Del. 1973). [8] Barker, 407 U.S. at 530-31 ; accord Dabney, 953 A.2d at 163; Page v. State, 934 A.2d 891, 896 (Del. 2007); Middlebrook v. State, 802 A.2d 268, 273 (Del. 2002); Skinner v. State, 575 A.2d 1108, 1115 (Del. 1990); Johnson, 305 A.2d at 623 . | 2 | 2 |
Doggett v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2021The Supreme Court of Delaware has held that “[t]he length of the delay is the trigger that necessitates the consideration of the other three Barker factors.”11 Until there is a delay that is presumptively prejudicial, there is no requirement to assess the remaining Barker factors.12 The right to a speedy trial attaches “as soon as the defendant is accused of a crime through arrest or indictment, whichever occurs first.”13 There is no specific delay that automatically violates the right to a speedy trial; rather, this factor will be considered on the peculiar circumstances of the case.14 The Su 2021The Supreme Court of Delaware has held that “[t]he length of the delay is the trigger that necessitates the consideration of the other three Barker factors.”11 Until there is a delay that is presumptively prejudicial, there is no requirement to assess the remaining Barker factors.12 The right to a speedy trial attaches “as soon as the defendant is accused of a crime through arrest or indictment, whichever occurs first.”13 There is no specific delay that automatically violates the right to a speedy trial; rather, this factor will be considered on the peculiar circumstances of the case.14 The Su | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Mariongreen2 sentences2009Barker, 407 U.S. at 533 . [9] Middlebrook, 802 A.2d at 273 (citing U.S. v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971)) [10] 953 A.2d at 164 (quoting Hughey v. State, 522 A.2d 335, 341 (Del. 1987)); accord Barker, 407 U.S. at 530 . [11] Barker, 407 U.S. at 530 ; Marion, 404 U.S. at 320 . [12] Hughey, 522 A.2d 335 (finding ten month delay "was not presumptively prejudicial or sufficient to trigger an inquiry into the remaining three Barker factors"). [13] See Dabney, 953 A.2d at 165 (noting delay in excess of one year between arrest and trial compels review of other factors); Skinner, 575 A.2d at 1116 (no 2009Barker, 407 U.S. at 533 . [9] Middlebrook, 802 A.2d at 273 (citing U.S. v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971)) [10] 953 A.2d at 164 (quoting Hughey v. State, 522 A.2d 335, 341 (Del. 1987)); accord Barker, 407 U.S. at 530 . [11] Barker, 407 U.S. at 530 ; Marion, 404 U.S. at 320 . [12] Hughey, 522 A.2d 335 (finding ten month delay "was not presumptively prejudicial or sufficient to trigger an inquiry into the remaining three Barker factors"). [13] See Dabney, 953 A.2d at 165 (noting delay in excess of one year between arrest and trial compels review of other factors); Skinner, 575 A.2d at 1116 (no | 2 | 2 |
Fensterer v. Stategreen2 sentences2002See also Fensterer v. State, 493 A.2d 959, 965 (Del.1985) (marking this Court's first application of the Barker test), rev'd on other grounds, 474 U.S. 15 , 106 S.Ct. 292 , 88 L.Ed.2d 15 (1985). 18 . 2002See also Fensterer v. State, 493 A.2d 959, 965 (Del.1985) (marking this Court's first application of the Barker test), rev'd on other grounds, 474 U.S. 15 , 106 S.Ct. 292 , 88 L.Ed.2d 15 (1985). 18 . | 2 | 2 |
Pittman v. Stategreen2 sentences2024C. § 2543(a); Pittman v. State, 301 A.2d 509, 512 (Del. 1973). 7 Id. § 2543(c). 8 Id. § 2542(a). 9 Id. 8 (16) To determine whether Kegler’s constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated, we use the four-factor balancing test set forth in Barker v. Wingo.10 The four factors are the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and the prejudice to the defendant.11 The factors are related and no one factor is conclusive.12 (17) A defendant’s right to a speedy trial “attaches as soon as the defendant is accused of a crime through arrest or indictment 2024C. § 2543(a); Pittman v. State, 301 A.2d 509, 512 (Del. 1973). 7 Id. § 2543(c). 8 Id. § 2542(a). 9 Id. 8 (16) To determine whether Kegler’s constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated, we use the four-factor balancing test set forth in Barker v. Wingo.10 The four factors are the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and the prejudice to the defendant.11 The factors are related and no one factor is conclusive.12 (17) A defendant’s right to a speedy trial “attaches as soon as the defendant is accused of a crime through arrest or indictment | 1 | 1 |
Wyoming v. Houghtongreen2 sentences2020See also Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999) (holding that police offers with probable cause to search a car for contraband may inspect passengers’ belongings found in the car that are capable of concealing the object of the search); California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991) (holding that the Fourth Amendment does not require the police to obtain a warrant to open a sack in a movable vehicle because they lack probable cause to search the entire car). 23 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (adopted by this Court in Johnson v. State, 305 A.2d 622, 623 (Del. 1973)). 24 Id. at 530. 25 Middlebrook v. State, 2020See also Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999) (holding that police offers with probable cause to search a car for contraband may inspect passengers’ belongings found in the car that are capable of concealing the object of the search); California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991) (holding that the Fourth Amendment does not require the police to obtain a warrant to open a sack in a movable vehicle because they lack probable cause to search the entire car). 23 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (adopted by this Court in Johnson v. State, 305 A.2d 622, 623 (Del. 1973)). 24 Id. at 530. 25 Middlebrook v. State, | 1 | 1 |
Weber v. Stategreen2 sentences2020He claims that the delay caused him to lose a key witness and almost caused him to lose two 16 Answering Brief at 22. 17 953 A.2d 159 (Del. 2008). 18 Id. at 165-69 . 19 Weber v. State, 971 A.2d 135, 162 (Del.2009). 12 additional key witnesses, but does not explain who these witnesses were or why they were key. (27) Having considered all of the Barker factors, we conclude that they do not weigh in favor of finding a violation of Benson’s right to a speedy trial. 2020He claims that the delay caused him to lose a key witness and almost caused him to lose two 16 Answering Brief at 22. 17 953 A.2d 159 (Del. 2008). 18 Id. at 165-69 . 19 Weber v. State, 971 A.2d 135, 162 (Del.2009). 12 additional key witnesses, but does not explain who these witnesses were or why they were key. (27) Having considered all of the Barker factors, we conclude that they do not weigh in favor of finding a violation of Benson’s right to a speedy trial. | 1 | 1 |
Klopfer v. North Carolinagreen2 sentences2014VI. 4 Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 222-23 (1967). 5 DEL. 2014VI. 4 Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 222-23 (1967). 5 DEL. | 1 | 1 |
Filimon Castillo Perez v. George E. Sullivan, Warden, and Attorney General, State of New Mexicogreen2 sentences2008Perez v. Sullivan, 793 F.2d 249, 254 (10th Cir.1986). 2008Perez v. Sullivan, 793 F.2d 249, 254 (10th Cir.1986). | 1 | 1 |
Delaware v. Fensterergreen2 sentences2002See also Fensterer v. State, 493 A.2d 959, 965 (Del.1985) (marking this Court's first application of the Barker test), rev'd on other grounds, 474 U.S. 15 , 106 S.Ct. 292 , 88 L.Ed.2d 15 (1985). 18 . 2002See also Fensterer v. State, 493 A.2d 959, 965 (Del.1985) (marking this Court's first application of the Barker test), rev'd on other grounds, 474 U.S. 15 , 106 S.Ct. 292 , 88 L.Ed.2d 15 (1985). 18 . | 1 | 1 |
Irwin v. Cohengreen2 sentences1992See Irwin v. Cohen, 40 Conn.Supp. 259 , 490 A.2d 552, 555 (1985). 1992See Irwin v. Cohen, 40 Conn.Supp. 259 , 490 A.2d 552, 555 (1985). | 1 | 1 |
Tramill v. Stategreen1 sentence1987See also Tramill v. State, Del.Supr., 425 A.2d 142, 143 (1980) (thirteen months not presumptively prejudicial); Beebe, supra (twelve months not presumptively prejudicial). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Delaware. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Lecates v. State
green
2 sentences2025Due to the almost two- 36 D.I. 33. 37 Id. 38 Cooper v. State, 2011 WL 6039613, at *7 (Del. 2011). 8 year delay in this matter, this factor weighs in favor of Aiken, and this Court will consider the remaining Barker factors. 2025Due to the almost two- 36 D.I. 33. 37 Id. 38 Cooper v. State, 2011 WL 6039613, at *7 (Del. 2011). 8 year delay in this matter, this factor weighs in favor of Aiken, and this Court will consider the remaining Barker factors. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
United States v. Quotez Pair
green
2 sentences2024We and other courts have treated this type of delay as a valid reason that also weighs against the defendants (or at least as a neutral reason that favors neither party).”); United States v. Pair, 84 F.4th 577 , 589 (4th Cir. 2023) (analyzing 13 (16) As to the defendant’s assertion of his right to a speedy trial, Sutton’s counsel did not assert a speedy-trial violation, a fact that might be attributable to counsel’s recognition that the Superior Court scheduled the matter within the authority afforded it in light of the judicial emergency. 2024We and other courts have treated this type of delay as a valid reason that also weighs against the defendants (or at least as a neutral reason that favors neither party).”); United States v. Pair, 84 F.4th 577 , 589 (4th Cir. 2023) (analyzing 13 (16) As to the defendant’s assertion of his right to a speedy trial, Sutton’s counsel did not assert a speedy-trial violation, a fact that might be attributable to counsel’s recognition that the Superior Court scheduled the matter within the authority afforded it in light of the judicial emergency. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Brady v. Maryland
green
2 sentences2023To determine if there is a speedy-trial violation, we use the four-factor balancing test set forth in Barker v. Wingo.4 The four factors are the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and the prejudice to the defendant.5 The factors are related and no one factor is conclusive.6 (12) A defendant’s right to a speedy trial “attaches as soon as the defendant is accused of a crime through arrest or indictment whichever occurs first.”7 Unless the length of delay is determined to be “presumptively prejudicial,” it is not necessary to consider the additi 2023To determine if there is a speedy-trial violation, we use the four-factor balancing test set forth in Barker v. Wingo.4 The four factors are the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and the prejudice to the defendant.5 The factors are related and no one factor is conclusive.6 (12) A defendant’s right to a speedy trial “attaches as soon as the defendant is accused of a crime through arrest or indictment whichever occurs first.”7 Unless the length of delay is determined to be “presumptively prejudicial,” it is not necessary to consider the additi | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Michigan v. Long
green
2 sentences2021Second, Mr. Rodriguez contends that the application of the Barker test requires this Court to dismiss Mr. Rodriguez’s case due to a violation of his right to a speedy trial under Article I, Section 7 of the Delaware Constitution and the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 4 Middlebrook v. State, 802 A.2d 268, 270 (Del. 2002) (citing Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 , 103 S. Ct. 3469 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983) (recognizing that state law, if separate and independent from federal law, may provide an adequate and independent ground for a state court's decision and that “[i]f the 2021Second, Mr. Rodriguez contends that the application of the Barker test requires this Court to dismiss Mr. Rodriguez’s case due to a violation of his right to a speedy trial under Article I, Section 7 of the Delaware Constitution and the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 4 Middlebrook v. State, 802 A.2d 268, 270 (Del. 2002) (citing Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 , 103 S. Ct. 3469 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983) (recognizing that state law, if separate and independent from federal law, may provide an adequate and independent ground for a state court's decision and that “[i]f the | 1 | 2021–2021 |
California v. Acevedo
green
2 sentences2020See also Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999) (holding that police offers with probable cause to search a car for contraband may inspect passengers’ belongings found in the car that are capable of concealing the object of the search); California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991) (holding that the Fourth Amendment does not require the police to obtain a warrant to open a sack in a movable vehicle because they lack probable cause to search the entire car). 23 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (adopted by this Court in Johnson v. State, 305 A.2d 622, 623 (Del. 1973)). 24 Id. at 530. 25 Middlebrook v. State, 2020See also Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999) (holding that police offers with probable cause to search a car for contraband may inspect passengers’ belongings found in the car that are capable of concealing the object of the search); California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991) (holding that the Fourth Amendment does not require the police to obtain a warrant to open a sack in a movable vehicle because they lack probable cause to search the entire car). 23 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (adopted by this Court in Johnson v. State, 305 A.2d 622, 623 (Del. 1973)). 24 Id. at 530. 25 Middlebrook v. State, | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Barker v. Huang
green
1 sentence1993Id. at 1352 . | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Barbieri v. News-Journal Company
green
1 sentence1992Invasion of Privacy The tort of invasion of privacy was originally adopted by this Gourt in the case of Barbieri v. News-Journal Co., Del.Supr., 189 A.2d 773 , 774 (1963). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Beebe v. State
green
1 sentence1987See also Tramill v. State, Del.Supr., 425 A.2d 142, 143 (1980) (thirteen months not presumptively prejudicial); Beebe, supra (twelve months not presumptively prejudicial). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.