Barker analysis in Utah

2026Where, as here, “the merits of a claim can easily be resolved in favor of the party asserting that the claim was not preserved, we readily may opt to do so without addressing preservation.” State v. Kitches, 2021 UT App 24, ¶ 28 , 484 P.3d 415 (emphasis omitted). 20240188-CA 4 2026 UT App 45 State v. Aden be tolerated for an ordinary street crime is considerably less than for a serious, complex conspiracy charge.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 531 . ¶9 Here, Aden waited for trial for 1,184 days—a little over three years—while charges were formally pending against him, which is plainly sufficient to trig

2026Where, as here, “the merits of a claim can easily be resolved in favor of the party asserting that the claim was not preserved, we readily may opt to do so without addressing preservation.” State v. Kitches, 2021 UT App 24, ¶ 28 , 484 P.3d 415 (emphasis omitted). 20240188-CA 4 2026 UT App 45 State v. Aden be tolerated for an ordinary street crime is considerably less than for a serious, complex conspiracy charge.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 531 . ¶9 Here, Aden waited for trial for 1,184 days—a little over three years—while charges were formally pending against him, which is plainly sufficient to trig

2025Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652 n.1; Younge, 2013 UT 71, ¶ 18 . __________________________________________________________ 7 The parties agree that the first two Barker factors—the length of and reason for the delay—weigh in Hintze’s favor.

2024This delay clearly exceeds one year and thus qualifies for a further Barker analysis. ¶16 The second part of this inquiry requires us to examine the “extent to which the delay stretches beyond the bare minimum needed to trigger judicial examination of the claim.” Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652 .

2007See State v. Hafen, 598 P.2d 538, 540 (Utah 1979) (adopting the Barker factors); see also State v. Knill, 656 P.2d 1026, 1029 (Utah 1982).

2007See State v. Hafen, 598 P.2d 538, 540 (Utah 1979) (adopting the Barker factors); see also State v. Knill, 656 P.2d 1026, 1029 (Utah 1982).

2025Thus, we disagree with the court of appeals’ view that this factor weighs “quite clearly in Hintze’s favor,” Hintze, 2022 UT App 117, ¶ 42 , and we, like the district court and the dissent, afford it no weight in the overall Barker analysis.

2025Thus, we disagree with the court of appeals’ view that this factor weighs “quite clearly in Hintze’s favor,” Hintze, 2022 UT App 117, ¶ 42 , and we, like the district court and the dissent, afford it no weight in the overall Barker analysis.

2025Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652 n.1; Younge, 2013 UT 71, ¶ 18 . __________________________________________________________ 7 The parties agree that the first two Barker factors—the length of and reason for the delay—weigh in Hintze’s favor.

2022The first part of this double enquiry asks whether the delay was long enough to even trigger a full-blown Barker analysis; indeed, “if the delay is not uncommonly long, the inquiry ends there.” See Younge, 2013 UT 71, ¶ 18 (quotation simplified).

2025See Perez v. Sullivan, 793 F.2d 249, 254 (10th Cir. 1986) (“We note at the outset that the factors set forth in Barker are guidelines, not rigid tests.”). ¶91 Among other things, some Barker factors may be particularly probative in one case but not in another.

2025See id. ¶76 Finally, in United States v. Loud Hawk, the Court noted that the appellate court had given “little weight” to the fourth Barker factor based on “the possibility” that a defense might be impaired due to the loss of witnesses’ memories during the delay.11 474 U.S. 302, 315 (1986) (cleaned up).

2025See id. ¶76 Finally, in United States v. Loud Hawk, the Court noted that the appellate court had given “little weight” to the fourth Barker factor based on “the possibility” that a defense might be impaired due to the loss of witnesses’ memories during the delay.11 474 U.S. 302, 315 (1986) (cleaned up).

2025See id. ¶76 Finally, in United States v. Loud Hawk, the Court noted that the appellate court had given “little weight” to the fourth Barker factor based on “the possibility” that a defense might be impaired due to the loss of witnesses’ memories during the delay.11 474 U.S. 302, 315 (1986) (cleaned up).

2025See id. ¶76 Finally, in United States v. Loud Hawk, the Court noted that the appellate court had given “little weight” to the fourth Barker factor based on “the possibility” that a defense might be impaired due to the loss of witnesses’ memories during the delay.11 474 U.S. 302, 315 (1986) (cleaned up).

2022See, e.g., United States v. Shulick, 18 F.4th 91 , 102 (3d Cir. 2021) (referring to prejudice as “the most important factor in the Barker analysis”); United States v. Lozano, 962 F.3d 773, 781 (4th Cir. 2020) (“Prejudice, while not essential to the establishment of a violation of the right, is a prime issue and a critical factor.” (quotation simplified)); Symdon, 689 F.3d at 752 (“Prejudice is the most important of the four Barker factors.”); State v. Leslie, 708 P.2d 719, 725 (Ariz. 1985) (en banc) (holding that of “these four factors, the length of the delay is the least conclusive and the p

2022See, e.g., United States v. Shulick, 18 F.4th 91 , 102 (3d Cir. 2021) (referring to prejudice as “the most important factor in the Barker analysis”); United States v. Lozano, 962 F.3d 773, 781 (4th Cir. 2020) (“Prejudice, while not essential to the establishment of a violation of the right, is a prime issue and a critical factor.” (quotation simplified)); Symdon, 689 F.3d at 752 (“Prejudice is the most important of the four Barker factors.”); State v. Leslie, 708 P.2d 719, 725 (Ariz. 1985) (en banc) (holding that of “these four factors, the length of the delay is the least conclusive and the p

2022In the absence of such a presumption, the defendant must affirmatively demonstrate prejudice.” (quotation simplified)); United States v. Machado, 886 F.3d 1070, 1081 (11th Cir. 2018) (holding that a “defendant must demonstrate actual prejudice unless each of the first three factors weighs heavily against the government” (quotation simplified)); State v. Flowers, 20200787-CA 56 2022 UT App 117 State v. Hintze 503 A.2d 1172, 1177 (Conn. 1986) (“Thus, an affirmative showing of actual prejudice is not essential to a speedy trial claim when the defendant is able to show that the other three factors

2022Other courts that have looked at it, however, have recognized (persuasively, I think) that this factor turns on whether and when “the government and the court were put on notice that a defendant has asserted his right to a speedy trial.” United States v. Black, 918 F.3d 243, 263 (2d Cir. 2019) (quotation simplified); accord United States v. Battis, 589 F.3d 673, 681 (3d Cir. 2009) (focusing on whether the defendant made “a reasonable assertion of the right so as to put authorities on notice of his Sixth Amendment claim” (quotation simplified)); State v. Buckner, 738 S.E.2d 65, 72 (Ga. 2013) (h

2022Other courts that have looked at it, however, have recognized (persuasively, I think) that this factor turns on whether and when “the government and the court were put on notice that a defendant has asserted his right to a speedy trial.” United States v. Black, 918 F.3d 243, 263 (2d Cir. 2019) (quotation simplified); accord United States v. Battis, 589 F.3d 673, 681 (3d Cir. 2009) (focusing on whether the defendant made “a reasonable assertion of the right so as to put authorities on notice of his Sixth Amendment claim” (quotation simplified)); State v. Buckner, 738 S.E.2d 65, 72 (Ga. 2013) (h

2022In the absence of such a presumption, the defendant must affirmatively demonstrate prejudice.” (quotation simplified)); United States v. Machado, 886 F.3d 1070, 1081 (11th Cir. 2018) (holding that a “defendant must demonstrate actual prejudice unless each of the first three factors weighs heavily against the government” (quotation simplified)); State v. Flowers, 20200787-CA 56 2022 UT App 117 State v. Hintze 503 A.2d 1172, 1177 (Conn. 1986) (“Thus, an affirmative showing of actual prejudice is not essential to a speedy trial claim when the defendant is able to show that the other three factors

2022In the absence of such a presumption, the defendant must affirmatively demonstrate prejudice.” (quotation simplified)); United States v. Machado, 886 F.3d 1070, 1081 (11th Cir. 2018) (holding that a “defendant must demonstrate actual prejudice unless each of the first three factors weighs heavily against the government” (quotation simplified)); State v. Flowers, 20200787-CA 56 2022 UT App 117 State v. Hintze 503 A.2d 1172, 1177 (Conn. 1986) (“Thus, an affirmative showing of actual prejudice is not essential to a speedy trial claim when the defendant is able to show that the other three factors

2022See Barker, 407 U.S. at 532 (listing “oppressive pretrial incarceration” as one of the types of harm commonly associated with delays in bringing a case to trial). 2 ¶60 We recognize, of course, that a defendant’s right to a speedy trial is not violated if his claims of prejudice are “insubstantial, speculative, and premature.” See United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 122 (1966).

2022See Barker, 407 U.S. at 532 (listing “oppressive pretrial incarceration” as one of the types of harm commonly associated with delays in bringing a case to trial). 2 ¶60 We recognize, of course, that a defendant’s right to a speedy trial is not violated if his claims of prejudice are “insubstantial, speculative, and premature.” See United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 122 (1966).

2022See Thompson-Jacobson, 2022 UT App 29, ¶ 23 (stating that the four Barker factors are to be assessed in “light of all the circumstances”).

2022And like the other Barker factors, this factor is analyzed in “light of all the circumstances.” Thompson-Jacobson, 2022 UT App 29, ¶ 23 . 20200787-CA 33 2022 UT App 117 State v. Hintze ¶81 This factor hasn’t received much attention in past Utah appellate decisions.

2022Ct. App. 2021) (“The lack of prejudice to the defendant weighs heavily in applying the Barker analysis.”); Phillips v. State, 227 A.3d 779, 795 (Md.

2022Ct. App. 2021) (“The lack of prejudice to the defendant weighs heavily in applying the Barker analysis.”); Phillips v. State, 227 A.3d 779, 795 (Md.

2022See, e.g., United States v. Shulick, 18 F.4th 91 , 102 (3d Cir. 2021) (referring to prejudice as “the most important factor in the Barker analysis”); United States v. Lozano, 962 F.3d 773, 781 (4th Cir. 2020) (“Prejudice, while not essential to the establishment of a violation of the right, is a prime issue and a critical factor.” (quotation simplified)); Symdon, 689 F.3d at 752 (“Prejudice is the most important of the four Barker factors.”); State v. Leslie, 708 P.2d 719, 725 (Ariz. 1985) (en banc) (holding that of “these four factors, the length of the delay is the least conclusive and the p

2022See, e.g., United States v. Shulick, 18 F.4th 91 , 102 (3d Cir. 2021) (referring to prejudice as “the most important factor in the Barker analysis”); United States v. Lozano, 962 F.3d 773, 781 (4th Cir. 2020) (“Prejudice, while not essential to the establishment of a violation of the right, is a prime issue and a critical factor.” (quotation simplified)); Symdon, 689 F.3d at 752 (“Prejudice is the most important of the four Barker factors.”); State v. Leslie, 708 P.2d 719, 725 (Ariz. 1985) (en banc) (holding that of “these four factors, the length of the delay is the least conclusive and the p

2022See, e.g., United States v. Shulick, 18 F.4th 91 , 102 (3d Cir. 2021) (referring to prejudice as “the most important factor in the Barker analysis”); United States v. Lozano, 962 F.3d 773, 781 (4th Cir. 2020) (“Prejudice, while not essential to the establishment of a violation of the right, is a prime issue and a critical factor.” (quotation simplified)); Symdon, 689 F.3d at 752 (“Prejudice is the most important of the four Barker factors.”); State v. Leslie, 708 P.2d 719, 725 (Ariz. 1985) (en banc) (holding that of “these four factors, the length of the delay is the least conclusive and the p

2022See, e.g., United States v. Shulick, 18 F.4th 91 , 102 (3d Cir. 2021) (referring to prejudice as “the most important factor in the Barker analysis”); United States v. Lozano, 962 F.3d 773, 781 (4th Cir. 2020) (“Prejudice, while not essential to the establishment of a violation of the right, is a prime issue and a critical factor.” (quotation simplified)); Symdon, 689 F.3d at 752 (“Prejudice is the most important of the four Barker factors.”); State v. Leslie, 708 P.2d 719, 725 (Ariz. 1985) (en banc) (holding that of “these four factors, the length of the delay is the least conclusive and the p

2022See, e.g., United States v. Shulick, 18 F.4th 91 , 102 (3d Cir. 2021) (referring to prejudice as “the most important factor in the Barker analysis”); United States v. Lozano, 962 F.3d 773, 781 (4th Cir. 2020) (“Prejudice, while not essential to the establishment of a violation of the right, is a prime issue and a critical factor.” (quotation simplified)); Symdon, 689 F.3d at 752 (“Prejudice is the most important of the four Barker factors.”); State v. Leslie, 708 P.2d 719, 725 (Ariz. 1985) (en banc) (holding that of “these four factors, the length of the delay is the least conclusive and the p

2022See, e.g., United States v. Shulick, 18 F.4th 91 , 102 (3d Cir. 2021) (referring to prejudice as “the most important factor in the Barker analysis”); United States v. Lozano, 962 F.3d 773, 781 (4th Cir. 2020) (“Prejudice, while not essential to the establishment of a violation of the right, is a prime issue and a critical factor.” (quotation simplified)); Symdon, 689 F.3d at 752 (“Prejudice is the most important of the four Barker factors.”); State v. Leslie, 708 P.2d 719, 725 (Ariz. 1985) (en banc) (holding that of “these four factors, the length of the delay is the least conclusive and the p

2022See, e.g., United States v. Shulick, 18 F.4th 91 , 102 (3d Cir. 2021) (referring to prejudice as “the most important factor in the Barker analysis”); United States v. Lozano, 962 F.3d 773, 781 (4th Cir. 2020) (“Prejudice, while not essential to the establishment of a violation of the right, is a prime issue and a critical factor.” (quotation simplified)); Symdon, 689 F.3d at 752 (“Prejudice is the most important of the four Barker factors.”); State v. Leslie, 708 P.2d 719, 725 (Ariz. 1985) (en banc) (holding that of “these four factors, the length of the delay is the least conclusive and the p

2022See, e.g., United States v. Shulick, 18 F.4th 91 , 102 (3d Cir. 2021) (referring to prejudice as “the most important factor in the Barker analysis”); United States v. Lozano, 962 F.3d 773, 781 (4th Cir. 2020) (“Prejudice, while not essential to the establishment of a violation of the right, is a prime issue and a critical factor.” (quotation simplified)); Symdon, 689 F.3d at 752 (“Prejudice is the most important of the four Barker factors.”); State v. Leslie, 708 P.2d 719, 725 (Ariz. 1985) (en banc) (holding that of “these four factors, the length of the delay is the least conclusive and the p

2022Ct. App. 1994) (“Actual prejudice is the final and most important factor . . . .”); State v. Brackett, 377 P.3d 1082, 1090 (Idaho Ct. App. 2016) (“The nature and extent of prejudice is the most important of the Barker factors.”); State v. Rodriguez, 494 P.3d 155, 163 (Kan.

2022Ct. App. 1994) (“Actual prejudice is the final and most important factor . . . .”); State v. Brackett, 377 P.3d 1082, 1090 (Idaho Ct. App. 2016) (“The nature and extent of prejudice is the most important of the Barker factors.”); State v. Rodriguez, 494 P.3d 155, 163 (Kan.

2022Other courts that have looked at it, however, have recognized (persuasively, I think) that this factor turns on whether and when “the government and the court were put on notice that a defendant has asserted his right to a speedy trial.” United States v. Black, 918 F.3d 243, 263 (2d Cir. 2019) (quotation simplified); accord United States v. Battis, 589 F.3d 673, 681 (3d Cir. 2009) (focusing on whether the defendant made “a reasonable assertion of the right so as to put authorities on notice of his Sixth Amendment claim” (quotation simplified)); State v. Buckner, 738 S.E.2d 65, 72 (Ga. 2013) (h

2022Other courts that have looked at it, however, have recognized (persuasively, I think) that this factor turns on whether and when “the government and the court were put on notice that a defendant has asserted his right to a speedy trial.” United States v. Black, 918 F.3d 243, 263 (2d Cir. 2019) (quotation simplified); accord United States v. Battis, 589 F.3d 673, 681 (3d Cir. 2009) (focusing on whether the defendant made “a reasonable assertion of the right so as to put authorities on notice of his Sixth Amendment claim” (quotation simplified)); State v. Buckner, 738 S.E.2d 65, 72 (Ga. 2013) (h

2022Other courts that have looked at it, however, have recognized (persuasively, I think) that this factor turns on whether and when “the government and the court were put on notice that a defendant has asserted his right to a speedy trial.” United States v. Black, 918 F.3d 243, 263 (2d Cir. 2019) (quotation simplified); accord United States v. Battis, 589 F.3d 673, 681 (3d Cir. 2009) (focusing on whether the defendant made “a reasonable assertion of the right so as to put authorities on notice of his Sixth Amendment claim” (quotation simplified)); State v. Buckner, 738 S.E.2d 65, 72 (Ga. 2013) (h

2022Other courts that have looked at it, however, have recognized (persuasively, I think) that this factor turns on whether and when “the government and the court were put on notice that a defendant has asserted his right to a speedy trial.” United States v. Black, 918 F.3d 243, 263 (2d Cir. 2019) (quotation simplified); accord United States v. Battis, 589 F.3d 673, 681 (3d Cir. 2009) (focusing on whether the defendant made “a reasonable assertion of the right so as to put authorities on notice of his Sixth Amendment claim” (quotation simplified)); State v. Buckner, 738 S.E.2d 65, 72 (Ga. 2013) (h