47 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1999–2026 22 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Cahillgreen2 sentences2025A court applying the Barker standard must consider and balance the four factors, State v. Tsetsekas, 411 N.J. 1 , 8 (App. Div. 2009), based on a "case-by-case analysis" because the "facts of an individual case are the best indicators of whether a right to a speedy trial has A-3580-22 13 been violated," State v. Cahill, 213 N.J. 253, 270-71 (2013). 2025As our Supreme Court has recognized, "once the delay exceeds one year, it is appropriate to engage in the analysis of the remaining Barker factors." Cahill, 213 N.J. at 266 . | 10 | 29 |
State v. Szimagreen2 sentences2024Our Supreme Court adopted the Barker test in State v. Szima, 70 N.J. 196, 200-01 (1976). 2024Our Supreme Court adopted the Barker test in State v. Szima, 70 N.J. 196, 200-01 (1976). | 8 | 10 |
Barker v. Wingogreen2 sentences2025The Barker test focuses on: (1) the length of the delay before trial; (2) the reason for the delay and, specifically, whether the government or the defendant is more to blame; (3) the extent to which the defendant asserted his speedy trial right; and (4) the prejudice to the defendant. 407 U.S. at 530-31 . 2025The Barker test focuses on: (1) the length of the delay before trial; (2) the reason for the delay and, specifically, whether the government or the defendant is more to blame; (3) the extent to which the defendant asserted his speedy trial right; and (4) the prejudice to the defendant. 407 U.S. at 530-31 . | 5 | 24 |
State v. Tsetsekasgreen2 sentences2025The Barker factors are "interrelated, and each must be considered in light of the relevant circumstances of each particular case." Tsetsekas, 411 N.J. 2025The Barker factors are "interrelated, and each must be considered in light of the relevant circumstances of each particular case." Tsetsekas, 411 N.J. | 4 | 17 |
State v. Merlinogreen2 sentences2021But, given the subjective nature of a speedy trial determination, we also deferentially review the court's assessment and balancing of the Barker factors, see Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652 (1992) (stating "we review trial court determinations of negligence [in delaying a case] with considerable deference"), and we will not disturb the trial court's speedy trial determination "unless clearly erroneous," State v. Merlino, 153 N.J. 2021But, given the subjective nature of a speedy trial determination, we also deferentially review the court's assessment and balancing of the Barker factors, see Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652 (1992) (stating "we review trial court determinations of negligence [in delaying a case] with considerable deference"), and we will not disturb the trial court's speedy trial determination "unless clearly erroneous," State v. Merlino, 153 N.J. | 4 | 7 |
Doggett v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2022We review the court's assessment and balancing of the Barker factors deferentially, see Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652 (1992), and we will reverse a trial court's determination as to whether a defendant has been deprived of a speedy trial "only if the court's determination is clearly erroneous," Tsetsekas, 411 N.J. 2022We review the court's assessment and balancing of the Barker factors deferentially, see Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652 (1992), and we will reverse a trial court's determination as to whether a defendant has been deprived of a speedy trial "only if the court's determination is clearly erroneous," Tsetsekas, 411 N.J. | 4 | 4 |
State v. Fulfordgreen2 sentences2026State v. Fulford, 349 N.J. 2026State v. Fulford, 349 N.J. | 3 | 4 |
State v. Berezanskygreen2 sentences2025See State v. Berezansky, 386 N.J. 2025See State v. Berezansky, 386 N.J. | 3 | 3 |
United States v. Loud Hawkgreen2 sentences2024A-3677-21 9 then moving to withdraw the plea in order to seek advice from an immigration attorney." See State v. Gallegan, 117 N.J. 345, 355 (1989) ("Any delay that defendant caused or requested would not weigh in favor of finding a speedy trial violation." (citing United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 316 (1986))). 2024A-3677-21 9 then moving to withdraw the plea in order to seek advice from an immigration attorney." See State v. Gallegan, 117 N.J. 345, 355 (1989) ("Any delay that defendant caused or requested would not weigh in favor of finding a speedy trial violation." (citing United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 316 (1986))). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Dunnsgreen2 sentences2021These factors are assessed and balanced in light of competing interests: on one side, the "societal right to have the accused tried and punished" and on the other, a defendant's right to be prosecuted "fairly and not oppressively." State v. Dunns, 266 N.J. 2021These factors are assessed and balanced in light of competing interests: on one side, the "societal right to have the accused tried and punished" and on the other, a defendant's right to be prosecuted "fairly and not oppressively." State v. Dunns, 266 N.J. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Detrickgreen2 sentences2025"But the question of how long" a delay of a trial is "too long 'cannot be answered by sole reference to the lapse of a specified period of time.'" State v. Detrick, 192 N.J. 1999Ibid. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Maygreen2 sentences2020There are many circumstances to consider, including but not limited to (1) the seriousness of the crimes; (2) the complexity and logistical challenges of an investigation that required forensic analysis of digital evidence used to identify and locate out-of-state child witnesses; (3) new information provided by two child victims who had been reluctant initially to reveal that they had been urged to engage in anal penetration; (4) the number of judges assigned to preside over various events; (5) numerous pretrial motions defendant filed at all stages of the case;6 and (6) defendant's unorthodox 2018A-5350-16T2 10 In May, we determined the trial court "did not err in its consideration and application of the four Barker factors in denying defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment on speedy-trial grounds." 362 N.J. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Perkinsgreen2 sentences2013In Perkins , the Law Division found dismissal after three months warranted based on the municipal court judge’s promise to dismiss the case if the State was not prepared on a date certain. 219 N.J.Super. at 124-25 , 529 A.2d 1056 . 2013In Perkins , the Law Division found dismissal after three months warranted based on the municipal court judge’s promise to dismiss the case if the State was not prepared on a date certain. 219 N.J.Super. at 124-25 , 529 A.2d 1056 . | 1 | 2 |
State v. Gallegangreen2 sentences2024A-3677-21 9 then moving to withdraw the plea in order to seek advice from an immigration attorney." See State v. Gallegan, 117 N.J. 345, 355 (1989) ("Any delay that defendant caused or requested would not weigh in favor of finding a speedy trial violation." (citing United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 316 (1986))). 2024A-3677-21 9 then moving to withdraw the plea in order to seek advice from an immigration attorney." See State v. Gallegan, 117 N.J. 345, 355 (1989) ("Any delay that defendant caused or requested would not weigh in favor of finding a speedy trial violation." (citing United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 316 (1986))). | 1 | 1 |
Strickland v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2021Even if defendant had successfully shown that he was denied his right to a speedy trial under the Barker factors, the Judge held he was unable to overcome the two-prong test established by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), and subsequently adopted by our Supreme Court in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987). 2021Even if defendant had successfully shown that he was denied his right to a speedy trial under the Barker factors, the Judge held he was unable to overcome the two-prong test established by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), and subsequently adopted by our Supreme Court in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Fritzgreen2 sentences2021Even if defendant had successfully shown that he was denied his right to a speedy trial under the Barker factors, the Judge held he was unable to overcome the two-prong test established by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), and subsequently adopted by our Supreme Court in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987). 2021Even if defendant had successfully shown that he was denied his right to a speedy trial under the Barker factors, the Judge held he was unable to overcome the two-prong test established by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), and subsequently adopted by our Supreme Court in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Molina-Soloriogreen2 sentences2021See United States v. Molina-Solorio, 577 F.3d 300, 304 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing cases from the Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits). 9 But see R. 3:25-2 (stating "[t]he court shall fix a date for trial" if a defendant who has been in pre-trial custody at least ninety consecutive days after indictment moves for a trial date) (emphasis added). 2021See United States v. Molina-Solorio, 577 F.3d 300, 304 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing cases from the Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits). 9 But see R. 3:25-2 (stating "[t]he court shall fix a date for trial" if a defendant who has been in pre-trial custody at least ninety consecutive days after indictment moves for a trial date) (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Robinsongreen2 sentences2019"Generally, a guilty plea constitutes a waiver of all issues which were or could have been addressed by the trial judge before the guilty plea." State v. Robinson, 224 N.J. 2019"Generally, a guilty plea constitutes a waiver of all issues which were or could have been addressed by the trial judge before the guilty plea." State v. Robinson, 224 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Smithgreen | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Martingreen2 sentences2013See, e.g., People v. Lomax, 49 Cal.4th 530 , 112 Cal.Rptr.3d 96 , 234 P.3d 377, 394-402 (2010) (analyzing speedy trial claim under both Cal.Penal Code § 1382 and Barker); Commonwealth v. Martin, 447 Mass. 274 , 850 N.E.2d 555, 563-64 (2006) (analyzing speedy trial claim under both Mass. R.Crim. 2013See, e.g., People v. Lomax, 49 Cal.4th 530 , 112 Cal.Rptr.3d 96 , 234 P.3d 377, 394-402 (2010) (analyzing speedy trial claim under both Cal.Penal Code § 1382 and Barker); Commonwealth v. Martin, 447 Mass. 274 , 850 N.E.2d 555, 563-64 (2006) (analyzing speedy trial claim under both Mass. R.Crim. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Smithgreen2 sentences2013See, e.g., State v. Smith, 131 N.J.Super. 354, 361-70 , 330 A.2d 29 (App.Div.1974) (reaching all four factors after thirteen-month delay), aff'd o.b., 70 N.J. 213 , 358 A.2d 782 (1976); Hakeem v. Beyer, 990 F.2d 750, 760 (3d Cir.1993) (finding fourteen-and-one-half-month delay sufficient to warrant further inquiry into Barker factors). 2013See, e.g., State v. Smith, 131 N.J.Super. 354, 361-70 , 330 A.2d 29 (App.Div.1974) (reaching all four factors after thirteen-month delay), aff'd o.b., 70 N.J. 213 , 358 A.2d 782 (1976); Hakeem v. Beyer, 990 F.2d 750, 760 (3d Cir.1993) (finding fourteen-and-one-half-month delay sufficient to warrant further inquiry into Barker factors). | 1 | 1 |
| Hakeem v. Beyergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Anderson v. Miltongreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Lomaxgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. MacDonaldgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Farrell
green
2 sentences2022Although we acknowledge that "'in the administration of justice, dismissal must be a recourse of last resort,'" Farrell, 320 N.J. 2009We concluded the delay was "so egregious" that the defendant's burden with regard to the three other Barker factors was "correspondingly diminished." Id. at 453, 727 A. 2d 501 . | 2 | 2009–2022 |
State v. Long
green
2 sentences1999Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64 , 96 S.Ct. 303 , 46 L.Ed. 2d 205 (1975). [8] Therefore the Barker analysis begins with consideration of whether the period of time between the arrest and trial has "crossed the threshold dividing ordinary from `presumptively prejudicial' delay." Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651-52 , 112 S.Ct. 2686, 2690 , 120 L.Ed. 2d 520, 528 (1992); see also Barker v. Wingo, supra, 407 U.S. at 530 , 92 S.Ct. at 2192 , 33 L.Ed. 2d at 117 ; United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 7 , 102 S.Ct. 1497, 1501 , 71 L.Ed. 2d 696, 703 (1982); State v. Long, 119 N.J. 1999Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64 , 96 S.Ct. 303 , 46 L.Ed. 2d 205 (1975). [8] Therefore the Barker analysis begins with consideration of whether the period of time between the arrest and trial has "crossed the threshold dividing ordinary from `presumptively prejudicial' delay." Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651-52 , 112 S.Ct. 2686, 2690 , 120 L.Ed. 2d 520, 528 (1992); see also Barker v. Wingo, supra, 407 U.S. at 530 , 92 S.Ct. at 2192 , 33 L.Ed. 2d at 117 ; United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 7 , 102 S.Ct. 1497, 1501 , 71 L.Ed. 2d 696, 703 (1982); State v. Long, 119 N.J. | 2 | 1999–2003 |
United States v. Keith
green
1 sentence2024The pertinent question, however, is "whether the defendant actively asserted his right, which requires more than merely moving to dismiss after [a] delay has already occurred." United States v. Keith, 61 F.4th 839 , 853 (10th Cir. 2023) (internal citations and quotations omitted). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Cassidy
green
2 sentences2021In attempting to explain the reasons for the delay under factor two of the Barker test, the prosecutor pointed to the time it took to: (1) resolve defendant's PTI application; (2) determine whether defendant's prior convictions were covered by the Supreme Court's decision in State v. Cassidy, 235 N.J. 482 (2018)2; and (3) obtain the records of defendant's convictions from other counties. 2021In attempting to explain the reasons for the delay under factor two of the Barker test, the prosecutor pointed to the time it took to: (1) resolve defendant's PTI application; (2) determine whether defendant's prior convictions were covered by the Supreme Court's decision in State v. Cassidy, 235 N.J. 482 (2018)2; and (3) obtain the records of defendant's convictions from other counties. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Wiggins
green
2 sentences2021Ibid. 2021Ibid. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Misurella
green
2 sentences2019However, as to defendants' argument that Misurella is inapplicable, there, we clearly applied the Barker factors and noted "the same framework and standard apply to evaluating undue delay on appeal as applies to a defendant's right to a speedy trial in the trial court." Misurella, 421 N.J. 2019However, as to defendants' argument that Misurella is inapplicable, there, we clearly applied the Barker factors and noted "the same framework and standard apply to evaluating undue delay on appeal as applies to a defendant's right to a speedy trial in the trial court." Misurella, 421 N.J. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Griffin v. Zurz
green
2 sentences2017Ed. 2d 101, 116-19 (1972); State v. Szima, 70 N.J. 196, 200-01 (adopting the Barker test and noting that the right to a speedy trial is relative and depends upon the circumstances), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 896 , 97 S. Ct. 259 , 50 L. 2017Ed. 2d 101, 116-19 (1972); State v. Szima, 70 N.J. 196, 200-01 (adopting the Barker test and noting that the right to a speedy trial is relative and depends upon the circumstances), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 896 , 97 S. Ct. 259 , 50 L. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Langone
green
2 sentences2013Stat. § 545.780 (requiring court to set trial date “as soon as reasonably possible” after defendant requests speedy trial), while others have employed only the Barker analysis, see, e.g., Ex Parte Anderson, 979 So.2d 777, 780-84 (Ala.2007) (analyzing right to speedy trial claim under Barker); State v. Langone, 127 N.H. 49 , 498 A.2d 731 (1985) (applying Barker to delay in trial for driving while intoxicated). 2013Stat. § 545.780 (requiring court to set trial date “as soon as reasonably possible” after defendant requests speedy trial), while others have employed only the Barker analysis, see, e.g., Ex Parte Anderson, 979 So.2d 777, 780-84 (Ala.2007) (analyzing right to speedy trial claim under Barker); State v. Langone, 127 N.H. 49 , 498 A.2d 731 (1985) (applying Barker to delay in trial for driving while intoxicated). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Robert E. Douglas v. Ronald H. Cathel, Administrator of New Jersey State Prison the Attorney General of the State of New Jersey, Zulima Farber.
green
2 sentences2013Ibid. 2013Ibid. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Hayes
green
2 sentences2013State v. Cahill, 208 N.J. 601 , 34 A.3d 782 (2011). 2013State v. Cahill, 208 N.J. 601 , 34 A.3d 782 (2011). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Dillingham v. United States green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.