27 Minnesota opinions name it 2 courts 1986–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Minnesota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Windishgreen2 sentences2023Those factors include: “(1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) whether the defendant asserted his or her right to a speedy trial; and (4) whether the delay prejudiced the defendant.” State v. Windish, 590 N.W.2d 311, 315 (Minn. 1999); see also State v. Widell, 258 N.W.2d 795, 796 (Minn. 1977) (adopting the Barker factors in Minnesota). 2023Those factors include: “(1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) whether the defendant asserted his or her right to a speedy trial; and (4) whether the delay prejudiced the defendant.” State v. Windish, 590 N.W.2d 311, 315 (Minn. 1999); see also State v. Widell, 258 N.W.2d 795, 796 (Minn. 1977) (adopting the Barker factors in Minnesota). | 9 | 12 |
State v. Widellgreen2 sentences2023Those factors include: “(1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) whether the defendant asserted his or her right to a speedy trial; and (4) whether the delay prejudiced the defendant.” State v. Windish, 590 N.W.2d 311, 315 (Minn. 1999); see also State v. Widell, 258 N.W.2d 795, 796 (Minn. 1977) (adopting the Barker factors in Minnesota). 2023Those factors include: “(1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) whether the defendant asserted his or her right to a speedy trial; and (4) whether the delay prejudiced the defendant.” State v. Windish, 590 N.W.2d 311, 315 (Minn. 1999); see also State v. Widell, 258 N.W.2d 795, 796 (Minn. 1977) (adopting the Barker factors in Minnesota). | 4 | 5 |
State v. Friberggreen2 sentences2011See Friberg, 435 N.W.2d at 515 (stating that “the stress, anxiety and inconvenience experienced by anyone who is involved in a trial” is insufficient to constitute prejudice for the purposes of a Barker analysis). 2004See Friberg, 435 N.W.2d at 515 (concluding merely that “[c]onsidering the Barker factors in light of all the circumstances, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ruling that there was good cause for the delay and that defendants were not denied their right to a speedy trial”). | 4 | 5 |
State of Minnesota v. Kemen Lavatos Taylor, IIgreen2 sentences2017Under the Barker test, we must consider: “ ‘(1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) whether the defendant asserted his or her right to a speedy trial; and (4) whether the delay prejudiced the defendant.’” Taylor, 869 N.W.2d at 19 (quoting Windish, 590 N.W.2d at 315 (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 530-33 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 )). 2017Under the Barker test, we must consider: “ ‘(1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) whether the defendant asserted his or her right to a speedy trial; and (4) whether the delay prejudiced the defendant.’” Taylor, 869 N.W.2d at 19 (quoting Windish, 590 N.W.2d at 315 (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 530-33 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 )). | 3 | 3 |
State v. Jonesgreen2 sentences2018State v. Jones , 392 N.W.2d 224 , 234-36 (Minn. 1986). 2016Id. | 2 | 4 |
Doggett v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2015See Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652-53 , 112 S.Ct. at 2691 (weighing the second Barker factor against the government because it “made no serious effort” to" find the defendant for six years after he was indicted on a drug charge); Erenas-Luna, 560 F.3d at 777-78 (concluding that the second Barker factor weighs “decidedly” in the defendant’s favor where the government’s negligent failure to take appropriate actions to apprehend defendant resulted in a three-year delay between indictment and arraignment); Sistrunk, 429 N.W.2d at 282 (concluding that “[t]he state’s failure to follow up on the indictment 2015See Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652-53 , 112 S.Ct. at 2691 (weighing the second Barker factor against the government because it “made no serious effort” to" find the defendant for six years after he was indicted on a drug charge); Erenas-Luna, 560 F.3d at 777-78 (concluding that the second Barker factor weighs “decidedly” in the defendant’s favor where the government’s negligent failure to take appropriate actions to apprehend defendant resulted in a three-year delay between indictment and arraignment); Sistrunk, 429 N.W.2d at 282 (concluding that “[t]he state’s failure to follow up on the indictment | 2 | 2 |
State v. Coraritogreen2 sentences2017State v. Corarito, 268 N.W.2d 79, 80 (Minn. 1978); see also Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652 n.1, 112 S.Ct. 2686 (“Depending on the nature of the charges, the lower courts have generally found pos-taccusation delay ‘presumptively prejudicial’ at least as it approaches one year.”). 2017State v. Corarito, 268 N.W.2d 79, 80 (Minn. 1978); see also Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652 n.1, 112 S.Ct. 2686 (“Depending on the nature of the charges, the lower courts have generally found pos-taccusation delay ‘presumptively prejudicial’ at least as it approaches one year.”). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Griffingreen2 sentences2014See State v. Griffin, 760 N.W.2d 336 , 339- 40 (Minn. App. 2009) (noting adoption of Barker test in Widell). 2014See State v. Griffin, 760 N.W.2d 336, 340 (Minn. App. 2009). “[T]he first [Barker] factor, the length of delay, is to some extent a triggering mechanism in that until some delay, which is presumptively prejudicial, is evident the other factors need not be considered.” Jones, 392 N.W.2d at 235 . | 2 | 2 |
Barker v. Wingogreen2 sentences2023Windish, 590 N.W.2d at 317 (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 524-28 ) (rejecting waivers and agreeing with the United States Supreme Court that “the better approach is to analyze the case by applying the Barker factors”). 5 Most of the other causes of delay are attributable to the state. 2023Windish, 590 N.W.2d at 317 (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 524-28 ) (rejecting waivers and agreeing with the United States Supreme Court that “the better approach is to analyze the case by applying the Barker factors”). 5 Most of the other causes of delay are attributable to the state. | 1 | 16 |
State v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2011See id. (observing that demands for a speedy-trial right do not favor defendant where the assertions are followed by additional defense motions delaying the trial). 1999Johnson , it should be noted, involved a 629-day delay between arrest and trial, only 16 days of which could be directly attributed to the state. 498 N.W.2d at 16 . | 1 | 2 |
State of Minnesota v. David Ernest Osoriogreen1 sentence2017Id. at 554-58. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Sistrunkgreen1 sentence2015See Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652-53 , 112 S.Ct. at 2691 (weighing the second Barker factor against the government because it “made no serious effort” to" find the defendant for six years after he was indicted on a drug charge); Erenas-Luna, 560 F.3d at 777-78 (concluding that the second Barker factor weighs “decidedly” in the defendant’s favor where the government’s negligent failure to take appropriate actions to apprehend defendant resulted in a three-year delay between indictment and arraignment); Sistrunk, 429 N.W.2d at 282 (concluding that “[t]he state’s failure to follow up on the indictment | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Erenas-Lunagreen1 sentence2015See Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652-53 , 112 S.Ct. at 2691 (weighing the second Barker factor against the government because it “made no serious effort” to" find the defendant for six years after he was indicted on a drug charge); Erenas-Luna, 560 F.3d at 777-78 (concluding that the second Barker factor weighs “decidedly” in the defendant’s favor where the government’s negligent failure to take appropriate actions to apprehend defendant resulted in a three-year delay between indictment and arraignment); Sistrunk, 429 N.W.2d at 282 (concluding that “[t]he state’s failure to follow up on the indictment | 1 | 1 |
State of Minnesota v. Claude Riley Crockson, Jr.green2 sentences2014When considering a claim that the evidence is insufficient to support a conviction, “this court thoroughly examines the record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the conviction, is sufficient to allow the jurors to reach the verdict they did.” State v. Crockson, 854 N.W.2d 244, 247 (Minn. App. 2014). 2014When considering a claim that the evidence is insufficient to support a conviction, “this court thoroughly examines the record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the conviction, is sufficient to allow the jurors to reach the verdict they did.” State v. Crockson, 854 N.W.2d 244, 247 (Minn. App. 2014). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Kaspergreen2 sentences1989See State v. Kasper, 411 N.W.2d 182, 185 (Minn.1987) (where there was no showing of good cause for a delay past the prescribed time period, violation of the rule violated the defendant’s right to a speedy trial, and required a dismissal of the charge with prejudice). 1989See State v. Kasper, 411 N.W.2d 182, 185 (Minn.1987) (where there was no showing of good cause for a delay past the prescribed time period, violation of the rule violated the defendant’s right to a speedy trial, and required a dismissal of the charge with prejudice). | 1 | 1 |
State, City of Oakdale v. Curtisgreen2 sentences1988The sixty-day period prescribed in Rule 6.06 is “presumptive only”; the Barker factors “should still be considered.” State v. Curtis, 393 N.W.2d 10, 12 (Minn.Ct.App.1986). a. 1988The sixty-day period prescribed in Rule 6.06 is “presumptive only”; the Barker factors “should still be considered.” State v. Curtis, 393 N.W.2d 10, 12 (Minn.Ct.App.1986). a. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Minnesota. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Goldberg v. Kelly
green
2 sentences2019In United States v. Eight Thousand Eight Hundred & Fifty Dollars ($8,850) in U.S. Currency , 461 U.S. 555 , 564, 103 S.Ct. 2005 , 76 L.Ed.2d 143 (1983), the Supreme Court applied the Barker factors when assessing procedural due process violations in a forfeiture case. 4 *602 Mathews identified a different set of factors to balance when assessing procedural due process challenges: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or sub 2019In United States v. Eight Thousand Eight Hundred & Fifty Dollars ($8,850) in U.S. Currency , 461 U.S. 555 , 564, 103 S.Ct. 2005 , 76 L.Ed.2d 143 (1983), the Supreme Court applied the Barker factors when assessing procedural due process violations in a forfeiture case. 4 *602 Mathews identified a different set of factors to balance when assessing procedural due process challenges: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or sub | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Mathews v. Eldridge
green
2 sentences2019In United States v. Eight Thousand Eight Hundred & Fifty Dollars ($8,850) in U.S. Currency , 461 U.S. 555 , 564, 103 S.Ct. 2005 , 76 L.Ed.2d 143 (1983), the Supreme Court applied the Barker factors when assessing procedural due process violations in a forfeiture case. 4 *602 Mathews identified a different set of factors to balance when assessing procedural due process challenges: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or sub 2019In United States v. Eight Thousand Eight Hundred & Fifty Dollars ($8,850) in U.S. Currency , 461 U.S. 555 , 564, 103 S.Ct. 2005 , 76 L.Ed.2d 143 (1983), the Supreme Court applied the Barker factors when assessing procedural due process violations in a forfeiture case. 4 *602 Mathews identified a different set of factors to balance when assessing procedural due process challenges: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or sub | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Heddan v. Dirkswager
green
2 sentences2019Further, when considering the nature of the private interest, we weigh "(1) the duration of the [deprivation of property]; (2) the availability of hardship relief; and (3) the availability of prompt postrevocation review." Heddan v. Dirkswager , 336 N.W.2d 54 , 60 (Minn. 1983) (citing Montrym , 443 U.S. at 11 -12 , 99 S.Ct. 2612 ). 2019Further, when considering the nature of the private interest, we weigh "(1) the duration of the [deprivation of property]; (2) the availability of hardship relief; and (3) the availability of prompt postrevocation review." Heddan v. Dirkswager , 336 N.W.2d 54 , 60 (Minn. 1983) (citing Montrym , 443 U.S. at 11 -12 , 99 S.Ct. 2612 ). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
MacKey v. Montrym
green
2 sentences2019Further, when considering the nature of the private interest, we weigh "(1) the duration of the [deprivation of property]; (2) the availability of hardship relief; and (3) the availability of prompt postrevocation review." Heddan v. Dirkswager , 336 N.W.2d 54 , 60 (Minn. 1983) (citing Montrym , 443 U.S. at 11 -12 , 99 S.Ct. 2612 ). 2019Further, when considering the nature of the private interest, we weigh "(1) the duration of the [deprivation of property]; (2) the availability of hardship relief; and (3) the availability of prompt postrevocation review." Heddan v. Dirkswager , 336 N.W.2d 54 , 60 (Minn. 1983) (citing Montrym , 443 U.S. at 11 -12 , 99 S.Ct. 2612 ). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
United States v. Eight Thousand Eight Hundred & Fifty Dollars
green
2 sentences2019In United States v. Eight Thousand Eight Hundred & Fifty Dollars ($8,850) in U.S. Currency , 461 U.S. 555 , 564, 103 S.Ct. 2005 , 76 L.Ed.2d 143 (1983), the Supreme Court applied the Barker factors when assessing procedural due process violations in a forfeiture case. 4 *602 Mathews identified a different set of factors to balance when assessing procedural due process challenges: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or sub 2019In United States v. Eight Thousand Eight Hundred & Fifty Dollars ($8,850) in U.S. Currency , 461 U.S. 555 , 564, 103 S.Ct. 2005 , 76 L.Ed.2d 143 (1983), the Supreme Court applied the Barker factors when assessing procedural due process violations in a forfeiture case. 4 *602 Mathews identified a different set of factors to balance when assessing procedural due process challenges: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or sub | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Vermont v. Brillon
green
2 sentences2017Under the second prong of the Barker test, “the key question is ‘whether the government or the criminal defendant is more to blame for th[e] delay.’ ” Taylor, 869 N.W.2d at 19 (quoting Brillon, 556 U.S. at 90 , 129 S.Ct. 1283 ). 2017Under the second prong of the Barker test, “the key question is ‘whether the government or the criminal defendant is more to blame for th[e] delay.’ ” Taylor, 869 N.W.2d at 19 (quoting Brillon, 556 U.S. at 90 , 129 S.Ct. 1283 ). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Rhoads
green
2 sentences2015Although the 140-day delay in this case creates a presumption that Bland’s speedy-trial right was violated and triggers further inquiry into the remaining Barker factors, “the length of time does not, as an independent factor, provide strong support for finding a violation.” State v. Rhoads, 802 N.W.2d 794 , 806–07 (Minn. App. 2011), rev’d on other grounds, 813 N.W.2d 880 (Minn. 2012). 2. 2015Although the 140-day delay in this case creates a presumption that Bland’s speedy-trial right was violated and triggers further inquiry into the remaining Barker factors, “the length of time does not, as an independent factor, provide strong support for finding a violation.” State v. Rhoads, 802 N.W.2d 794 , 806–07 (Minn. App. 2011), rev’d on other grounds, 813 N.W.2d 880 (Minn. 2012). 2. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Rhoads
green
2 sentences2015Although the 140-day delay in this case creates a presumption that Bland’s speedy-trial right was violated and triggers further inquiry into the remaining Barker factors, “the length of time does not, as an independent factor, provide strong support for finding a violation.” State v. Rhoads, 802 N.W.2d 794 , 806–07 (Minn. App. 2011), rev’d on other grounds, 813 N.W.2d 880 (Minn. 2012). 2. 2015Although the 140-day delay in this case creates a presumption that Bland’s speedy-trial right was violated and triggers further inquiry into the remaining Barker factors, “the length of time does not, as an independent factor, provide strong support for finding a violation.” State v. Rhoads, 802 N.W.2d 794 , 806–07 (Minn. App. 2011), rev’d on other grounds, 813 N.W.2d 880 (Minn. 2012). 2. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Moore v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2009Rather, they are related factors and must be considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant.” Windish, 590 N.W.2d at 315 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 533 , 92 S.Ct. at 2182 ). “[Prejudice to a defendant caused by delay in bringing him to trial is not confined to the possible prejudice to his defense in those proceedings.” Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25, 26-27 , 94 S.Ct. 188, 190 , 38 L.Ed.2d 183 (1973). 2009Rather, they are related factors and must be considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant.” Windish, 590 N.W.2d at 315 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 533 , 92 S.Ct. at 2182 ). “[Prejudice to a defendant caused by delay in bringing him to trial is not confined to the possible prejudice to his defense in those proceedings.” Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25, 26-27 , 94 S.Ct. 188, 190 , 38 L.Ed.2d 183 (1973). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. DeRosier
green
2 sentences2009To determine whether a delay constitutes a deprivation of the right to a speedy trial, a court must balance the following four factors: “(1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for the *340 delay, (3) whether the defendant asserted his or her right to a speedy trial, and (4) whether the delay prejudiced the defendant.” Id. at 109 (citing test from Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530-33 , 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2192-93 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972) and State v. Widell, 258 N.W.2d 795, 796 (Minn.1977), which adopted the four-part Barker inquiry for speedy-trial demands). 2009To determine whether a delay constitutes a deprivation of the right to a speedy trial, a court must balance the following four factors: “(1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for the *340 delay, (3) whether the defendant asserted his or her right to a speedy trial, and (4) whether the delay prejudiced the defendant.” Id. at 109 (citing test from Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530-33 , 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2192-93 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972) and State v. Widell, 258 N.W.2d 795, 796 (Minn.1977), which adopted the four-part Barker inquiry for speedy-trial demands). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Larson
green
2 sentences1986Interpreting two cases from this court, State v. Larson, 369 N.W.2d 323 (Minn.Ct.App.1985), and Brooke, 381 N.W.2d at 885 , the trial court concluded that “the State has the burden of showing the reason for failure to vitiate defendant’s speedy trial right, and the traditional notice that defendant must show prejudice to merit relief has been reduced in importance.” We believe the trial court misapplies these cases and that its failure to consider and balance the remaining Barker factors was error. 1986Interpreting two cases from this court, State v. Larson, 369 N.W.2d 323 (Minn.Ct.App.1985), and Brooke, 381 N.W.2d at 885 , the trial court concluded that “the State has the burden of showing the reason for failure to vitiate defendant’s speedy trial right, and the traditional notice that defendant must show prejudice to merit relief has been reduced in importance.” We believe the trial court misapplies these cases and that its failure to consider and balance the remaining Barker factors was error. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
State v. Brooke
green
2 sentences1986Interpreting two cases from this court, State v. Larson, 369 N.W.2d 323 (Minn.Ct.App.1985), and Brooke, 381 N.W.2d at 885 , the trial court concluded that “the State has the burden of showing the reason for failure to vitiate defendant’s speedy trial right, and the traditional notice that defendant must show prejudice to merit relief has been reduced in importance.” We believe the trial court misapplies these cases and that its failure to consider and balance the remaining Barker factors was error. 1986Interpreting two cases from this court, State v. Larson, 369 N.W.2d 323 (Minn.Ct.App.1985), and Brooke, 381 N.W.2d at 885 , the trial court concluded that “the State has the burden of showing the reason for failure to vitiate defendant’s speedy trial right, and the traditional notice that defendant must show prejudice to merit relief has been reduced in importance.” We believe the trial court misapplies these cases and that its failure to consider and balance the remaining Barker factors was error. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.