Barker test in Massachusetts

2025"Under the Barker test, a reviewing court weighs the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right to a speedy trial, and prejudice to the defendant." Dirico, supra at 506 , citing Barker, supra at 530 .

2025"Under the Barker test, a reviewing court weighs the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right to a speedy trial, and prejudice to the defendant." Dirico, supra at 506 , citing Barker, supra at 530 .

2025"Once a defendant has established presumptive prejudice, courts apply the four-factor Barker test to evaluate whether the defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial has, in fact, been violated." Butler, 464 Mass. at 710 .

2025"Once a defendant has established presumptive prejudice, courts apply the four-factor Barker test to evaluate whether the defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial has, in fact, been violated." Butler, 464 Mass. at 710 .

2025Barker analysis. "[T]o trigger a speedy trial analysis, an accused must allege that the interval between accusation and trial has crossed the threshold dividing ordinary from 'presumptively prejudicial' delay." Butler, 464 Mass. at 709-710 (2013), quoting Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651-652 (1992).

2018Even where a lengthy delay permits a presumption of prejudice, the United States Supreme Court has made clear that "presumptive prejudice cannot alone carry a Sixth Amendment claim without regard to the other Barker criteria." Doggett v. United States , 505 U.S. 647 , 656 (1992). 3 Upon review of the motion judge's findings, and having applied the Barker factors, the defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial was not violated.

2025"Under the Barker test, a reviewing court weighs the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right to a speedy trial, and prejudice to the defendant." Dirico, supra at 506 , citing Barker, supra at 530 .

2025"Under the Barker test, a reviewing court weighs the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right to a speedy trial, and prejudice to the defendant." Dirico, supra at 506 , citing Barker, supra at 530 .

2025See Commonwealth v. Dame, 473 Mass. 524, 530 , cert. denied, 580 U.S. 857 (2016), quoting Commonwealth v. George, 430 Mass. 276, 281 (1999) ("A defendant seeking dismissal of an indictment due to 12 Considering the Barker factors as a whole, we find that the defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial was not violated.

2025See Commonwealth v. Dame, 473 Mass. 524, 530 , cert. denied, 580 U.S. 857 (2016), quoting Commonwealth v. George, 430 Mass. 276, 281 (1999) ("A defendant seeking dismissal of an indictment due to 12 Considering the Barker factors as a whole, we find that the defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial was not violated.

2025See Commonwealth v. Carr, 464 Mass. 855, 860 (2013); Look, 379 Mass. at 898 ; Commonwealth v. Gilbert, 366 Mass. 18, 22 (1974).

2025See Commonwealth v. Carr, 464 Mass. 855, 860 (2013); Look, 379 Mass. at 898 ; Commonwealth v. Gilbert, 366 Mass. 18, 22 (1974).

2025See Commonwealth v. Dame, 473 Mass. 524, 530 , cert. denied, 580 U.S. 857 (2016), quoting Commonwealth v. George, 430 Mass. 276, 281 (1999) ("A defendant seeking dismissal of an indictment due to 12 Considering the Barker factors as a whole, we find that the defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial was not violated.

2025See Commonwealth v. Dame, 473 Mass. 524, 530 , cert. denied, 580 U.S. 857 (2016), quoting Commonwealth v. George, 430 Mass. 276, 281 (1999) ("A defendant seeking dismissal of an indictment due to 12 Considering the Barker factors as a whole, we find that the defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial was not violated.

2025The length of the delay between accusation and trial "is not alone decisive on the issue of speedy trial." Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 380 Mass. 643, 652 (1980).

2025The length of the delay between accusation and trial "is not alone decisive on the issue of speedy trial." Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 380 Mass. 643, 652 (1980).

2017See Lanigan , 419 Mass. at 19 .

2017See Lanigan , 419 Mass. at 19 .

2013Therefore, because the decision not to advance a losing argument does not fall “measurably below that which might be expected from an ordinary fallible lawyer,” and because the defendant was not “deprived of an otherwise available, substantial ground of defence” by virtue of his counsel’s decision not to advance a constitutional speedy trial argument on direct appeal, we conclude that the defendant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel. 16 Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 (1974).

2013Therefore, because the decision not to advance a losing argument does not fall “measurably below that which might be expected from an ordinary fallible lawyer,” and because the defendant was not “deprived of an otherwise available, substantial ground of defence” by virtue of his counsel’s decision not to advance a constitutional speedy trial argument on direct appeal, we conclude that the defendant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel. 16 Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 (1974).

1982See, for example, Barker v. Colorado Region - Sports Car Club of America, 532 P.2d at 378 (“Nor has [the release signed by Mr. Barker] any effect whatsoever on Mrs. Barker’s claim for loss of consortium.