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40 Montana opinions name it 1 courts 1975–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Montana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Barker v. Wingogreen2 sentences2020However, “[s]o long as the defendant asserts his right to a speedy trial by a motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds filed prior to the time of trial, we conclude that the defendant has satisfied the third-prong of the Barker test and that further analysis of that prong is not only unnecessary, but inappropriate.” Ariegwe, ¶ 137; see generally Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S. Ct. 2182 . ¶13 Chambers asserted his speedy trial right when he filed a pro se motion to dismiss in June 2017, which was refiled in December 2017 after counsel was appointed. 2020However, “[s]o long as the defendant asserts his right to a speedy trial by a motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds filed prior to the time of trial, we conclude that the defendant has satisfied the third-prong of the Barker test and that further analysis of that prong is not only unnecessary, but inappropriate.” Ariegwe, ¶ 137; see generally Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S. Ct. 2182 . ¶13 Chambers asserted his speedy trial right when he filed a pro se motion to dismiss in June 2017, which was refiled in December 2017 after counsel was appointed. | 4 | 13 |
State v. Thompsongreen2 sentences1994Thompson, 865 P.2d at 1134-35 . *68 In assessing the second factor of the Barker test, the United States Supreme Court in Loud Hawk noted that different weights should be assigned to different reasons for delay, and that “[g]iven the important public interests in appellate review,... it hardly need be said that an interlocutory appeal by the Government ordinarily is a valid reason that justifies delay.” Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. at 315 , 106 S.Ct. at 656 , 88 L.Ed.2d at 654 . 1994Thompson, 865 P.2d at 1134-35 . *68 In assessing the second factor of the Barker test, the United States Supreme Court in Loud Hawk noted that different weights should be assigned to different reasons for delay, and that “[g]iven the important public interests in appellate review,... it hardly need be said that an interlocutory appeal by the Government ordinarily is a valid reason that justifies delay.” Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. at 315 , 106 S.Ct. at 656 , 88 L.Ed.2d at 654 . | 4 | 7 |
State v. Williams-Ruschgreen2 sentences1997We have also indicated that the anxiety and concern to be considered under the Barker test is that which was “aggravated as a result of the delay.” Williams-Rusch, 928 P.2d at 178 . “[S]ince it is nearly impossible for the State to prove that anxiety and concern do not exist, the State’s burden to show a lack of anxiety becomes considerably lighter in the absence of more than marginal evidence of anxiety.” Williams-Rusch, 928 P.2d at 178 . 1997We have also indicated that the anxiety and concern to be considered under the Barker test is that which was “aggravated as a result of the delay.” Williams-Rusch, 928 P.2d at 178 . “[S]ince it is nearly impossible for the State to prove that anxiety and concern do not exist, the State’s burden to show a lack of anxiety becomes considerably lighter in the absence of more than marginal evidence of anxiety.” Williams-Rusch, 928 P.2d at 178 . | 3 | 4 |
City of Billings v. Brucegreen2 sentences2001See, e.g., City of Billings v. Bruce, 1998 MT 186, ¶ 19 , 290 Mont. 148, ¶ 19 , 965 P.2d 866, ¶ 19 (citations omitted). ¶21 The Barker test offers four criteria for a court’s consideration: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the assertion of the right to a speedy trial by the defendant; and (4) the prejudice to the defense. 2001See, e.g., City of Billings v. Bruce, 1998 MT 186, ¶ 19 , 290 Mont. 148, ¶ 19 , 965 P.2d 866, ¶ 19 (citations omitted). ¶21 The Barker test offers four criteria for a court’s consideration: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the assertion of the right to a speedy trial by the defendant; and (4) the prejudice to the defense. | 2 | 4 |
State v. Heffernangreen2 sentences2001See State v. Heffernan (1991), 248 Mont. 67, 73 , 809 P.2d 566, 569 (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 529 , 92 S.Ct. at 2191 ). 2001See State v. Heffernan (1991), 248 Mont. 67, 73 , 809 P.2d 566, 569 (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 529 , 92 S.Ct. at 2191 ). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Gouldgreen2 sentences1996State v. Gould, (1995), 273 Mont. 207, 213-15 , 902 P.2d 532, 537 . 1996State v. Gould, (1995), 273 Mont. 207, 213-15 , 902 P.2d 532, 537 . | 1 | 3 |
State v. Olmstedgreen2 sentences2007For this reason, we overrule our statements to the contrary in State v. Olmsted, 1998 MT 301, ¶ 55 , 292 Mont. 66, ¶ 55 , 968 P.2d 1154, ¶ 55 (“The fourth factor of the Barker test, prejudice to the defendant, must be demonstrated by the defendant before there is a speedy trial violation.”), State v. Foshee, 282 Mont. 326, 333 , 938 P.2d 601, 605 (1997) (“A criminal defendant must somehow show that he or she has been prejudiced by the delay before this Court will hold that the State has violated his or her right to a speedy trial.”), and State v. Mooney, 2006 MT 121, ¶ 17 , 332 Mont. 249, ¶ 17 2007For this reason, we overrule our statements to the contrary in State v. Olmsted, 1998 MT 301, ¶ 55 , 292 Mont. 66, ¶ 55 , 968 P.2d 1154, ¶ 55 (“The fourth factor of the Barker test, prejudice to the defendant, must be demonstrated by the defendant before there is a speedy trial violation.”), State v. Foshee, 282 Mont. 326, 333 , 938 P.2d 601, 605 (1997) (“A criminal defendant must somehow show that he or she has been prejudiced by the delay before this Court will hold that the State has violated his or her right to a speedy trial.”), and State v. Mooney, 2006 MT 121, ¶ 17 , 332 Mont. 249, ¶ 17 | 1 | 1 |
State v. Highpinegreen2 sentences2007State v. Johnson, 2000 MT 180, ¶ 14 , 300 Mont. 367, ¶ 14 , 4 P.3d 654, ¶ 14 (“No single factor of the Barker test is indispensable or dispositive.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); State v. Highpine, 2000 MT 368, ¶ 14 , 303 Mont. 422, ¶ 14 , 15 P.3d 938, ¶ 14 (“Because no single factor is by itself decisive, courts must still engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process.” (internal quotation marks omitted)), and we now reaffirm that none of the foregoing four factors is either a necessary or a sufficient condition to the legal conclusion that the accused has been deprived of the 2007State v. Johnson, 2000 MT 180, ¶ 14 , 300 Mont. 367, ¶ 14 , 4 P.3d 654, ¶ 14 (“No single factor of the Barker test is indispensable or dispositive.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); State v. Highpine, 2000 MT 368, ¶ 14 , 303 Mont. 422, ¶ 14 , 15 P.3d 938, ¶ 14 (“Because no single factor is by itself decisive, courts must still engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process.” (internal quotation marks omitted)), and we now reaffirm that none of the foregoing four factors is either a necessary or a sufficient condition to the legal conclusion that the accused has been deprived of the | 1 | 1 |
State v. Fosheegreen2 sentences2007For this reason, we overrule our statements to the contrary in State v. Olmsted, 1998 MT 301, ¶ 55 , 292 Mont. 66, ¶ 55 , 968 P.2d 1154, ¶ 55 (“The fourth factor of the Barker test, prejudice to the defendant, must be demonstrated by the defendant before there is a speedy trial violation.”), State v. Foshee, 282 Mont. 326, 333 , 938 P.2d 601, 605 (1997) (“A criminal defendant must somehow show that he or she has been prejudiced by the delay before this Court will hold that the State has violated his or her right to a speedy trial.”), and State v. Mooney, 2006 MT 121, ¶ 17 , 332 Mont. 249, ¶ 17 2007For this reason, we overrule our statements to the contrary in State v. Olmsted, 1998 MT 301, ¶ 55 , 292 Mont. 66, ¶ 55 , 968 P.2d 1154, ¶ 55 (“The fourth factor of the Barker test, prejudice to the defendant, must be demonstrated by the defendant before there is a speedy trial violation.”), State v. Foshee, 282 Mont. 326, 333 , 938 P.2d 601, 605 (1997) (“A criminal defendant must somehow show that he or she has been prejudiced by the delay before this Court will hold that the State has violated his or her right to a speedy trial.”), and State v. Mooney, 2006 MT 121, ¶ 17 , 332 Mont. 249, ¶ 17 | 1 | 1 |
State v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2007State v. Johnson, 2000 MT 180, ¶ 14 , 300 Mont. 367, ¶ 14 , 4 P.3d 654, ¶ 14 (“No single factor of the Barker test is indispensable or dispositive.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); State v. Highpine, 2000 MT 368, ¶ 14 , 303 Mont. 422, ¶ 14 , 15 P.3d 938, ¶ 14 (“Because no single factor is by itself decisive, courts must still engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process.” (internal quotation marks omitted)), and we now reaffirm that none of the foregoing four factors is either a necessary or a sufficient condition to the legal conclusion that the accused has been deprived of the 2007State v. Johnson, 2000 MT 180, ¶ 14 , 300 Mont. 367, ¶ 14 , 4 P.3d 654, ¶ 14 (“No single factor of the Barker test is indispensable or dispositive.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); State v. Highpine, 2000 MT 368, ¶ 14 , 303 Mont. 422, ¶ 14 , 15 P.3d 938, ¶ 14 (“Because no single factor is by itself decisive, courts must still engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process.” (internal quotation marks omitted)), and we now reaffirm that none of the foregoing four factors is either a necessary or a sufficient condition to the legal conclusion that the accused has been deprived of the | 1 | 1 |
State v. Mooneygreen2 sentences2007For this reason, we overrule our statements to the contrary in State v. Olmsted, 1998 MT 301, ¶ 55 , 292 Mont. 66, ¶ 55 , 968 P.2d 1154, ¶ 55 (“The fourth factor of the Barker test, prejudice to the defendant, must be demonstrated by the defendant before there is a speedy trial violation.”), State v. Foshee, 282 Mont. 326, 333 , 938 P.2d 601, 605 (1997) (“A criminal defendant must somehow show that he or she has been prejudiced by the delay before this Court will hold that the State has violated his or her right to a speedy trial.”), and State v. Mooney, 2006 MT 121, ¶ 17 , 332 Mont. 249, ¶ 17 2007For this reason, we overrule our statements to the contrary in State v. Olmsted, 1998 MT 301, ¶ 55 , 292 Mont. 66, ¶ 55 , 968 P.2d 1154, ¶ 55 (“The fourth factor of the Barker test, prejudice to the defendant, must be demonstrated by the defendant before there is a speedy trial violation.”), State v. Foshee, 282 Mont. 326, 333 , 938 P.2d 601, 605 (1997) (“A criminal defendant must somehow show that he or she has been prejudiced by the delay before this Court will hold that the State has violated his or her right to a speedy trial.”), and State v. Mooney, 2006 MT 121, ¶ 17 , 332 Mont. 249, ¶ 17 | 1 | 1 |
State v. Sandersgreen2 sentences1998See State v. Sanders (1973), 163 Mont. 209, 214 , 516 P.2d 372, 375 . 1998See State v. Sanders (1973), 163 Mont. 209, 214 , 516 P.2d 372, 375 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Watersgreen2 sentences1998See State v. Waters (1987), 228 Mont. 490, 494 , 743 P.2d 617, 620 . 1998See State v. Waters (1987), 228 Mont. 490, 494 , 743 P.2d 617, 620 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Weeksgreen2 sentences1998See Weeks, 270 Mont. at 72 , 891 P.2d at 482 ; Moore, 268 Mont. at 67 , 885 P.2d at 486 . 1998See Weeks, 270 Mont. at 72 , 891 P.2d at 482 ; Moore, 268 Mont. at 67 , 885 P.2d at 486 . | 1 | 1 |
Massey v. Georgiagreen2 sentences1997See Barker, 407 U.S. at 530 , 92 S. Ct. at 2192 , 33 L. 1997See Barker, 407 U.S. at 530 , 92 S. Ct. at 2192 , 33 L. | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Bullockgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Montana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State ex rel. Briceno v. District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District ex rel. County of Yellowstone
neutral
2 sentences1996Briceno v. District Court (1977), 173 Mont. 516, 518 , 568 P.2d 162 , 163-64. 1996Briceno v. District Court (1977), 173 Mont. 516, 518 , 568 P.2d 162 , 163-64. | 10 | 1986–1996 |
State Ex Rel. Briceno v. DIST. CT. OF 13TH JUD. DIST. ETC.
neutral
2 sentences1996Briceno v. District Court (1977), 173 Mont. 516, 518 , 568 P.2d 162 , 163-64. 1996Briceno v. District Court (1977), 173 Mont. 516, 518 , 568 P.2d 162 , 163-64. | 10 | 1986–1996 |
State v. Tweedy
green
2 sentences2000No single factor of the Barker test is “indispensable or dispositive.” Tweedy, 277 Mont, at 320 , 922 P.2d at 1138 ; accord Bruce, ¶ 75. 2000No single factor of the Barker test is “indispensable or dispositive.” Tweedy, 277 Mont, at 320 , 922 P.2d at 1138 ; accord Bruce, ¶ 75. | 3 | 1996–2000 |
State v. Collier
green
2 sentences1998See State v. Williams-Rusch (1996), 279 Mont. 437, 449 , 928 P.2d 169, 176-77 ; State v. Collier (1996), 277 Mont. 46, 54 , 919 P.2d 376, 382 . ¶24 Although we have been consistent in our statements that a delay sufficient to trigger further analysis also creates a presumption of prejudice, we have likewise been inconsistent in our application of that presumption. ¶25 We first discussed the effect of presumptive prejudice in Fitzpatrick, 165 Mont. at 388 , 528 P.2d at 1326 , where we were concerned with a delay of seven months. 1998See State v. Williams-Rusch (1996), 279 Mont. 437, 449 , 928 P.2d 169, 176-77 ; State v. Collier (1996), 277 Mont. 46, 54 , 919 P.2d 376, 382 . ¶24 Although we have been consistent in our statements that a delay sufficient to trigger further analysis also creates a presumption of prejudice, we have likewise been inconsistent in our application of that presumption. ¶25 We first discussed the effect of presumptive prejudice in Fitzpatrick, 165 Mont. at 388 , 528 P.2d at 1326 , where we were concerned with a delay of seven months. | 3 | 1996–1998 |
State v. Mooney
green
2 sentences1993In State v. Mooney (1991), 248 Mont. 115, 119 , 809 P.2d 591, 594 , we said that a failure to object to a lack of a speedy trial until four days prior to trial showed a lack of actual interest in moving the case forward to trial and should be considered in balancing the Barker factors. 1993In State v. Mooney (1991), 248 Mont. 115, 119 , 809 P.2d 591, 594 , we said that a failure to object to a lack of a speedy trial until four days prior to trial showed a lack of actual interest in moving the case forward to trial and should be considered in balancing the Barker factors. | 3 | 1993–1996 |
State ex rel. Thomas v. District Court
neutral
2 sentences2007Thomas v. District Court, 151 Mont. 1 , 438 P.2d 554 (1968), based on an earlier listing of those factors in United States v. Simmons, 338 F.2d 804 (2nd Cir. 1964). 2007Thomas v. District Court, 151 Mont. 1 , 438 P.2d 554 (1968), based on an earlier listing of those factors in United States v. Simmons, 338 F.2d 804 (2nd Cir. 1964). | 2 | 1975–2007 |
United States v. Carnie Simmons, A/K/A Harold
green
2 sentences2007Thomas v. District Court, 151 Mont. 1 , 438 P.2d 554 (1968), based on an earlier listing of those factors in United States v. Simmons, 338 F.2d 804 (2nd Cir. 1964). 2007Thomas v. District Court, 151 Mont. 1 , 438 P.2d 554 (1968), based on an earlier listing of those factors in United States v. Simmons, 338 F.2d 804 (2nd Cir. 1964). | 2 | 1975–2007 |
State v. Steward
green
2 sentences2007Indeed, in State v. Steward, 168 Mont. 385 , 543 P.2d 178 (1975), we explained that this Court had adopted the Barker factors in State ex rel. 2007Indeed, in State v. Steward, 168 Mont. 385 , 543 P.2d 178 (1975), we explained that this Court had adopted the Barker factors in State ex rel. | 2 | 1979–2007 |
State v. Rose
green
1 sentence2009The evidence of Patrick’s previous assault was offered for the proper purpose of establishing notice, and the expert testimony assisted the jury in understanding the evidence. ¶22 The District Court imposed a legal sentence within statutory parameters, and Patrick’s arguments concerning the equity of the sentence must be presented to the Sentence Review Division. 5 ¶23 We review for an abuse of discretion a district court’s decision concerning appointment of counsel, State v. Rose, 2009 MT 4 , 348 Mont. 291 , 202 P.3d 749 , and evidentiary rulings, including rulings on the admission of other a | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Rose
green
2 sentences2009The evidence of Patrick’s previous assault was offered for the proper purpose of establishing notice, and the expert testimony assisted the jury in understanding the evidence. ¶22 The District Court imposed a legal sentence within statutory parameters, and Patrick’s arguments concerning the equity of the sentence must be presented to the Sentence Review Division. 5 ¶23 We review for an abuse of discretion a district court’s decision concerning appointment of counsel, State v. Rose, 2009 MT 4 , 348 Mont. 291 , 202 P.3d 749 , and evidentiary rulings, including rulings on the admission of other a 2009The evidence of Patrick’s previous assault was offered for the proper purpose of establishing notice, and the expert testimony assisted the jury in understanding the evidence. ¶22 The District Court imposed a legal sentence within statutory parameters, and Patrick’s arguments concerning the equity of the sentence must be presented to the Sentence Review Division. 5 ¶23 We review for an abuse of discretion a district court’s decision concerning appointment of counsel, State v. Rose, 2009 MT 4 , 348 Mont. 291 , 202 P.3d 749 , and evidentiary rulings, including rulings on the admission of other a | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State ex rel. Sanford v. District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District ex rel. County of Carbon
neutral
2 sentences1998While earlier decisions placed greater emphasis on the length of delay without regard to demonstrable prejudice, see, e.g., Sanford, 170 Mont. 196 , 551 P.2d 1005 , later decisions have placed greater emphasis on the defendant’s failure to demonstrate prejudice regardless of the length of delay. 1998While earlier decisions placed greater emphasis on the length of delay without regard to demonstrable prejudice, see, e.g., Sanford, 170 Mont. 196 , 551 P.2d 1005 , later decisions have placed greater emphasis on the defendant’s failure to demonstrate prejudice regardless of the length of delay. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Fitzpatrick v. Crist
green
2 sentences1998See State v. Williams-Rusch (1996), 279 Mont. 437, 449 , 928 P.2d 169, 176-77 ; State v. Collier (1996), 277 Mont. 46, 54 , 919 P.2d 376, 382 . ¶24 Although we have been consistent in our statements that a delay sufficient to trigger further analysis also creates a presumption of prejudice, we have likewise been inconsistent in our application of that presumption. ¶25 We first discussed the effect of presumptive prejudice in Fitzpatrick, 165 Mont. at 388 , 528 P.2d at 1326 , where we were concerned with a delay of seven months. 1998See State v. Williams-Rusch (1996), 279 Mont. 437, 449 , 928 P.2d 169, 176-77 ; State v. Collier (1996), 277 Mont. 46, 54 , 919 P.2d 376, 382 . ¶24 Although we have been consistent in our statements that a delay sufficient to trigger further analysis also creates a presumption of prejudice, we have likewise been inconsistent in our application of that presumption. ¶25 We first discussed the effect of presumptive prejudice in Fitzpatrick, 165 Mont. at 388 , 528 P.2d at 1326 , where we were concerned with a delay of seven months. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
State Ex Rel. Sanford v. DISTRICT CT., 13TH JD
neutral
2 sentences1998While earlier decisions placed greater emphasis on the length of delay without regard to demonstrable prejudice, see, e.g., Sanford, 170 Mont. 196 , 551 P.2d 1005 , later decisions have placed greater emphasis on the defendant’s failure to demonstrate prejudice regardless of the length of delay. 1998While earlier decisions placed greater emphasis on the length of delay without regard to demonstrable prejudice, see, e.g., Sanford, 170 Mont. 196 , 551 P.2d 1005 , later decisions have placed greater emphasis on the defendant’s failure to demonstrate prejudice regardless of the length of delay. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
State v. Moore
red
2 sentences1998See Weeks, 270 Mont. at 72 , 891 P.2d at 482 ; Moore, 268 Mont. at 67 , 885 P.2d at 486 . 1998See Weeks, 270 Mont. at 72 , 891 P.2d at 482 ; Moore, 268 Mont. at 67 , 885 P.2d at 486 . | 1 | 1998–1998 |
State v. Matthews
green
2 sentences1997Williams-Rusch, *473 928 P.2d at 176 ; Matthews, 894 P.2d at 287 . 1997Williams-Rusch, *473 928 P.2d at 176 ; Matthews, 894 P.2d at 287 . | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| State v. Barker green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| State v. Atkins green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| State v. Hagberg green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| State v. Mantz green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| United States v. Loud Hawk green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| State v. Morris green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| State v. Hembd green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| John J. Carden, A/K/A James J. Carden, and Gloria (Eusek) Carden v. State of Montana green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Bowcut v. Jaarsma neutral | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| State v. Carden green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| State v. Ackley green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| State v. Palmer green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| State v. Hall green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| First American National Bank of Nashville v. Scarboro green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Schneider v. Bowes green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Premo Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co. green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| State v. Larson green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| State v. Tiedemann green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| State v. Cassidy green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| State v. Bretz green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| State v. Collins green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.