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6 Alaska opinions name it 2 courts 1991–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alaska courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Barker v. Wingogreen2 sentences2017KING & ORIN S. KERR, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 18.1(c), at 110 (3d ed. 2007)). 10 Id. at 1006. 11 Id. 12 Id. at 1006-07. 13 806 P.2d 330 (Alaska App. 1991). 14 546 P.2d 564 (Alaska 1976). -7- 7200 Turning to the trial court’s decision, the court of appeals found that the trial court had misapplied the four-factor Barker test.15 According to the court of appeals, the trial court erred in finding Wright partially responsible for the delay because after he left Alaska he “was not hiding out, and the State had avenues of locating him” that likely would have been productive.16 Further, the trial court s 2017KING & ORIN S. KERR, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 18.1(c), at 110 (3d ed. 2007)). 10 Id. at 1006. 11 Id. 12 Id. at 1006-07. 13 806 P.2d 330 (Alaska App. 1991). 14 546 P.2d 564 (Alaska 1976). -7- 7200 Turning to the trial court’s decision, the court of appeals found that the trial court had misapplied the four-factor Barker test.15 According to the court of appeals, the trial court erred in finding Wright partially responsible for the delay because after he left Alaska he “was not hiding out, and the State had avenues of locating him” that likely would have been productive.16 Further, the trial court s | 2 | 2 |
State v. Mousergreen2 sentences2024We will require the defendant to demonstrate prejudice in order to prevail.”). –6– 2772 But this Court adopted the Barker test in State v. Mouser.21 And as various commentators have explained, deducting the time attributable to the defendant for purposes of this initial threshold inquiry is inconsistent with the Barker test, which treats the reason for the delay as a separate factor to be considered if (and only if) the initial threshold under the first factor is met.22 For example, in his treatise on criminal procedure, Professor LaFave has explained: Some lower courts apply the first Barker 2024We will require the defendant to demonstrate prejudice in order to prevail.”). –6– 2772 But this Court adopted the Barker test in State v. Mouser.21 And as various commentators have explained, deducting the time attributable to the defendant for purposes of this initial threshold inquiry is inconsistent with the Barker test, which treats the reason for the delay as a separate factor to be considered if (and only if) the initial threshold under the first factor is met.22 For example, in his treatise on criminal procedure, Professor LaFave has explained: Some lower courts apply the first Barker | 1 | 3 |
Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beckgreen2 sentences2007See discussion of the Barker test in Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 880-86 (Alaska 1979). [36] Martech, 852 P.2d at 1149 n. 7 (citation omitted); see also Meyer v. State, 994 P.2d 365, 367 (Alaska 1999). [37] Martech, 852 P.2d at 1149 n. 7 (citation omitted). [38] Collateral estoppel, also known as issue preclusion, "is the doctrine that prevents the relitigation of an issue that was actually litigated and was a critical and necessary part of the earlier judgment. 2007See discussion of the Barker test in Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 880-86 (Alaska 1979). [36] Martech, 852 P.2d at 1149 n. 7 (citation omitted); see also Meyer v. State, 994 P.2d 365, 367 (Alaska 1999). [37] Martech, 852 P.2d at 1149 n. 7 (citation omitted). [38] Collateral estoppel, also known as issue preclusion, "is the doctrine that prevents the relitigation of an issue that was actually litigated and was a critical and necessary part of the earlier judgment. | 1 | 2 |
Davis v. Stategreen2 sentences2024LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure §18.2(b), at 130-32 (4th ed. 2015); State v. Serros, 366 P.3d 1121 , 1131 (N.M. 2015) (holding that the parties’ fault in causing the delay is irrelevant to the analysis of the first Barker factor). 23 LaFave, Criminal Procedure §18.2(b), at 132 (citation omitted). 24 See Mouser, 860 P.2d at 336, 339-41; Wright, 404 P.3d at 178 . 25 See, e.g., Alvarez v. Ketchikan Gateway Borough, 91 P.3d 289, 294-95 (Alaska App. 2004); Davis v. State, 133 P.3d 719, 725 (Alaska App. 2006); Tix v. State, 2011 WL 2437680 , at *4 (Alaska App. June 15, 2011) (unpublished); Sage v. 2024LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure §18.2(b), at 130-32 (4th ed. 2015); State v. Serros, 366 P.3d 1121 , 1131 (N.M. 2015) (holding that the parties’ fault in causing the delay is irrelevant to the analysis of the first Barker factor). 23 LaFave, Criminal Procedure §18.2(b), at 132 (citation omitted). 24 See Mouser, 860 P.2d at 336, 339-41; Wright, 404 P.3d at 178 . 25 See, e.g., Alvarez v. Ketchikan Gateway Borough, 91 P.3d 289, 294-95 (Alaska App. 2004); Davis v. State, 133 P.3d 719, 725 (Alaska App. 2006); Tix v. State, 2011 WL 2437680 , at *4 (Alaska App. June 15, 2011) (unpublished); Sage v. | 1 | 1 |
Braithwaite v. West Valley City Corp.green2 sentences2024LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure §18.2(b), at 130-32 (4th ed. 2015); State v. Serros, 366 P.3d 1121 , 1131 (N.M. 2015) (holding that the parties’ fault in causing the delay is irrelevant to the analysis of the first Barker factor). 23 LaFave, Criminal Procedure §18.2(b), at 132 (citation omitted). 24 See Mouser, 860 P.2d at 336, 339-41; Wright, 404 P.3d at 178 . 25 See, e.g., Alvarez v. Ketchikan Gateway Borough, 91 P.3d 289, 294-95 (Alaska App. 2004); Davis v. State, 133 P.3d 719, 725 (Alaska App. 2006); Tix v. State, 2011 WL 2437680 , at *4 (Alaska App. June 15, 2011) (unpublished); Sage v. 2024LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure §18.2(b), at 130-32 (4th ed. 2015); State v. Serros, 366 P.3d 1121 , 1131 (N.M. 2015) (holding that the parties’ fault in causing the delay is irrelevant to the analysis of the first Barker factor). 23 LaFave, Criminal Procedure §18.2(b), at 132 (citation omitted). 24 See Mouser, 860 P.2d at 336, 339-41; Wright, 404 P.3d at 178 . 25 See, e.g., Alvarez v. Ketchikan Gateway Borough, 91 P.3d 289, 294-95 (Alaska App. 2004); Davis v. State, 133 P.3d 719, 725 (Alaska App. 2006); Tix v. State, 2011 WL 2437680 , at *4 (Alaska App. June 15, 2011) (unpublished); Sage v. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Wrightgreen2 sentences2024We will require the defendant to demonstrate prejudice in order to prevail.”). –6– 2772 But this Court adopted the Barker test in State v. Mouser.21 And as various commentators have explained, deducting the time attributable to the defendant for purposes of this initial threshold inquiry is inconsistent with the Barker test, which treats the reason for the delay as a separate factor to be considered if (and only if) the initial threshold under the first factor is met.22 For example, in his treatise on criminal procedure, Professor LaFave has explained: Some lower courts apply the first Barker 2024We will require the defendant to demonstrate prejudice in order to prevail.”). –6– 2772 But this Court adopted the Barker test in State v. Mouser.21 And as various commentators have explained, deducting the time attributable to the defendant for purposes of this initial threshold inquiry is inconsistent with the Barker test, which treats the reason for the delay as a separate factor to be considered if (and only if) the initial threshold under the first factor is met.22 For example, in his treatise on criminal procedure, Professor LaFave has explained: Some lower courts apply the first Barker | 1 | 1 |
Alvarez v. Ketchikan Gateway Boroughgreen2 sentences2024LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure §18.2(b), at 130-32 (4th ed. 2015); State v. Serros, 366 P.3d 1121 , 1131 (N.M. 2015) (holding that the parties’ fault in causing the delay is irrelevant to the analysis of the first Barker factor). 23 LaFave, Criminal Procedure §18.2(b), at 132 (citation omitted). 24 See Mouser, 860 P.2d at 336, 339-41; Wright, 404 P.3d at 178 . 25 See, e.g., Alvarez v. Ketchikan Gateway Borough, 91 P.3d 289, 294-95 (Alaska App. 2004); Davis v. State, 133 P.3d 719, 725 (Alaska App. 2006); Tix v. State, 2011 WL 2437680 , at *4 (Alaska App. June 15, 2011) (unpublished); Sage v. 2024LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure §18.2(b), at 130-32 (4th ed. 2015); State v. Serros, 366 P.3d 1121 , 1131 (N.M. 2015) (holding that the parties’ fault in causing the delay is irrelevant to the analysis of the first Barker factor). 23 LaFave, Criminal Procedure §18.2(b), at 132 (citation omitted). 24 See Mouser, 860 P.2d at 336, 339-41; Wright, 404 P.3d at 178 . 25 See, e.g., Alvarez v. Ketchikan Gateway Borough, 91 P.3d 289, 294-95 (Alaska App. 2004); Davis v. State, 133 P.3d 719, 725 (Alaska App. 2006); Tix v. State, 2011 WL 2437680 , at *4 (Alaska App. June 15, 2011) (unpublished); Sage v. | 1 | 1 |
Martech Construction Co. v. Ogden Environmental Services, Inc.green2 sentences2007See discussion of the Barker test in Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 880-86 (Alaska 1979). [36] Martech, 852 P.2d at 1149 n. 7 (citation omitted); see also Meyer v. State, 994 P.2d 365, 367 (Alaska 1999). [37] Martech, 852 P.2d at 1149 n. 7 (citation omitted). [38] Collateral estoppel, also known as issue preclusion, "is the doctrine that prevents the relitigation of an issue that was actually litigated and was a critical and necessary part of the earlier judgment. 2007See discussion of the Barker test in Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 880-86 (Alaska 1979). [36] Martech, 852 P.2d at 1149 n. 7 (citation omitted); see also Meyer v. State, 994 P.2d 365, 367 (Alaska 1999). [37] Martech, 852 P.2d at 1149 n. 7 (citation omitted). [38] Collateral estoppel, also known as issue preclusion, "is the doctrine that prevents the relitigation of an issue that was actually litigated and was a critical and necessary part of the earlier judgment. | 1 | 1 |
Meyer v. State, Department of Revenue, Child Support Enforcement Division Ex Rel. N.G.T.green2 sentences2007See discussion of the Barker test in Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 880-86 (Alaska 1979). [36] Martech, 852 P.2d at 1149 n. 7 (citation omitted); see also Meyer v. State, 994 P.2d 365, 367 (Alaska 1999). [37] Martech, 852 P.2d at 1149 n. 7 (citation omitted). [38] Collateral estoppel, also known as issue preclusion, "is the doctrine that prevents the relitigation of an issue that was actually litigated and was a critical and necessary part of the earlier judgment. 2007See discussion of the Barker test in Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 880-86 (Alaska 1979). [36] Martech, 852 P.2d at 1149 n. 7 (citation omitted); see also Meyer v. State, 994 P.2d 365, 367 (Alaska 1999). [37] Martech, 852 P.2d at 1149 n. 7 (citation omitted). [38] Collateral estoppel, also known as issue preclusion, "is the doctrine that prevents the relitigation of an issue that was actually litigated and was a critical and necessary part of the earlier judgment. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alaska. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Yarbor v. State
green
2 sentences2017KING & ORIN S. KERR, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 18.1(c), at 110 (3d ed. 2007)). 10 Id. at 1006. 11 Id. 12 Id. at 1006-07. 13 806 P.2d 330 (Alaska App. 1991). 14 546 P.2d 564 (Alaska 1976). -7- 7200 Turning to the trial court’s decision, the court of appeals found that the trial court had misapplied the four-factor Barker test.15 According to the court of appeals, the trial court erred in finding Wright partially responsible for the delay because after he left Alaska he “was not hiding out, and the State had avenues of locating him” that likely would have been productive.16 Further, the trial court s 2017KING & ORIN S. KERR, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 18.1(c), at 110 (3d ed. 2007)). 10 Id. at 1006. 11 Id. 12 Id. at 1006-07. 13 806 P.2d 330 (Alaska App. 1991). 14 546 P.2d 564 (Alaska 1976). -7- 7200 Turning to the trial court’s decision, the court of appeals found that the trial court had misapplied the four-factor Barker test.15 According to the court of appeals, the trial court erred in finding Wright partially responsible for the delay because after he left Alaska he “was not hiding out, and the State had avenues of locating him” that likely would have been productive.16 Further, the trial court s | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Doggett v. United States
green
2 sentences2024Under this prior case law, the total length of delay is immaterial.17 Instead, to determine whether the length of delay qualifies as presumptively prejudicial, the delay that is attributable to the defendant is subtracted from the total length of delay.18 If the remaining length of delay is more than fourteen months, Alaska courts have treated the delay as “presumptively prejudicial” for purposes of the Alaska constitution’s speedy trial right.19 If the remaining length of delay is less than eight months, the defendant must demonstrate actual prejudice.20 15 Id. at 652 n.1. 2024Under this prior case law, the total length of delay is immaterial.17 Instead, to determine whether the length of delay qualifies as presumptively prejudicial, the delay that is attributable to the defendant is subtracted from the total length of delay.18 If the remaining length of delay is more than fourteen months, Alaska courts have treated the delay as “presumptively prejudicial” for purposes of the Alaska constitution’s speedy trial right.19 If the remaining length of delay is less than eight months, the defendant must demonstrate actual prejudice.20 15 Id. at 652 n.1. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Brown v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences1992While the social utility and value of prescription drugs as a class of products may exceed that of most other classes of products, we do not believe that this generalization warrants granting “the same protection from liability to those who gave us thalidomide as to the producers of penicillin.” 245 Cal.Rptr. at 423 , 751 P.2d at 481 . 1992While the social utility and value of prescription drugs as a class of products may exceed that of most other classes of products, we do not believe that this generalization warrants granting “the same protection from liability to those who gave us thalidomide as to the producers of penicillin.” 245 Cal.Rptr. at 423 , 751 P.2d at 481 . | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.