Barker factors in Texas

2026See, e.g., Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 286 (“[E]vidence of generalized anxiety, though relevant, is not sufficient proof of prejudice under the Barker test, especially when it is no greater anxiety or concern beyond the level normally associated with a criminal charge or investigation.”).

2026See, e.g., Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 286 (“[E]vidence of generalized anxiety, though relevant, is not sufficient proof of prejudice under the Barker test, especially when it is no greater anxiety or concern beyond the level normally associated with a criminal charge or investigation.”).

2026On Taylor’s petition for discretionary review, the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed, holding that the court of appeals erred in requiring a “specially-designated ‘Speedy Trial Hearing’” before weighing the Barker factors. 667 S.W.3d at 810; see also Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972).

2026On Taylor’s petition for discretionary review, the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed, holding that the court of appeals erred in requiring a “specially-designated ‘Speedy Trial Hearing’” before weighing the Barker factors. 667 S.W.3d at 810; see also Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972).

2026App. 2014) (concluding that a six-year delay “was more than adequate to find presumptive prejudice and trigger a full Barker analysis” and that “this factor—in and of itself—weighs heavily against the State”); Zamorano v. State, 84 S.W.3d 643, 649 (Tex. Crim.

2026App. 2014) (concluding that a six-year delay “was more than adequate to find presumptive prejudice and trigger a full Barker analysis” and that “this factor—in and of itself—weighs heavily against the State”); Zamorano v. State, 84 S.W.3d 643, 649 (Tex. Crim.

2025“As to the ‘oppressive pretrial incarceration’ subfactor, the ‘dispositive consideration’ is the impairment of a defendant’s liberty with its effects upon the defendant.” Munoz, 991 S.W.2d at 828 . “[E]vidence of generalized anxiety, though relevant, is not sufficient proof of prejudice under the Barker test, especially when it is no greater anxiety or concern beyond the level normally associated with a criminal charge or investigation.” Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 286 .

2025“As to the ‘oppressive pretrial incarceration’ subfactor, the ‘dispositive consideration’ is the impairment of a defendant’s liberty with its effects upon the defendant.” Munoz, 991 S.W.2d at 828 . “[E]vidence of generalized anxiety, though relevant, is not sufficient proof of prejudice under the Barker test, especially when it is no greater anxiety or concern beyond the level normally associated with a criminal charge or investigation.” Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 286 .

2026Dragoo v. State, 96 S.W.3d 308, 314 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (“In general, courts deem delay approaching one year to be ‘unreasonable enough to trigger the Barker inquiry.’”) (quoting Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652 (1992)).

2026Dragoo v. State, 96 S.W.3d 308, 314 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (“In general, courts deem delay approaching one year to be ‘unreasonable enough to trigger the Barker inquiry.’”) (quoting Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652 (1992)).

2026While an evaluation of the Barker factors includes fact determinations and legal conclusions, "the balancing test as a whole is a purely legal question that we review de novo." Balderas v. State, 517 S.W.3d 756, 767-68 (Tex. Crim.

2026Review of the individual Barker factors involves both factual determinations as well as legal conclusions, but “the balancing test as a whole is a purely legal question that we review de novo.” Lopez, 631 S.W.3d at 114 (quoting Balderas, 517 S.W.3d at 768 ).

2021See generally Lopez v. State, No. 12-16-00043-CR, 2016 WL 7488864 , at *5 (Tex. App.—Tyler Dec. 30, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (two and one-half year delay not presumptively excessive); State v. Wray, No. 05– 01-01799–CR, 2002 WL 1763567 , at *4 (Tex. App.–Dallas July 31, 2002, pet. ref’d, untimely filed) (not designated for publication) (delay of twenty-five months not presumptively prejudicial even though sufficient to trigger Barker analysis) (citing Sanders v. State, 978 S.W.2d 597, 605 (Tex. App.–Tyler 1997, pet. ref’d)); see also Clarke v. State, 928 S.W.2d

2020See State v. Wray, No. 05-01-01799-CR, 2002 WL 1763567 , at *4 (Tex. App.–Dallas July 31, 2002, pet. ref’d, untimely filed) (op., not designated for publication) (delay of twenty-five months not presumptively prejudicial even though sufficient to trigger Barker analysis) (citing Sanders v. State, 978 S.W.2d 597, 605 (Tex. App.–Tyler 1997, pet. ref’d)); see also Clarke v. State, 928 S.W.2d 709, 717 (Tex. App.–Fort Worth 1996, pet. ref’d) (concluding no presumptive prejudice in case where delay in bringing appellant to retrial on punishment was two years and five months after Supreme Court denie

2025“Texas courts apply the same Barker test for speedy-trial analysis under state law as under federal law.” Id.; see Harris v. State, 827 S.W.2d 949, 956 (Tex. Crim.

2025The Zamorano court wrote that, in a “plain-vanilla DWI case, a delay of two years and ten months[] was sufficiently lengthy to trigger the court of appeals’ analysis of the other 3 Barker factors.” Id.

2024As a result, although it is relevant, it “is not sufficient proof of prejudice under the Barker test.” Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 286 (citing Shaw v. State, 117 S.W.3d 883, 890 (Tex. Crim.

2024As a result, although it is relevant, it “is not sufficient proof of prejudice under the Barker test.” Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 286 (citing Shaw v. State, 117 S.W.3d 883, 890 (Tex. Crim.

2026See Gonzales, 435 S.W.3d at 808 (stating that the defendant must make a threshold showing before the court is required to consider and weigh all Barker factors); Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 280 (specifying that the State has the burden to justify the length of the delay).

2024When reviewing an application of the Barker balancing test, “we give almost total deference to historical findings of fact of the trial court that the record supports . . . , but we review de novo whether there was sufficient presumptive prejudice to proceed to a Barker analysis and the weighing of the Barker factors, which are legal questions.” Gonzales, 435 S.W.3d at 808–09.

2018“Review of the individual Barker factors necessarily involves fact determinations and legal conclusions, but the balancing test as a whole is a purely legal question that we review de novo.” Id. (citing Johnson v. State, 954 S.W.2d 770, 771 (Tex. Crim.

2018“Review of the individual Barker factors necessarily involves fact determinations and legal conclusions, but the balancing test as a whole is a purely legal question that we review de novo.” Id. (citing Johnson v. State, 954 S.W.2d 770, 771 (Tex. Crim.

2026Once the Barker analysis is triggered, we then analyze the second part of the inquiry—“to what extent [the delay] stretches beyond this triggering length.” Hopper, 520 S.W.3d at 924 .

2026Once the Barker analysis is triggered, we then analyze the second part of the inquiry—“to what extent [the delay] stretches beyond this triggering length.” Hopper, 520 S.W.3d at 924 .

2025“Because dismissal of the charges is a radical remedy, a wooden application of the Barker factors would infringe upon ‘the societal interest in trying people accused of crime, rather than granting them immunization because of legal error.’” Id. (internal footnote omitted) (quoting United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 121 (1966)).

2025“Because dismissal of the charges is a radical remedy, a wooden application of the Barker factors would infringe upon ‘the societal interest in trying people accused of crime, rather than granting them immunization because of legal error.’” Id. (internal footnote omitted) (quoting United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 121 (1966)).

2008Id. (citing Barker , 407 U.S. at 530 , 92 S. Ct. at 2192 ). “ In conducting a speedy trial analysis under the Barker test, we review legal issues de novo but give deference to a trial court’s resolution of factual issues.” Kelly v. State , 163 S.W.3d 722, 726 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).

2008App. 1997) (in reviewing trial courts’ decisions on federal constitutional speedy-trial claims, appellate courts may conduct de novo review by independently weighing and balancing the four Barker factors). 30 Zamorano, 84 S.W.3d at 648 n.19. 31 163 S.W.3d 722, 726 (Tex. Crim.

2024“At least two of the Barker factors (the reason for the delay and the prejudice to the accused) are fact-specific inquiries and may not be readily apparent from the trial record.” Id.

2024“At least two of the Barker factors (the reason for the delay and the prejudice to the accused) are fact-specific inquiries and may not be readily apparent from the trial record.” Id.

2019See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 , 530-32, 92 S. Ct. 2182 , 2191-93 (1972) (creating test under federal constitution); Cantu v. State, 253 S.W.3d 273 , 280 n.16 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (stating that test under Texas constitution uses same four Barker factors); see also State v. Jones, 168 S.W.3d 339 , 346-52 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, pet. ref’d) (applying Barker factors to motion to dismiss for alleged speedy-trial violation). 15 Once the Barker test is triggered, courts analyze the claim by weighing the strength of the four factors and balancing their relative weights in light of both the State

2019See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 , 530-32, 92 S. Ct. 2182 , 2191-93 (1972) (creating test under federal constitution); Cantu v. State, 253 S.W.3d 273 , 280 n.16 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (stating that test under Texas constitution uses same four Barker factors); see also State v. Jones, 168 S.W.3d 339 , 346-52 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, pet. ref’d) (applying Barker factors to motion to dismiss for alleged speedy-trial violation). 15 Once the Barker test is triggered, courts analyze the claim by weighing the strength of the four factors and balancing their relative weights in light of both the State

2020“The Barker test is triggered by a delay that is unreasonable enough to be ‘presumptively prejudicial.’” Id. at 281 (citing Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 , 652 n.1 (1992)).

2020“The Barker test is triggered by a delay that is unreasonable enough to be ‘presumptively prejudicial.’” Id. at 281 (citing Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 , 652 n.1 (1992)).

2022Although there is no set amount of time that is necessary to trigger the Barker analysis, the Court of Criminal Appeals has “held that a delay of four months is not sufficient while a seventeen-month delay”—such as the delay at issue here—“is [sufficient].” Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 281 (reciting Barker rules in an enhanced DWI case); see Phillips v. State, 650 S.W.2d 396, 399 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1983) (holding that 17-month delay between time appellant was first indicted for rape and time of trial was sufficient to trigger Barker analysis).11 Therefore Black has met her threshold burden t

2022Although there is no set amount of time that is necessary to trigger the Barker analysis, the Court of Criminal Appeals has “held that a delay of four months is not sufficient while a seventeen-month delay”—such as the delay at issue here—“is [sufficient].” Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 281 (reciting Barker rules in an enhanced DWI case); see Phillips v. State, 650 S.W.2d 396, 399 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1983) (holding that 17-month delay between time appellant was first indicted for rape and time of trial was sufficient to trigger Barker analysis).11 Therefore Black has met her threshold burden t

2022Reasons for the Delay “If a presumptively prejudicial delay has occurred, the State bears the initial burden of justifying the delay.” Harper, 567 S.W.3d at 459 ; see Emery, 881 S.W.2d at 708 .

2022Reasons for the Delay “If a presumptively prejudicial delay has occurred, the State bears the initial burden of justifying the delay.” Harper, 567 S.W.3d at 459 ; see Emery, 881 S.W.2d at 708 .

2022In other words, although Taylor “raised the speedy trial issue below, there is no meaningful evidentiary record from which we can apply, analyze, or balance the Barker factors.” Grimaldo v. State, 130 S.W.3d 450, 454 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2004, no pet.).

2022In other words, although Taylor “raised the speedy trial issue below, there is no meaningful evidentiary record from which we can apply, analyze, or balance the Barker factors.” Grimaldo v. State, 130 S.W.3d 450, 454 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2004, no pet.).

2008Zamorano v. State, 84 S.W.3d 643, 648 (Tex.Crim.App.2002); State v. Munoz, 991 S.W.2d 818, 821 (Tex.Crim.App.1999) (setting out standard); Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex.Crim.App.1997) (reviewing courts should "afford almost total deference to a trial court’s determination of the historical facts that the record supports"); Johnson v. State, 954 S.W.2d 770, 771 (Tex.Crim.App.1997) (in reviewing trial courts’ decisions on federal constitutional speedy-trial claims, appellate courts may conduct de novo review by independently weighing and balancing the four Barker factors). 30 .

2005See State v. Munoz, 991 S.W.2d 818, 821 (Tex.Crim.App.1999) (citing Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex.Crim.App.1997)) (appellate courts should afford almost total deference to a trial court’s determination of the historical facts that are supported by the record); Johnson v. State, 954 S.W.2d 770, 771 (Tex.Crim.App.1997) (appellate courts conduct de novo review by independently weighing and balancing the four Barker factors 7 ).

2013See, e.g., Holmes v. State, 938 S.W.2d 488 , 489–91 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1996, no pet.).

2009See, e.g., Holmes v. State , 938 S.W.2d 488, 489-91 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 1996, no pet.).

2006Emery , 881 S.W.2d at 708 ; Lott v. State , 951 S.W.2d 489, 493 (Tex.App.--El Paso 1997, pet. ref’d).

2006Emery , 881 S.W.2d at 708 ; Lott v. State , 951 S.W.2d 489, 493 (Tex.App.--El Paso 1997, pet. ref’d).

2020Although there is no set time that triggers a Barker analysis, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals “ha[s] held that a delay of four months is not sufficient while a seventeen-month delay is.” Id. (citing Pete v. State, 501 S.W.2d 683, 687 (Tex. Crim.

2020Although there is no set time that triggers a Barker analysis, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals “ha[s] held that a delay of four months is not sufficient while a seventeen-month delay is.” Id. (citing Pete v. State, 501 S.W.2d 683, 687 (Tex. Crim.

2008See Russell v. State , 90 S.W.3d 865, 874-75 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 2002, pet. denied) (holding that lack of prejudice outweighs the remaining Barker factors); see also Guajardo , 999 S.W.2d at 571 (holding that, where first three Barker factors clearly weigh in favor of the appellant, lack of prejudice outweighs remaining factors).

2008See Russell v. State , 90 S.W.3d 865, 874-75 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 2002, pet. denied) (holding that lack of prejudice outweighs the remaining Barker factors); see also Guajardo , 999 S.W.2d at 571 (holding that, where first three Barker factors clearly weigh in favor of the appellant, lack of prejudice outweighs remaining factors).

2023As a result, we do not address that claim in this opinion. -9- two of the Barker factors (the reason for delay and the prejudice to the accused) are fact-specific inquiries and may not be readily apparent from the trial record.” Henson v. State, 407 S.W.3d 764, 769 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); see also Newcomb v. State, 547 S.W.2d 37, 38 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (“If we were to consider this issue [of violation of a defendant’s right to a speedy trial], which by nature of the applicable balancing test requires a full development of the facts, on our own motion, it would be necessary to abate the case

2023As a result, we do not address that claim in this opinion. -9- two of the Barker factors (the reason for delay and the prejudice to the accused) are fact-specific inquiries and may not be readily apparent from the trial record.” Henson v. State, 407 S.W.3d 764, 769 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); see also Newcomb v. State, 547 S.W.2d 37, 38 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (“If we were to consider this issue [of violation of a defendant’s right to a speedy trial], which by nature of the applicable balancing test requires a full development of the facts, on our own motion, it would be necessary to abate the case

2013The Barker test is triggered by a delay that is unreasonable enough to be ―presumptively prejudicial.‖ Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 , 652 n.1, 112 S. Ct. 2686 , 2691 n.1 (1992); Murphy v. State, 280 S.W.3d 445, 451 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, pet. ref‘d).

2013The Barker test is triggered by a delay that is unreasonable enough to be ―presumptively prejudicial.‖ Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 , 652 n.1, 112 S. Ct. 2686 , 2691 n.1 (1992); Murphy v. State, 280 S.W.3d 445, 451 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, pet. ref‘d).

2024Webb, 36 S.W.3d at 176 ; Conatser, 645 S.W.3d at 931. 4) Barker Balancing After a review of the Barker factors, we uphold the trial court’s ruling denying Diaz’s motion for a speedy trial.

2024Webb, 36 S.W.3d at 176 ; Conatser, 645 S.W.3d at 931. 4) Barker Balancing After a review of the Barker factors, we uphold the trial court’s ruling denying Diaz’s motion for a speedy trial.

2019Compare id. (stating that because delay of more than eight years was “far beyond” the minimum threshold to trigger Barker inquiry, the length-of-delay factor weighed “heavily” in defendant’s favor), and Orand v. State, 254 S.W.3d 560, 566 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, pet. ref’d) (stating that because delay of nearly twelve years was “far, far beyond” the minimum threshold to trigger Barker inquiry, the length-of-delay factor weighed “extremely heavily” in defendant’s favor), with State v. Fisher, 198 S.W.3d 332, 338 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2006, pet. ref’d) (stating that presumptively prejudicial

2011Length of delay ―The Barker test is triggered by a delay that is unreasonable enough to be ‗presumptively prejudicial.‘ There is no set time element that triggers the analysis, but [the court of criminal appeals has] held that a delay of four months is not sufficient while a seventeen-month delay is.‖ Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 281 ; see Murphy, 280 S.W.3d at 451 ; Orand, 254 S.W.3d at 566 (―The length of delay between the initial charge and the trial acts as a triggering mechanism, and unless the length of this delay is presumptively prejudicial, courts need not 10 inquire into or examine the other