68 Louisiana opinions name it 2 courts 1983–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Louisiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Reavesgreen2 sentences2019“In determining whether a defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated, courts consider the four Barker factors: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reason for delay; (3) the assertion of his right to speedy trial; and (4) the prejudice resulting from the delay.” Love, 00- 3347, p.15, 847 So.2d at 1210 (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972)); see also State v. Reaves, 376 So.2d 136 (La. 1979) (adopting Barker). 2017Id. at 531-532 , 92 S.Ct. at 2192-93 ; see also State v. Reaves , 376 So.2d 136 (La.1979) (adopting Barker factors). | 10 | 21 |
State v. Santiagogreen2 sentences2006In State v. Santiago, XXXX-XXXX (La.App. 4 Cir. 7/23/03), 853 So.2d 671 , this Court considered all of the Barker factors even though it found that a fifteen-month delay was not presumptively prejudicial. 2006In State v. Santiago, XXXX-XXXX (La.App. 4 Cir. 7/23/03), 853 So.2d 671 , this Court considered all of the Barker factors even though it found that a fifteen-month delay was not presumptively prejudicial. | 8 | 16 |
State v. Scottgreen2 sentences2013See State v. Brown, 11-0947 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/7/12) , 88 So.3d 662 ; State v. Scott, 04-1142 (La.App. 4 Cir. 7/27/05) , 913 So.2d 843 ; State v. Santiago, 03-0693 (La.App. 4 Cir. 7/23/03) , 853 So.2d 671 . 2013See State v. Brown, 2011-0947 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/7/12) , 88 So.3d 662 ; State v. Scott, 2004-1142 (La.App. 4 Cir. 7/27/05) , 913 So.2d 843 ; State v. Santiago, 2003-0693 (La.App. 4 Cir. 7/23/03) , 853 So.2d 671 . | 5 | 7 |
State v. DeRouengreen2 sentences2007The first of the factors the length of the delay has been held by Louisiana courts to be the "triggering mechanism" and "absent a presumptively prejudicial delay, further inquiry into the Barker factors is unnecessary." State v. DeRouen, 96-0725 (La.App. 4 Cir. 6/26/96) , 678 So.2d 39, 40 . 2007The first of the factors the length of the delay has been held by Louisiana courts to be the "triggering mechanism" and "absent a presumptively prejudicial delay, further inquiry into the Barker factors is unnecessary." State v. DeRouen, 96-0725 (La.App. 4 Cir. 6/26/96) , 678 So.2d 39, 40 . | 4 | 5 |
State v. Lovegreen2 sentences2025As explained by this Court in Andrews, “[n]one of the four Barker factors is ‘either a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right to a speedy trial,” but rather “are related and must be considered together in light of the circumstances of each case.” Id. at pp. 8-9, 255 So.3d at 1113 (quoting State v. Love, 2000-3347, p. 15 (La. 5/23/03), 847 So.2d 1198, 1210 ). (1) The Length of Delay Though the Barker factors must be considered together, this Court has explained that “[t]he first [Barker] factor, the length of the delay, is a ‘triggering mechanism’ for fur 2025As explained by this Court in Andrews, “[n]one of the four Barker factors is ‘either a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right to a speedy trial,” but rather “are related and must be considered together in light of the circumstances of each case.” Id. at pp. 8-9, 255 So.3d at 1113 (quoting State v. Love, 2000-3347, p. 15 (La. 5/23/03), 847 So.2d 1198, 1210 ). (1) The Length of Delay Though the Barker factors must be considered together, this Court has explained that “[t]he first [Barker] factor, the length of the delay, is a ‘triggering mechanism’ for fur | 3 | 18 |
United States v. Jose Avalos and Rudolfo Castrillongreen2 sentences2024State v. Love, citing United States v. Avalos, 541 F. 2d 1100 (5 Cir., 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 970 , 97 S. Ct. 1656 , 52 L. 2024State v. Love, citing United States v. Avalos, 541 F. 2d 1100 (5 Cir., 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 970 , 97 S. Ct. 1656 , 52 L. | 3 | 4 |
State v. Browngreen2 sentences2016“The first Barker factor, the length of the delay, is a threshold requirement for invoking a speedy trial, analysis; it functions as a triggering mechanism for further inquiry into the other three Barker factors.” State v. Brown, 2011-0947, p. 9 (La.App, 4 Cir. 3/7/12), 88 So.3d 662, 668 , citing State v. Love, 2000-3347, p. 16 (La. 5/23/03), 847 So.2d 1198, 1210 , “Only if there is a presumptively prejudicial’ delay will courts proceed to analyze the other Barker factors.” Id. 2016“The first Barker factor, the length of the delay, is a threshold requirement for invoking a speedy trial, analysis; it functions as a triggering mechanism for further inquiry into the other three Barker factors.” State v. Brown, 2011-0947, p. 9 (La.App, 4 Cir. 3/7/12), 88 So.3d 662, 668 , citing State v. Love, 2000-3347, p. 16 (La. 5/23/03), 847 So.2d 1198, 1210 , “Only if there is a presumptively prejudicial’ delay will courts proceed to analyze the other Barker factors.” Id. | 3 | 4 |
Barker v. Wingogreen2 sentences2020Id., 407 U.S. at 530 , 92 S. Ct. at 2192 The Louisiana Supreme Court has explained: The first of the Barker factors, the length of the delay, is a threshold requirement for courts reviewing speedy trial claims. 2020Id., 407 U.S. at 530 , 92 S. Ct. at 2192 The Louisiana Supreme Court has explained: The first of the Barker factors, the length of the delay, is a threshold requirement for courts reviewing speedy trial claims. | 2 | 18 |
State v. Harrisgreen2 sentences2007See, State v. Love, 2000-3347 (La.5/23/03), 847 So.2d 1198 , and State v. Harris, 2003-0524 (La.App. 4 Cir. 9/10/03) , 857 So.2d 16 . 2007See, State v. Love, 2000-3347 (La.5/23/03), 847 So.2d 1198 , and State v. Harris, 2003-0524 (La.App. 4 Cir. 9/10/03) , 857 So.2d 16 . | 2 | 2 |
Doggett v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2010In applying the Barker factors to Dog-gett’s case, the Court recognized that such an inquiry involved four separate questions: “whether delay before trial was |3uncommonly long, whether the government or the criminal defendant is more to blame for that delay, whether, in due course, the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial, and whether he suffered prejudice as the delay’s result.” Doggett, 505 U.S. at 651 , 112 S.Ct. 2686 (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 , 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2192 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 ). 3 In determining whether the delay “has crossed the threshold dividing ordinary 2010In applying the Barker factors to Dog-gett’s case, the Court recognized that such an inquiry involved four separate questions: “whether delay before trial was |3uncommonly long, whether the government or the criminal defendant is more to blame for that delay, whether, in due course, the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial, and whether he suffered prejudice as the delay’s result.” Doggett, 505 U.S. at 651 , 112 S.Ct. 2686 (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 , 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2192 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 ). 3 In determining whether the delay “has crossed the threshold dividing ordinary | 1 | 3 |
State v. Batistegreen2 sentences2014“The circumstances of a case will determine the weight to be ascribed to the length of and reason for the delay.” Batiste , 2005-1571, p. 7, 939 So.2d at 1250 . “[T]he delay that can be tolerated for an ordinary street crime is considerably less than for a serious, complex conspiracy charge.” Reaves, 376 So.2d at 138 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 531 , 92 S.Ct. at 2192 ). 2014“The circumstances of a case will determine the weight to be ascribed to the length of and reason for the delay.” Batiste , 2005-1571, p. 7, 939 So.2d at 1250 . “[T]he delay that can be tolerated for an ordinary street crime is considerably less than for a serious, complex conspiracy charge.” Reaves, 376 So.2d at 138 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 531 , 92 S.Ct. at 2192 ). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Van Dykegreen2 sentences2011In the matter before us, however, the vast majority of the delays are attributable to the defense.” Id. at 199. 2011In the matter before us, however, the vast majority of the delays are attributable to the defense.” Id. at 199. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Andrews (In re Andrews)green2 sentences2025As explained by this Court in Andrews, “[n]one of the four Barker factors is ‘either a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right to a speedy trial,” but rather “are related and must be considered together in light of the circumstances of each case.” Id. at pp. 8-9, 255 So.3d at 1113 (quoting State v. Love, 2000-3347, p. 15 (La. 5/23/03), 847 So.2d 1198, 1210 ). (1) The Length of Delay Though the Barker factors must be considered together, this Court has explained that “[t]he first [Barker] factor, the length of the delay, is a ‘triggering mechanism’ for fur 2025As explained by this Court in Andrews, “[n]one of the four Barker factors is ‘either a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right to a speedy trial,” but rather “are related and must be considered together in light of the circumstances of each case.” Id. at pp. 8-9, 255 So.3d at 1113 (quoting State v. Love, 2000-3347, p. 15 (La. 5/23/03), 847 So.2d 1198, 1210 ). (1) The Length of Delay Though the Barker factors must be considered together, this Court has explained that “[t]he first [Barker] factor, the length of the delay, is a ‘triggering mechanism’ for fur | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Jonesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Mathewsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Bergfeldgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Serna-Villarrealgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Shannongreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Carnie Simmons, A/K/A Haroldgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Simmons v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Stewartgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Jamesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Jamesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. MacDonaldgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Louisiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Leban
green
2 sentences2010Noting that the delay was presumptively prejudicial, this Court considered the Barker factors, and without specifically determining whether the defendant was prejudiced 11sby the delay, found that taking all the factors into consideration, the judgment granting the motion to quash was proper. 20 Leban, 611 So.2d at 169 . 2010Noting that the delay was presumptively prejudicial, this Court considered the Barker factors, and without specifically determining whether the defendant was prejudiced 11sby the delay, found that taking all the factors into consideration, the judgment granting the motion to quash was proper. 20 Leban, 611 So.2d at 169 . | 4 | 1997–2012 |
State v. Pham
green
2 sentences2007For example, in State v. Pham, 97-0459 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/26/97) , 692 So.2d 11 , this court found that a nine-month delay for a defendant forced to travel from Houston to New Orleans after being charged with cheating at gaming did not merit the granting of a motion to quash. 2007For example, in State v. Pham, 97-0459 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/26/97) , 692 So.2d 11 , this court found that a nine-month delay for a defendant forced to travel from Houston to New Orleans after being charged with cheating at gaming did not merit the granting of a motion to quash. | 4 | 2006–2007 |
Curry v. Califano
green
2 sentences2024State v. Love, citing United States v. Avalos, 541 F. 2d 1100 (5 Cir., 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 970 , 97 S. Ct. 1656 , 52 L. 2024State v. Love, citing United States v. Avalos, 541 F. 2d 1100 (5 Cir., 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 970 , 97 S. Ct. 1656 , 52 L. | 3 | 2003–2024 |
Casper v. United States
green
2 sentences2024State v. Love, citing United States v. Avalos, 541 F. 2d 1100 (5 Cir., 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 970 , 97 S. Ct. 1656 , 52 L. 2024State v. Love, citing United States v. Avalos, 541 F. 2d 1100 (5 Cir., 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 970 , 97 S. Ct. 1656 , 52 L. | 3 | 2003–2024 |
Harbolt v. McCune
green
2 sentences2024State v. Love, citing United States v. Avalos, 541 F. 2d 1100 (5 Cir., 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 970 , 97 S. Ct. 1656 , 52 L. 2024State v. Love, citing United States v. Avalos, 541 F. 2d 1100 (5 Cir., 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 970 , 97 S. Ct. 1656 , 52 L. | 3 | 2003–2024 |
State v. Firshing
green
2 sentences2010In Firshing , this Court applied the Barker factors to the facts of the case, noting that with regard to prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the delay, defendant asserted that “he has had to appear in court repeatedly and to retain counsel for this protracted litigation.” Firshing, 624 So.2d at 926 . 2010In Firshing , this Court applied the Barker factors to the facts of the case, noting that with regard to prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the delay, defendant asserted that “he has had to appear in court repeatedly and to retain counsel for this protracted litigation.” Firshing, 624 So.2d at 926 . | 3 | 2005–2010 |
State v. Bell
green
2 sentences2020Cf.State v. Bell, 13- 0117 ( La. 9/ 27/ 13), 122 So. 3d 1007 ; Love, 847 So. 2d at 1210 . 2014See also State v. Mathews, 129 So.3d at 1218-19 (per curiam) (15 and one-half months delay was not presumptively prejudicial and did not require an inquiry into the remaining three Barker factors); State v. Bell, 13-117 (La.9/27/13), 122 So.3d 1007 (per curiam) (defendant’s right to a speedy trial was not violated by the 30-month delay where defendant was shown to be an active party in delay, failed to object to ^continuances, and made no formal speedy trial claim until motion to quash). | 2 | 2014–2020 |
State v. Johnson
green
2 sentences2009In State v. Johnson, 622 So.2d 845 (La.App. 4th Cir.1993), a delay of twenty-two months was found not to be excessive. 2009In State v. Johnson, 622 So.2d 845 (La.App. 4th Cir.1993), a delay of twenty-two months was found not to be excessive. | 2 | 2008–2009 |
State v. Brown
neutral
2 sentences2009App. 4 Cir. 7/27/94), 641 So.2d 687 , did not specifically state that nineteen months was presumptively prejudicial, but we nevertheless considered all the Barker factors. 2009App. 4 Cir. 7/27/94), 641 So.2d 687 , did not specifically state that nineteen months was presumptively prejudicial, but we nevertheless considered all the Barker factors. | 2 | 2008–2009 |
State v. Willis
neutral
2 sentences2005Id. 2005Id. | 2 | 2003–2005 |
State v. James
green
2 sentences1988State v. James, 394 So.2d 1197 (La.1981); State v. Reaves, 376 So.2d 136 (La.1979). 1988State v. James, 394 So.2d 1197 (La.1981); State v. Reaves, 376 So.2d 136 (La.1979). | 2 | 1986–1988 |
State v. Gaines
green
2 sentences2025App. 4 Cir. 2/11/09), 5 So.3d 915, 917 ; and then citing State v. DeRouen, 1996-0725, p. 3 (La. 2025App. 4 Cir. 2/11/09), 5 So.3d 915, 917 ; and then citing State v. DeRouen, 1996-0725, p. 3 (La. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Sanders
green
1 sentence2025App. 4 Cir. 11/14/12) 104 So. 3d 619, 626 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State ex rel. L.L.
green
2 sentences2019L.L., 09-0595, p.3, 23 So.3d at 973 , our Court applied the Barker factors in a juvenile case. 2019L.L., 09-0595, p.3, 23 So.3d at 973 , our Court applied the Barker factors in a juvenile case. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Smith
green
2 sentences2018App. 4 Cir. 11/23/16), 204 So.3d 1035 , 1038, applying the Mathews method of calculation, this Court found that a twenty-five month delay on a charge of possession of heroin arguably constituted a presumptively prejudicial delay that triggered the consideration of the remaining Barker factors. 6 In State v. Noel , supra , this Court found that a nineteen-month delay from the filing of the bill of information charging simple burglary of an outdoor shed was sufficiently great to trigger an analysis of the three remaining Barker factors. 2018App. 4 Cir. 11/23/16), 204 So.3d 1035 , 1038, applying the Mathews method of calculation, this Court found that a twenty-five month delay on a charge of possession of heroin arguably constituted a presumptively prejudicial delay that triggered the consideration of the remaining Barker factors. 6 In State v. Noel , supra , this Court found that a nineteen-month delay from the filing of the bill of information charging simple burglary of an outdoor shed was sufficiently great to trigger an analysis of the three remaining Barker factors. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Toney
green
2 sentences2016The State relies in part on State v. Toney, 2002-0992 (La.4/9/03), 842 So.2d 1083 , wherein the Louisiana Supreme Court distinguished both McQueen and Broussard , finding that a seventeen-month delay between the filing of the multiple bill of information, and: the hearing on the multiple bill was not an unreasonable delay where 1 there was. no evidence that the State engaged.-in dilatory tactics nor was the defendant surprised by the filing of the multiple bill: ■ Ifi the instant case, we cannot say that dilatory tactics of the district attorney caused the delay between the filing of the multi 2016The State relies in part on State v. Toney, 2002-0992 (La.4/9/03), 842 So.2d 1083 , wherein the Louisiana Supreme Court distinguished both McQueen and Broussard , finding that a seventeen-month delay between the filing of the multiple bill of information, and: the hearing on the multiple bill was not an unreasonable delay where 1 there was. no evidence that the State engaged.-in dilatory tactics nor was the defendant surprised by the filing of the multiple bill: ■ Ifi the instant case, we cannot say that dilatory tactics of the district attorney caused the delay between the filing of the multi | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Richardson
green
2 sentences2016Id. at pp. 15-18, 155 So.3d at 95-97 . 2016Id. at pp. 15-18, 155 So.3d at 95-97 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| State v. Esteen green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| State v. Esteen green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| State v. King green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| State v. Lee green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| State v. Ervin green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| State v. Lollis green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| State v. Cowger green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| State v. Shanklin green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| State v. Scott green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| State v. Bias green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| State v. Dees green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| State v. Chambers green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| State v. Brown green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| State v. Brown neutral | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| State v. Larce green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| State v. Trotter green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| United States v. Loud Hawk green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| United States v. Banco Cafetero Panama, Banco Cafetero Colon, Defendants-In-Rem-Appellants green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| United States v. Eight Thousand Eight Hundred & Fifty Dollars green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| State v. Leban green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| State v. Hicks green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Castaneda v. Partida green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| State v. Dewey green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.