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8 Oregon opinions name it 2 courts 1977–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Ivorygreen2 sentences2000As noted, in Ivory this court explained that the speedy-trial provision in Article I, section 10, is equivalent to the speedy trial provided in the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and. that the Barker test generally is the appropriate methodology for testing the requirement of Article I, section 10. 278 Or at 504 . 2000As noted, in Ivory this court explained that the speedy-trial provision in Article I, section 10, is equivalent to the speedy trial provided in the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and. that the Barker test generally is the appropriate methodology for testing the requirement of Article I, section 10. 278 Or at 504 . | 2 | 4 |
State v. Harbertsgreen2 sentences2021See Harberts, 331 Or at 87 (“Although this court endorsed the Barker analysis in Ivory, it subsequently acknowledged that not all the Barker analysis is appropriate for evaluating claims under Article I, section 10,” including that a defendant is no longer required to demand a speedy trial.). 2021See Harberts, 331 Or at 87 (“Although this court endorsed the Barker analysis in Ivory, it subsequently acknowledged that not all the Barker analysis is appropriate for evaluating claims under Article I, section 10,” including that a defendant is no longer required to demand a speedy trial.). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Vawtergreen2 sentences2000Instead, the court took the rather dramatic step of eliminating a factor from the Barker analysis in a footnote containing nothing more than a citation to Vawter, 236 Or. at 87 , 386 P.2d 915 , for the proposition that "this court has consistently held that it is not incumbent upon the accused to demand a trial[.]" Dykast, 300 Or. at 375 n. 6, 712 P.2d 79 . 2000Instead, the court took the rather dramatic step of eliminating a factor from the Barker analysis in a footnote containing nothing more than a citation to Vawter, 236 Or at 87 , for the proposition that “this court has consistently held that it is not incumbent upon the accused to demand a trial[.]” Dykast, 300 Or at 375 n 6. | 1 | 2 |
Barker v. Wingogreen2 sentences2000Id. at 508, 92 S.Ct. 2182 . [8] Although this court endorsed the Barker analysis in Ivory, it subsequently acknowledged that not all the Barker analysis is appropriate for evaluating claims under Article I, section 10. 2000Id. at 508, 92 S.Ct. 2182 . [8] Although this court endorsed the Barker analysis in Ivory, it subsequently acknowledged that not all the Barker analysis is appropriate for evaluating claims under Article I, section 10. | 1 | 2 |
United States v. Homer Lee Tuckergreen2 sentences2012See United States v. Tucker, 8 F3d 673, 676 (9th Cir 1993), cert den, 510 US 1182 (1994) (applying the four factors in Barker to determine when “extreme delay” violates due process); Burkett v. Cunningham, 826 F2d 1208, 1221-22, (3d Cir 1987) (applying the four-part Barker test to analyze due process violations after recognizing that the Fifth and Tenth Circuits apply the same test); United States v. Johnson, 732 F2d 379, 381-82 (4th Cir), cert den, 469 US 1033 (1984) (applying the Barker test to two-year delay in preparing transcript for appeal); Rheuark v. Shaw, 628 F2d 297, 303 (5th Cir 198 2012See United States v. Tucker, 8 F3d 673, 676 (9th Cir 1993), cert den, 510 US 1182 (1994) (applying the four factors in Barker to determine when “extreme delay” violates due process); Burkett v. Cunningham, 826 F2d 1208, 1221-22, (3d Cir 1987) (applying the four-part Barker test to analyze due process violations after recognizing that the Fifth and Tenth Circuits apply the same test); United States v. Johnson, 732 F2d 379, 381-82 (4th Cir), cert den, 469 US 1033 (1984) (applying the Barker test to two-year delay in preparing transcript for appeal); Rheuark v. Shaw, 628 F2d 297, 303 (5th Cir 198 | 1 | 1 |
Tucker v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2012See United States v. Tucker, 8 F3d 673, 676 (9th Cir 1993), cert den, 510 US 1182 (1994) (applying the four factors in Barker to determine when “extreme delay” violates due process); Burkett v. Cunningham, 826 F2d 1208, 1221-22, (3d Cir 1987) (applying the four-part Barker test to analyze due process violations after recognizing that the Fifth and Tenth Circuits apply the same test); United States v. Johnson, 732 F2d 379, 381-82 (4th Cir), cert den, 469 US 1033 (1984) (applying the Barker test to two-year delay in preparing transcript for appeal); Rheuark v. Shaw, 628 F2d 297, 303 (5th Cir 198 2012See United States v. Tucker, 8 F3d 673, 676 (9th Cir 1993), cert den, 510 US 1182 (1994) (applying the four factors in Barker to determine when “extreme delay” violates due process); Burkett v. Cunningham, 826 F2d 1208, 1221-22, (3d Cir 1987) (applying the four-part Barker test to analyze due process violations after recognizing that the Fifth and Tenth Circuits apply the same test); United States v. Johnson, 732 F2d 379, 381-82 (4th Cir), cert den, 469 US 1033 (1984) (applying the Barker test to two-year delay in preparing transcript for appeal); Rheuark v. Shaw, 628 F2d 297, 303 (5th Cir 198 | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Raygreen2 sentences2012The *498 Second Circuit, in United States v. Ray, 578 F3d 184, 199 (2d Cir 2009), cert den,_US_, 130 S Ct 2401 (2010), applied a different test based on due process violations from preindictment delay that the Supreme Court announced in United States v. Lovasco, 431 US 783, 789 , 97 S Ct 2044 , 52 L Ed 2d 752 (1977). 2012The *498 Second Circuit, in United States v. Ray, 578 F3d 184, 199 (2d Cir 2009), cert den,_US_, 130 S Ct 2401 (2010), applied a different test based on due process violations from preindictment delay that the Supreme Court announced in United States v. Lovasco, 431 US 783, 789 , 97 S Ct 2044 , 52 L Ed 2d 752 (1977). | 1 | 1 |
Doggett v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2000See Doggett v. United States, 505 US 647 , 112 S Ct 2686 , 120 L Ed 2d 520 (1992) (applying Barker methodology). 2000See Doggett v. United States, 505 US 647 , 112 S Ct 2686 , 120 L Ed 2d 520 (1992) (applying Barker methodology). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Chasegreen2 sentences2000See Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 , 112 S.Ct. 2686 , 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992) (applying Barker methodology.) This court has held that delay in and of itself may be sufficient to establish a speedy-trial violation if the delay is so long "that the thought of ordering [a] defendant to trial `shocks the imagination and the conscience,' " Vawter, 236 Or. at 96 , 386 P.2d 915 (quoting United States v. Chase, 135 F.Supp. 230, 233 (N.D.Ill.1955)), or if the delay is caused purposely to hamper the defense, Ivory, 278 Or. at 506 , 564 P.2d 1039 . 2000See Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 , 112 S.Ct. 2686 , 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992) (applying Barker methodology.) This court has held that delay in and of itself may be sufficient to establish a speedy-trial violation if the delay is so long "that the thought of ordering [a] defendant to trial `shocks the imagination and the conscience,' " Vawter, 236 Or. at 96 , 386 P.2d 915 (quoting United States v. Chase, 135 F.Supp. 230, 233 (N.D.Ill.1955)), or if the delay is caused purposely to hamper the defense, Ivory, 278 Or. at 506 , 564 P.2d 1039 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Mendegreen2 sentences1994See State v. Mende, 304 Or 18, 21 , 741 P2d 496 (1987) (setting forth three-factor test). 14 In another speedy trial case, this court again separated the constitutional and statutory inquiries and declined to determine whether there was a violation of ORS 135.747 because defendant sought an outright dismissal with prejudice under the constitution. 1994See State v. Mende, 304 Or 18, 21 , 741 P2d 496 (1987) (setting forth three-factor test). 14 In another speedy trial case, this court again separated the constitutional and statutory inquiries and declined to determine whether there was a violation of ORS 135.747 because defendant sought an outright dismissal with prejudice under the constitution. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant
green
2 sentences2012The *498 Second Circuit, in United States v. Ray, 578 F3d 184, 199 (2d Cir 2009), cert den,_US_, 130 S Ct 2401 (2010), applied a different test based on due process violations from preindictment delay that the Supreme Court announced in United States v. Lovasco, 431 US 783, 789 , 97 S Ct 2044 , 52 L Ed 2d 752 (1977). 2012The *498 Second Circuit, in United States v. Ray, 578 F3d 184, 199 (2d Cir 2009), cert den,_US_, 130 S Ct 2401 (2010), applied a different test based on due process violations from preindictment delay that the Supreme Court announced in United States v. Lovasco, 431 US 783, 789 , 97 S Ct 2044 , 52 L Ed 2d 752 (1977). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
United States v. Lovasco
green
2 sentences2012The *498 Second Circuit, in United States v. Ray, 578 F3d 184, 199 (2d Cir 2009), cert den,_US_, 130 S Ct 2401 (2010), applied a different test based on due process violations from preindictment delay that the Supreme Court announced in United States v. Lovasco, 431 US 783, 789 , 97 S Ct 2044 , 52 L Ed 2d 752 (1977). 2012The *498 Second Circuit, in United States v. Ray, 578 F3d 184, 199 (2d Cir 2009), cert den,_US_, 130 S Ct 2401 (2010), applied a different test based on due process violations from preindictment delay that the Supreme Court announced in United States v. Lovasco, 431 US 783, 789 , 97 S Ct 2044 , 52 L Ed 2d 752 (1977). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Kohls v. United Parcel Service, Inc.
green
2 sentences2012See United States v. Tucker, 8 F3d 673, 676 (9th Cir 1993), cert den, 510 US 1182 (1994) (applying the four factors in Barker to determine when “extreme delay” violates due process); Burkett v. Cunningham, 826 F2d 1208, 1221-22, (3d Cir 1987) (applying the four-part Barker test to analyze due process violations after recognizing that the Fifth and Tenth Circuits apply the same test); United States v. Johnson, 732 F2d 379, 381-82 (4th Cir), cert den, 469 US 1033 (1984) (applying the Barker test to two-year delay in preparing transcript for appeal); Rheuark v. Shaw, 628 F2d 297, 303 (5th Cir 198 2012See United States v. Tucker, 8 F3d 673, 676 (9th Cir 1993), cert den, 510 US 1182 (1994) (applying the four factors in Barker to determine when “extreme delay” violates due process); Burkett v. Cunningham, 826 F2d 1208, 1221-22, (3d Cir 1987) (applying the four-part Barker test to analyze due process violations after recognizing that the Fifth and Tenth Circuits apply the same test); United States v. Johnson, 732 F2d 379, 381-82 (4th Cir), cert den, 469 US 1033 (1984) (applying the Barker test to two-year delay in preparing transcript for appeal); Rheuark v. Shaw, 628 F2d 297, 303 (5th Cir 198 | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Black v. Romano
green
2 sentences2012See United States v. Tucker, 8 F3d 673, 676 (9th Cir 1993), cert den, 510 US 1182 (1994) (applying the four factors in Barker to determine when “extreme delay” violates due process); Burkett v. Cunningham, 826 F2d 1208, 1221-22, (3d Cir 1987) (applying the four-part Barker test to analyze due process violations after recognizing that the Fifth and Tenth Circuits apply the same test); United States v. Johnson, 732 F2d 379, 381-82 (4th Cir), cert den, 469 US 1033 (1984) (applying the Barker test to two-year delay in preparing transcript for appeal); Rheuark v. Shaw, 628 F2d 297, 303 (5th Cir 198 2012See United States v. Tucker, 8 F3d 673, 676 (9th Cir 1993), cert den, 510 US 1182 (1994) (applying the four factors in Barker to determine when “extreme delay” violates due process); Burkett v. Cunningham, 826 F2d 1208, 1221-22, (3d Cir 1987) (applying the four-part Barker test to analyze due process violations after recognizing that the Fifth and Tenth Circuits apply the same test); United States v. Johnson, 732 F2d 379, 381-82 (4th Cir), cert den, 469 US 1033 (1984) (applying the Barker test to two-year delay in preparing transcript for appeal); Rheuark v. Shaw, 628 F2d 297, 303 (5th Cir 198 | 1 | 2012–2012 |
State v. Emery
green
2 sentences2000State v. Emery, 318 Or 460 , 468 n 13, 869 P2d 859 (1994). 2000State v. Emery, 318 Or 460 , 468 n 13, 869 P2d 859 (1994). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
State v. Dodson
green
2 sentences2000Vawter , in turn, cited to State v. Dodson, 226 Or 458, 466 , 360 P2d 782 (1961). 2000Vawter , in turn, cited to State v. Dodson, 226 Or 458, 466 , 360 P2d 782 (1961). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
State v. Dykast
green
2 sentences2000State v. Dykast, 300 Or 368 , 375 n 6, 712 P2d 79 (1985). 1 Thus, the other three Barker factors — the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, and the resulting prejudice to the defendant — make up the present analysis under Article I, section 10. 2000State v. Dykast, 300 Or 368 , 375 n 6, 712 P2d 79 (1985). 1 Thus, the other three Barker factors — the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, and the resulting prejudice to the defendant — make up the present analysis under Article I, section 10. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
United States v. MacDonald
green
2 sentences2000The speedy trial guarantee is designed to minimize the possibility of lengthy incarceration prior to trial, to reduce the lesser, but nevertheless substantial, impairment of liberty imposed on an accused while released on bail, and to shorten the disruption of life caused by arrest and the presence of unresolved criminal charges." United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 8 , 102 S.Ct. 1497 , 71 L.Ed.2d 696 (1982). 2000The speedy trial guarantee is designed to minimize the possibility of lengthy incarceration prior to trial, to reduce the lesser, but nevertheless substantial, impairment of liberty imposed on an accused while released on bail, and to shorten the disruption of life caused by arrest and the presence of unresolved criminal charges." United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 8 , 102 S.Ct. 1497 , 71 L.Ed.2d 696 (1982). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
United States v. Loud Hawk
green
2 sentences2000In United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 314 , 106 S.Ct. 648 , 88 L.Ed.2d 640 (1986), the Supreme Court reaffirmed that "[t]he Barker test furnishes the flexibility to take account of the competing concerns of orderly appellate review on the one hand, and a speedy trial on the other." [6] Within a decade of Barker, 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 , the Court declared that the Sixth Amendment's speedy-trial guarantee is "not primarily intended to prevent prejudice to the defense caused by passage of time; that interest is protected primarily by the Due Process Clause and by st 2000In United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 314 , 106 S.Ct. 648 , 88 L.Ed.2d 640 (1986), the Supreme Court reaffirmed that "[t]he Barker test furnishes the flexibility to take account of the competing concerns of orderly appellate review on the one hand, and a speedy trial on the other." [6] Within a decade of Barker, 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 , the Court declared that the Sixth Amendment's speedy-trial guarantee is "not primarily intended to prevent prejudice to the defense caused by passage of time; that interest is protected primarily by the Due Process Clause and by st | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Strunk v. United States
green
2 sentences1994At the same time that this court adopted the Barker test, it also announced that “the remedy available for a violation of the Article I, section 10, guarantee should be equivalent to the federal remedy under [Strunk v. United States, 412 US 434, 440 , 93 S Ct 2260 , 37 L Ed 2d 56 (1973)] *469 (dismissal with a bar to reprosecution).” State v. Ivory, supra, 278 Or at 505 . 1994At the same time that this court adopted the Barker test, it also announced that “the remedy available for a violation of the Article I, section 10, guarantee should be equivalent to the federal remedy under [Strunk v. United States, 412 US 434, 440 , 93 S Ct 2260 , 37 L Ed 2d 56 (1973)] *469 (dismissal with a bar to reprosecution).” State v. Ivory, supra, 278 Or at 505 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
State v. Langlois
green
1 sentence1982Similarly, in State v. Langlois, supra, finding that the record lacked evidence of prejudice, we held that defendant had failed to establish a constitutional violation. 54 Or App at 458-59 . | 1 | 1982–1982 |
State v. Vance
neutral
2 sentences1982In State v. Vance, 53 Or App 290, 631 P2d 843 (1981), even though the state had conceded that the first three Barker factors favored defendants, we found no constitutional violation, absent a showing of prejudice. 53 Or App at 297 . 1982In State v. Vance, 53 Or App 290, 631 P2d 843 (1981), even though the state had conceded that the first three Barker factors favored defendants, we found no constitutional violation, absent a showing of prejudice. 53 Or App at 297 . | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Application of Haynes
green
2 sentences1981Haynes v. Burks, 290 Or 75 , 619 P2d 632 (1980); State v. Ivory, 278 Or 499, 564 P2d 1039 (1979). 1981Haynes v. Burks, 290 Or 75 , 619 P2d 632 (1980); State v. Ivory, 278 Or 499, 564 P2d 1039 (1979). | 1 | 1981–1981 |
State v. Gardner
green
2 sentences1977State v. Vawter, 236 Or 85, 92 , 386 P2d 915 (1963); State v. Gardner, 233 Or 252, 256 , 377 P2d 919 (1963). 8 Defendant here was probably unaware of the secret indictment. 1977State v. Vawter, 236 Or 85, 92 , 386 P2d 915 (1963); State v. Gardner, 233 Or 252, 256 , 377 P2d 919 (1963). 8 Defendant here was probably unaware of the secret indictment. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.