Barker analysis in Washington

2024Ollivier, 178 Wn.2d at 827-28 ; see Iniguez, 167 Wn.2d at 292 (finding eight-month delay presumptively prejudicial). 1 The first Barker factor—length of delay—“focuses on the extent to which the delay stretches past the bare minimum needed to trigger the Barker analysis.” Iniguez, 167 Wn.2d at 283-84 .

2024Ollivier, 178 Wn.2d at 827-28 ; see Iniguez, 167 Wn.2d at 292 (finding eight-month delay presumptively prejudicial). 1 The first Barker factor—length of delay—“focuses on the extent to which the delay stretches past the bare minimum needed to trigger the Barker analysis.” Iniguez, 167 Wn.2d at 283-84 .

2026The State’s response cites State v. Iniguez, 167 Wn.2d 273, 293 , 217 P.3d 768 (2009), finding an eight-month delay is “just beyond the bare minimum needed to trigger the Barker inquiry under these circumstances.” Turning to the facts here, Johnson remained in custody throughout the six-month period.

2026The State’s response cites State v. Iniguez, 167 Wn.2d 273, 293 , 217 P.3d 768 (2009), finding an eight-month delay is “just beyond the bare minimum needed to trigger the Barker inquiry under these circumstances.” Turning to the facts here, Johnson remained in custody throughout the six-month period.

2021However, in order to trigger the Barker analysis, the defendant must first demonstrate that the “interval between accusation and trial has crossed the threshold 12 No. 36634-1-III State v. Hobbs dividing ordinary from ‘presumptively prejudicial’ delay.” Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651-52 , 112 S. Ct. 2686 , 120 L.

2021However, in order to trigger the Barker analysis, the defendant must first demonstrate that the “interval between accusation and trial has crossed the threshold 12 No. 36634-1-III State v. Hobbs dividing ordinary from ‘presumptively prejudicial’ delay.” Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651-52 , 112 S. Ct. 2686 , 120 L.

2013E.g., United States v. Malina-Solorio, 577 F.3d 300, 307 (5th Cir. 2009); Howard, 218 F.3d at 564-65 ; Hills, 618 F.3d at 632 ; United States v. Toombs, 574 F.3d 1262, 1275 (lOth Cir. 2009) ("[i]n Doggett v. United States, the Supreme Court held that if there is extreme delay, the defendant need not present specific evidence of prejudice and instead may rely on the presumption of prejudice created by the extreme delay").

2013E.g., United States v. Molina-Solorio, 577 F.3d 300, 307 (5th Cir. 2009); Howard, 218 F.3d at 564-65 ; Hills, 618 F.3d at 632 ; United States v. Toombs, 574 F.3d 1262, 1275 (10th Cir. 2009) (“[i]n Doggett v. United States, the Supreme Court held that if there is extreme delay, the defendant need not present specific evidence of prejudice and instead may rely on the presumption of prejudice created by the extreme delay”). ¶60 The delay in Ollivier’s case is not lengthy enough to constitute extreme delay warranting the presumption of prejudice.

2013E.g., United States v. Malina-Solorio, 577 F.3d 300, 307 (5th Cir. 2009); Howard, 218 F.3d at 564-65 ; Hills, 618 F.3d at 632 ; United States v. Toombs, 574 F.3d 1262, 1275 (lOth Cir. 2009) ("[i]n Doggett v. United States, the Supreme Court held that if there is extreme delay, the defendant need not present specific evidence of prejudice and instead may rely on the presumption of prejudice created by the extreme delay").

2013E.g., United States v. Molina-Solorio, 577 F.3d 300, 307 (5th Cir. 2009); Howard, 218 F.3d at 564-65 ; Hills, 618 F.3d at 632 ; United States v. Toombs, 574 F.3d 1262, 1275 (10th Cir. 2009) (“[i]n Doggett v. United States, the Supreme Court held that if there is extreme delay, the defendant need not present specific evidence of prejudice and instead may rely on the presumption of prejudice created by the extreme delay”). ¶60 The delay in Ollivier’s case is not lengthy enough to constitute extreme delay warranting the presumption of prejudice.

2009Doggett, 505 U.S. at 655-56 , 112 S.Ct. 2686 (citing United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 315 , 106 S.Ct. 648 , 88 L.Ed.2d 640 (1986)). ¶ 18 Under the Sixth Amendment analysis, once the defendant demonstrates a delay is presumptively prejudicial, that showing triggers the remainder of the Barker inquiry, which then examines the nature of the delay to determine if a constitutional violation occurred.

2009Doggett, 505 U.S. at 655-56 , 112 S.Ct. 2686 (citing United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 315 , 106 S.Ct. 648 , 88 L.Ed.2d 640 (1986)). ¶ 18 Under the Sixth Amendment analysis, once the defendant demonstrates a delay is presumptively prejudicial, that showing triggers the remainder of the Barker inquiry, which then examines the nature of the delay to determine if a constitutional violation occurred.

2026The nonexclusive Barker factors include the “[l]ength of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of [their] right, and prejudice to the defendant.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 530 .

2025Absent such a threshold showing, the Barker analysis is not required, and the claim fails. 2 407 U.S. 514, 529-30 , 92 S. Ct. 2182 , 33 L.

2009Id. at 859 . ¶38 In analyzing the Barker factors, the Court of Appeals noted that (1) Iniguez was never the cause of any pretrial delay; (2) the delay due to the unavailability of the witness should be weighed against the State; (3) Iniguez consistently asserted his speedy trial rights by objecting to all delays; and (4) Iniguez was prejudiced by his pretrial incarceration, which caused anxiety and concern and was exacerbated by the delay of his trial.

2009Id. at 859 . ¶38 In analyzing the Barker factors, the Court of Appeals noted that (1) Iniguez was never the cause of any pretrial delay; (2) the delay due to the unavailability of the witness should be weighed against the State; (3) Iniguez consistently asserted his speedy trial rights by objecting to all delays; and (4) Iniguez was prejudiced by his pretrial incarceration, which caused anxiety and concern and was exacerbated by the delay of his trial.

2025The delay was not unreasonably lengthy, especially in light of the nature of the charges; nearly all the delays were either agreed to by Mr. Glazier or credited to his attorney’s need to prepare for trial, locate witnesses, and interview witnesses; and Mr. Glazier asserted his right to a speedy 5 E.g., State v. Lawson, 352 Or. 724, 746 , 291 P.3d 673 (2012) (“Memory generally decays over time.”). 17 No. 39526-0-III State v. Glazier trial by objecting to only three of the continuances and the final three-week rescheduling of his trial date.

2025The delay was not unreasonably lengthy, especially in light of the nature of the charges; nearly all the delays were either agreed to by Mr. Glazier or credited to his attorney’s need to prepare for trial, locate witnesses, and interview witnesses; and Mr. Glazier asserted his right to a speedy 5 E.g., State v. Lawson, 352 Or. 724, 746 , 291 P.3d 673 (2012) (“Memory generally decays over time.”). 17 No. 39526-0-III State v. Glazier trial by objecting to only three of the continuances and the final three-week rescheduling of his trial date.

2023Shemesh, 187 Wn.

2023Shemesh, 187 Wn.

2019Although all the Barker factors are relevant to the speedy trial analysis, “the second factor – who is more to blame for the delay – often dictates the outcome of cases.” United States v. Fernandes, 618 F. Supp. 2d 62, 67 (D.D.C. 2009). a.

2019Although all the Barker factors are relevant to the speedy trial analysis, “the second factor – who is more to blame for the delay – often dictates the outcome of cases.” United States v. Fernandes, 618 F. Supp. 2d 62, 67 (D.D.C. 2009). a.

2016Although the length of delay is sufficient to trigger the Barker analysis, because the delay does not substantially exceed the "bare minimum" and Martin's prior convictions complicated the case, this factor weighs in favor of the State. 11 See Iniquez, 167 Wn.2d at 292 . 12 State v. 011ivier, 178 Wn.2d 813, 828 , 312 P.3d 1 (2013) (quoting United States v. Colombo, 852 F.2d 19, 24 (1st Cir. 1988)). 13 178 Wn.2d 813, 828-29 , 312 P.3d 1 (2013). -7- No. 75230-8-1 / 8 The second factor is the reason for the delay and which party is more responsible for it.14 "'[D]elay caused by the defense weighs

2016Although the length of delay is sufficient to trigger the Barker analysis, because the delay does not substantially exceed the "bare minimum" and Martin's prior convictions complicated the case, this factor weighs in favor of the State. 11 See Iniquez, 167 Wn.2d at 292 . 12 State v. 011ivier, 178 Wn.2d 813, 828 , 312 P.3d 1 (2013) (quoting United States v. Colombo, 852 F.2d 19, 24 (1st Cir. 1988)). 13 178 Wn.2d 813, 828-29 , 312 P.3d 1 (2013). -7- No. 75230-8-1 / 8 The second factor is the reason for the delay and which party is more responsible for it.14 "'[D]elay caused by the defense weighs

2015The Iniguez Court took pains to note this eight-month delay was, however, "just beyond the bare minimum needed to trigger the Barker inquiry." Iniguez, 167 Wn.2d at 293 ; see also State v. Ollivier, 178 Wn.2d 813, 828 , 312 P.3d 1 (2013), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 71 , 190 L.

2015The Iniguez Court took pains to note this eight-month delay was, however, "just beyond the bare minimum needed to trigger the Barker inquiry." Iniguez, 167 Wn.2d at 293 ; see also State v. Ollivier, 178 Wn.2d 813, 828 , 312 P.3d 1 (2013), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 71 , 190 L.

2015The Iniguez court took pains to note this eight-month delay was, however, “just beyond the bare minimum needed to trigger the Barker inquiry.” Id. at 293; see also State v. Ollivier, 178 Wn.2d 813, 828 , 312 P.3d 1 (2013), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 72 (2014) (23-month delay enough to trigger Barker analysis). ¶27 1.

2015The Iniguez court took pains to note this eight-month delay was, however, “just beyond the bare minimum needed to trigger the Barker inquiry.” Id. at 293; see also State v. Ollivier, 178 Wn.2d 813, 828 , 312 P.3d 1 (2013), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 72 (2014) (23-month delay enough to trigger Barker analysis). ¶27 1.

2015The Iniguez Court took pains to note this eight-month delay was, however, "just beyond the bare minimum needed to trigger the Barker inquiry." Iniguez, 167 Wn.2d at 293 ; see also State v. Ollivier, 178 Wn.2d 813, 828 , 312 P.3d 1 (2013), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 71 , 190 L.

2015The Iniguez Court took pains to note this eight-month delay was, however, "just beyond the bare minimum needed to trigger the Barker inquiry." Iniguez, 167 Wn.2d at 293 ; see also State v. Ollivier, 178 Wn.2d 813, 828 , 312 P.3d 1 (2013), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 71 , 190 L.

2012Br. of Resp’t at 11; see also Smith, 94 F.3d at 209 (recognizing that delays of 2 to 10 years have been deemed egregious enough to require further inquiry; 3-year delay justified further inquiry). *879 ¶29 Turning to the second factor, the reason for the delay was the court reporter’s unexplained failure to complete the transcripts in a timely manner.

2012Br. of Resp’t at 11; see also Smith, 94 F.3d at 209 (recognizing that delays of 2 to 10 years have been deemed egregious enough to require further inquiry; 3-year delay justified further inquiry). *879 ¶29 Turning to the second factor, the reason for the delay was the court reporter’s unexplained failure to complete the transcripts in a timely manner.

2009Id. at 859 , 180 P.3d 855 . ¶ 38 In analyzing the Barker factors, the Court of Appeals noted that (1) Iniguez was never the cause of any pretrial delay, (2) the delay due to the unavailability of the witness should be weighed against the State, (3) Iniguez consistently asserted his speedy trial rights by objecting to all delays, and (4) Iniguez was prejudiced by his pretrial incarceration which caused anxiety and concern and was exacerbated by the delay of his trial.

2009Id. at 859 , 180 P.3d 855 . ¶ 38 In analyzing the Barker factors, the Court of Appeals noted that (1) Iniguez was never the cause of any pretrial delay, (2) the delay due to the unavailability of the witness should be weighed against the State, (3) Iniguez consistently asserted his speedy trial rights by objecting to all delays, and (4) Iniguez was prejudiced by his pretrial incarceration which caused anxiety and concern and was exacerbated by the delay of his trial.