Barker factors in Alabama

2024Once again, however, Williams does not argue that the analysis of his speedy-trial claim would be different under the two constitutions. 6 CR-2024-0124 no need to inquire into the other Barker factors.' Roberson v. State, 864 So. 2d 379 (Ala. Crim.

2024Once again, however, Williams does not argue that the analysis of his speedy-trial claim would be different under the two constitutions. 6 CR-2024-0124 no need to inquire into the other Barker factors.' Roberson v. State, 864 So. 2d 379 (Ala. Crim.

1994Kelley , supra. Considering all of the Barker factors, especially the fact that much of the delay was attributable to the appellant, we find that the appellant's right to a speedy trial was not violated.

1994Kelley , supra. Considering all of the Barker factors, especially the fact that much of the delay was attributable to the appellant, we find that the appellant's right to a speedy trial was not violated.

2026We thus examine the remaining Barker factors.6 Ex parte Walker, 928 So. 2d at 264-65 (finding a 50-month delay presumptively prejudicial). 6The State argues that Bonar "essentially waived her right to a speedy trial" by, the State says, "absenting herself from the jurisdiction." (State's brief, p. 15.) In support of this argument, the State describes Bonar as a "fugitive" and cites her waiting more than six years to assert 13 CR-2023-0629 B.

2026We thus examine the remaining Barker factors.6 Ex parte Walker, 928 So. 2d at 264-65 (finding a 50-month delay presumptively prejudicial). 6The State argues that Bonar "essentially waived her right to a speedy trial" by, the State says, "absenting herself from the jurisdiction." (State's brief, p. 15.) In support of this argument, the State describes Bonar as a "fugitive" and cites her waiting more than six years to assert 13 CR-2023-0629 B.

2022Those additional six months would not change our conclusion that, although the first and second Barker factors weigh against the State, they do not weigh heavily against the State. 13 CR-21-0374 Benefield v. State, 726 So. 2d 286, 291 (Ala. Crim.

2016Compare Kelley v. State, 568 So.2d 405, 410 (Ala.Crim.App.1990)(“Repeated requests for a speedy trial weigh heavily in favor of an accused.”), with Clancy v. State, 886 So.2d 166, 172 (Ala.Crim.App.2003) (weighting third factor against an accused who asserted his right to a speedy trial two weeks before trial, and stating: “‘The fact that the appellant did not assert his right to a speedy trial sooner “tends to suggest that he either acquiesced in the delays or suffered only minimal prejudice prior to that date.” ’ ”)(quoting Benefield v. State, 726 So.2d 286, 291 (Ala.Crim.App.1997), addition

2016Compare Kelley v. State, 568 So.2d 405, 410 (Ala.Crim.App.1990)(“Repeated requests for a speedy trial weigh heavily in favor of an accused.”), with Clancy v. State, 886 So.2d 166, 172 (Ala.Crim.App.2003) (weighting third factor against an accused who asserted his right to a speedy trial two weeks before trial, and stating: “‘The fact that the appellant did not assert his right to a speedy trial sooner “tends to suggest that he either acquiesced in the delays or suffered only minimal prejudice prior to that date.” ’ ”)(quoting Benefield v. State, 726 So.2d 286, 291 (Ala.Crim.App.1997), addition

2016Compare Kelley v. State, 568 So.2d 405, 410 (Ala.Crim.App.1990)(“Repeated requests for a speedy trial weigh heavily in favor of an accused.”), with Clancy v. State, 886 So.2d 166, 172 (Ala.Crim.App.2003) (weighting third factor against an accused who asserted his right to a speedy trial two weeks before trial, and stating: “‘The fact that the appellant did not assert his right to a speedy trial sooner “tends to suggest that he either acquiesced in the delays or suffered only minimal prejudice prior to that date.” ’ ”)(quoting Benefield v. State, 726 So.2d 286, 291 (Ala.Crim.App.1997), addition

2026Even so, courts applying the Barker factors are to consider in the weighing process whether and when the accused asserts the right to a speedy trial, 407 U.S. at 528-29 , 92 S. Ct. 2182 , and not every assertion of the right to a speedy trial is weighted equally.

2026Even so, courts applying the Barker factors are to consider in the weighing process whether and when the accused asserts the right to a speedy trial, 407 U.S. at 528-29 , 92 S. Ct. 2182 , and not every assertion of the right to a speedy trial is weighted equally.

2016Compare Kelley v. State, 568 So.2d 405, 410 (Ala.Crim.App.1990)(“Repeated requests for a speedy trial weigh heavily in favor of an accused.”), with Clancy v. State, 886 So.2d 166, 172 (Ala.Crim.App.2003) (weighting third factor against an accused who asserted his right to a speedy trial two weeks before trial, and stating: “‘The fact that the appellant did not assert his right to a speedy trial sooner “tends to suggest that he either acquiesced in the delays or suffered only minimal prejudice prior to that date.” ’ ”)(quoting Benefield v. State, 726 So.2d 286, 291 (Ala.Crim.App.1997), addition

2016Compare Kelley v. State, 568 So.2d 405, 410 (Ala.Crim.App.1990)(“Repeated requests for a speedy trial weigh heavily in favor of an accused.”), with Clancy v. State, 886 So.2d 166, 172 (Ala.Crim.App.2003) (weighting third factor against an accused who asserted his right to a speedy trial two weeks before trial, and stating: “‘The fact that the appellant did not assert his right to a speedy trial sooner “tends to suggest that he either acquiesced in the delays or suffered only minimal prejudice prior to that date.” ’ ”)(quoting Benefield v. State, 726 So.2d 286, 291 (Ala.Crim.App.1997), addition

2024"A finding that the length of delay is presumptively prejudicial 'triggers' an examination of the remaining three Barker factors. 505 U.S. at 652 n.1, 112 S. Ct. 2686 ('[A]s the term is used in this threshold context, "presumptive prejudice" does not necessarily indicate a statistical probability of prejudice; it simply marks the point at which courts deem the delay unreasonable enough to trigger the Barker enquiry.').

2023The Court then weighed that presumed prejudice along with the other Barker factors and decided that, under the circumstances of that particular case, "when the presumption of prejudice, albeit 9 CR-18-1211 unspecified, is neither extenuated, as by the defendant's acquiescence, e.g., [Barker,] 407 U.S., at 534-536 , 92 S. Ct., at 2194-2195 , nor persuasively rebutted, the defendant is entitled to relief." Doggett, 505 U.S. at 658 (footnotes omitted).

2022App. 2006))); and United States v. Serna-Villarreal, 352 F.3d 225, 232 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that the first and second Barker factors did not weigh heavily against the State in a case involving a negligent delay of 42 months).2 2In his reply brief, Quinnie argues that this Court should attribute all of the 31-month delay that occurred from July 12, 2019, to February 8, 2022, to the State's negligence.

2016Negligent delay may be so lengthy—or the first three Barker factors may weigh so heavily in the accused’s favor—that the accused becomes entitled to a finding of presumed prejudice. 352 F.3d at 231 (citing Robinson, 2 F.3d at 570 , citing in turn Doggett, 505 U.S. at 655 , 112 S.Ct. 2686 ).

1985While ‘joint proceedings cannot be deemed an unjustifiable cause of delay,’ see People v. Powell, 40 Cal.App.3d 107, 152 , 115 Cal.Rptr. 109, 138 (Cal.Dist.Ct.App.1974), a ‘deliberate attempt by the State to ... enhance its own case,’ Corn v. State, 387 So.2d 275, 278 (Ala.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 387 So.2d 280 (Ala.1980), weighs heavily against the prosecution under the Barker analysis.

1985While `joint proceedings cannot be deemed an unjustifiable cause of delay,' see People v. Powell , 40 Cal.App.3d 107 , 152 , 115 Cal.Rptr. 109 , 138 (Cal.Dist.Ct.App. 1974), a `deliberate attempt by the State to . . . enhance its own case,' Corn v. State , 387 So.2d 275 , 278 (Ala.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 387 So.2d 280 (Ala. 1980), weighs heavily against the prosecution under the Barker analysis.

2022Douglas v. Roper, [Ms. 1200503, June 24, 2022] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. 2022). 17 CR-21-0374 Barker factor weighs heavily against Quinnie because he acquiesced in the delay for more than three years, and the fourth Barker factor weighs against him because he is not entitled to a presumption of prejudice and he has made no attempt to demonstrate that he suffered any actual prejudice. " 'Obviously, in this balancing [of the Barker factors], the less prejudice [an accused] experiences, the less likely it is that a denial of a speedy trial right will be found.' " State v. Jones, 35 So. 3d 644, 65

2022Douglas v. Roper, [Ms. 1200503, June 24, 2022] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. 2022). 17 CR-21-0374 Barker factor weighs heavily against Quinnie because he acquiesced in the delay for more than three years, and the fourth Barker factor weighs against him because he is not entitled to a presumption of prejudice and he has made no attempt to demonstrate that he suffered any actual prejudice. " 'Obviously, in this balancing [of the Barker factors], the less prejudice [an accused] experiences, the less likely it is that a denial of a speedy trial right will be found.' " State v. Jones, 35 So. 3d 644, 65

2003For purposes of this opinion, we will assume, without deciding, that the State is correct and that the date the delinquency petitions were filed, which is the date most favorable to the appellant’s claim, is the starting point for our analysis. 3 To trigger a speedy-trial analysis, the delay in bringing an accused to trial must be so excessive as to be “presumptively prejudicial.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 530 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 ; “Unless the delay is presumptively prejudicial, there is no need to inquire into the other Barker factors.” Roberson v. State, 864 So.2d 379 (Ala.Crim.App.2002). “[Wjhether t

2003For purposes of this opinion, we will assume, without deciding, that the State is correct and that the date the delinquency petitions were filed, which is the date most favorable to the appellant’s claim, is the starting point for our analysis. 3 To trigger a speedy-trial analysis, the delay in bringing an accused to trial must be so excessive as to be “presumptively prejudicial.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 530 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 ; “Unless the delay is presumptively prejudicial, there is no need to inquire into the other Barker factors.” Roberson v. State, 864 So.2d 379 (Ala.Crim.App.2002). “[Wjhether t

1985While `joint proceedings cannot be deemed an unjustifiable cause of delay,' see People v. Powell , 40 Cal.App.3d 107 , 152 , 115 Cal.Rptr. 109 , 138 (Cal.Dist.Ct.App. 1974), a `deliberate attempt by the State to . . . enhance its own case,' Corn v. State , 387 So.2d 275 , 278 (Ala.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 387 So.2d 280 (Ala. 1980), weighs heavily against the prosecution under the Barker analysis.

1985While `joint proceedings cannot be deemed an unjustifiable cause of delay,' see People v. Powell , 40 Cal.App.3d 107 , 152 , 115 Cal.Rptr. 109 , 138 (Cal.Dist.Ct.App. 1974), a `deliberate attempt by the State to . . . enhance its own case,' Corn v. State , 387 So.2d 275 , 278 (Ala.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 387 So.2d 280 (Ala. 1980), weighs heavily against the prosecution under the Barker analysis.

1996The appellant contends that when the first three prongs of the Barker test have been met, the element of prejudice to the defendant *Page 472 is "totally irrelevant." He cites as authority the case of Ex parte Carrell , 565 So.2d 104 (Ala. 1990).

1996The appellant contends that when the first three prongs of the Barker test have been met, the element of prejudice to the defendant *Page 472 is "totally irrelevant." He cites as authority the case of Ex parte Carrell , 565 So.2d 104 (Ala. 1990).

2005Regarding the fourth factor, the Turner court stated: "The record is silent with regards to whether [Turner] was prejudiced by the excessive delay in bringing him to trial. "`[H]owever, there is authority which holds that where the other three Barker factors weigh in favor of the accused, "prejudice — either actual or presumed — becomes totally irrelevant."'" 378 So.2d at 1179 (quoting Prince v. State , 354 So.2d 1186 , 1192 (Ala.Crim.App. 1977), quoting in turn Hoskins v. Wainwright , 485 F.2d 1186 , 1192 (5th Cir. 1973)).

2005On the one hand, the court suggests that it did not require any showing under the fourth Barker factor, because it stated that "`where the other three Barker factors weigh in favor of the accused, "prejudice — either actual or presumed — becomes totally irrelevant."'" 378 So.2d at 1179 (quoting Prince , 354 So.2d at 1192 , quoting in turn Hoskins , 485 F.2d at 1192 ).

2018Additionally, " '[a] finding that the length of delay is presumptively prejudicial "triggers" an examination of the remaining three Barker factors. [ Doggett v. United States ,] 505 U.S. [647] at 652 n.1, 112 S.Ct. 2686 , 120 L.Ed. 2d 520 [ (1992) ] ("[A]s the term is used in this threshold context, 'presumptive prejudice' does not necessarily indicate a statistical probability of prejudice; it simply marks the *408 point at which courts deem the delay unreasonable enough to trigger the Barker enquiry.").' " 154 So.3d at 192 -93 (quoting Walker , 928 So. 2d at 263-64 ).

2018Additionally, " '[a] finding that the length of delay is presumptively prejudicial "triggers" an examination of the remaining three Barker factors. [ Doggett v. United States ,] 505 U.S. [647] at 652 n.1, 112 S.Ct. 2686 , 120 L.Ed. 2d 520 [ (1992) ] ("[A]s the term is used in this threshold context, 'presumptive prejudice' does not necessarily indicate a statistical probability of prejudice; it simply marks the *408 point at which courts deem the delay unreasonable enough to trigger the Barker enquiry.").' " 154 So.3d at 192 -93 (quoting Walker , 928 So. 2d at 263-64 ).

1996United States v. Marion , 404 U.S. 307 , 313 , 92 S.Ct. 455 , 459 , 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971). '[I]t is either a formal indictment or information or else the actual restraints imposed by arrest and holding to answer a criminal charge that engage the particular protections of the speedy trial provision of the Sixth Amendment.' Id. at 320 , 92 S.Ct. at 463." As this court further stated in Howard v. State , 678 So.2d 302 , 304 (Ala.Cr.App. 1996): " 'Unless the length of time between the commencement of the prosecution and the trial is presumptively prejudicial, it is unnecessary to consider the othe

1996United States v. Marion , 404 U.S. 307 , 313 , 92 S.Ct. 455 , 459 , 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971). '[I]t is either a formal indictment or information or else the actual restraints imposed by arrest and holding to answer a criminal charge that engage the particular protections of the speedy trial provision of the Sixth Amendment.' Id. at 320 , 92 S.Ct. at 463." As this court further stated in Howard v. State , 678 So.2d 302 , 304 (Ala.Cr.App. 1996): " 'Unless the length of time between the commencement of the prosecution and the trial is presumptively prejudicial, it is unnecessary to consider the othe

2016Negligent delay may be so lengthy—or the first three Barker factors may weigh so heavily in the accused’s favor—that the accused becomes entitled to a finding of presumed prejudice. 352 F.3d at 231 (citing Robinson, 2 F.3d at 570 , citing in turn Doggett, 505 U.S. at 655 , 112 S.Ct. 2686 ).

2014Negligent der lay may be so lengthy — or the first three Barker factors may weigh., so heavily in the accused’s favor — that the accused becomes entitled to a finding of presumed prejudice. 352 F.3d at 231 (citing Robinson, 2 F.3d at 570 , citing in turn Doggett, 505 U.S. at 655 , 112 S.Ct. 2686 ).

2014(State’s reply brief, p. 1.) In Parris v. State, 885 So.2d 813 (Ala.Crim.App.2001), we remanded that case to the circuit court for the circuit court to enter an “order containing detailed written findings regarding the Barker factors” after finding the following: “From the record before us, we are ■unable to. determine the exact reasons for some of the delays; therefore, we are unable to determine whether the reasons were neutral' or whether they should be attributed to the government.

2014(State’s reply brief, p. 1.) In Parris v. State, 885 So.2d 813 (Ala.Crim.App.2001), we remanded that case to the circuit court for the circuit court to enter an “order containing detailed written findings regarding the Barker factors” after finding the following: “From the record before us, we are ■unable to. determine the exact reasons for some of the delays; therefore, we are unable to determine whether the reasons were neutral' or whether they should be attributed to the government.

2006See, e.g., Mansel v. State , 716 So.2d 234 , 236 (Ala.Crim.App. 1997) (26-month delay); Ingram v. State , 629 So.2d 800 , 802 (Ala.Crim.App. 1993) (19-month delay); Beaver v. State , 455 So.2d 253 , 254 (Ala.Crim.App. 1984) (16-month delay); and Broadnax v. State , 455 So.2d 205 , 206-07 (Ala.Crim.App. 1984) (more than 26-month delay). 6 As noted, the trial court's order of March 10, 2005, found that "there was not a deliberate delay by the office of the District Attorney during investigation or by the Alabama Department of Forensic Science relative to testing"; that finding partially addresse

2006See, e.g., Mansel v. State , 716 So.2d 234 , 236 (Ala.Crim.App. 1997) (26-month delay); Ingram v. State , 629 So.2d 800 , 802 (Ala.Crim.App. 1993) (19-month delay); Beaver v. State , 455 So.2d 253 , 254 (Ala.Crim.App. 1984) (16-month delay); and Broadnax v. State , 455 So.2d 205 , 206-07 (Ala.Crim.App. 1984) (more than 26-month delay). 6 As noted, the trial court's order of March 10, 2005, found that "there was not a deliberate delay by the office of the District Attorney during investigation or by the Alabama Department of Forensic Science relative to testing"; that finding partially addresse

2006See, e.g., Mansel v. State , 716 So.2d 234 , 236 (Ala.Crim.App. 1997) (26-month delay); Ingram v. State , 629 So.2d 800 , 802 (Ala.Crim.App. 1993) (19-month delay); Beaver v. State , 455 So.2d 253 , 254 (Ala.Crim.App. 1984) (16-month delay); and Broadnax v. State , 455 So.2d 205 , 206-07 (Ala.Crim.App. 1984) (more than 26-month delay). 6 As noted, the trial court's order of March 10, 2005, found that "there was not a deliberate delay by the office of the District Attorney during investigation or by the Alabama Department of Forensic Science relative to testing"; that finding partially addresse

2006See, e.g., Mansel v. State , 716 So.2d 234 , 236 (Ala.Crim.App. 1997) (26-month delay); Ingram v. State , 629 So.2d 800 , 802 (Ala.Crim.App. 1993) (19-month delay); Beaver v. State , 455 So.2d 253 , 254 (Ala.Crim.App. 1984) (16-month delay); and Broadnax v. State , 455 So.2d 205 , 206-07 (Ala.Crim.App. 1984) (more than 26-month delay). 6 As noted, the trial court's order of March 10, 2005, found that "there was not a deliberate delay by the office of the District Attorney during investigation or by the Alabama Department of Forensic Science relative to testing"; that finding partially addresse

2024See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 900 So. 2d 482 (Ala. Crim.

2024See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 900 So. 2d 482 (Ala. Crim.

2006See, e.g., Mansel v. State , 716 So.2d 234 , 236 (Ala.Crim.App. 1997) (26-month delay); Ingram v. State , 629 So.2d 800 , 802 (Ala.Crim.App. 1993) (19-month delay); Beaver v. State , 455 So.2d 253 , 254 (Ala.Crim.App. 1984) (16-month delay); and Broadnax v. State , 455 So.2d 205 , 206-07 (Ala.Crim.App. 1984) (more than 26-month delay). 6 As noted, the trial court's order of March 10, 2005, found that "there was not a deliberate delay by the office of the District Attorney during investigation or by the Alabama Department of Forensic Science relative to testing"; that finding partially addresse

2006See, e.g., Mansel v. State , 716 So.2d 234 , 236 (Ala.Crim.App. 1997) (26-month delay); Ingram v. State , 629 So.2d 800 , 802 (Ala.Crim.App. 1993) (19-month delay); Beaver v. State , 455 So.2d 253 , 254 (Ala.Crim.App. 1984) (16-month delay); and Broadnax v. State , 455 So.2d 205 , 206-07 (Ala.Crim.App. 1984) (more than 26-month delay). 6 As noted, the trial court's order of March 10, 2005, found that "there was not a deliberate delay by the office of the District Attorney during investigation or by the Alabama Department of Forensic Science relative to testing"; that finding partially addresse

2005On the one hand, the court suggests that it did not require any showing under the fourth Barker factor, because it stated that "`where the other three Barker factors weigh in favor of the accused, "prejudice — either actual or presumed — becomes totally irrelevant."'" 378 So.2d at 1179 (quoting Prince , 354 So.2d at 1192 , quoting in turn Hoskins , 485 F.2d at 1192 ).

2005Regarding the fourth factor, the Turner court stated: "The record is silent with regards to whether [Turner] was prejudiced by the excessive delay in bringing him to trial. "`[H]owever, there is authority which holds that where the other three Barker factors weigh in favor of the accused, "prejudice — either actual or presumed — becomes totally irrelevant."'" 378 So.2d at 1179 (quoting Prince v. State , 354 So.2d 1186 , 1192 (Ala.Crim.App. 1977), quoting in turn Hoskins v. Wainwright , 485 F.2d 1186 , 1192 (5th Cir. 1973)).

2003See Bishop v. State, 656 So.2d 394 (Ala.Crim.App.1994).

2002Barker , 407 U.S. at 530 ; Parris v. State , [Ms. CR-00-0406, August 31, 2001] ___ So.2d ___ (Ala.Crim.App. 2001); Bishop v. State , 656 So.2d at 395 .