Barker factors in Hawaii

2003The Hawai'i Supreme Court has recognized that delays shorter than Libero’s were sufficient to trigger the Barker analysis: White, 92 Hawai'i at 203 , 990 P.2d at 101 (eleven-month delay was sufficient to trigger Barker analysis); State v. Lau, 78 Hawai'i 54, 62-63 , 890 P.2d 291, 299-300 (1995) (six-month delay in DUI trials was sufficient to trigger analysis); Almeida, 54 Haw. at 448 , 509 P.2d at 552 (seven-month delay was presumptively prejudicial).

2003The Hawai'i Supreme Court has recognized that delays shorter than Libero’s were sufficient to trigger the Barker analysis: White, 92 Hawai'i at 203 , 990 P.2d at 101 (eleven-month delay was sufficient to trigger Barker analysis); State v. Lau, 78 Hawai'i 54, 62-63 , 890 P.2d 291, 299-300 (1995) (six-month delay in DUI trials was sufficient to trigger analysis); Almeida, 54 Haw. at 448 , 509 P.2d at 552 (seven-month delay was presumptively prejudicial).

2003“The length of the delay serves as a triggering mechanism to the Barker analysis.” State v. Nihipali, 64 Haw. 65, 68 , 637 P.2d 407, 411 (1981).

2003“The length of the delay serves as a triggering mechanism to the Barker analysis.” State v. Nihipali, 64 Haw. 65, 68 , 637 P.2d 407, 411 (1981).

2003The Hawai'i Supreme Court has recognized that delays shorter than Libero’s were sufficient to trigger the Barker analysis: White, 92 Hawai'i at 203 , 990 P.2d at 101 (eleven-month delay was sufficient to trigger Barker analysis); State v. Lau, 78 Hawai'i 54, 62-63 , 890 P.2d 291, 299-300 (1995) (six-month delay in DUI trials was sufficient to trigger analysis); Almeida, 54 Haw. at 448 , 509 P.2d at 552 (seven-month delay was presumptively prejudicial).

2003The Hawai'i Supreme Court has recognized that delays shorter than Libero’s were sufficient to trigger the Barker analysis: White, 92 Hawai'i at 203 , 990 P.2d at 101 (eleven-month delay was sufficient to trigger Barker analysis); State v. Lau, 78 Hawai'i 54, 62-63 , 890 P.2d 291, 299-300 (1995) (six-month delay in DUI trials was sufficient to trigger analysis); Almeida, 54 Haw. at 448 , 509 P.2d at 552 (seven-month delay was presumptively prejudicial).

2021See Visintin, 143 Hawai#i at 157-58, 426 P.3d at 381-82 (disapproving of this appellate court's evaluation of the four Barker factors where the lower court had not stated any findings or conclusions as required by HRPP Rule 12(e) for a speedy trial motion, and the lower court had only relied on a HRPP Rule 48 motion in denying Visintin's motion to dismiss).

2020While 8 NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER there are no other "findings" in the record that touch upon the Barker factors, and no written findings entered, it appears that Preston's trial was conducted over a period of nearly six months, on seven trial days, in roughly one to two hour segments.4 In State v. Visintin, 143 Hawai#i 143, 157-58, 426 P.3d 367, 381-82 (2018), the supreme court held that this court erred in considering the defendant's speedy trial claim on the merits because the trial court in that case had not considered the Barker factors and had not

2025State v. White, 92 Hawai i at 202, 990 P.2d at 100 ("The length of delay triggers the Barker analysis.").

2025State v. White, 92 Hawai i at 202, 990 P.2d at 100 ("The length of delay triggers the Barker analysis.").

1994Length of the delay The first factor, the length of the interval between accusation and trial, “serves as a triggering mechanism to the Barker analysis.” Id. at 68, 637 P.2d at 411 (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 530 , 92 S.Ct. at 2192 , and State v. O’Daniel, 62 Haw. 518, 524 , 616 P.2d 1383, 1388 (1980)).

1994Length of the delay The first factor, the length of the interval between accusation and trial, “serves as a triggering mechanism to the Barker analysis.” Id. at 68, 637 P.2d at 411 (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 530 , 92 S.Ct. at 2192 , and State v. O’Daniel, 62 Haw. 518, 524 , 616 P.2d 1383, 1388 (1980)).

2025None of the four Barker factors "is to be regarded as either a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right to a speedy trial." Id. (cleaned up).

2023In her concurring opinion, Justice Sotomayor suggested using the test the Court applies to violations of the Speedy Trial Clause set out in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972): [I]t seems to me that the Barker factors capture many of the concerns posed in the sentencing delay context and that because the Barker test is flexible, it will allow courts to take account of any differences between trial and sentencing delays.

2023Assertion of the right Applying the Barker factors in the speedy trial context, this court has held that the State, not the defendant, has the duty to bring about the commencement of proceedings: [A] defendant has no duty to bring himself [or herself] to trial; the [S]tate has that duty.” State v. Wasson, 76 Hawai‘i 415, 420, 879 P.2d 520, 525 (alterations in original) (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 527 ).

2023See United States v. Sanders, 452 F.3d 572, 577 (C.A.6 2006) (collecting cases).

2023See United States v. Sanders, 452 F.3d 572, 577 (C.A.6 2006) (collecting cases).

2020Id. at 163, 426 P.3d at 387. (4) Preston argues that his conviction was based on insufficient evidence because Corporal Sagawa testified inconsistently regarding whether a video camera was recording at the time of the incident underlying the Harassment charge against Preston, i.e., when Corporal Sagawa was reportedly shoved by Preston.

2020Id. at 163, 426 P.3d at 387. (4) Preston argues that his conviction was based on insufficient evidence because Corporal Sagawa testified inconsistently regarding whether a video camera was recording at the time of the incident underlying the Harassment charge against Preston, i.e., when Corporal Sagawa was reportedly shoved by Preston.

1994Doggett v. United States, — U.S. -, -, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 2690 , 120 L.Ed.2d 520, 528 (1992).

1994Doggett v. United States, — U.S. -, -, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 2690 , 120 L.Ed.2d 520, 528 (1992).

1994Reasons for the delay “The flag all litigants seek to capture is the second factor, the reason for the delay.” United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 315 , 106 S.Ct. 648, 656 , 88 L.Ed.2d 640, 654 (1986).

1994Reasons for the delay “The flag all litigants seek to capture is the second factor, the reason for the delay.” United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 315 , 106 S.Ct. 648, 656 , 88 L.Ed.2d 640, 654 (1986).

1981See also United States v. Henry, 615 F.2d 1223 (9th Cir. 1980) (one-year delay presumptively prejudicial); United States v. Mitchell, 615 F.2d 1133 (5th Cir. 1979) (fifteen-month delay sufficient to trigger Barker analysis).

1981See also United States v. Henry, 615 F.2d 1223 (9th Cir. 1980) (one-year delay presumptively prejudicial); United States v. Mitchell, 615 F.2d 1133 (5th Cir. 1979) (fifteen-month delay sufficient to trigger Barker analysis).