Barker test in California

2025(People v. Williams (2013) 58 Cal.4th 197, 233 , citing Barker, at p. 532.) In its opening brief, the Public Guardian argued that the Barker test does not apply in LPS cases because they are not criminal cases.

2025(People v. Williams (2013) 58 Cal.4th 197, 233 , citing Barker, at p. 532.) In its opening brief, the Public Guardian argued that the Barker test does not apply in LPS cases because they are not criminal cases.

2023II, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 399 [noting the United States Supreme Court has not addressed the issue].) In the absence of more specific guidance, the Courts of Appeal have uniformly borrowed the Barker framework used to adjudicate claims of speedy trial violations in criminal cases.

2023II, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 399 [noting the United States Supreme Court has not addressed the issue].) In the absence of more specific guidance, the Courts of Appeal have uniformly borrowed the Barker framework used to adjudicate claims of speedy trial violations in criminal cases.

2018Code, § 351.) The evidence is relevant to the Barker inquiry if it sheds light on whether, objectively speaking, the product was designed as safely as it should have been, given "the complexity of, and trade-offs implicit in, the design process." ( Barker , supra , 20 Cal.3d p. 432, 143 Cal.Rptr. 225 , 573 P.2d 443 .) Whether the evidence serves this purpose depends on whether, under the circumstances of the case, it is reasonable to conclude that other manufacturers' choices do, as the Court of Appeal put it, "reflect legitimate, independent research and practical experience regarding the app

2018Code, § 351.) The evidence is relevant to the Barker inquiry if it sheds light on whether, objectively speaking, the product was designed as safely as it should have been, given "the complexity of, and trade-offs implicit in, the design process." ( Barker , supra , 20 Cal.3d p. 432, 143 Cal.Rptr. 225 , 573 P.2d 443 .) Whether the evidence serves this purpose depends on whether, under the circumstances of the case, it is reasonable to conclude that other manufacturers' choices do, as the Court of Appeal put it, "reflect legitimate, independent research and practical experience regarding the app

2023(Vasquez, supra, 27 Cal.App.5th at p. 61 [“We conclude a 17-year delay before trial is by any measure an ‘extraordinary’ delay that triggers the Barker inquiry and weighs against the state”].) It held the trial court did not err in finding “ ‘[t]he dysfunctional manner in which the Public Defender’s Office handled Mr. Vasquez’s case’ ” constituted a “systemic or institutional breakdown” that could not be attributed to the appellant.

2023(Vasquez, supra, 27 Cal.App.5th at p. 61 [“We conclude a 17-year delay before trial is by any measure an ‘extraordinary’ delay that triggers the Barker inquiry and weighs against the state”].) It held the trial court did not err in finding “ ‘[t]he dysfunctional manner in which the Public Defender’s Office handled Mr. Vasquez’s case’ ” constituted a “systemic or institutional breakdown” that could not be attributed to the appellant.

2025(See Conservatorship of John L. (2010) 48 Cal.4th 131, 150, 154 (John L.) [applying Mathews factors “to determine whether a particular procedure or absence of a procedure violates due process”]; Ben C., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 543 [applying Mathews factors in deciding that the LPS Act does not require Anders/Wende review].) Camacho, however, held that the Barker test, rather than the Mathews test, was more suitable for deciding whether an alleged SVP was deprived of his constitutional right to a timely trial.

2025(See Conservatorship of John L. (2010) 48 Cal.4th 131, 150, 154 (John L.) [applying Mathews factors “to determine whether a particular procedure or absence of a procedure violates due process”]; Ben C., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 543 [applying Mathews factors in deciding that the LPS Act does not require Anders/Wende review].) Camacho, however, held that the Barker test, rather than the Mathews test, was more suitable for deciding whether an alleged SVP was deprived of his constitutional right to a timely trial.

2025(Camacho, at pp. 379, 381.)14 The high court in Barker “identified four factors for courts to examine: the length of the pretrial delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant caused by the delay.” (Camacho, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 380, citing Barker, supra, 407 U.S. at p. 530 .) “The defendant carries the ‘burden of demonstrating a speedy trial 14 Prior to Camacho, many California courts evaluated speedy trial claims in SVPA cases under the Barker framework and the general balancing test described in Mathews v. Eldridge (1976) 424 U.S.

2025(Camacho, at pp. 379, 381.)14 The high court in Barker “identified four factors for courts to examine: the length of the pretrial delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant caused by the delay.” (Camacho, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 380, citing Barker, supra, 407 U.S. at p. 530 .) “The defendant carries the ‘burden of demonstrating a speedy trial 14 Prior to Camacho, many California courts evaluated speedy trial claims in SVPA cases under the Barker framework and the general balancing test described in Mathews v. Eldridge (1976) 424 U.S.

2023Federal Constitutional Challenge “For the federal Constitution’s speedy trial right, the United States Supreme Court has articulated a balancing test that requires consideration of the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of the right, and prejudice to the defense caused by the delay.” (Martinez, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 755 , citing Barker v. Wingo (1972) 407 U.S. 514, 530 (Barker), italics omitted.) “When the delay is of sufficient length to be presumptively prejudicial, any actual prejudice is balanced with the other Barker factors, including the justifica

2023Federal Constitutional Challenge “For the federal Constitution’s speedy trial right, the United States Supreme Court has articulated a balancing test that requires consideration of the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of the right, and prejudice to the defense caused by the delay.” (Martinez, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 755 , citing Barker v. Wingo (1972) 407 U.S. 514, 530 (Barker), italics omitted.) “When the delay is of sufficient length to be presumptively prejudicial, any actual prejudice is balanced with the other Barker factors, including the justifica

2020(Landau, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at p. 43 .) The court found that “the delay was not unreasonable given a new lawyer was assigned to the case after the mistrial, the complexity of the case, the number of experts involved, the reports to be read and digested, and the consideration to be given to the prior testimony of a number of witnesses in the two prior trials.” (Ibid.) The final 98-day delay after both parties announced ready for trial was due to court congestion which, while not excusable, was not presumptively prejudicial for purposes of triggering a Barker inquiry.

2020(Landau, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at p. 43 .) The court found that “the delay was not unreasonable given a new lawyer was assigned to the case after the mistrial, the complexity of the case, the number of experts involved, the reports to be read and digested, and the consideration to be given to the prior testimony of a number of witnesses in the two prior trials.” (Ibid.) The final 98-day delay after both parties announced ready for trial was due to court congestion which, while not excusable, was not presumptively prejudicial for purposes of triggering a Barker inquiry.

2026(Cowan v. Superior Court (1996) 14 Cal.4th 367, 374 [trial court does not lack jurisdiction to try a criminal case merely because the action may be time-barred by a statute of limitations]; People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 551-553 [trial court does not lose jurisdiction merely because of a failure to conduct a preliminary hearing within the timeframe mandated by § 859b]; People v. Gompper (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1 , 13 Thus, contrary to the conclusion reached by the Appellate Division, defendant’s failure to appear as agreed to in her written promise to appear remains relevant to an

2026(Cowan v. Superior Court (1996) 14 Cal.4th 367, 374 [trial court does not lack jurisdiction to try a criminal case merely because the action may be time-barred by a statute of limitations]; People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 551-553 [trial court does not lose jurisdiction merely because of a failure to conduct a preliminary hearing within the timeframe mandated by § 859b]; People v. Gompper (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1 , 13 Thus, contrary to the conclusion reached by the Appellate Division, defendant’s failure to appear as agreed to in her written promise to appear remains relevant to an

2026(Cowan v. Superior Court (1996) 14 Cal.4th 367, 374 [trial court does not lack jurisdiction to try a criminal case merely because the action may be time-barred by a statute of limitations]; People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 551-553 [trial court does not lose jurisdiction merely because of a failure to conduct a preliminary hearing within the timeframe mandated by § 859b]; People v. Gompper (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1 , 13 Thus, contrary to the conclusion reached by the Appellate Division, defendant’s failure to appear as agreed to in her written promise to appear remains relevant to an

2026(Cowan v. Superior Court (1996) 14 Cal.4th 367, 374 [trial court does not lack jurisdiction to try a criminal case merely because the action may be time-barred by a statute of limitations]; People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 551-553 [trial court does not lose jurisdiction merely because of a failure to conduct a preliminary hearing within the timeframe mandated by § 859b]; People v. Gompper (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1 , 13 Thus, contrary to the conclusion reached by the Appellate Division, defendant’s failure to appear as agreed to in her written promise to appear remains relevant to an

2025(See Conservatorship of John L. (2010) 48 Cal.4th 131, 150, 154 (John L.) [applying Mathews factors “to determine whether a particular procedure or absence of a procedure violates due process”]; Ben C., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 543 [applying Mathews factors in deciding that the LPS Act does not require Anders/Wende review].) Camacho, however, held that the Barker test, rather than the Mathews test, was more suitable for deciding whether an alleged SVP was deprived of his constitutional right to a timely trial.

2025(See Conservatorship of John L. (2010) 48 Cal.4th 131, 150, 154 (John L.) [applying Mathews factors “to determine whether a particular procedure or absence of a procedure violates due process”]; Ben C., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 543 [applying Mathews factors in deciding that the LPS Act does not require Anders/Wende review].) Camacho, however, held that the Barker test, rather than the Mathews test, was more suitable for deciding whether an alleged SVP was deprived of his constitutional right to a timely trial.

2025(Eneaji v. Ubboe (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1463 [de novo review applies in deciding whether the court used an incorrect legal standard in exercising its discretion]; In re A.B. (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 906 , 925 [de novo review for due process challenge].) To determine whether the trial court’s failure to apply the Barker test was harmless and to decide more generally whether the court erred in denying A.H.’s motions, we next consider how the Barker test should have been applied in this case.

2025(Eneaji v. Ubboe (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1463 [de novo review applies in deciding whether the court used an incorrect legal standard in exercising its discretion]; In re A.B. (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 906 , 925 [de novo review for due process challenge].) To determine whether the trial court’s failure to apply the Barker test was harmless and to decide more generally whether the court erred in denying A.H.’s motions, we next consider how the Barker test should have been applied in this case.

2024(Gregory, supra, 322 F.3d at p. 1163 ; see also Beamon, supra, 992 F.2d at p. 1014 [17- and 20-month delay insufficient].) In addition, Torres has not shown that any relevant documents were lost, any witnesses died, or evidence otherwise became unavailable.

2024(Gregory, supra, 322 F.3d at p. 1163 ; see also Beamon, supra, 992 F.2d at p. 1014 [17- and 20-month delay insufficient].) In addition, Torres has not shown that any relevant documents were lost, any witnesses died, or evidence otherwise became unavailable.

2020(Lewis v. County of Sacramento (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 107, 112 [“Facts not contained in the separate statements do not exist”].) While she did attempt to cure the insufficiencies in the record, her motions to augment were inadequate as they sought to add only her opposition to Barker’s motion and the reporter’s transcript of the summary judgment hearing.

2020(Lewis v. County of Sacramento (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 107, 112 [“Facts not contained in the separate statements do not exist”].) While she did attempt to cure the insufficiencies in the record, her motions to augment were inadequate as they sought to add only her opposition to Barker’s motion and the reporter’s transcript of the summary judgment hearing.

2010Unless, however, ‘the first three Barker factors weighed heavily against the government, the defendants must demonstrate actual prejudice.’ (United States v. Mitchell (11th Cir. 1985) 769 F.2d 1544, 1547 ; see also United States, v. Diaz-Alvarado [(1978)] 587 F.2d 1002, 1005 (noting the absence of a showing of actual prejudice).)’’ In People v. Alvarado, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1 , the Appellate Department of the Los Angeles Superior Court authored an opinion that expressly supports the People’s position, and hence appears to directly support the trial court decision: “The Sixth Amendment

1990(But see United States v. Nance (9th Cir. 1982) 666 F.2d 353, 360-361 , and United States v. Diaz-Alvarado (9th Cir. 1978) 587 F.2d 1002, 1005 (five-month delay insufficient to trigger further Barker analysis).) The length of the delays was not excessive.

2014Elsewhere in the Serna decision, the court unequivocally sets forth the Barker analysis—unmodified—as the relevant formula for analyzing a federal speedy trial claim: “When a delay in bringing a [misdemeanor] defendant to trial after the filing of formal charges has become presumptively prejudicial, and the defendant seeks dismissal of the charges on grounds that his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial has been violated, the court must balance the relevant factors—the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of the right, and the prejudice to the defendant—i

2014Elsewhere in the Serna decision, the court unequivocally sets forth the Barker analysis—unmodified—as the relevant formula for analyzing a federal speedy trial claim: “When a delay in bringing a [misdemeanor] defendant to trial after the filing of formal charges has become presumptively prejudicial, and the defendant seeks dismissal of the charges on grounds that his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial has been violated, the court must balance the relevant factors—the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of the right, and the prejudice to the defendant—i

2023Federal Constitutional Challenge “For the federal Constitution’s speedy trial right, the United States Supreme Court has articulated a balancing test that requires consideration of the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of the right, and prejudice to the defense caused by the delay.” (Martinez, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 755 , citing Barker v. Wingo (1972) 407 U.S. 514, 530 (Barker), italics omitted.) “When the delay is of sufficient length to be presumptively prejudicial, any actual prejudice is balanced with the other Barker factors, including the justifica

2023Federal Constitutional Challenge “For the federal Constitution’s speedy trial right, the United States Supreme Court has articulated a balancing test that requires consideration of the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of the right, and prejudice to the defense caused by the delay.” (Martinez, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 755 , citing Barker v. Wingo (1972) 407 U.S. 514, 530 (Barker), italics omitted.) “When the delay is of sufficient length to be presumptively prejudicial, any actual prejudice is balanced with the other Barker factors, including the justifica

2023“The Barker test involves a weighing of four 9 factors: length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant.” (U.S. v. Eight Thousand Eight Hundred & Fifty Dollars ($8,850) in U.S. Currency (1983) 461 U.S. 555, 564 .) These factors are “related . . . and must be considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant.” (Barker, supra, 407 U.S. at 533 .) None of these four factors is a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial.

2023“The Barker test involves a weighing of four 9 factors: length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant.” (U.S. v. Eight Thousand Eight Hundred & Fifty Dollars ($8,850) in U.S. Currency (1983) 461 U.S. 555, 564 .) These factors are “related . . . and must be considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant.” (Barker, supra, 407 U.S. at 533 .) None of these four factors is a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial.

2020The reasons for the delay As the People assert, “the ‘all-important question’ is who is to blame for this presumptively prejudicial delay.” Under the Barker analysis, it is, as our state and federal Supreme Courts have stated, “the ‘flag all litigants seek to capture.’ ” (Williams, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 239 , quoting United States v. Loud Hawk (1986) 474 U.S. 302, 315 .) In examining the reason for the delay, the court asks “ ‘whether the government or the criminal defendant is more to blame for th[e] delay.’ ” (Vermont v. Brillon (2009) 556 U.S. 81, 90 (Brillon).) “A deliberate attempt to d

2020The reasons for the delay As the People assert, “the ‘all-important question’ is who is to blame for this presumptively prejudicial delay.” Under the Barker analysis, it is, as our state and federal Supreme Courts have stated, “the ‘flag all litigants seek to capture.’ ” (Williams, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 239 , quoting United States v. Loud Hawk (1986) 474 U.S. 302, 315 .) In examining the reason for the delay, the court asks “ ‘whether the government or the criminal defendant is more to blame for th[e] delay.’ ” (Vermont v. Brillon (2009) 556 U.S. 81, 90 (Brillon).) “A deliberate attempt to d

2016(Id. at pp. 1021-1023.) The Ogle court explained: “Though the government bore significant responsibility for the long delay, the court refused to consider the government’s conduct in the balance.” (Id. at p. 1022.) Still, Ogle’s “own role in the delay” could not be overlooked and was relevant in weighing the Barker factors. ( Ogle, supra, at pp. 1019, 1021 .) Here, too, defendant’s own role in the delay in prosecuting him cannot be overlooked.

2016(Id. at pp. 1021-1023.) The Ogle court explained: “Though the government bore significant responsibility for the long delay, the court refused to consider the government’s conduct in the balance.” (Id. at p. 1022.) Still, Ogle’s “own role in the delay” could not be overlooked and was relevant in weighing the Barker factors. ( Ogle, supra, at pp. 1019, 1021 .) Here, too, defendant’s own role in the delay in prosecuting him cannot be overlooked.

1997(Id. at p. 533 [ 92 S.Ct. at p. 2193 ].) To prevail on a Sixth Amendment speedy trial claim, a defendant must demonstrate actual prejudice unless “ ‘the first three Barker factors weighed heavily against the government. . . .’ [Citations.]” (Gallenkamp v. Superior Court (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1, 18 [ 270 Cal.Rptr. 346 ].) Additionally, the United States Supreme Court has established that a trial court must consider how much time had passed beyond the “presumptive prejudice” threshold.

1997(Id. at p. 533 [ 92 S.Ct. at p. 2193 ].) To prevail on a Sixth Amendment speedy trial claim, a defendant must demonstrate actual prejudice unless “ ‘the first three Barker factors weighed heavily against the government. . . .’ [Citations.]” (Gallenkamp v. Superior Court (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1, 18 [ 270 Cal.Rptr. 346 ].) Additionally, the United States Supreme Court has established that a trial court must consider how much time had passed beyond the “presumptive prejudice” threshold.