Barker analysis in Indiana

2018See Vermillion, 719 N.E.2d at 1206 (citing Doggett v. United States, Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 48A02-1711-CR-2744 | September 5, 2018 Page 9 of 16 505 U.S. 647 , 652 n.1 (1992)) (a delay of more than a year post-accusation is “presumptively prejudicial” and triggers the Barker analysis).

2018See Vermillion, 719 N.E.2d at 1206 (citing Doggett v. United States, Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 48A02-1711-CR-2744 | September 5, 2018 Page 9 of 16 505 U.S. 647 , 652 n.1 (1992)) (a delay of more than a year post-accusation is “presumptively prejudicial” and triggers the Barker analysis).

2018Id. [8] “The length of the delay acts as a triggering mechanism; a delay of more than a year post-accusation is ‘presumptively prejudicial” and triggers the Barker analysis.” Johnson, 83 N.E.3d at 85 (quoting Vermillion v. State, 719 N.E.2d 1201, 1206 (Ind. 1999)).

2018Id. [8] “The length of the delay acts as a triggering mechanism; a delay of more than a year post-accusation is ‘presumptively prejudicial” and triggers the Barker analysis.” Johnson, 83 N.E.3d at 85 (quoting Vermillion v. State, 719 N.E.2d 1201, 1206 (Ind. 1999)).

2011Danks v. State, 733 N.E.2d 474, 481 (Ind.Ct.App.2000), trans. denied.

2011Danks v. State, 733 N.E.2d 474, 481 (Ind.Ct.App.2000), trans. denied.

2018“The final factor in the Barker test, prejudice, is assessed in light of the three interests which the right to a speedy trial was designed to protect: (i) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired.” Sweeney, 704 N.E.2d at 103 (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 532 , 92 S. Ct. 2182 ).

2018“The final factor in the Barker test, prejudice, is assessed in light of the three interests which the right to a speedy trial was designed to protect: (i) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired.” Sweeney, 704 N.E.2d at 103 (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 532 , 92 S. Ct. 2182 ).

2020See Wingate v. State, 900 N.E.2d 468, 474 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (holding trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance by not arguing the State violated Criminal Rule 4(B) when it filed additional charges). 2.

2013See Wingate v. State, 900 N.E.2d 468, 475 (Ind.Ct.App.2009) (concluding that the issue was waived where the defendant summarized the rules but did not make a cogent argument regarding the application of the rules); Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) (requiring each of the appellant’s contentions to be supported by cogent reasoning and citation to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the appendix or record relied on).

2019See Crawford v. State, 669 N.E.2d 141, 145 (Ind. 1996) (applying Barker factors).

2019See Crawford v. State, 669 N.E.2d 141, 145 (Ind. 1996) (applying Barker factors). [19] Ratliff argues the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for discharge because the State’s delay in bringing him to trial violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial.

2015To trigger a speedy trial analysis, he must allege that the time between the charge and the trial “crossed the threshold dividing ordinary from ‘presumptively prejudicial’ delay . . . .” Doggett v. U.S., 505 U.S. 647, 651-52 (1992). “[W]hen length of delay is Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 30A05-1408-CR-372 | July 17, 2015 Page 11 of 18 considered as a factor in the Barker analysis, this court determines ‘the extent to which the delay stretches beyond the bare minimum needed to trigger judicial examination of the claim.’” Davis v. State, 819 N.E.2d 91, 96 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004

2014Vermillion, 719 N.E.2d at 1206 (citing Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 , 652 n. 1, 112 S.Ct. 2686 , 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992)). “[W]hen length of delay is considered as a factor in the Barker analysis, this court determines ‘the extent to which the delay stretches beyond the bare minimum needed to trigger judicial examination of the claim.’ ” Davis v. State, 819 N.E.2d 91, 96 (Ind.Ct.App.2004) (citing Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652 , 112 S.Ct. 2686 ), trans. denied.

2013See Sturgeon, 683 N.E.2d at 616 (holding that an eighteen-month delay was “presumptively prejudicial.”).

2013See Sturgeon, 683 N.E.2d at 616 (holding that an eighteen-month delay was “presumptively prejudicial.”).

2004Savuerheber, 698 N.E.2d at 805 .

2004Savuerheber, 698 N.E.2d at 805 .

1993Indeed, there is a general consensus that a delay of eight months or longer is presumptively prejudicial, see Collins v. State (1975), 163 Ind.App. 72, 75 , 321 N.E.2d 868, 871 (Barker analysis triggered after nine months, however delay was not inordinate); Flores v. State (1990) Miss., 574 So.2d 1314, 1322 (seven-month delay triggered analysis and eight months or longer was presumptively prejudicial); Smith v. Mabry (1977), 8th Cir., 564 F.2d 249, 251 , cert. denied, 435 U.S. 907 , 98 S.Ct. 1456 , 55 L.Ed.2d 499 (1978) (ten-month delay) and that a delay of less than five months is not presump

1993Indeed, there is a general consensus that a delay of eight months or longer is presumptively prejudicial, see Collins v. State (1975), 163 Ind.App. 72, 75 , 321 N.E.2d 868, 871 (Barker analysis triggered after nine months, however delay was not inordinate); Flores v. State (1990) Miss., 574 So.2d 1314, 1322 (seven-month delay triggered analysis and eight months or longer was presumptively prejudicial); Smith v. Mabry (1977), 8th Cir., 564 F.2d 249, 251 , cert. denied, 435 U.S. 907 , 98 S.Ct. 1456 , 55 L.Ed.2d 499 (1978) (ten-month delay) and that a delay of less than five months is not presump

2020However, as our Indiana Supreme Court observed in Underwood v. State, trial courts are “not required” to respond to pro se requests or motions when the litigant is represented by counsel. 722 N.E.2d 828, 832 (Ind. 2000) (“To require the trial court to respond to both Defendant and counsel would effectively create a hybrid representation to which Defendant is not entitled.”), reh’g denied.

2020However, as our Indiana Supreme Court observed in Underwood v. State, trial courts are “not required” to respond to pro se requests or motions when the litigant is represented by counsel. 722 N.E.2d 828, 832 (Ind. 2000) (“To require the trial court to respond to both Defendant and counsel would effectively create a hybrid representation to which Defendant is not entitled.”), reh’g denied.

2019See id. (right to speedy trial not violated when trial delayed for over four years at fault of defendant and defendant did not demonstrate prejudice).

2010See Hampton v. State, 754 N.E.2d 1037 (Ind.Ct.App.2001), trans. denied.

2010See Hampton v. State, 754 N.E.2d 1037 (Ind.Ct.App.2001), trans. denied.

2007McLellan v. Cavanaugh, 127 N.H. 33 , 498 A.2d 735, 740 (1985) (citations omitted) (Souter, J.).

2007McLellan v. Cavanaugh, 127 N.H. 33 , 498 A.2d 735, 740 (1985) (citations omitted) (Souter, J.).

2002In Eguia, 468 N.E.2d at 564-65 , we applied the Barker analysis to a defendant’s claim that he had been denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial.

2002In Eguia, 468 N.E.2d at 564-65 , we applied the Barker analysis to a defendant’s claim that he had been denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial.

2001See, e.g., Sauerheber v. State, 698 N.E.2d 796, 805 (Ind.1998) (delay from arrest to trial of one year triggered analysis), Lahr v. State, 615 N.E.2d 150, 152 (Ind.Ct.App.1993) (eighteen-month delay triggered analysis).

2001See, e.g., Sauerheber v. State, 698 N.E.2d 796, 805 (Ind.1998) (delay from arrest to trial of one year triggered analysis), Lahr v. State, 615 N.E.2d 150, 152 (Ind.Ct.App.1993) (eighteen-month delay triggered analysis).