23 Kentucky opinions name it 2 courts 1978–2024 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kentucky courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Dunaway v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2024As for Bradley’s constitutional right to a speedy trial, “[w]e analyze a defendant’s constitutional rights to a speedy trial, under both the Federal and Kentucky constitutional provisions, by applying the four-factor Barker test.” Dunaway v. Commonwealth, 60 S.W.3d 563, 569 (Ky. 2001) (citing Barker, 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S. Ct. 2182 ). 2024As for Bradley’s constitutional right to a speedy trial, “[w]e analyze a defendant’s constitutional rights to a speedy trial, under both the Federal and Kentucky constitutional provisions, by applying the four-factor Barker test.” Dunaway v. Commonwealth, 60 S.W.3d 563, 569 (Ky. 2001) (citing Barker, 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S. Ct. 2182 ). | 6 | 6 |
Preston v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2019It is the burden of the defendant to establish actual prejudice.” Miller v. 28 Commonwealth, 283 S.W.3d 690, 703 (Ky. 2009) (citing Preston v. Commonwealth, 898 S.W.2d 504, 507 (Ky. App. 1995)); see also Bratcher, 151 S.W.3d at 345 (“[a] long delay, while creating ‘presumptive prejudice’ sufficient to continue the Barker analysis, does not necessarily create real prejudice to a defendant.”). 2019It is the burden of the defendant to establish actual prejudice.” Miller v. 28 Commonwealth, 283 S.W.3d 690, 703 (Ky. 2009) (citing Preston v. Commonwealth, 898 S.W.2d 504, 507 (Ky. App. 1995)); see also Bratcher, 151 S.W.3d at 345 (“[a] long delay, while creating ‘presumptive prejudice’ sufficient to continue the Barker analysis, does not necessarily create real prejudice to a defendant.”). | 3 | 3 |
McDonald v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2016Such claims are evaluated under a balancing test with four factors: "Length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant." Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972); see also McDonald v. Commonwealth, 569 S.W.2d 134, 136 (Ky. 1978) (applying the Barker test). 2016Such claims are evaluated under a balancing test with four factors: "Length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant." Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972); see also McDonald v. Commonwealth, 569 S.W.2d 134, 136 (Ky. 1978) (applying the Barker test). | 2 | 2 |
Gerlaugh v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2013See, e.g., Gerlaugh v. Commonwealth, 156 S.W.3d 747 (Ky.2005) (a nine-month delay in a robbery trial is not presumptively prejudicial). 2007See Gerlaugh v. Commonwealth, 156 S.W.3d 747, 750 (Ky.2005) (nine-month delay in prosecution resulting in first-degree robbery conviction not presumptively prejudicial); Brown v. Commonwealth, 934 S.W.2d 242, 248-49 (Ky.1996) (eleven-month delay in prosecution resulting in two murder and first-degree assault convictions not presumptively prejudicial); Soto v. Commonwealth, *573 139 S.W.3d 827, 843-44 (Ky.2004) (slightly less than one-year delay in prosecution resulting in conviction on two murder counts, attempted murder, first-degree wanton endangerment, first-degree burglary, and tampering w | 2 | 2 |
Barker v. Wingogreen2 sentences2024As for Bradley’s constitutional right to a speedy trial, “[w]e analyze a defendant’s constitutional rights to a speedy trial, under both the Federal and Kentucky constitutional provisions, by applying the four-factor Barker test.” Dunaway v. Commonwealth, 60 S.W.3d 563, 569 (Ky. 2001) (citing Barker, 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S. Ct. 2182 ). 2024As for Bradley’s constitutional right to a speedy trial, “[w]e analyze a defendant’s constitutional rights to a speedy trial, under both the Federal and Kentucky constitutional provisions, by applying the four-factor Barker test.” Dunaway v. Commonwealth, 60 S.W.3d 563, 569 (Ky. 2001) (citing Barker, 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S. Ct. 2182 ). | 1 | 13 |
Bratcher v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2019It is the burden of the defendant to establish actual prejudice.” Miller v. 28 Commonwealth, 283 S.W.3d 690, 703 (Ky. 2009) (citing Preston v. Commonwealth, 898 S.W.2d 504, 507 (Ky. App. 1995)); see also Bratcher, 151 S.W.3d at 345 (“[a] long delay, while creating ‘presumptive prejudice’ sufficient to continue the Barker analysis, does not necessarily create real prejudice to a defendant.”). 2019It is the burden of the defendant to establish actual prejudice.” Miller v. 28 Commonwealth, 283 S.W.3d 690, 703 (Ky. 2009) (citing Preston v. Commonwealth, 898 S.W.2d 504, 507 (Ky. App. 1995)); see also Bratcher, 151 S.W.3d at 345 (“[a] long delay, while creating ‘presumptive prejudice’ sufficient to continue the Barker analysis, does not necessarily create real prejudice to a defendant.”). | 1 | 3 |
Goncalves v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2024We further note that, “[w]hile a long delay creates ‘presumptive prejudice’ sufficient to compel a full Barker inquiry, it does not necessarily prove that the defendant suffered actual prejudice.” Goncalves v. Commonwealth, 404 S.W.3d 180, 202 (Ky. 2013) (citing Bratcher v. Commonwealth, 151 S.W.3d, 345 (Ky. 2004)). 2024We further note that, “[w]hile a long delay creates ‘presumptive prejudice’ sufficient to compel a full Barker inquiry, it does not necessarily prove that the defendant suffered actual prejudice.” Goncalves v. Commonwealth, 404 S.W.3d 180, 202 (Ky. 2013) (citing Bratcher v. Commonwealth, 151 S.W.3d, 345 (Ky. 2004)). | 1 | 1 |
Tamme v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2024These factors are: “(1) length of the delay; (2) reason for the delay; (3) the defendant’s assertion of his right to a speedy trial; and (4) prejudice to the defendant.” Tamme v. Commonwealth, 973 S.W.2d 13, 22 (Ky. 1998) (citing Barker, 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S. Ct. 2182 ). 2024These factors are: “(1) length of the delay; (2) reason for the delay; (3) the defendant’s assertion of his right to a speedy trial; and (4) prejudice to the defendant.” Tamme v. Commonwealth, 973 S.W.2d 13, 22 (Ky. 1998) (citing Barker, 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S. Ct. 2182 ). | 1 | 1 |
Foley v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2022Our Supreme Court has held that “CR 60.02 is not intended merely as an additional opportunity to relitigate the same issues which could reasonably have -7- been presented by direct appeal or an RCr 11.42 proceeding.” Foley, 425 S.W.3d at 884 (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Terrellgreen2 sentences2021In addressing whether a defendant’s speedy trial rights were violated by an interlocutory appeal by the government, the United States Supreme Court explained “that an interlocutory appeal by the Government ordinarily is a valid reason that justifies delay.” United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302 , 315 5 We acknowledge that in Commonwealth v. Terrell we stated that “the Commonwealth is required by statute to continue with its prosecution when appealing a trial court’s interlocutory order.” 464 S.W.3d 495, 499 (Ky. 2015). 2021In addressing whether a defendant’s speedy trial rights were violated by an interlocutory appeal by the government, the United States Supreme Court explained “that an interlocutory appeal by the Government ordinarily is a valid reason that justifies delay.” United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302 , 315 5 We acknowledge that in Commonwealth v. Terrell we stated that “the Commonwealth is required by statute to continue with its prosecution when appealing a trial court’s interlocutory order.” 464 S.W.3d 495, 499 (Ky. 2015). | 1 | 1 |
Miller v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2019It is the burden of the defendant to establish actual prejudice.” Miller v. 28 Commonwealth, 283 S.W.3d 690, 703 (Ky. 2009) (citing Preston v. Commonwealth, 898 S.W.2d 504, 507 (Ky. App. 1995)); see also Bratcher, 151 S.W.3d at 345 (“[a] long delay, while creating ‘presumptive prejudice’ sufficient to continue the Barker analysis, does not necessarily create real prejudice to a defendant.”). 2019It is the burden of the defendant to establish actual prejudice.” Miller v. 28 Commonwealth, 283 S.W.3d 690, 703 (Ky. 2009) (citing Preston v. Commonwealth, 898 S.W.2d 504, 507 (Ky. App. 1995)); see also Bratcher, 151 S.W.3d at 345 (“[a] long delay, while creating ‘presumptive prejudice’ sufficient to continue the Barker analysis, does not necessarily create real prejudice to a defendant.”). | 1 | 1 |
Stacy v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2016Dunaway v. Commonwealth, 60 S.W.3d 563, 569 (Ky. 2001) (noting that “[w]e analyze a defendant’s constitutional rights to a speedy trial, under both the Federal and Kentucky constitutional provisions, by applying the four-factor Barker test”); Stacy v. Commonwealth, 396 S.W.3d 787, 795 (Ky. 2013) (same). 2016Dunaway v. Commonwealth, 60 S.W.3d 563, 569 (Ky. 2001) (noting that “[w]e analyze a defendant’s constitutional rights to a speedy trial, under both the Federal and Kentucky constitutional provisions, by applying the four-factor Barker test”); Stacy v. Commonwealth, 396 S.W.3d 787, 795 (Ky. 2013) (same). | 1 | 1 |
Soto v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2007See Gerlaugh v. Commonwealth, 156 S.W.3d 747, 750 (Ky.2005) (nine-month delay in prosecution resulting in first-degree robbery conviction not presumptively prejudicial); Brown v. Commonwealth, 934 S.W.2d 242, 248-49 (Ky.1996) (eleven-month delay in prosecution resulting in two murder and first-degree assault convictions not presumptively prejudicial); Soto v. Commonwealth, *573 139 S.W.3d 827, 843-44 (Ky.2004) (slightly less than one-year delay in prosecution resulting in conviction on two murder counts, attempted murder, first-degree wanton endangerment, first-degree burglary, and tampering w | 1 | 1 |
Brown v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2007See Gerlaugh v. Commonwealth, 156 S.W.3d 747, 750 (Ky.2005) (nine-month delay in prosecution resulting in first-degree robbery conviction not presumptively prejudicial); Brown v. Commonwealth, 934 S.W.2d 242, 248-49 (Ky.1996) (eleven-month delay in prosecution resulting in two murder and first-degree assault convictions not presumptively prejudicial); Soto v. Commonwealth, *573 139 S.W.3d 827, 843-44 (Ky.2004) (slightly less than one-year delay in prosecution resulting in conviction on two murder counts, attempted murder, first-degree wanton endangerment, first-degree burglary, and tampering w | 1 | 1 |
James Leroy Cain v. Steve Smith, Steven L. Besheargreen2 sentences2004An analysis of the last three Barker factors is triggered only upon a determination that the length of delay was “presumptively prejudicial.” Id. at 530 , 92 S.Ct. at 2192 ; Cain v. Smith, 686 F.2d 374, 381 (6th Cir.1982). 2004An analysis of the last three Barker factors is triggered only upon a determination that the length of delay was "presumptively prejudicial." Id. at 530 , 92 S.Ct. at 2192 ; Cain v. Smith, 686 F.2d 374, 381 (6th Cir.1982). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Paul Clyde Villano and Pauline Smaldonegreen2 sentences1995Accordingly, his claim of prejudice on this point must also fail. 2 Tranakos, 911 F.2d at 1429 ; United States v. Villano, 529 F.2d 1046, 1060 (10th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 953 , 96 S.Ct. 3180 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1193 (1976). *508 In summary, the delay in bringing Preston’s case to trial was sufficient to trigger a Barker inquiry. 1995Accordingly, his claim of prejudice on this point must also fail. 2 Tranakos, 911 F.2d at 1429 ; United States v. Villano, 529 F.2d 1046, 1060 (10th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 953 , 96 S.Ct. 3180 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1193 (1976). *508 In summary, the delay in bringing Preston’s case to trial was sufficient to trigger a Barker inquiry. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kentucky. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Gabow v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2017A four-factor balancing test (hereinafter “the- Barker inquiry”) is considered in determining whether the Constitutional right to a speedy trial v , has been violated: “(1) The length of delay; (2) the reason for delay; (3) the defendant's assertion of his right to a speedy tiial; and (4) prejudice to the defendant.” Gdbow, 34 S.W.3d at 70 , citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 , 92 `_ t - S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (-1972). 2017A four-factor balancing test (hereinafter "the Barker inquiry") is considered in determining whether the Constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated: "(1) The length of delay; (2) the reason for delay; (3) the defendant's assertion of his right to a speedy trial; and (4) prejudice to the defendant." Gabow, 34 S.W.3d at 70 , citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 , 92 . · S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). | 3 | 2009–2017 |
United States v. Loud Hawk
green
2 sentences2021In addressing whether a defendant’s speedy trial rights were violated by an interlocutory appeal by the government, the United States Supreme Court explained “that an interlocutory appeal by the Government ordinarily is a valid reason that justifies delay.” United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302 , 315 5 We acknowledge that in Commonwealth v. Terrell we stated that “the Commonwealth is required by statute to continue with its prosecution when appealing a trial court’s interlocutory order.” 464 S.W.3d 495, 499 (Ky. 2015). 2021In addressing whether a defendant’s speedy trial rights were violated by an interlocutory appeal by the government, the United States Supreme Court explained “that an interlocutory appeal by the Government ordinarily is a valid reason that justifies delay.” United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302 , 315 5 We acknowledge that in Commonwealth v. Terrell we stated that “the Commonwealth is required by statute to continue with its prosecution when appealing a trial court’s interlocutory order.” 464 S.W.3d 495, 499 (Ky. 2015). | 2 | 2009–2021 |
Doggett v. United States
green
2 sentences2008Delays much less than a year generally do not raise constitutional concern, but beyond that the other Barker factors take on increasing significanc e. Doggett v. United States , 505 U.S . 647, 112 S. Ct . 2686, 120 L. 2008Delays much less than a year generally do not raise constitutional concern, but beyond that the other Barker factors take on increasing significanc e. Doggett v. United States , 505 U.S . 647, 112 S. Ct . 2686, 120 L. | 2 | 2008–2019 |
Barker v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences1995In Barker v. Commonwealth, Ky., 385 S.W.2d 671 (1964), this court considered Barker’s motion to dismiss for denial of a speedy trial as a motion for speedy trial. 1978In Barker v. Commonwealth, Ky., 385 S.W.2d 671 (1964), this court considered Barker’s motion to dismiss for denial of a speedy trial as a motion for speedy trial. | 2 | 1978–1995 |
Barker v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2019“No error in . . . the admission ... of evidence ... is ground for granting a new trial or for setting aside a verdict or for vacating, modifying or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order unless it appears to the court that the denial of such relief would be inconsistent with substantial justice.”18 “The court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding that does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.”19 “[A] nonconstitutional evidentiary error may be deemed harmless if the reviewing court can say with fair assurance that the judgment was 2019“No error in . . . the admission ... of evidence ... is ground for granting a new trial or for setting aside a verdict or for vacating, modifying or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order unless it appears to the court that the denial of such relief would be inconsistent with substantial justice.”18 “The court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding that does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.”19 “[A] nonconstitutional evidentiary error may be deemed harmless if the reviewing court can say with fair assurance that the judgment was | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Christopher Gribbins v. Commonwealth of Kentucky
green
2 sentences2019That in so doing he was acting wantonly or as described in paragraph C.(2) of this instruction;16 13 This is exactly what happened in Gribbins v. Commonwealth, 483 S.W.3d 370 , 373- 76 (Ky. 2016), in the context of self-defense. 2019That in so doing he was acting wantonly or as described in paragraph C.(2) of this instruction;16 13 This is exactly what happened in Gribbins v. Commonwealth, 483 S.W.3d 370 , 373- 76 (Ky. 2016), in the context of self-defense. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Dillingham v. United States
green
2 sentences2017"No single one of these factors is.ultimately determinative by itself." Gabow, 34 S.W.3d at 70 . (1) Length of Delay. 8 The "length of the delay[] is the time between the earlier of the arrest or the indictment and the time the trial begins." Dunaway v. Commonwealth, 60 S.W.3d 563, 569 (Ky. 2001), citing Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64 , 96 S.Ct. 303 , 46 L.Ed.2d 205 (1975). 2017"No single one of these factors is.ultimately determinative by itself." Gabow, 34 S.W.3d at 70 . (1) Length of Delay. 8 The "length of the delay[] is the time between the earlier of the arrest or the indictment and the time the trial begins." Dunaway v. Commonwealth, 60 S.W.3d 563, 569 (Ky. 2001), citing Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64 , 96 S.Ct. 303 , 46 L.Ed.2d 205 (1975). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Johnson v. Commonwealth
neutral
2 sentences2016Our predecessor' Court'early on adopted the Barker analysis-as appropriate for the purposes of Section 11 as well as the Sixth Amendment, Johnson v. Commonwealth, 514 S.W.2d 115 (Ky. 1974), and since then we have continued to analyze a defendant’s speedy-trial rights under both constitutions by applying the four-factor Barker analysis as applied by the Supreme Court. 2016Our predecessor' Court'early on adopted the Barker analysis-as appropriate for the purposes of Section 11 as well as the Sixth Amendment, Johnson v. Commonwealth, 514 S.W.2d 115 (Ky. 1974), and since then we have continued to analyze a defendant’s speedy-trial rights under both constitutions by applying the four-factor Barker analysis as applied by the Supreme Court. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
United States v. Arthur P. Tranakos, United States of America v. William Pilgrim
green
2 sentences1995Accordingly, his claim of prejudice on this point must also fail. 2 Tranakos, 911 F.2d at 1429 ; United States v. Villano, 529 F.2d 1046, 1060 (10th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 953 , 96 S.Ct. 3180 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1193 (1976). *508 In summary, the delay in bringing Preston’s case to trial was sufficient to trigger a Barker inquiry. 1995Accordingly, his claim of prejudice on this point must also fail. 2 Tranakos, 911 F.2d at 1429 ; United States v. Villano, 529 F.2d 1046, 1060 (10th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 953 , 96 S.Ct. 3180 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1193 (1976). *508 In summary, the delay in bringing Preston’s case to trial was sufficient to trigger a Barker inquiry. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Omernick v. Wisconsin
green
2 sentences1995Accordingly, his claim of prejudice on this point must also fail. 2 Tranakos, 911 F.2d at 1429 ; United States v. Villano, 529 F.2d 1046, 1060 (10th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 953 , 96 S.Ct. 3180 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1193 (1976). *508 In summary, the delay in bringing Preston’s case to trial was sufficient to trigger a Barker inquiry. 1995Accordingly, his claim of prejudice on this point must also fail. 2 Tranakos, 911 F.2d at 1429 ; United States v. Villano, 529 F.2d 1046, 1060 (10th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 953 , 96 S.Ct. 3180 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1193 (1976). *508 In summary, the delay in bringing Preston’s case to trial was sufficient to trigger a Barker inquiry. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Millanes-Ruiz v. United States
green
2 sentences1995Accordingly, his claim of prejudice on this point must also fail. 2 Tranakos, 911 F.2d at 1429 ; United States v. Villano, 529 F.2d 1046, 1060 (10th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 953 , 96 S.Ct. 3180 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1193 (1976). *508 In summary, the delay in bringing Preston’s case to trial was sufficient to trigger a Barker inquiry. 1995Accordingly, his claim of prejudice on this point must also fail. 2 Tranakos, 911 F.2d at 1429 ; United States v. Villano, 529 F.2d 1046, 1060 (10th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 953 , 96 S.Ct. 3180 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1193 (1976). *508 In summary, the delay in bringing Preston’s case to trial was sufficient to trigger a Barker inquiry. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Moore v. Arizona
green
2 sentences1978In Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25 , 94 S.Ct. 188 , 38 L.Ed.2d 183 (1973), there was a three-year delay after Moore was charged before he was brought to trial. 1978In Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25 , 94 S.Ct. 188 , 38 L.Ed.2d 183 (1973), there was a three-year delay after Moore was charged before he was brought to trial. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.