Barker factors in Mississippi

2022The trial court erred by not conducting a proper analysis of the Barker factors when it denied Ward’s motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial. 3 ¶6. “[A] delay of eight months or longer is presumptively prejudicial.” Johnson v. State, 68 So. 3d 1239, 1242 (Miss. 2011) (citing Smith v. State, 550 So. 2d 406, 408 (Miss. 1989)).

2022The trial court erred by not conducting a proper analysis of the Barker factors when it denied Ward’s motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial. 3 ¶6. “[A] delay of eight months or longer is presumptively prejudicial.” Johnson v. State, 68 So. 3d 1239, 1242 (Miss. 2011) (citing Smith v. State, 550 So. 2d 406, 408 (Miss. 1989)).

2021“The weight given each [of the Barker factors] necessarily turns on the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case, the quality of evidence available on each factor and, in the absence of evidence, identification of the party with the risk of non-persuasion.” Jaco v. State, 574 So. 2d 625, 630 (Miss. 1990). ¶54.

2021“The weight given each [of the Barker factors] necessarily turns on the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case, the quality of evidence available on each factor and, in the absence of evidence, identification of the party with the risk of non-persuasion.” Jaco v. State, 574 So. 2d 625, 630 (Miss. 1990). ¶54.

2002The prejudice prong of the Barker analysis encompasses interference with a defendant's liberty and actual prejudice in defending his case. *65 State v. Magnusen, 646 So.2d 1275, 1284 (Miss.1994).

2002The prejudice prong of the Barker analysis encompasses interference with a defendant's liberty and actual prejudice in defending his case. *65 State v. Magnusen, 646 So.2d 1275, 1284 (Miss.1994).

2013“The Mississippi Supreme Court has also stated that a motion for dismissal based on violation of the right to a speedy trial and a demand for a speedy trial are not equivalent, with regard to the Barker analysis, as one seeks discharge and the other an immediate trial.” Mims v. State, 856 So.2d 518, 521 (¶ 6) (Miss.Ct.App.2003) (citing Perry v. State, 637 So.2d 871, 875 (Miss.1994)).

2013“The Mississippi Supreme Court has also stated that a motion for dismissal based on violation of the right to a speedy trial and a demand for a speedy trial are not equivalent, with regard to the Barker analysis, as one seeks discharge and the other an immediate trial.” Mims v. State, 856 So.2d 518, 521 (¶ 6) (Miss.Ct.App.2003) (citing Perry v. State, 637 So.2d 871, 875 (Miss.1994)).

2026“Presumptive prejudice ‘simply marks the point’ where the court must then consider the 14 remaining Barker factors, and the burden is shifted to the State to show good reason for delay.” Galloway v. State, 122 So. 3d 614, 650 (Miss. 2013) (quoting Johnson v. State, 68 So. 3d 1239, 1242 (Miss. 2011)).

2025Therefore, a Barker analysis is triggered, “and the burden of persuasion shifts to the State to establish good cause for the delay.” Johnson v. State, 68 So. 3d 1239, 1242 (¶8) (Miss. 2011).

2015When it 13 Id. at 533 . 14 Id. at 530 . 15 Johnson, 68 So. 3d at 1242 (citing Smith v. State, 550 So. 2d 406, 408 (Miss. 1989)). 16 State v. Ferguson, 576 So. 2d 1252, 1255 (Miss. 1991), abrogated by Johnson, 68 So. 3d at 1243 . 16 began to appear that defendants were experiencing long delays—some for years—and some were coming dangerously close to winning a speedy-trial motion, this Court changed directions by announcing that “presumptively prejudicial” does not really mean that prejudice is presumed, and amazingly, that “presumptively prejudicial” has nothing to do with the “prejudice” facto

2015When it 13 Id. at 533 . 14 Id. at 530 . 15 Johnson, 68 So. 3d at 1242 (citing Smith v. State, 550 So. 2d 406, 408 (Miss. 1989)). 16 State v. Ferguson, 576 So. 2d 1252, 1255 (Miss. 1991), abrogated by Johnson, 68 So. 3d at 1243 . 16 began to appear that defendants were experiencing long delays—some for years—and some were coming dangerously close to winning a speedy-trial motion, this Court changed directions by announcing that “presumptively prejudicial” does not really mean that prejudice is presumed, and amazingly, that “presumptively prejudicial” has nothing to do with the “prejudice” facto

2026Therefore, the speedy-trial clock begins running ‘with the defendant’s arrest, indictment, or information,’ whichever occurs first.” Berryman, 337 So. 3d at 1126 (¶34) (citation omitted) (quoting Stark v. State, 911 So. 2d 447, 450 (¶7) (Miss. 2005)). “‘[A]ny delay exceeding eight months is presumptively prejudicial’ and requires analysis of the remaining Barker factors.” Id. at 1126-27 (¶34) ¶81.

2026Therefore, the speedy-trial clock begins running ‘with the defendant’s arrest, indictment, or information,’ whichever occurs first.” Berryman, 337 So. 3d at 1126 (¶34) (citation omitted) (quoting Stark v. State, 911 So. 2d 447, 450 (¶7) (Miss. 2005)). “‘[A]ny delay exceeding eight months is presumptively prejudicial’ and requires analysis of the remaining Barker factors.” Id. at 1126-27 (¶34) ¶81.

2025When the trial court does not articulate findings of fact, this Court “act[s] de novo in performing the Barker analysis.” DeLoach, 722 So. 2d at 516 (¶15).

2025When the trial court does not articulate findings of fact, this Court “act[s] de novo in performing the Barker analysis.” DeLoach, 722 So. 2d at 516 (¶15).

2019Brengettcy v. State, 794 So. 2d 987, 992 (¶11) (Miss. 2001) (explaining that “where the delay is not presumptively prejudicial, there is no need to review the remaining Barker factors”). ¶41.

2019Brengettcy v. State, 794 So. 2d 987, 992 (¶11) (Miss. 2001) (explaining that “where the delay is not presumptively prejudicial, there is no need to review the remaining Barker factors”). ¶41.

2026The Barker test requires consideration of the following factors: “(1) the length of delay; (2) the reason for delay; (3) whether the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial; and (4) whether the defendant has been prejudiced by the delay.” Id. (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 530-33 ).

2026The Barker test requires consideration of the following factors: “(1) the length of delay; (2) the reason for delay; (3) whether the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial; and (4) whether the defendant has been prejudiced by the delay.” Id. (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 530-33 ).

2007See also Herring, 691 So.2d at 955 ("[t]he weighing of the Barker factors is not a mechanistic weighing.

2007See also Herring, 691 So.2d at 955 ("[t]he weighing of the Barker factors is not a mechanistic weighing.

2015The constitutional right to a speedy trial attaches “at the time of a formal indictment or information , or else the actual restraints imposed by arrest and holding to a criminal charge.” Handley v. State, 574 So.2d 671, 674 (Miss.1990) (quoting Lightsey v. State, 493 So.2d 375, 378 (Miss.1986)), superseded by statute on other grounds.

1999"This Court utilizes the Barker factors in determining whether the discretionary length of time between trials violated the defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial." Handley, 574 So.2d at 674 (citing Kinzey, 498 So.2d at 816 ). ¶ 9.

2025As our supreme court has previously recognized, “allowing time for plea negotiations to continue[] cannot be weighed against the State in a Barker analysis.” Graham v. State, 185 So. 3d 992, 1006 (¶43) (Miss. 2016) (citing Taylor v. State, 672 So. 2d 1246, 1259 (Miss. 1996)).

2016See Taylor v. State, 672 So.2d 1246, 1259 (Miss.1996) (applying the rule that plea negotiations toll the running of-the statutory 270-day speedy trial clock to a constitutional Barker analysis)...The record does-not contain a satisfactory answer to the question of why the trial court granted the December 5, 2012, motion for a continuance.

2003"Nor is the balancing process restricted to the Barker factors to the exclusion of any other relevant circumstances." McGhee v. State, 657 So.2d 799, 802 (Miss.1995).

2003"Nor is the balancing process restricted to the Barker factors to the exclusion of any other relevant circumstances." McGhee v. State, 657 So.2d 799, 802 (Miss.1995).

2026“In weighing the Barker factors, we must consider the ‘totality of the circumstances,’ and ‘no one factor is dispositive.’” Berryman, 337 So. 3d at 1131 (¶53) (quoting Price v. State, 898 So. 2d 641, 648 (¶11) (Miss. 2005)). ¶93.

2026“In weighing the Barker factors, we must consider the ‘totality of the circumstances,’ and ‘no one factor is dispositive.’” Berryman, 337 So. 3d at 1131 (¶53) (quoting Price v. State, 898 So. 2d 641, 648 (¶11) (Miss. 2005)). ¶93.

2007See also Atterberry, 667 So.2d at 627 (citations omitted) ("failure to assert a right to a speedy trial should be given `strong evidentiary weight' in the Barker analysis.").

2007See also Atterberry, 667 So.2d at 627 (citations omitted) ("failure to assert a right to a speedy trial should be given `strong evidentiary weight' in the Barker analysis.").

1999No solitary factor is controlling, Id., and the court is not strictly limited to the Barker factors.

1999No solitary factor is controlling, Id., and the court is not strictly limited to the Barker factors.

2000Adams v. State, 583 So.2d 165, 168 (Miss. 1991).

2000Adams v. State, 583 So.2d 165, 168 (Miss. 1991).

1994In Smith v. State, 550 So.2d 406 (Miss. 1989); Beavers v. State, 498 So.2d 788 (Miss. 1986); Burgess v. State, 473 So.2d 432 (Miss. 1985); Bailey v. State, 463 So.2d 1059 (Miss. 1985); and Perry v. State, 419 So.2d 194 (Miss. 1982), each defendant, in the wake of a Barker analysis, was discharged following delays of 370, 423, 480, 298, and 566 days, respectively.

1993The length of the delay from arrest to trial was 475 days. [1] In Smith v. State, 550 So.2d 406, 408 (Miss. 1989); Beavers v. State, supra, 498 So.2d 788 (Miss. 1986); Burgess v. State, 473 So.2d 432 (Miss. 1985); Bailey v. State, 463 So.2d 1059, 1062 (Miss. 1985); and Perry v. State, 419 So.2d 194, 199 (Miss. 1982), each defendant, in the wake of a Barker analysis, was discharged following delays of 370, 423, 480, 298, and 566 days, respectively.

2015As this Court held in Brengettcy v. State, 794 So.2d 987, 994 (Miss.2001), “While failure or delay in raising a speedy trial claim may cost a defendant points in the Barker analysis, there is no procedural bar-solely for failing to properly pursue the- claim in open court.” See also Flores v. State, 574 So.2d 1314, 1323 (Miss.1990) (holding that defendant’s “failure to consistently badger the prosecution” to bring him to trial did not eliminate his speedy-trial claim).

2015As this Court held in Brengettcy v. State, 794 So.2d 987, 994 (Miss.2001), “While failure or delay in raising a speedy trial claim may cost a defendant points in the Barker analysis, there is no procedural bar-solely for failing to properly pursue the- claim in open court.” See also Flores v. State, 574 So.2d 1314, 1323 (Miss.1990) (holding that defendant’s “failure to consistently badger the prosecution” to bring him to trial did not eliminate his speedy-trial claim).

2005Id.

2005Id.

2025As our supreme court has previously recognized, “allowing time for plea negotiations to continue[] cannot be weighed against the State in a Barker analysis.” Graham v. State, 185 So. 3d 992, 1006 (¶43) (Miss. 2016) (citing Taylor v. State, 672 So. 2d 1246, 1259 (Miss. 1996)).

2024Rather, actual prejudice is determined at a different point in the Barker analysis.” Graham v. State, 185 So. 3d 992, 1005 (¶41) (Miss. 2016) (quoting Johnson v. State, 68 So. 3d 1239, 1242 (¶7) (Miss. 2011)).

2023“A full Barker analysis is warranted only if the delay was presumptively prejudicial.” McBride, 61 So. 3d at 142 (¶7); accord Stark v. State, 911 So. 2d 447, 450 (¶9) (Miss. 2005) (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 530 ).

2023“A full Barker analysis is warranted only if the delay was presumptively prejudicial.” McBride, 61 So. 3d at 142 (¶7); accord Stark v. State, 911 So. 2d 447, 450 (¶9) (Miss. 2005) (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 530 ).

2017This Court has held that, when the defendant has asserted his speedy-trial right but the trial court did not hold an adequate hearing, we have two alternatives: “(1) decide the case based on a de novo review of the record before us, if good cause for the delay is apparent, or (2) remand the case 5 to the circuit court to allow the State to present evidence explaining the delay and to conduct a proper Barker analysis.” Rowsey v. State, 188 So. 3d 486, 493 (Miss. 2015).

2017This Court has held that, when the defendant has asserted his speedy-trial right but the trial court did not hold an adequate hearing, we have two alternatives: “(1) decide the case based on a de novo review of the record before us, if good cause for the delay is apparent, or (2) remand the case 5 to the circuit court to allow the State to present evidence explaining the delay and to conduct a proper Barker analysis.” Rowsey v. State, 188 So. 3d 486, 493 (Miss. 2015).

2015Moreover, the Myers Court wrote, “While failure or delay in raising a speedy trial claim may cost a defendant points in the Barker analysis, there is no procedural bar solely for failing to properly pursue the claim in open court.” Myers, 145 So.3d at 1151 (¶ 20) (citing Brengettcy v. State, 794 So.2d 987, 994 (Miss.2001)).

2015Moreover, the Myers Court wrote, “While failure or delay in raising a speedy trial claim may cost a defendant points in the Barker analysis, there is no procedural bar solely for failing to properly pursue the claim in open court.” Myers, 145 So.3d at 1151 (¶ 20) (citing Brengettcy v. State, 794 So.2d 987, 994 (Miss.2001)).

2006"Once we find the delay is presumptively prejudicial, the burden shifts to the prosecution to produce evidence justifying the delay and to persuade the trier of fact of the legitimacy of the reasons." Birkley, 750 So.2d at 1250 (¶ 15) (quoting State v. Ferguson, 576 So.2d 1252, 1254 (Miss.1991)).

2006"Once we find the delay is presumptively prejudicial, the burden shifts to the prosecution to produce evidence justifying the delay and to persuade the trier of fact of the legitimacy of the reasons." Birkley, 750 So.2d at 1250 (¶ 15) (quoting State v. Ferguson, 576 So.2d 1252, 1254 (Miss.1991)).

1994In Smith v. State, 550 So.2d 406 (Miss. 1989); Beavers v. State, 498 So.2d 788 (Miss. 1986); Burgess v. State, 473 So.2d 432 (Miss. 1985); Bailey v. State, 463 So.2d 1059 (Miss. 1985); and Perry v. State, 419 So.2d 194 (Miss. 1982), each defendant, in the wake of a Barker analysis, was discharged following delays of 370, 423, 480, 298, and 566 days, respectively.

1993The length of the delay from arrest to trial was 475 days. [1] In Smith v. State, 550 So.2d 406, 408 (Miss. 1989); Beavers v. State, supra, 498 So.2d 788 (Miss. 1986); Burgess v. State, 473 So.2d 432 (Miss. 1985); Bailey v. State, 463 So.2d 1059, 1062 (Miss. 1985); and Perry v. State, 419 So.2d 194, 199 (Miss. 1982), each defendant, in the wake of a Barker analysis, was discharged following delays of 370, 423, 480, 298, and 566 days, respectively.