36 Idaho opinions name it 2 courts 1985–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Idaho courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Guzmangreen2 sentences2025The only authority cited by Loza is State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981 , 842 P.2d 660 (1992) for the propositions that the good faith exception is not valid in Idaho, Art. 1 § 17 of the Idaho Constitution prohibits warrants on less than probable cause, and introduction of evidence at trial from a deficient warrant is illegal. 2025The only authority cited by Loza is State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981 , 842 P.2d 660 (1992) for the propositions that the good faith exception is not valid in Idaho, Art. 1 § 17 of the Idaho Constitution prohibits warrants on less than probable cause, and introduction of evidence at trial from a deficient warrant is illegal. | 7 | 13 |
State v. Prestwichgreen2 sentences1992Justice Bistline did concur in the Court's adoption of the good faith exception, but did so only on the basis of "temporarily engaging" in the federal court's experiment, 116 Idaho at 966 , 783 P.2d at 305 , "notwithstanding the contrary and better reasoned views of Justices Brennan and Stevens [who authored dissents in Leon ]." 116 Idaho at 965 , 783 P.2d at 304 (Bistline, J., concurring). 1992Justice Bistline did concur in the Court's adoption of the good faith exception, but did so only on the basis of "temporarily engaging" in the federal court's experiment, 116 Idaho at 966 , 783 P.2d at 305 , "notwithstanding the contrary and better reasoned views of Justices Brennan and Stevens [who authored dissents in Leon ]." 116 Idaho at 965 , 783 P.2d at 304 (Bistline, J., concurring). | 4 | 5 |
United States v. Leongreen2 sentences1995See State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 987-998 , 842 P.2d 660, 666-677 (1992) (holding that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule announced in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 , 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984), is inapplicable under Art. 1995See State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 987-998 , 842 P.2d 660, 666-677 (1992) (holding that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule announced in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 , 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984), is inapplicable under Art. | 2 | 10 |
State v. KOIVUgreen2 sentences2024Indeed, “[s]tate [c]ourts are at liberty to find within the provisions of their constitutions greater protection than is afforded under the federal constitution as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court.” Donato, 135 Idaho at 471 , 20 P.3d at 7 (quoting State v. Newman, 108 Idaho 5 , 11 n.6, 696 P.2d 856 , 862 n.6 (1985)); see, e.g., State v. Webb, 130 Idaho 462 , 943 P.2d 52 (1997) (holding that Article I, section 17 provides broader protection for curtilage than that provided under the Fourth Amendment); State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981 , 842 P.2d 660 (1992) (rejecting a good faith exc 2024Indeed, “[s]tate [c]ourts are at liberty to find within the provisions of their constitutions greater protection than is afforded under the federal constitution as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court.” Donato, 135 Idaho at 471 , 20 P.3d at 7 (quoting State v. Newman, 108 Idaho 5 , 11 n.6, 696 P.2d 856 , 862 n.6 (1985)); see, e.g., State v. Webb, 130 Idaho 462 , 943 P.2d 52 (1997) (holding that Article I, section 17 provides broader protection for curtilage than that provided under the Fourth Amendment); State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981 , 842 P.2d 660 (1992) (rejecting a good faith exc | 2 | 2 |
State v. Webbgreen2 sentences2024Indeed, “[s]tate [c]ourts are at liberty to find within the provisions of their constitutions greater protection than is afforded under the federal constitution as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court.” Donato, 135 Idaho at 471 , 20 P.3d at 7 (quoting State v. Newman, 108 Idaho 5 , 11 n.6, 696 P.2d 856 , 862 n.6 (1985)); see, e.g., State v. Webb, 130 Idaho 462 , 943 P.2d 52 (1997) (holding that Article I, section 17 provides broader protection for curtilage than that provided under the Fourth Amendment); State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981 , 842 P.2d 660 (1992) (rejecting a good faith exc 2024Indeed, “[s]tate [c]ourts are at liberty to find within the provisions of their constitutions greater protection than is afforded under the federal constitution as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court.” Donato, 135 Idaho at 471 , 20 P.3d at 7 (quoting State v. Newman, 108 Idaho 5 , 11 n.6, 696 P.2d 856 , 862 n.6 (1985)); see, e.g., State v. Webb, 130 Idaho 462 , 943 P.2d 52 (1997) (holding that Article I, section 17 provides broader protection for curtilage than that provided under the Fourth Amendment); State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981 , 842 P.2d 660 (1992) (rejecting a good faith exc | 2 | 2 |
State v. Donatogreen2 sentences2024Indeed, “[s]tate [c]ourts are at liberty to find within the provisions of their constitutions greater protection than is afforded under the federal constitution as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court.” Donato, 135 Idaho at 471 , 20 P.3d at 7 (quoting State v. Newman, 108 Idaho 5 , 11 n.6, 696 P.2d 856 , 862 n.6 (1985)); see, e.g., State v. Webb, 130 Idaho 462 , 943 P.2d 52 (1997) (holding that Article I, section 17 provides broader protection for curtilage than that provided under the Fourth Amendment); State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981 , 842 P.2d 660 (1992) (rejecting a good faith exc 2015But see Donato, 135 Idaho at 472 , 20 P.3d at 8 (holding there is nothing unique about one's expectation of privacy in one’s garbage in Idaho that would justify an interpretation different from the Fourth Amendment. | 1 | 3 |
State v. Thompsongreen2 sentences2024Indeed, “[s]tate [c]ourts are at liberty to find within the provisions of their constitutions greater protection than is afforded under the federal constitution as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court.” Donato, 135 Idaho at 471 , 20 P.3d at 7 (quoting State v. Newman, 108 Idaho 5 , 11 n.6, 696 P.2d 856 , 862 n.6 (1985)); see, e.g., State v. Webb, 130 Idaho 462 , 943 P.2d 52 (1997) (holding that Article I, section 17 provides broader protection for curtilage than that provided under the Fourth Amendment); State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981 , 842 P.2d 660 (1992) (rejecting a good faith exc 2024Indeed, “[s]tate [c]ourts are at liberty to find within the provisions of their constitutions greater protection than is afforded under the federal constitution as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court.” Donato, 135 Idaho at 471 , 20 P.3d at 7 (quoting State v. Newman, 108 Idaho 5 , 11 n.6, 696 P.2d 856 , 862 n.6 (1985)); see, e.g., State v. Webb, 130 Idaho 462 , 943 P.2d 52 (1997) (holding that Article I, section 17 provides broader protection for curtilage than that provided under the Fourth Amendment); State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981 , 842 P.2d 660 (1992) (rejecting a good faith exc | 1 | 2 |
State v. Josephsongreen2 sentences1995Based upon State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981 , 842 P.2d 660 (1992), and State v. Josephson, 123 Idaho 790 , 852 P.2d 1387 (1993), Judge Hart ruled that this Court abolished the good faith exception principles which provided a partial basis for the holding in Illinois v. Rodriguez, supra , and that therefore Rodriguez should not be followed. 1995Based upon State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981 , 842 P.2d 660 (1992), and State v. Josephson, 123 Idaho 790 , 852 P.2d 1387 (1993), Judge Hart ruled that this Court abolished the good faith exception principles which provided a partial basis for the holding in Illinois v. Rodriguez, supra , and that therefore Rodriguez should not be followed. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Schaffergreen2 sentences2025See State v. Schaffer, 133 Idaho 126, 130 , 982 P.2d 961, 965 (Ct. App. 1999). 3 Magomadov argues that the district court erred in allowing the officers to rely on the information regarding Magomadov’s probation status because to do so would amount to permitting a good- faith exception to the warrant requirement, which Idaho has rejected. 2025See State v. Schaffer, 133 Idaho 126, 130 , 982 P.2d 961, 965 (Ct. App. 1999). 3 Magomadov argues that the district court erred in allowing the officers to rely on the information regarding Magomadov’s probation status because to do so would amount to permitting a good- faith exception to the warrant requirement, which Idaho has rejected. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Younggreen2 sentences2010See also State v. Young, 144 Idaho 646 , 649 n. 1, 167 P.3d 783 , 786 n. 1 (Ct.App. 2006); State v. Schmadeka, 136 Idaho 595 , 599 n. 3, 38 P.3d 633 , 637 n. 3 (Ct.App.2001). 2010See also State v. Young, 144 Idaho 646 , 649 n. 1, 167 P.3d 783 , 786 n. 1 (Ct.App. 2006); State v. Schmadeka, 136 Idaho 595 , 599 n. 3, 38 P.3d 633 , 637 n. 3 (Ct.App.2001). | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Glickgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Whitegreen | 1 | 1 |
Brown v. Stategreen1 sentence2010Dec.7, 2009) (noting the Ninth, Seventh, and Sixth Circuits have refused to apply the good faith exception while the Fifth and Tenth Circuits have held Leon’s good-faith exception applies to warrantless searches considered lawful under the case law existing when the search was performed); Brown v. State, 24 So.3d 671, 680-82 (Fla.App. 5th Dist.2009). | 1 | 1 |
United States of America,plaintiff-Appellee v. Maurice Lashaw King,defendant-Appellantgreen1 sentence2010See, e.g., United States v. King, 244 F.3d 736, 737-41 (9th Cir.2001) (officer’s mistake of law, although reasonable, cannot form basis for reasonable suspicion to initiate traffic stop); United States v. Twilley, 222 F.3d 1092 , 1096 n. 1 (9th Cir.2000) (officer’s correct understanding of the law, together with a good-faith error regarding the facts, can establish reasonable suspicion) (also citing McCarthy, supra); compare People v. Glick, 203 Cal.App.3d 796 , 250 Cal.Rptr. 315, 318 (1988) (mistake of fact and law treated the same) with People v. White, 107 Cal.App.4th 636 , 132 Cal.Rptr.2d | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Schaffergreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Oakesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Gutierrezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Bigelowgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Alumet v. Bear Lake Grazing Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Prestwichgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Whitegreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Prestwichgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Lindseygreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Johnsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Harlow v. Fitzgeraldgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Samuel v. Busnuckgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Arroyo v. Walshgreen | 1 | 1 |
| cluster 310081green | 1 | 1 |
| Williams v. Thomasgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Brudney v. Ematrudogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Richardson v. Snowgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Donatogreen2 sentences2024Indeed, “[s]tate [c]ourts are at liberty to find within the provisions of their constitutions greater protection than is afforded under the federal constitution as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court.” Donato, 135 Idaho at 471 , 20 P.3d at 7 (quoting State v. Newman, 108 Idaho 5 , 11 n.6, 696 P.2d 856 , 862 n.6 (1985)); see, e.g., State v. Webb, 130 Idaho 462 , 943 P.2d 52 (1997) (holding that Article I, section 17 provides broader protection for curtilage than that provided under the Fourth Amendment); State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981 , 842 P.2d 660 (1992) (rejecting a good faith exc 2015But see Donato, 135 Idaho at 472 , 20 P.3d at 8 (holding there is nothing unique about one's expectation of privacy in one’s garbage in Idaho that would justify an interpretation different from the Fourth Amendment. | 1 | 3 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Rice
green
2 sentences1992As noted in part II, our Court of Appeals adopted the good faith exception in State v. Rice, 109 Idaho 985 , 712 P.2d 686 (Ct.App. 1985). 1992As noted in part II, our Court of Appeals adopted the good faith exception in State v. Rice, 109 Idaho 985 , 712 P.2d 686 (Ct.App. 1985). | 3 | 1989–1993 |
Davis v. United States
green
2 sentences2012The Court has since expanded the good-faith exception to include a search conducted in reasonable reliance upon a subsequently invalidated statute because legislators, like judges, are not the focus of the rule, Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 , 107 S.Ct. 1160 , 94 L.Ed.2d 364 (1987); an arrest in reasonable reliance upon information that the arrestee had an outstanding warrant, where the warrant had been quashed but the court clerk had failed to notify the sheriffs office, because applying the exclusionary rule would not deter mistakes made by court employees, Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 , 1 2012The Court has since expanded the good-faith exception to include a search conducted in reasonable reliance upon a subsequently invalidated statute because legislators, like judges, are not the focus of the rule, Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 , 107 S.Ct. 1160 , 94 L.Ed.2d 364 (1987); an arrest in reasonable reliance upon information that the arrestee had an outstanding warrant, where the warrant had been quashed but the court clerk had failed to notify the sheriffs office, because applying the exclusionary rule would not deter mistakes made by court employees, Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 , 1 | 2 | 2012–2012 |
Illinois v. Krull
green
2 sentences2012The Court has since expanded the good-faith exception to include a search conducted in reasonable reliance upon a subsequently invalidated statute because legislators, like judges, are not the focus of the rule, Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 , 107 S.Ct. 1160 , 94 L.Ed.2d 364 (1987); an arrest in reasonable reliance upon information that the arrestee had an outstanding warrant, where the warrant had been quashed but the court clerk had failed to notify the sheriffs office, because applying the exclusionary rule would not deter mistakes made by court employees, Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 , 1 2012The Court has since expanded the good-faith exception to include a search conducted in reasonable reliance upon a subsequently invalidated statute because legislators, like judges, are not the focus of the rule, Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 , 107 S.Ct. 1160 , 94 L.Ed.2d 364 (1987); an arrest in reasonable reliance upon information that the arrestee had an outstanding warrant, where the warrant had been quashed but the court clerk had failed to notify the sheriffs office, because applying the exclusionary rule would not deter mistakes made by court employees, Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 , 1 | 2 | 1992–2012 |
State v. Newman
green
2 sentences2024Indeed, “[s]tate [c]ourts are at liberty to find within the provisions of their constitutions greater protection than is afforded under the federal constitution as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court.” Donato, 135 Idaho at 471 , 20 P.3d at 7 (quoting State v. Newman, 108 Idaho 5 , 11 n.6, 696 P.2d 856 , 862 n.6 (1985)); see, e.g., State v. Webb, 130 Idaho 462 , 943 P.2d 52 (1997) (holding that Article I, section 17 provides broader protection for curtilage than that provided under the Fourth Amendment); State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981 , 842 P.2d 660 (1992) (rejecting a good faith exc 2024Indeed, “[s]tate [c]ourts are at liberty to find within the provisions of their constitutions greater protection than is afforded under the federal constitution as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court.” Donato, 135 Idaho at 471 , 20 P.3d at 7 (quoting State v. Newman, 108 Idaho 5 , 11 n.6, 696 P.2d 856 , 862 n.6 (1985)); see, e.g., State v. Webb, 130 Idaho 462 , 943 P.2d 52 (1997) (holding that Article I, section 17 provides broader protection for curtilage than that provided under the Fourth Amendment); State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981 , 842 P.2d 660 (1992) (rejecting a good faith exc | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Hansen
green
2 sentences2023“Warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable.” State v. Hansen, 167 Idaho 831 , 835, 477 P.3d 885 , 889 (2020) (citation omitted). 2023“Warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable.” State v. Hansen, 167 Idaho 831 , 835, 477 P.3d 885 , 889 (2020) (citation omitted). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Ivan Drake Pettit
green
2 sentences2018Id. at ___, 406 P.3d at 376 . 2018Id. at ___, 406 P.3d at 376 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
United States v. Peltier
green
2 sentences2017United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 542 , 95 S.Ct. 2313, 2320 , 45 L.Ed.2d 374 [383] (1975). 2017United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 542 , 95 S.Ct. 2313, 2320 , 45 L.Ed.2d 374 [383] (1975). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Michigan v. DeFillippo
green
2 sentences2017The State nonetheless advocates for a good faith, mistake of law exception on the basis that traffic stops are only minimal intrusions on privacy as compared to warrantless searches of a person, home, car, or other property and that not creating a good faith exception is inconsistent with the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 , 99 S.Ct. 2627 , 61 L.Ed.2d 343 (1979) (imposing a good faith exception for an officer’s acts performed pursuant to a statute later declared unconstitutionally vague). 2017The State nonetheless advocates for a good faith, mistake of law exception on the basis that traffic stops are only minimal intrusions on privacy as compared to warrantless searches of a person, home, car, or other property and that not creating a good faith exception is inconsistent with the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 , 99 S.Ct. 2627 , 61 L.Ed.2d 343 (1979) (imposing a good faith exception for an officer’s acts performed pursuant to a statute later declared unconstitutionally vague). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Heien v. North Carolina
green
2 sentences2017The State argues that Heien v. North Carolina, — U.S. —, 135 S.Ct. 530 , 190 L.Ed.2d 475 (2014) requires the Court to treat the officer’s unconstitutional stop as valid for suppression purposes. 2017The State argues that Heien v. North Carolina, — U.S. —, 135 S.Ct. 530 , 190 L.Ed.2d 475 (2014) requires the Court to treat the officer’s unconstitutional stop as valid for suppression purposes. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Marjorie Ellmaker v. Calvin Tabor
green
1 sentence2016Id. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Herring v. United States
green
2 sentences2012The Court has since expanded the good-faith exception to include a search conducted in reasonable reliance upon a subsequently invalidated statute because legislators, like judges, are not the focus of the rule, Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 , 107 S.Ct. 1160 , 94 L.Ed.2d 364 (1987); an arrest in reasonable reliance upon information that the arrestee had an outstanding warrant, where the warrant had been quashed but the court clerk had failed to notify the sheriffs office, because applying the exclusionary rule would not deter mistakes made by court employees, Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 , 1 2012The Court has since expanded the good-faith exception to include a search conducted in reasonable reliance upon a subsequently invalidated statute because legislators, like judges, are not the focus of the rule, Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 , 107 S.Ct. 1160 , 94 L.Ed.2d 364 (1987); an arrest in reasonable reliance upon information that the arrestee had an outstanding warrant, where the warrant had been quashed but the court clerk had failed to notify the sheriffs office, because applying the exclusionary rule would not deter mistakes made by court employees, Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 , 1 | 1 | 2012–2012 |
State v. Anderson
green
2 sentences2012The Idaho Supreme Court first addressed the admission into evidence of unlawfully obtained evidence in State v. Anderson, 31 Idaho 514 , 174 P. 124 (1918). 2012The Idaho Supreme Court first addressed the admission into evidence of unlawfully obtained evidence in State v. Anderson, 31 Idaho 514 , 174 P. 124 (1918). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Arizona v. Evans
green
2 sentences2012The Court has since expanded the good-faith exception to include a search conducted in reasonable reliance upon a subsequently invalidated statute because legislators, like judges, are not the focus of the rule, Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 , 107 S.Ct. 1160 , 94 L.Ed.2d 364 (1987); an arrest in reasonable reliance upon information that the arrestee had an outstanding warrant, where the warrant had been quashed but the court clerk had failed to notify the sheriffs office, because applying the exclusionary rule would not deter mistakes made by court employees, Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 , 1 2012The Court has since expanded the good-faith exception to include a search conducted in reasonable reliance upon a subsequently invalidated statute because legislators, like judges, are not the focus of the rule, Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 , 107 S.Ct. 1160 , 94 L.Ed.2d 364 (1987); an arrest in reasonable reliance upon information that the arrestee had an outstanding warrant, where the warrant had been quashed but the court clerk had failed to notify the sheriffs office, because applying the exclusionary rule would not deter mistakes made by court employees, Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 , 1 | 1 | 2012–2012 |
cluster 239
green
1 sentence2010People v. McCarty, 229 P.3d 1041 (Colo.2010); State v. Harris, 154 Wash.App. 87 , 224 P.3d 830 (2010); United States v. Gonzalez, 578 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir.2009) rehearing and rehearing en banc denied, 598 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir.2010). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Schmadeka
green
2 sentences2010See also State v. Young, 144 Idaho 646 , 649 n. 1, 167 P.3d 783 , 786 n. 1 (Ct.App. 2006); State v. Schmadeka, 136 Idaho 595 , 599 n. 3, 38 P.3d 633 , 637 n. 3 (Ct.App.2001). 2010See also State v. Young, 144 Idaho 646 , 649 n. 1, 167 P.3d 783 , 786 n. 1 (Ct.App. 2006); State v. Schmadeka, 136 Idaho 595 , 599 n. 3, 38 P.3d 633 , 637 n. 3 (Ct.App.2001). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| People v. McCarty green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
United States v. Joe Davis Twilley
green
1 sentence2010See, e.g., United States v. King, 244 F.3d 736, 737-41 (9th Cir.2001) (officer’s mistake of law, although reasonable, cannot form basis for reasonable suspicion to initiate traffic stop); United States v. Twilley, 222 F.3d 1092 , 1096 n. 1 (9th Cir.2000) (officer’s correct understanding of the law, together with a good-faith error regarding the facts, can establish reasonable suspicion) (also citing McCarthy, supra); compare People v. Glick, 203 Cal.App.3d 796 , 250 Cal.Rptr. 315, 318 (1988) (mistake of fact and law treated the same) with People v. White, 107 Cal.App.4th 636 , 132 Cal.Rptr.2d | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| United States v. Gonzalez green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Harris
green
1 sentence2010People v. McCarty, 229 P.3d 1041 (Colo.2010); State v. Harris, 154 Wash.App. 87 , 224 P.3d 830 (2010); United States v. Gonzalez, 578 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir.2009) rehearing and rehearing en banc denied, 598 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir.2010). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Harris
green
1 sentence2010People v. McCarty, 229 P.3d 1041 (Colo.2010); State v. Harris, 154 Wash.App. 87 , 224 P.3d 830 (2010); United States v. Gonzalez, 578 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir.2009) rehearing and rehearing en banc denied, 598 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir.2010). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| State v. Ham green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| State v. Marsala green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Weeks v. United States red | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| State v. Novembrino green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Sutherlin Ex Rel. Estate of Sutherlin v. Fenenga green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| People v. Sundling green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| State v. Cowen green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| State v. Carter green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Hays v. State green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| State v. Lindsey green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.