good faith exception in Pennsylvania

2025Edmunds emphasized that Article I, Section 8 guards individual privacy rights “more zealously” than its federal counterpart “by serving as an independent source of supplemental rights.” Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 899 (quotation marks and citation omitted). [G]iven the strong right of privacy which inheres in Article I, Section 8, as well as the clear prohibition against the issuance of warrants without probable cause, or based upon defective warrants, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule would directly clash with those rights of citizens as developed in our Commonwealth over the past 20

2025The Commonwealth argued that Pennsylvania should adopt the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule set forth in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), in which the United States Supreme Court held “the Fourth Amendment does not mandate suppression of illegally seized evidence obtained pursuant to a constitutionally defective warrant, so long as the police officer acted in good faith reliance upon the warrant issued by a neutral and detached magistrate.” Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 888, 892 .

2017The good-faith exception distinguishes .the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution from its -Pennsylvania counterpart since “it is settled that under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania [Constitution, a good[-]faith ex-, ception to the exclusionary rule does not exist.” Commonwealth v. Frederick, 124 A.3d 748, 756 (Pa. Super. 2015), appeal denied, 635 Pa. 769 , 138 A.3d 2 (2016) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Arnold, 932 A.2d 143, 148 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation omitted); Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 526 Pa. 374 , 586 A.2d 887, 888 (1991).

2017The good-faith exception distinguishes .the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution from its -Pennsylvania counterpart since “it is settled that under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania [Constitution, a good[-]faith ex-, ception to the exclusionary rule does not exist.” Commonwealth v. Frederick, 124 A.3d 748, 756 (Pa. Super. 2015), appeal denied, 635 Pa. 769 , 138 A.3d 2 (2016) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Arnold, 932 A.2d 143, 148 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation omitted); Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 526 Pa. 374 , 586 A.2d 887, 888 (1991).

2025The Commonwealth argued that Pennsylvania should adopt the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule set forth in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), in which the United States Supreme Court held “the Fourth Amendment does not mandate suppression of illegally seized evidence obtained pursuant to a constitutionally defective warrant, so long as the police officer acted in good faith reliance upon the warrant issued by a neutral and detached magistrate.” Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 888, 892 .

2025In Edmunds, our Supreme Court declined to adopt the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule promulgated by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).

2017The good-faith exception distinguishes .the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution from its -Pennsylvania counterpart since “it is settled that under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania [Constitution, a good[-]faith ex-, ception to the exclusionary rule does not exist.” Commonwealth v. Frederick, 124 A.3d 748, 756 (Pa. Super. 2015), appeal denied, 635 Pa. 769 , 138 A.3d 2 (2016) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Arnold, 932 A.2d 143, 148 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation omitted); Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 526 Pa. 374 , 586 A.2d 887, 888 (1991).

2017The good-faith exception distinguishes .the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution from its -Pennsylvania counterpart since “it is settled that under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania [Constitution, a good[-]faith ex-, ception to the exclusionary rule does not exist.” Commonwealth v. Frederick, 124 A.3d 748, 756 (Pa. Super. 2015), appeal denied, 635 Pa. 769 , 138 A.3d 2 (2016) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Arnold, 932 A.2d 143, 148 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation omitted); Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 526 Pa. 374 , 586 A.2d 887, 888 (1991).

2017See Davis, 564 U.S. at 249 , 131 S.Ct. 2419 (this case "comes within the good-faith exception”); Krull, 480 U.S. at 346 , 107 S.Ct. 1160 (internal citation omitted) (“We granted certiorari to consider whether [the] good-faith exception to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applies” in this case.).

2017See Davis, 564 U.S. at 249 , 131 S.Ct. 2419 (this case "comes within the good-faith exception”); Krull, 480 U.S. at 346 , 107 S.Ct. 1160 (internal citation omitted) (“We granted certiorari to consider whether [the] good-faith exception to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applies” in this case.).

2017Although a concurring opinion authored by a member of .this Court suggests that the good-faith exception may apply to exclusionary claims raised under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution in circumstances such as the ones present in this case, see Commonwealth v. Burgos, 64 A.3d 641, 657 (Pa. Super. 2013) (Shogan, J., concurring), appeal denied, 621 Pa. 686 , 77 A.3d 635 (2013), the majority in Burgos explicitly rejected this statement and noted that “the good[-]faith exception does not exist [under] Pennsylvania [law].” Id. at 657 n.22 (citation omitted).

2017Although a concurring opinion authored by a member of .this Court suggests that the good-faith exception may apply to exclusionary claims raised under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution in circumstances such as the ones present in this case, see Commonwealth v. Burgos, 64 A.3d 641, 657 (Pa. Super. 2013) (Shogan, J., concurring), appeal denied, 621 Pa. 686 , 77 A.3d 635 (2013), the majority in Burgos explicitly rejected this statement and noted that “the good[-]faith exception does not exist [under] Pennsylvania [law].” Id. at 657 n.22 (citation omitted).

2017See Davis, 564 U.S. at 249 , 131 S.Ct. 2419 (this case "comes within the good-faith exception”); Krull, 480 U.S. at 346 , 107 S.Ct. 1160 (internal citation omitted) (“We granted certiorari to consider whether [the] good-faith exception to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applies” in this case.).

2017See Davis, 564 U.S. at 249 , 131 S.Ct. 2419 (this case "comes within the good-faith exception”); Krull, 480 U.S. at 346 , 107 S.Ct. 1160 (internal citation omitted) (“We granted certiorari to consider whether [the] good-faith exception to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applies” in this case.).

2021However, in order for a complaint to remain effective, our Supreme Court held in Lamp v. Heyman, 366 A.2d 882, 889 (Pa. 1976), that the plaintiff must “refrain. . . from a course of conduct which serves to stall in its tracks the legal machinery he has just set in motion” and “comply with local practice as to the delivery of the [complaint] to the sheriff for service.” As our High Court clarified a decade later in Farinacci v. Beaver County Industrial Development Authority, 511 A.2d 757, 759 (Pa. 1986), “Lamp requires of -8- J-A07007-21 plaintiffs a good-faith effort to effectuate notice of co

2019Development Authority, 511 A.2d 757 759 (Pa. 1986)], requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate “a good-faith effort to effectuate notice of commencement of the action.” In announcing this refinement to the Lamp rule, we acknowledged that the good faith requirement is “not apparent from a reading of the rule itself,” but rather, satisfied the stated purpose of our decision in Lamp which was to avoid the situation where a plaintiff can retain exclusive control over litigation by not making a good faith effort to notify the defendant.

2021Bigansky v. Thomas Jefferson University Hosp., 658 A.2d 423, 434 (Pa.Super. 1995) (a showing of bad faith or overt acts to delay service is not required to trigger Lamp).

2019Bigansky v. Thomas Jefferson University Hosp., 658 A.2d 423, 434 (Pa.Super. 1995), appeal denied, 668 A.2d 1119 (Pa. 1995).

2017“To effectuate the rights guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment, in the early part of the last century, the- [Supreme Court of the United States] adopted the exclusionary rule, which bars the use of evidence obtained. through an illegal search and seizure.” Commonwealth v. Arter, 151 A.3d 149, 153 (Pa. 2016) (citation omitted).

2017“To effectuate the rights guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment, in the early part of the last century, the- [Supreme Court of the United States] adopted the exclusionary rule, which bars the use of evidence obtained. through an illegal search and seizure.” Commonwealth v. Arter, 151 A.3d 149, 153 (Pa. 2016) (citation omitted).

2021However, in order for a complaint to remain effective, our Supreme Court held in Lamp v. Heyman, 366 A.2d 882, 889 (Pa. 1976), that the plaintiff must “refrain. . . from a course of conduct which serves to stall in its tracks the legal machinery he has just set in motion” and “comply with local practice as to the delivery of the [complaint] to the sheriff for service.” As our High Court clarified a decade later in Farinacci v. Beaver County Industrial Development Authority, 511 A.2d 757, 759 (Pa. 1986), “Lamp requires of -8- J-A07007-21 plaintiffs a good-faith effort to effectuate notice of co

2005Lamp, 366 A.2d at 889 (“[A] plaintiff should comply with local practice____”); Farin acci, 511 A.2d at 759 (“Plaintiffs are required to comply with local practice to ensure, insofar as they are able, prompt service of process.”) 13 The City also directs our attention to those Superior Court and Commonwealth Court cases that have required strict compliance with the rules of procedure in order to satisfy the good faith requirement of Fannacci. 14 Moreover, the City attempts to distinguish those cases that permit deviation from the Rules of Civil Procedure, noting that, unlike the case at bar, th

2017Finally, and most importantly, we insisted that whether the mistake was made in good or bad faith was entirely irrelevant to the constitutional analysis, reminding that our rejection of a good faith exception in Edmunds “turned on a determination that, under Article I, Section 8, the exclusionary rule in Pennsylvania serves other values besides deterrence; it also vindicates an individual’s right to privacy.” Id. at 188.

2017Appellant equates the case at bar with the scenarios in Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1991) and Commonwealth v. Johnson, 86 A.3d 182 (Pa. 2014), two cases where our High Court refused to apply the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule as a result of the Commonwealth’s execution of an invalid search warrant.

2021The court also found that plaintiff’s counsel did not make a good-faith effort to effectuate service, and cited Feher by Feher v. Altman, 515 A.2d 317 (Pa.Super. 1986), in support of its conclusion that, “[a]t a minimum, the good faith requirement mandates compliance with the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure and local practice.” Id. at 4.

2005Accord Nagy v. Upper Yoder Township, 652 A.2d 428, 430 (Pa.Cmwlth. 1994) (holding simple neglect or mistake could support finding of failure to comply with Lamp's good faith requirement); Williams v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 137 Pa.Cmwlth. 163 , 585 A.2d 583, 585 (1991) (“Lamp requires a plaintiff to comply with local practice regarding delivery of the writ to the sheriff for service.”); Feher by Feher v. Altman, 357 Pa.Super. 50 , 515 A.2d 317, 319 (1986) ("At a minimum, the good-faith requirement in [Lamp] mandates compliance with the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Pr

2023In McCreesh, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted: The Superior and Commonwealth Courts have struggled to apply the Lamp-Farinacci rule, with some panels requiring plaintiffs to comply strictly with the Rules of Civil Procedure related to service of process and local practice in order to satisfy the good faith requirement, see, e.g., Teamann v. Zafris, 811 A.2d 52, 63 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002),[9] and other panels providing a more flexible approach, excusing plaintiffs’ initial procedurally defective service where the defendant has actual notice of the commencement of litigation and is not otherwise

2005The Superior and Commonwealth Courts have struggled to apply the Lamp-Farinacci rule, with some panels requiring plaintiffs to comply strictly with the Rules of Civil Procedure related to service of process and local practice in order to satisfy the good faith requirement, see, e.g., Teamann v. Zafris, 811 A.2d 52, 63 (Pa.Cmwlth.2002), and other panels providing a more flexible approach, excusing plaintiffs’ initial procedurally defective service where the defendant has actual notice of the commencement of litigation and is not otherwise prejudiced, see, e.g., Leidich v. Franklin, 394 Pa.Super

2020Accord id. (citing, inter alia, Kansas v. Schmidt, 385 P.3d 936, 943 (Kan.

2017App.2d 225 , 385 P.3d 936 (2016). 7 In that case, the cdurt found that the good-faith exception applied and that the blood draw evidence was admissible.

2018See Evans, supra. See also Commonwealth v. Kurtz , 172 A.3d 1153 , 1161 (Pa. Super. 2017) ("Because the suppression court concluded that Kurtz *486 consented to the blood draw after being informed that he faced enhanced criminal penalties for refusal, the court did not err in finding that his consent was involuntary under the circumstances."). 4 In its second claim, the Commonwealth argues that a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule should apply to pre- Birchfield cases.

2018This Court affirmed the trial court's order granting suppression and refusing to apply a good-faith exception: "Given the entanglement of privacy interests inherent in a blood test administered by the state, we decline to recognize a good[-]faith exception to the exclusionary rule, as it would frustrate the purpose of Article 1, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution by undermining privacy interests." Kurtz , 172 A.3d at 1159 (citation omitted).

2017Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 899, 906 (Pa. 1991); accord Commonwealth v. Myers, ___ A.3d ____, 2017 WL 3045867 , at *10 n.16 (Pa. July 19, 2017) (discussing Birchfield and decisions from other jurisdictions, and noting that “Pennsylvania law does not recognize a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule”); -5- J-S22029-17 Commonwealth v. Hopkins, ___ A.3d ____, 2017 WL 2822511 , at *1, 9 (Pa. June 30, 2017) (concluding trial court properly suppressed evidence because there is no good-faith exception to exclusionary rule in case where “information contained in the affidavit in sup

2017Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 899, 906 (Pa. 1991); accord Commonwealth v. Myers, ___ A.3d ____, 2017 WL 3045867 , at *10 n.16 (Pa. July 19, 2017) (discussing Birchfield and decisions from other jurisdictions, and noting that “Pennsylvania law does not recognize a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule”); Commonwealth v. Hopkins, ___ A.3d ____, 2017 WL 2822511 , at *1, 9 (Pa. June 30, 2017) (concluding trial court properly suppressed evidence because there is no good-faith exception to exclusionary rule in case where “information contained in the affidavit in support of probable

2025Five years later, this Court granted review in Melilli, 555 A.2d at 1254, to address whether Beauford was properly decided and whether there is a good faith exception to the probable cause requirement for pen registers.

2025Five years later, this Court granted review in Melilli, 555 A.2d at 1254 , to address whether Beauford was properly decided and whether there is a good faith exception to the probable cause requirement for pen registers.

1989Although we do not as yet have clear directions from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on the good faith exception announced in Leon, supra, and Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 , 104 S.Ct. 3424 , 82 L.Ed.2d 737 (1984), we believe if the doctrine were approved by our Supreme Court, this case would clearly fall within it, even under the restricted view taken by the dissent of the probable cause statement contained in the search warrant and affidavit.

1989Although we do not as yet have clear directions from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on the good faith exception announced in Leon, supra, and Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 , 104 S.Ct. 3424 , 82 L.Ed.2d 737 (1984), we believe if the doctrine were approved by our Supreme Court, this case would clearly fall within it, even under the restricted view taken by the dissent of the probable cause statement contained in the search warrant and affidavit.

2017See Birchfield, 136 S.Ct. at 2186 n.9 (vacating a defendant’s conviction who had consented to a blood draw after being read partially incorrect warnings, similar to the DL-26 warnings, and remanding for a determination if the defendant’s consent was voluntary notwithstanding the warnings and, if not, whether the good-faith exception applies).

2017Given the entanglement of privacy interests inherent in a blood test administered by the state, see Birchfield, 136 S.Ct. at 2183 , we decline to recognize a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, as it would frustrate the purpose of Article 1, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution by undermining privacy interests.

2023McCreesh, 888 A.2d at 666 (footnote omitted).

2022McCreesh, 888 A.2d at 666 .

1990In Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 373 Pa.Super. 384 , 541 A.2d 368 (1988), petition for allowance of appeal granted, 520 Pa. 595 , 552 A.2d 250 (1989), we determined that the exclusionary rule in Pennsylvania is no more extensive than the federal constitutional rule, and therefore the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule is valid.

1990In Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 373 Pa.Super. 384 , 541 A.2d 368 (1988), petition for allowance of appeal granted, 520 Pa. 595 , 552 A.2d 250 (1989), we determined that the exclusionary rule in Pennsylvania is no more extensive than the federal constitutional rule, and therefore the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule is valid.

2025It is not an ‘exception’ to the exclusionary rule to admit untainted evidence; no rational application of an exclusionary rule would exclude untainted evidence.”) (quoting Commonwealth v. Henderson, 47 A.3d 797 , 806 n.2 (Pa. 2012) (Castille, C.J., concurring)).

2020See also Henderson, 47 A.3d at 806 n.2 (Castille, C.J., concurring) (“The independent source doctrine does not involve an exclusionary rule ‘exception,’ such as the good faith exception, but a question of taint from prior illegality, which implicates principles of independence and attenuation.

2022Based on this factual finding, the suppression court correctly applied the exclusionary rule under Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) and Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1991) (holding that the good-faith exception to the warrant requirement is incompatible with the heightened privacy protections found in Article I, § 8 of the Pennsylvania constitution).

2022To determine if suppression is required under the fruit-of-the- -4- J-S16027-22 poisonous-tree doctrine the question is “whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence [was discovered] by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.” Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488 .

2018"The good-faith exception distinguishes the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution from its Pennsylvania counterpart since it is settled that under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania [C]onstitution, a good[-]faith exception to the exclusionary rule does not exist." Commonwealth v. Updike , 172 A.3d 621 , 626 (Pa. Super. 2017) (quotation marks and some citations omitted).

2018“The good-faith exception distinguishes the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution from its Pennsylvania counterpart since it is settled that under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania [C]onstitution, a good[-]faith exception to the exclusionary rule does not exist.” Commonwealth v. Updike, 172 A.3d 621, 626 (Pa. Super. 2017) (quotation marks and some citations omitted).