good faith exception in Ohio

2026“When police act under a warrant that is invalid for lack of probable cause, the exclusionary rule does not apply if the police acted ‘in objectively reasonable reliance’ on the subsequently invalidated search warrant.” Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 139-140 (2009), quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984). {¶19} Under the good-faith exception, suppression is appropriate when (1) the judge was misled by statements the affiant knew were false, (2) the issuing judge wholly abandoned his role, (3) the affidavit is so lacking in indicia of probable cause, no officer could r

2025United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984); State v. Wilmoth, 22 Ohio St.3d 251 (1986). {¶ 31} In his first assignment of error, Williams argues that the trial court erred in finding that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule was applicable in this case.

2024In doing so, “ ‘trial and appellate courts should accord great deference to the magistrate’s determination of probable cause, and doubtful or marginal cases in this area should be resolved in favor of upholding the warrant.’ ” State v. Jones, 143 Ohio St.3d 266 , 2015-Ohio-483 , 37 N.E.3d 123, ¶ 14 , quoting State v. George, 45 Ohio St.3d 325 , 544 N.E.2d 640 (1989), paragraph two of the syllabus. 1 The probable cause “nexus” requirement is not to be confused with the “ ‘minimally sufficient nexus’ ” requirement that Ohio courts and the Sixth Circuit have applied in determining whether to appl

2024In doing so, “ ‘trial and appellate courts should accord great deference to the magistrate’s determination of probable cause, and doubtful or marginal cases in this area should be resolved in favor of upholding the warrant.’ ” State v. Jones, 143 Ohio St.3d 266 , 2015-Ohio-483 , 37 N.E.3d 123, ¶ 14 , quoting State v. George, 45 Ohio St.3d 325 , 544 N.E.2d 640 (1989), paragraph two of the syllabus. 1 The probable cause “nexus” requirement is not to be confused with the “ ‘minimally sufficient nexus’ ” requirement that Ohio courts and the Sixth Circuit have applied in determining whether to appl

2025See also id. at 264 (explaining that the Court was “[a]ssuming, arguendo, that this failure of the magistrate was a constitutional violation”). {¶15} Invoking the good-faith exception, the Court in Wilmoth ruled that suppression of the evidence collected by police officers who relied on the constitutionally suspect search warrant was not justified.

2025United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984); State v. Wilmoth, 22 Ohio St.3d 251 (1986). {¶ 31} In his first assignment of error, Williams argues that the trial court erred in finding that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule was applicable in this case.

2024“In reviewing whether a search warrant has been issued upon probable cause, courts must examine the totality of the circumstances.” State v. Maranger, 2018-Ohio-1425 , 110 N.E.3d 895, ¶ 27 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Jones, 143 Ohio St.3d 266 , 2015-Ohio-483 , 37 N.E.3d 123, ¶ 15 . {¶ 44} If “a reviewing court determines that a warrant should not have been issued, it must then determine whether the good-faith exception applies, and that question is a question of law, subject to de novo review by the appellate court.” Castagnola at ¶ 32, citing United States v. Leary, 846 F.2d 592, 606 (10th Ci

2021"Moreover, when a reviewing court determines that a warrant should not have been issued, it must then determine whether the good-faith exception applies, and that question is a question of law, subject to de novo review by the appellate court." Id., citing United States v. Leary, 846 F.2d 592, 606 (10th Cir.1988). {¶ 22} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violate

2020However, in Dickman, this court explained why the good-faith exception is inapplicable to these facts: [T]he state cites broad language from Davis [v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 , 131 S.Ct. 2419 (2011)] regarding the deterrent aims of the Fourth Amendment as justification for urging us to go further and hold that the "good faith exception" should act as a balancing test in all cases.

2020However, in Dickman, this court explained why the good-faith exception is inapplicable to these facts: [T]he state cites broad language from Davis [v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 , 131 S.Ct. 2419 (2011)] regarding the deterrent aims of the Fourth Amendment as justification for urging us to go further and hold that the "good faith exception" should act as a balancing test in all cases.

2021“This is known as the good-faith exception.” United States v. Rose, 714 F.3d 362, 367 (6th Cir.2013).

2021“This is known as the good-faith exception.” United States v. Rose, 714 F.3d 362, 367 (6th Cir.2013).

2026“When police act under a warrant that is invalid for lack of probable cause, the exclusionary rule does not apply if the police acted ‘in objectively reasonable reliance’ on the subsequently invalidated search warrant.” Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 139-140 (2009), quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984). {¶19} Under the good-faith exception, suppression is appropriate when (1) the judge was misled by statements the affiant knew were false, (2) the issuing judge wholly abandoned his role, (3) the affidavit is so lacking in indicia of probable cause, no officer could r

2024Id. at ¶ 29-31, citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (applying the good faith exception where a search warrant was subsequently invalidated for a lack of probable cause), Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009) (applying the good faith exception where police arrested a suspect on a warrant, which had been recalled, in reliance on a police database that had not been changed after a hard copy of the warrant was returned to the clerk’s office in a neighboring county months earlier), and Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995) (applying the good faith exception where the officer rel

2022See also Castagnola at ¶ 96 (“The purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct.”). {¶28} “The United States Supreme Court has applied the good-faith exception * * * to searches conducted in reasonable reliance on subsequently invalidated statutes * * *.” State v. Banks-Harvey, 152 Ohio St.3d 368 , 2018-Ohio-201, ¶ 33 , citing Krull, 480 U.S. 340 .

2021No. 08AP-264, 2008-Ohio-6916, at ¶ 33 ("we further conclude that, even if probable cause did not exist, the police executed the search warrant in good faith under Leon"); Washington, 380 F.3d 236 at 239 (upon finding that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied, the court assumed without deciding that probable cause did not exist). {¶ 30} "When evidence is obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the judicially developed exclusionary rule usually precludes its use in a criminal proceeding against the victim of the illegal search and seizure." State v. Johnson, 48 Ohio A

2025Id. at 990 . {¶91} None of the four factors set forth above prevent the good faith exception from applying, here.

2025See U.S. v Leon (1984), 468 U.S. 897 (holding the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule should not be applied to bar the use of evidence obtained by officers acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate but ultimately found to be invalid); See also Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984) (holding that there was an objectively reasonable basis for police officers' mistaken belief that search warrant authorized the search which officers conducted); State v. Banks, 1994 WL 220401 (2d Dist.) (finding that the officer, in good faith, relied upon

2025State v. Johnson, 48 Ohio App.3d 256, 259 (1988), citing Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 347 (1987).

2021No. 08AP-264, 2008-Ohio-6916, at ¶ 33 ("we further conclude that, even if probable cause did not exist, the police executed the search warrant in good faith under Leon"); Washington, 380 F.3d 236 at 239 (upon finding that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied, the court assumed without deciding that probable cause did not exist). {¶ 30} "When evidence is obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the judicially developed exclusionary rule usually precludes its use in a criminal proceeding against the victim of the illegal search and seizure." State v. Johnson, 48 Ohio A

2013The good-faith inquiry established in Leon is confined to the objectively ascertainable question of whether a reasonably well-trained officer would have known that the search was illegal despite the issuance of a warrant; subjective beliefs of the officer are not to be considered. * * * The Supreme Court now prefers to discuss this issue in terms of an officer’s “objectively reasonable reliance” on a warrant, commenting that the term “good faith” has perhaps been confusing. * * *State v. Jacob, 185 Ohio App.3d 408 , 2009-Ohio-7048 , 924 N.E.2d 410, ¶ 27 (2d Dist.). {¶ 27} As this Court has fur

2013The good-faith inquiry established in Leon is confined to the objectively ascertainable question of whether a reasonably well-trained officer would have known that the search was illegal despite the issuance of a warrant; subjective beliefs of the officer are not to be considered. * * * The Supreme Court now prefers to discuss this issue in terms of an officer’s “objectively reasonable reliance” on a warrant, commenting that the term “good faith” has perhaps been confusing. * * *State v. Jacob, 185 Ohio App.3d 408 , 2009-Ohio-7048 , 924 N.E.2d 410, ¶ 27 (2d Dist.). {¶ 27} As this Court has fur

2017We find no basis under Crim.R. 41 or the facts and history of this case to carve out any exception. {¶ 28} And the seminal case defining the good-faith exception to a bad search warrant, Leon makes clear that as a matter of law an officer does not "manifest objective good faith in relying on a warrant based on an affidavit 'so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.' " (Emphasis added.) Leon at 923, 104 S.Ct. 3405 , quoting Brown v. Illinois , 422 U.S. 590 , 610-11, 95 S.Ct. 2254 , 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring i

2017We find no basis under Crim.R. 41 or the facts and history of this case to carve out any exception. {¶ 28} And the seminal case defining the good-faith exception to a bad search warrant, Leon makes clear that as a matter of law an officer does not "manifest objective good faith in relying on a warrant based on an affidavit 'so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.' " (Emphasis added.) Leon at 923, 104 S.Ct. 3405 , quoting Brown v. Illinois , 422 U.S. 590 , 610-11, 95 S.Ct. 2254 , 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring i

2020Under the rule, the state is precluded from using evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment.” (Citation omitted.) State v. Brown, 142 Ohio St.3d 92 , 2015-Ohio-486 , 28 N.E.3d 81, ¶ 12 ; see also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961). {¶ 43} Under the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, the exclusionary rule should not be applied to bar the use of evidence obtained by police officers acting in objectively reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate, but ultimately found to be unsupported by probable ca

2020Under the rule, the state is precluded from using evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment.” (Citation omitted.) State v. Brown, 142 Ohio St.3d 92 , 2015-Ohio-486 , 28 N.E.3d 81, ¶ 12 ; see also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961). {¶ 43} Under the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, the exclusionary rule should not be applied to bar the use of evidence obtained by police officers acting in objectively reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate, but ultimately found to be unsupported by probable ca

2024Id. at ¶ 29-31, citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (applying the good faith exception where a search warrant was subsequently invalidated for a lack of probable cause), Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009) (applying the good faith exception where police arrested a suspect on a warrant, which had been recalled, in reliance on a police database that had not been changed after a hard copy of the warrant was returned to the clerk’s office in a neighboring county months earlier), and Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995) (applying the good faith exception where the officer rel

2023Situations in which courts have applied the good faith exception include where a database erroneously informed police they had a warrant, Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 , 115 S.Ct. 1185 , 131 L.Ed.2d 34 (1995), and where a probate judge issued a warrant without the legal authority to issue warrants on criminal manners, State v. Brown, 142 Ohio St.3d 92 , 2015-Ohio-486 , 28 N.E.3d 81 . {¶21} Here, while Mr. Grayson’s allegation that the magistrate failed to conduct the legally-required investigation into Mr. Grayson’s ability to pay the fine issued, see R.C. 2947.14(A), is very worrisome, the rec

2020It is limited to the third exception stated in Leon, which contains a probable-cause review and prohibits the application of the good-faith exception when the warrant affidavit is “ ‘so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.’ ” Id. at 923 , quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 611 , 95 S.Ct. 2254 , 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring in part).

2020It is limited to the third exception stated in Leon, which contains a probable-cause review and prohibits the application of the good-faith exception when the warrant affidavit is “ ‘so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.’ ” Id. at 923 , quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 611 , 95 S.Ct. 2254 , 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring in part).

2023The United States Supreme Court has applied the good-faith exception to searches conducted in objectively reasonable, good-faith reliance on “an invalid search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate, to searches conducted in reasonable reliance on subsequently invalidated statutes, to searches conducted in reasonable reliance on erroneous information in a warrant database, and to searches conducted in reasonable reliance on binding judicial precedent.” (Citations omitted.) Banks-Harvey at ¶ 33 . {¶ 54} However, when police exhibit “ ‘ “deliberate,” “reckless,” or “grossly negligen

2023The United States Supreme Court has applied the good-faith exception to searches conducted in objectively reasonable, good-faith reliance on “an invalid search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate, to searches conducted in reasonable reliance on subsequently invalidated statutes, to searches conducted in reasonable reliance on erroneous information in a warrant database, and to searches conducted in reasonable reliance on binding judicial precedent.” (Citations omitted.) Banks-Harvey at ¶ 33 . {¶ 54} However, when police exhibit “ ‘ “deliberate,” “reckless,” or “grossly negligen

2016“Where * * * it has been determined that the magistrate did not have a substantial basis for finding probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant, the -17- applicability of the good faith exception turns on whether the police officer's reliance on the magistrate's probable cause determination and on the technical sufficiency of the warrant was objectively reasonable.” State v. Klosterman, 114 Ohio App.3d 327, 332 , 683 N.E.2d 100 (2d Dist.1996), citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 , 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984).

2016“Where * * * it has been determined that the magistrate did not have a substantial basis for finding probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant, the -17- applicability of the good faith exception turns on whether the police officer's reliance on the magistrate's probable cause determination and on the technical sufficiency of the warrant was objectively reasonable.” State v. Klosterman, 114 Ohio App.3d 327, 332 , 683 N.E.2d 100 (2d Dist.1996), citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 , 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984).

2026In making such an assessment, a 2 “The probable cause ‘nexus’ requirement is not to be confused with the ‘minimally sufficient nexus’ requirement that Ohio courts . . . have applied in determining whether to apply the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.” State v. Johnson, 2024-Ohio-1147, ¶ 15, fn. 1 (1st Dist.), quoting State v. Schubert, 2022-Ohio-4604, ¶ 9-13 .

2026“The ‘minimally sufficient nexus’ requirement for the good faith exception is a distinct and lower standard than the probable cause ‘nexus’ requirement, and a ‘minimally sufficient nexus’ is insufficient for concluding a magistrate had a ‘substantial basis’ for probable cause.” Id. -25- Case No. 15-25-06 judicial officer may give considerable weight to the conclusions of experienced law enforcement officers regarding where evidence of a crime is likely to be found and is “entitled to draw reasonable inferences about where evidence is likely to be kept, based on the nature of the evidence and t

2017Crim.R. 41 has been amended several times since the establishment of the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule, but the recorded testimony requirement in the rule has never been extended beyond the determination of probable cause.6 Nor has the Supreme Court of Ohio issued a decision prohibiting a trial court from considering unrecorded oral testimony in determining the applicability of the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. {¶ 48} The good-faith exception applies where the search warrant affidavit " 'contain[s] a minimally sufficient nexus between the illegal activity and t

2017Crim.R. 41 has been amended several times since the establishment of the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule, but the recorded testimony requirement in the rule has never been extended beyond the determination of probable cause. 6 Nor has the Supreme Court of Ohio issued a decision prohibiting a trial court from considering unrecorded oral testimony in determining the applicability of the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. {¶ 48} The good-faith exception applies where the search warrant affidavit " 'contain[s] a minimally sufficient nexus between the illegal activity and

2025The exclusionary rule “is designed to deter police misconduct that flagrantly, deliberately, or recklessly violates the Fourth Amendment,” State v. Hoffman, 2014-Ohio-4795, ¶ 46 , while the good-faith exception to that rule recognizes that “when police act in an objectively reasonable manner in executing a search believed in good faith to be legal, there is no bad conduct to deter.” State v. Dibble, 2020-Ohio-546, ¶ 16 . {¶14} The Supreme Court of Ohio has applied the good-faith exception in a case not unlike this one.

2023Concerning appellant's argument that the probate court order was obtained illegally, we recognize "the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule when officers act in good faith upon a search warrant ultimately found to be invalid." State v. Hoffman, 141 Ohio St.3d 428 , 2014-Ohio-4795, ¶ 42 , citing State v. Wilmoth, 22 Ohio St.3d 251 (1986), at paragraph one of syllabus, and State v. George, 45 Ohio St.3d 325 (1989), paragraph three of the syllabus.

2025Case No. 25 MA 0039 – 40 – {¶89} “Under the good-faith exception, evidence obtained during a search conducted pursuant to a warrant that is unsupported by probable cause will not be excluded if the officers who obtained the evidence acted reasonably in relying on the warrant.” State v. Dibble, 2020-Ohio-546, ¶ 9 , citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 924-925 (1984). [S]uppression would still be appropriate in circumstances when (1) the supporting affidavit contained information the affiant knew to be false or would have known to be false but for reckless disregard of the truth, (2) the

2025The exclusionary rule “is designed to deter police misconduct that flagrantly, deliberately, or recklessly violates the Fourth Amendment,” State v. Hoffman, 2014-Ohio-4795, ¶ 46 , while the good-faith exception to that rule recognizes that “when police act in an objectively reasonable manner in executing a search believed in good faith to be legal, there is no bad conduct to deter.” State v. Dibble, 2020-Ohio-546, ¶ 16 . {¶14} The Supreme Court of Ohio has applied the good-faith exception in a case not unlike this one.

2008Stated differently, “[t]he test for the good-faith exception is ‘ “whether a reasonably well trained officer would have known that the search was illegal despite the magistrate’s authorization.” ’ State v. Jones (1991), 72 Ohio App.3d 522, 528 , 595 N.E.2d 485 , quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. at *198 922, 923, 104 S.Ct. 3405 , 82 L.Ed.2d 677 .” State v. Williams, 173 Ohio App.3d 119 , 2007-Ohio-4472 , 877 N.E.2d 717 , ¶ 27. {¶ 33} We conclude that there is competent, credible evidence in the record supporting the trial court’s finding that the sheriffs department acted in good faith i

2008Stated differently, “[t]he test for the good-faith exception is ‘ “whether a reasonably well trained officer would have known that the search was illegal despite the magistrate’s authorization.” ’ State v. Jones (1991), 72 Ohio App.3d 522, 528 , 595 N.E.2d 485 , quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. at *198 922, 923, 104 S.Ct. 3405 , 82 L.Ed.2d 677 .” State v. Williams, 173 Ohio App.3d 119 , 2007-Ohio-4472 , 877 N.E.2d 717 , ¶ 27. {¶ 33} We conclude that there is competent, credible evidence in the record supporting the trial court’s finding that the sheriffs department acted in good faith i

2007“The Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule should not be applied so as to bar the use in the prosecution’s case-in-chief of evidence obtained by officers acting in objectively reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate but ultimately found to be unsupported by probable cause.” State v. Gales (2001), 143 Ohio App.3d 55, 62 , 757 N.E.2d 390 , quoting State v. George, 45 Ohio St.3d 325 , 544 N.E.2d 640 , at paragraph three of the syllabus. {¶ 26} The good-faith exception, however, is not a license to give an otherwise insufficient warrant validity.

2007“The Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule should not be applied so as to bar the use in the prosecution’s case-in-chief of evidence obtained by officers acting in objectively reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate but ultimately found to be unsupported by probable cause.” State v. Gales (2001), 143 Ohio App.3d 55, 62 , 757 N.E.2d 390 , quoting State v. George, 45 Ohio St.3d 325 , 544 N.E.2d 640 , at paragraph three of the syllabus. {¶ 26} The good-faith exception, however, is not a license to give an otherwise insufficient warrant validity.